


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


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GOLDWIN SMITH.







SEBASTOPOL FROM THE SEA.

EXPLANATION.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| A. The Malakoff. | G.G. The English Camp. |
| B. The Redan. | H. The Right of the French Camp. |
| C. The Flagstaff Bastion. | R. The spot from which Lord Raglan reconnoitred Sebastopol on the 25th Sept. |
| D. The Central Bastion. | |
| E. The (land) Quarantine Bastion. | |
-
- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Fort Constantine and adjoining Batteries. | 13. Prisons. |
| 2. Telegraph Battery. | 14. Man-of-war Harbor. |
| 3. Fort Michael. | 15. Roadstead. |
| 4. The Severnaya or Star Fort. | 16 & 17. Fort Saint Nicholas. |
| 5. Batteries called Number Four. | 18. Artillery Fort. |
| 6. West Lighthouse. | 19. Fort Alexander. |
| 7. East Lighthouse. | 20. Quarantine Sea-Fort. |
| 8. Russian Ships. | 21. Cemetery. |
| 9. Fort Saint Paul. | 22. Port and Buildings of the Quarantine. |
| 10. The Karabel Faubourg. | 23. Rafts showing the Reefs. |
| 11. Basins and Docks. | 24. River Tchernaya. |
| 12. Hospital. | 25. River Tchernaya. |
| | 26. Careenage Port. |

The line of sunken ships (which does not appear in the drawing) stretched across the entrance of the Roadstead from the Reef beneath Fort Constantine to the one beneath Fort Alexander. The chains stretched from the Reef beneath Fort Michael to the one beneath Fort Nicholas.

NOTE.—It must not be understood that this drawing should be regarded as a strictly accurate representation; but it may aid the endeavors of those who desire to have a general conception of the appearance which Sebastopol might present under a 'Bird's-eye View' from the West. It is based upon a print published in Paris which purported to reproduce a drawing prepared for the Emperor Nicholas; but the representation of the Malakoff shows marks of a non-Russian origin, because the work is made to look like what the Allies supposed it to be, i.e., a round tower, whereas it was in part of a horseshoe form.

THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:
ITS ORIGIN,
AND
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF
LORD RAGLAN.

BY
ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE.

VOLUME II.

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LORD KAVANAH

ALEXANDER WILLIAM KIRKLAND

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INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

CHAPTER I.

Disposition of the Allied armies after the Battle of the Alma. WHEN the fighting on the banks of the Alma had ceased along the whole line, more than one of the English generals prayed hard that their troops might be suffered to come down and bivouac near the bank of the stream, for the labor already undergone by the men had been so great that it was painful to have them distressed by the toil of going a long way for water, and fetching it up to the heights. But not choosing to loose his hold of ground carried at no small cost of life, Lord Raglan was steadfast in his resistance to all these entreaties, and ordered that his troops should bivouac upon the heights they had won.

With the sanction of his chief, General Airey placed our infantry for the night in a line of columns on the heights, with the artillery in rear of each column ; and the disposition of these two arms had been so contrived that, although the artillery was covered, yet at any moment, and without there being any need of moving the infantry, the guns could be rapidly brought to the front, and placed in battery between the columns. In this order, and having a portion of the cavalry covering the rear, with the rest of our horsemen on its left flank, the English army bivouacked for the night.

When General Martimprey learned that this plan had been adopted by the English, he was so well pleased with it that he resolved to advise a like disposition of the French army.

During the battle, the wagons which followed the English army had, of course, been kept far enough in the rear to be, for the most part, out of fire ; but when the fighting had ceased, they were brought down toward the bridge, and soon became so crowded as to breed much confusion. For hours, and even, I think, all night, men were eagerly seeking after others whom none could help them to find.

On the night which followed the battle, men were sickening and dying of cholera in numbers as great as before.

Continued prevalence of the cholera during the night.

That which lay in sight of the troops when the fight on the Alma had ceased was new to the bulk of the soldiery, and, in one feature, new to all. In general, the warring armies of Europe have been followed by a hateful swarm, who make it their livelihood to hover upon the march of the regiments, alighting at last upon a field of battle, that they may rifle the dead and the wounded.

State of the field after the battle.

And there comes, too, that other and yet fouler swarm which strips the dead of their clothing and accoutrements with so strange a swiftness, that a field which was speckled and glittering, at the close of the battle, with the uniforms of prostrate soldiers, is changed of a sudden to a ghastly shamble, with little except maimed or dead horses, and the buff, naked corpses of men, to show where the battle has raged.

But the breadth of the lands and the seas which divided this simple Crim Tartary from the great seats of European vice, had hitherto defeated the baneful energy of those who come out to prey upon armies by selling strong drinks, and robbing the dead and the wounded. Armed and clothed as he stood when, receiving his death-wound he heard the last of the din of battle, so now the soldier lay. Many had been struck in such a manner that their limbs were suddenly stiffened, and this so fixedly, that, although their bodies fell to the ground, their hands and arms remained held in the very posture they chanced to be in at the moment of death.¹ This was observed, for the most part, in instances of soldiers who had been on the point of firing at the moment when they were struck dead; for, where this had happened, the man's hands being thrown forward and fixed in the attitude required for leveling a firelock, they of course stretched upward toward the heavens when the body fell back upon the ground. These upstretched arms of dead men were ghastly in the eyes of some: others thought they could envy the soldier released at last from his toil, and encountering no moment of interval between hard fighting and death.

In general, the undisturbed clothing of the stricken soldiers hid their wounds from a common observer; and it was only here and there—as where a man's head had been partly shot away, or where the skull had

The bearing of the wounded men.

¹ Medical men knew, as might be expected, that this catalepsy-like stiffness might now and then result from a gunshot wound; but I believe they were somewhat surprised at the large proportion of instances in which it occurred.

been entered by a cannon-ball—that the ugliness of the havoc was obtruded upon the sight. For the most part the wounded men lay silent. Now and then a man would gently ask for water, or would seek to know when it was likely that he would be moved and cared for; but, in general, the wounded were so little inclined to be craving after help or sympathy, that for dignity and composure they were almost the equals of the dead.

Still, although there was nothing in the field of the battle which could mar the dignity of war, the sight was of a kind to press hurtfully upon the imagination of young soldiers. For such troops it was an ill thing to be kept a long time together in the contemplation of a field strewn with dead and wounded; and this the more because the sight went to make a man question the cause of the slaughter in his own corps. None can wonder if the survivors of the Light Division men who had stormed the redoubt were inclined to let their thoughts dwell upon the nature of the trial to which they had been exposed, and even, in some regiments, to comment, and say, ‘We were sacrificed.’ In such questionings there is danger.

That priceless confidence which sustains the accomplished soldier, and gives him the mastery in battle, is, after all, a sentiment of a tender and delicate kind, which may be easily weakened or destroyed, if he comes to believe that his regiment has been mishandled in a bloody encounter; and it could not but happen that regiments which had suffered great losses would be encouraged in the indulgence of a sinister criticism by keeping them long on the ground where their comrades lay maimed and slaughtered.²

On the day after the battle, the hundreds of Russians who lay wounded on the English part of the field had been brought to a sheltered spot of ground near the river.³ There, they were laid down in even, parallel

¹ I myself, in passing, heard this the day after the battle. The sentence was uttered in a group of private soldiers belonging to one of the regiments of the Light Division.

² Many will recognize the high authority which is my warrant for venturing this remark, and for insisting on the danger to which the *morale* of the Light Division was exposed by its experience on the day of the Alma. Over, and over, and over again, Lord Clyde used to say that no troops in the world could be subjected to such a trial without undergoing a ruinous loss of soldierly confidence.

³ The number, I believe, was about 500; but it was estimated, and on some authority, at 750.

ranks, and in such manner that the surface they covered with their prostrate bodies was a large symmetrical oblong. The ground where they lay was at some short distance from the Head-quarters camp, and but little exposed to view. From the neglect to which, for a time, they were subjected, that not only the wounded Russians, but also the English soldiers mounting guard at the spot, were forgotten, and left without food for many hours. But happily there was a man at Head-quarters whose sense of honor and duty was supported by a strong will, by resistless energy, and a soundness of judgment and command of temper rarely united with great activity. Romaine came to know that these poor wounded Russians were lying untended, and he judged that, unless they were cared for, there would be a lasting blot upon the honor of the English name. An officer of the common stamp who had got to be possessed with such a feeling would have cheaply discharged his conscience by making a communication to Lord Raglan, or some other 'proper authority.' It was not so that the task was passed on, and got rid of. Knowing the weight of the cares pressing upon the chief, Romaine did not appeal to Lord Raglan, but began to act himself, giving no repose to any whose aid he needed, but disturbing nobody else. Under the power of his generous indignation and strong will all lethargy slowly gave way; and, having obtained four hundred pounds of biscuit, and the number of hands that were needed to aid him in the undertaking, he toiled at his good work until there was no one in all those prostrate ranks of wounded men who had not been tended with the offer of food and water. It was from seven in the evening until half-past eleven at night that he thus labored. At the time, his exceeding zeal made him seem to be acting for the honor of some great cause much more than from tender pity; but what he felt he has owned and recorded: 'It was the most painful act,' he says, 'I ever had to perform. Some of the faces were terrible and ghastly from wounds, and hardly had mouths to eat or drink with. They were faces to haunt one in sleep.' One young man in the centre of a rank of prostrate soldiers sat up, and succeeded in causing himself to be distinguished as an officer; and although there were few or none amongst the other sufferers who could speak any tongue but their own, there was a plaintive melody in the sound of the words they uttered which served to convey to a stranger an idea of their gentleness and gratitude. There were some who, in cheerful tones,

declined to prolong life by eating, and asked instead for a light. Sankey, of the Quartermaster-General's department, entered into Romaine's feeling with great warmth, and not only shared with him in the bodily labor of tending the sufferers, but helped to overcome the difficulty that there is in wringing new kinds of exertion from people who are overmuch regulated. Of course, the English sentries, who had been left for a time without food, were at once supplied with biscuit; but it did not at all delight them to have the mere staff of life without any of what they regarded as the more cheering part of their rations.

There was no enemy's force at hand to whom the care of these wounded Russians could be given up; and, within the period of the halt on the Alma it was not practicable for the English to do more than get their own wounded men on board ship. So when, on the morning of the 23rd, the Allies resumed their advance, the wounded Russians were left where they lay on the banks of the Alma, in charge of a medical officer. As soon as might be, they were to be got on board ship and sent to some Russian port under a flag of truce.

It fell to the lot of Dr. Thompson, assistant-surgeon of the 44th Regiment, to be left with the charge of these sufferers in a country abandoned to the enemy.¹ He kept with him his servant, a soldier named John M'Grath, but no other was left to take part with him in the performance of the forlorn duty that he had to fulfill.² In the event of a Russian force coming upon this surgeon and his attendant whilst left alone with their charge, the best fate they could hope for was that of being prisoners of war; but unless their idea of the modern 'Cossacks' was other than that which commonly

¹ I have always understood that Dr. Thompson was *ordered* upon this painful duty, but the language of Captain Lushington rather leads to the inference that Dr. Thompson had *volunteered* the service. See the next note.

² Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, 27th September, 1854. Captain Lushington speaks of Dr. Thompson, with his servant M'Grath, as having 'remained alone in an enemy's country, without tent or accommodation of any sort, for the sole purpose of alleviating the sufferings of 500 'of his fellow-creatures.' And Dundas, in reporting the matter to Lord Raglan, speaks of Dr. Thompson and his servant as having 'remained by themselves in an open country, without food or shelter.'—*Dundas to Lord Raglan, Official Dispatch, 30th September, 1854.* What they needed, however, was the help of their fellow-men, not shelter; and with regard to Dundas's idea of their having been without food, Lord Raglan, I see, with his own hand, has written on the margin opposite to that passage the following words: '*They had food.* R.'

obtained in the Allied armies, they must have believed themselves to be in more or less danger of barbarous treatment.¹

The arrangement imposing such a service must have been made in the full assurance that there would be no cruel delay in the arrival of succor from the fleet; but (from causes to me unknown) it did actually happen that, between the time when the army marched off, and the time when succor came, there was an interval of three days and three nights.² Of the five hundred ghastly and prostrate forms which were left to this one surgeon and his one attendant for their only companions, all were so stricken as to be unable to help to lift a body; very many were shattered in limb; very many, still tortured by strong remains of life, were lying on their faces, with their vitals ploughed open by round-shot; but some were dying more quickly, and others already lay dead.³ From time to time during those three days, and to the utmost of their bodily strength, Dr. Thompson and his servant labored to part the dead from the living, to heave the corpses away, and get them more or less under ground; but when, at last, succor came, our seamen had to lift out as many as thirty-nine bodies—some, in part, decomposed—before they could get at the living.⁴

When at length, on the morning of the 26th, Captain Lushington of the 'Albion' came up from the shore, and discovered his two fellow-countrymen at their dismal post of duty, he was filled with admiration of their fortitude, and with sympathy for what they had endured.⁵

All that day, and for five or six hours more on the following morning, the seamen of the 'Albion' and the 'Vesuvius,' being well provided with stretchers, labored hard, and with cheerful alacrity, at the business of carrying the sufferers on board ship; and there only remained about fifty of the wounded still lying on the ground, when the appearance of a Rus-

Succor brought by Captain Lushington after an interval of three days.

The wounded Russians, except about fifty of them, got on board ship and sent to Odessa.

¹ It was observed, I think, in a former volume, that the modern Cossacks were obedient regiments of regular cavalry, with nothing of the wild, lawless character which belong to the Cossacks of 1812; but the fact that this change had occurred was not generally known in the Allied armies.

² From the morning of the 23rd to the morning of the 26th. Lushington reached the anchorage late at night on the 25th, and the next morning early went up to the ground where the wounded Russians were lying.—*Lushington to Dundas*, 27th September, 1854.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. Captain Lushington was dispatched on this duty in his ship, the 'Albion,' towed by the 'Vesuvius,' and having the 'Avon' transport in company.

sian infantry force, which was judged to be three thousand strong, obliged Captain Lushington to give up the rest of his task.¹

The wounded men carried on board ship were sent to Odessa under a flag of truce;² and the number of those who lived to be thus delivered up to their fellow-countrymen was 342;³ but so utter a weakness had prostrated this suffering mass of human beings, that the Governor of Odessa declared it impossible, for the time, to make out by question and answer how many of them were non-commissioned officers and how many private soldiers.⁴

In his letter to the Governor of Odessa, Dundas had spoken of the surrender of these wounded men as an act dictated by feelings of humanity.⁵ The answer of the Governor was so stern and cold as to make Dundas remark that it 'might have been more gracious';⁶ but remembering what was the aspect of those wounded men on the morrow of the battle, and inferring the state they were in at the time of their reaching the port, I can excuse the Governor of Odessa if he angered a little at the sight of the word 'humanity,' and almost thought himself mocked when he was asked to agree that these poor remains of what once had been soldiers, might be considered as 'non-combatants' until they should be exchanged. If Dundas had boarded the 'Avon,' and looked on those ruins of human forms with which she was laden, his kindly heart would rather have inclined him to utter his sorrow for the havoc inflicted by war, than to speak as though he were indulging in any act of humanity.⁷ With only, perhaps, too

¹ Ibid. The arrangements made by Captain Lushington for covering the working-parties who carried the wounded, and for effecting the orderly retreat of his marines and small-arms men, seem to have been very able and neatly timed.

² Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 30th September, 1854.

³ Acknowledgment dated $\frac{17}{29}$ September, 1854, signed by General Anenkov, the Governor of Odessa.

⁴ The Governor says, he does not distinguish the non-commissioned officers from the privates, 'par l'impossibilité d'en questionner la plupart dans l'état d'affaiblissement où ils se trouvent.'

⁵ Dundas to the Governor of Odessa: 'I trust your Excellency will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and consider them as non-combatants until regularly exchanged.'

⁶ Dundas to Lord Raglan, 30th September, 1854. The answer of the Governor to Dundas, $\frac{17}{29}$ September, refers coldly to the acknowledgment—the one above quoted—which he, the Governor, had given; and adds, that he will communicate to the Emperor the arrival of the wounded, and the condition which Dundas annexed to the surrender of them.

⁷ To make the act an act of 'humanity,' I suppose something like sacri-

The state in which they arrived.

The tone taken by the Russian Governor in acknowledging the arrival of the wounded.

much truth he might have palliated any seeming neglect of those poor Russian prisoners by alleging the hardships and privations which he could not find means to avert from our own sick and wounded men.

CHAPTER II.

WE saw that, at the close of the fight on the Alma, an unwillingness to lengthen the distance between the French and their knapsacks, then lying in the valley below, was the reason avowed by St. Arnaud for withstanding Lord Raglan's desire to advance at once in pursuit; but unless there were some other and heavier shackle which still held back the Allies, there could hardly be room for question that, on the morrow of the battle at latest, it would be well for them to push forward and follow up their victory. Yet they lingered on the ground they had won for the whole of two clear days. The reason why they thus remained halted must not be kept in concealment.¹

It had hitherto been taken for granted that the Allies were to march upon the Severnaya, or north side of Sebastopol; and—not at first harboring the thought that Marshal St. Arnaud would swerve from the purpose with which the Allies had come out—Lord Raglan deemed it to be of great moment to press on, and at once attack the northern forts, without giving the enemy time to recover from the blow which had felled him.

As expressed—not in language originating with Lord Raglan himself, but by his declared concurrence in the statement of opinion submitted to him by Sir Edmund Lyons,—Lord Raglan conceived 'that the character of the whole expedition was that of a surprise, that it was undertaken without accurate

fice was needed, but there was none. The poor wounded men were simply an incumbrance, which it was convenient to shift off upon the Russians.

¹ Both in his official and private correspondence with the Home Government, Lord Raglan is silent as to the causes of the halt on the Alma, and neither records his endeavors to bring Marshal St. Arnaud to march upon the position of the Star Fort, nor the Marshal's refusal to do so. As to the cause of this reserve I shall hazard my surmise in a future chapter (see chap. xi). It is fortunate that the silence of the English Commander has been in some measure compensated by other testimony.

'knowledge of the strength of the enemy or their resources, and that in great measure they [the Allies] still remained ignorant on these points; that all they knew positively was, that the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to them, and that the best chance of continued success was to follow it up rapidly, and try and take the Northern Forts by a *coup-de-main*."

In order to give effect to his desire for an advance on the morrow, and to concert the movement with the naval chiefs, the English Commander had, on the day which followed the battle, sent a note to Sir Edmund Lyons, requesting him to come up to the English Head-quarters at eight o'clock the next morning;² but the peremptory orders of Admiral Dundas prevented Sir Edmund's compliance with the request until after midday;³ and before Lord Raglan and Lyons were destined to have their interview, counsels opposite to those they judged right had not only prevented that immediate resumption of the forward march which they both deemed to be of great moment, but had brought into question and seeming jeopardy the whole plan and fate of the expedition.

Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan had met; and the purport of what passed between them, as conveyed by Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, was this:—Convinced of the policy of an immediate advance, and an attack of the Northern Forts, Lord Raglan pressed his opinion upon the French Marshal, and proposed to him at once to advance on the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the forts."

In answer to this proposal for an immediate ad-

¹ MS. Memorandum of a conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons on the 10th of February, 1856, by Mr. George Loch. The memorandum was placed in Sir Edmund's hands on the same day, and after he had read it over, he returned it with a statement that it was correct, and, a note stating that approval having been forthwith made, the paper became, upon the death of Sir Edmund Lyons, a valuable and authentic record. Its value was increased by the corroboration which was given to it in writing by the late Duke of Newcastle.—See Appendix, where will be found all that portion of the memorandum which relates to affairs touched in this volume.

² Lyons's recollection seems to have placed these circumstances at a time one day earlier than that which I assign to them; but his notes to Lord Raglan, now lying before me, show that he must have been mistaken.

³ These were orders founded on the report—a false report—that seven Russian men-of-war had slipped out of Sebastopol and sailed (apparently) for Odessa. Lyons with the steam squadron was ordered to pursue.

⁴ The MS. memorandum mentioned in note 1, above.

view to attack the North Forts.

Marshal St. Arnaud refuses.

Lord Raglan's vexation.

vance and attack upon the Northern Forts, Marshal St. Arnaud said that 'his troops were tired, and that it could not be done.'¹

Lord Raglan, as may be supposed, 'was disappointed by this answer,' and 'could not,' he said, 'understand it; for he knew that the troops could not be tired, and that there must be some other reason for the Marshal's answer.'²

After this Lord Raglan had another interview with Marshal St. Arnaud, at which he exerted his power of persuasion in 'again urging the French General to advance across the Belbec;' but in reply the Marshal now said: 'He had ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong earth-works on the banks of the river; and though he did not doubt that the Allies could force them, as they had the works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed.'³

In his power of warding off or concealing every access of despondency which might be hurtful to the public service, Lord Raglan stood above other men; but even he could not hide—not, at least, from his friend Sir Edmund Lyons—the dejection of spirits which was brought upon him by Marshal St. Arnaud's refusal to go on with the campaign as hitherto planned.⁴ And, indeed, the conjuncture was a painful one. I have never learned that the Marshal proposed any alternative plan; and for a while the pause of the Allies was not a mere halt. The enterprise stopped.

It might seem that now once more—and this, too, on the morrow of a victory—the expedition was in danger of coming to an end; but if Lord Raglan had undertaken a venturesome campaign in loyal obedience to the desire of the Queen's Government rather than to his own judgment, for that very reason perhaps he was the more steadfast in his resolve to overcome or elude all obstacles: and the moment he found himself encountered by this sudden recusancy at the French Head-quarters, he sought and perceived a way by which his continued persistence in

¹ Ibid.

² The MS. memorandum mentioned in note, *ante*, p. 33. My surmise as to what the other reason was will be given in chap. iv. ³ Ibid.

⁴ Sir Edmund says he 'found him (Lord Raglan) in low spirits. On asking him the cause, he (Lord Raglan) said' [then follows the account of Lord Raglan's second interview with St. Arnaud as above given].

THE COUNTRY FROM THE ALMA TO BALACLAVA.

NOTE.

The line of the Flank March executed by the Allies, thus, ----
Lord Raglan's Reconnaissance, thus,
Prince Mentchikoff's Flank March, thus, - - - -



As an alternative to which the Allies were reduced by St. Arnaud's refusal to attack the North Forts, Lord Raglan proposes to march to the south coast.

the enterprise against Sebastopol could be made to consist with St. Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts. Lord Raglan, indeed, had not yet abandoned the hope that this refusal might be withdrawn; but, for the time, he had to deal with it as a decision which was only too likely to be adhered to: and accordingly, but only on the supposition that St. Arnaud might really persist in

refusing to attack the North Forts, Lord Raglan proposed for consideration a plan of campaign which would relieve the Allies from the duty of having to march against the northern defenses, by transferring the theatre of war from the western to the southern coast. Of the counsels which ended in a resolve to adopt this new plan of campaign I shall have to speak by and by, and it is only in the process of accounting for the halt on the Alma that I stay to glance at them here.

Upon the question thus raised there was no need for the Allies to come to their final and absolute decision until they should be in the neighborhood of the Belbec; but whilst they were still on the Alma they apparently determined that nothing but a return to the old plan of attacking the North Forts should prevent them from adopting Lord Raglan's conditional proposal: and this determination carried them so far toward an actual adoption of the measure, that already their merely inchoate approval of it began to govern their movements.

The way in which these changes of plan detained the Allies on the Alma will now be perceived. So far as concerns the earlier period of the halt, it resulted of necessity from Marshal St. Arnaud's refusal to go on and attack the North Forts; for between the time of the refusal and the conditional acceptance of Lord Raglan's alternative proposal, the Allies were without any purpose sufficing to guide their steps; and when at length, by persisting in his refusal, the Marshal constrained the Allies to entertain a measure involving the abandonment of the western coast, he drove them to an alternative which still farther lengthened the halt.

It is easy to see how the idea of abandoning the western coast carried with it a prolongation of the halt on the Alma. The number of the wounded was so great, that the labor of getting them on board could not but fill a good deal of time, and it was of necessity that this operation should be covered by the presence

The Allies, whilst still on the Alma, were resolved to prepare for the eventuality of their ultimately adopting the measure.

Cause of the halt on the Alma.

The way in which the project of the flank march tended to prolong the halt.

of a sufficient force. Now, if the Allies had been firmly persisting in their determination to march against the Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol, the western coast would have necessarily continued to be the theatre of operations, and in that case it would have been easy for them to go on with their advance the very day after the battle, leaving only a detachment on the Alma to cover the embarkation of the wounded. If, on the other hand, the Allies should determine to abandon the western coast, they could not well venture to leave there an isolated detachment; and the business of embarking the wounded must either go on without the presence of any land forces to cover the operation, or else the whole Allied army would have to be detained for the purpose; and since the abandonment of the wounded by the land forces was an alternative too painful in its possible consequences to be held worthy of adoption,¹ it followed that to harbor the idea of giving up the intended attack on the North Side, and quitting the western coast of the peninsula, was to bring upon the whole Allied army the necessity of a halt on the Alma, and a halt, too, for such a time as would suffice for getting the wounded on board ship.

So, although it is true that the cause of the delay on the Alma was the unwillingness of the French Marshal to go on with the advance against the north side of Sebastopol, still, the halt having once been resolved upon, its duration was made to depend on the time it would take to have the sick and the wounded put on board ship. The French would have been able to get their sick and wounded on board in one full day. On the other hand, the number of the wounded English being, as Lord Raglan computed, just three times greater than that of the French, and the ground whence they had to be moved being very much farther from the shore, it soon became certain that at least two days of ceaseless labor would have to be gone through before the English would be able to bury their dead, and to get all their sick and wounded on board.

Even within the two full days, the work could not have been done without bringing to bear upon it surpassing exertions. Nothing short of the energy

Although the Marshal's unwillingness to attack the Severnaya was the cause of the halt, its duration depended on the time needed for embarking the wounded.

Time required by the French.

Time required by the English.

The zeal and devotion dis-

¹ With our present knowledge we may entertain no doubt that the seamen and marines of the Allied navies might have been well able to secure the safe embarkation of the wounded without requiring the support of the land forces; but, at the time, there was not information enough in the Allied camp to warrant such an assumption.

played by the officers and men of the navy in rendering this service.

The part taken by our seamen in removing the sick and wounded, and getting them on board ship.

and the tenderness of the sailors would have sufficed. Admiral Dundas devoted all his medical officers to the care of the sick and wounded who lay on the field; and in the duty of removing these sufferers, and bringing them on board ship, as well as in that of landing stores, he employed all his boats, and no less than a thousand of his seamen.¹ Every soldier prostrate with wounds or sickness was a difficult load, which had to be carried by the strength of men for a distance of three or four miles; but the sailors toiled, and toiled with a generous, exuberant zeal which left them no rest till the work was achieved. Deep, indeed, as Lord Raglan declared, was his 'feeling of 'gratitude' to the sailors for these kindly services; and he owned that he had been singularly touched by observing the devotion with which naval officers took part in the bodily labor of lifting and carrying the wounded soldiers.²

Of the whole number of wounded English, amounting, as we saw, in number to more than sixteen hundred, a large proportion were so stricken as to be helpless; but besides, there were the sufferers who lay upon the ground cast down and disabled by mortal sickness, and of these there were very many; for—baffling the hopes which medical science had tried, one may say, to harbor—the cholera had proved to be a pestilence which was not to be warded off by the stir and glory of battle.³

The numbers of men stricken with cholera.

Thus, then, the battle having ended before five o'clock on the afternoon of the 20th of September, the Allied armies remained halted on the Alma until the morning of the 23rd; and when it is asked why, instead of thus tarrying, they did not resume their advance on the morrow of the battle, the answer, we see, must be like to that which showed why they did not press the enemy's retreat on the afternoon of the fight. The hinderer was Marshal St. Arnaud. But the halt having once been resolved upon, it lasted two whole days instead of one, because, though the

The halt on the Alma lasted till the morning of the 23rd.

Recapitulation of the circumstances which occasioned it.

¹ Admiral Dundas to Admiralty, 27th October, 1854.

² Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.

³ Captain Dacres, the commander of the 'Sanspareil,' and his captain-of the fore-castle, were but two out of the number of those seamen who generously busied themselves in the kindly duties which they felt to be imposed upon them by the painful scenes of the battle-field; but they alone took out from the tents (and buried as well as they could) the corpses of twenty-eight men who had died of cholera during the night.—*Letter from Admiral Dacres, 19th October, 1863.*

French could embark all their wounded men in one day, the number of those who lay stricken on the English part of the

Although Marshal St. Arnaud's refusal to attack the North Forts had occasioned the halt, he could still say with truth on the 22nd that he was kept waiting by the English.

field was too great to allow of their being dealt with in the lesser time.¹ So, notwithstanding that the measure of halting on the Alma was chargeable upon Marshal St. Arnaud, still, on the 22nd of September (having by that time got his own wounded on board), he could say, and could say with literal truth, that the French army was able to advance when the English army was not. Accordingly, on the 22nd, whilst the English were

still toiling hard at the painful task of getting their wounded on board, the Marshal suffered himself to write: 'The

Accordingly, he suffered himself so to write.

'English are not yet ready, and I am kept back, just as at Balchick, just as at Old Fort. It is true they have more wounded than I have, and

'that they are farther from the sea.'² What slowness in our movements! War can hardly be carried on in this way. 'The weather is admirable, and I am not profiting by it. I 'rage.'³

It being now seen that St. Arnaud's refusal to advance on

The Fort which stood between the Allies and the North Side,

the position of the Northern Fort was the cause of the halt on the Alma, there remains the task of determining how far this refusal was warranted.

Of the strength of the works which were thus arresting the Allies on the morrow of their victory we shall have to speak more fully by and by. For the present, it is enough to say that the main obstacle was the Star Fort, an octagon earth-work, surrounded by a ditch and glacis, looking down upon the open sea toward the west and the Sebastopol bay on the south; that the Fort was not a work designed against invaders coming from the Belbec, being commanded and looked into from the ground by which the Allies might approach it;⁴ that the fire of the French and English ships could be easily brought to bear upon it;⁵ that, whatever accession of strength might be given to the adjacent ground by the hasty labors of the enemy, there were only twelve

¹ By some it has been thought that commissariat difficulties prevented the earlier advance of the Allies: but after considering the grounds on which that belief rested, I have not accepted it.

² Letter to his brother, 22nd September.

³ Private journal under same date.

⁴ Sir John Burgoyne questions this, but he had not an opportunity of effecting any sufficing reconnaissance of the ground; and upon such a matter I can hardly refuse to treat General de Todleben's statements as a safe guide.—'Défense de Sebastopol,' pp. 131, 230.

⁵ Ibid., p. 222.

out of all the guns then arming the Fort itself which could be brought to bear upon the approaches by which the Allies might advance; that the new, and as yet unarmed, work which threatened the mouth of the Belbec was assailable from the ships as well as by the land forces;¹ and that, finally, in the judgment both of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Fort, with all its new adjuncts, was not an obstacle which ought to baffle a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men advancing along the coast, with the active and available support of the attendant fleets.²

Time, at last, has apparently proved that the inferences of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were sound. More than that, it has shown that, at a period when the Allies might have been marching upon the Star Fort,³ Prince Mentschikoff had not only withdrawn to the south of Sebastopol, but had deliberately renounced the idea of venturing his army in any encounter on the north of the roadstead.⁴ Therefore, if St. Arnaud had followed the counsels of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Allies would have occupied the north side of Sebastopol without encountering resistance, and having done this, they could have proceeded at once to execute the main purpose of the invasion by destroying the Black Sea fleet and the naval establishments of Sebastopol.⁵ Nor was even this all; for there is reason to believe that, by adding to their operations the mere occupation of a point on the road to Bak-

¹ Ibid.

² Mr. Loch's MS. memorandum, quoted *ante*, p. 33.

³ Viz., the 22nd or 23rd of September. After the departure of Prince Mentschikoff in the night of the 24th, the Allies, though not liable to be encountered at the Star Fort by any 'army,' would still have had to deal, as we shall afterward see, with Korniloff and his sailors; but on the 22nd or the 23rd, or even, as I consider, on the 24th, the invaders might have marched upon the position of the Star Fort without being met by either the army or the seamen.

⁴ After giving his reasons for regarding the position of the Star Fort as untenable by the Prince's army against the Allies, General Todleben says: 'Having thus convinced himself that there was not, on this ground, any position where our troops could await the enemy with some hope of success, and without being exposed to find themselves in a most critical situation in case of failure, Prince Mentschikoff saw himself obliged to renounce encountering the Allies on the north of the roadstead. Recognizing, at the same time, the necessity of reorganizing his troops, of completing his supplies of ammunition and food, of reinforcing the garrison of Sebastopol, and determining the measures necessary for its defense, Prince Mentschikoff took the resolve of transporting himself to the south of Sebastopol.'—*'Defense de Sebastopol'* p. 215.

⁵ The authority for this conclusion will be given *post*, chap. iv.

tchi Seräi, the Allies would have secured the surrender of the south of Sebastopol, and have brought the campaign to an end.¹

I said that the victory of the 20th of September gave Sebastopol to the Allies on condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize.² That condition Marshal St. Arnaud rejected, by refusing to go on against the northern defenses of the place. We shall have to make a reckoning of the lost occasions which followed the Battle of the Alma. This one stands as the first.

This the first
of the lost occa-
sions.

CHAPTER III.

ON the morning of the 23rd of September the Allies once more marched forward; and moving all the way along ground thickly strewn with arms and accoutrements—the signs of the enemy's haste to retreat—they descended at length into the valley of the Katcha. The English were quartered amidst the gardens and vineyards of a village all smiling with signs of plenty; for although, in broken furniture and emptied chests, there were traces of Cossack spoilers, and although, in their terror, the villagers had fled, still the happy-looking cottages, with their trellised and welcoming porches, the cherished fruit-trees and especially the abounding clusters of the vine, all seemed to speak of content and rewarded industry.

Advance on
the Katcha.

The village on
its banks.

Though the villagers had fled they had not gone far. A knot of Englishmen inclined to ramble into the country had chosen the road leading eastward as the one most likely to withdraw them from the familiar scenes of the camp. When they had gone some way in this direction, they saw that, at a distance of some hundred of yards in front of them, there was a crowd. At sight of the strangers the crowd began to fly, but after awhile some of the people turned round, and, little by little, were brought to attend to the beckoning and the encouraging signs with which they were met. After a while, the fugitive villagers—for these were the people who formed the crowd—began to grow somewhat less fearful; and at length, though often

The people of
the village.

¹ So also as to this.

² Vol i., p. 632.

halting in doubt, they came nearer, and then again nearer; but even when they had evidently made up their minds to accept the proffered intercourse, they yet stopped from time to time that they might make prostrations and gestures in token of submission.

These poor people were lurking about the neighborhood of the village in order to see or make out what was going to befall their homes. The Englishmen saw the importance of re-assuring the villagers, and an interpreter was fetched. When the people came to understand that no harm would be done to them or their property they became very grateful, and some of them ventured back into their village. From them the English first came to hear of the panic which had seized the Russian army in the midnight after the battle; and it was here, too (as told in a former page), that the simple natives excused their content by saying that for three generations they had lived in peace under the Czars.

The English at this time received a small accession to the strength of their cavalry from the landing of the Scots Greys.

The landing of
the Scots
Greys.

Lord Raglan
had already
pushed forward
his cavalry to
the Belbec.

But whilst the whole of the French, and the main body of the English army, were establishing their quarters in the valley of the Katcha, Lord Raglan—in the person of the General commanding his cavalry—was already in sight of Sebastopol, and descending unmolested to the Belbec. He had ordered Lord Lucan with the bulk of the cavalry and his troop of horse-artillery to push forward, and take possession of the village of Duvanköi, a village lying close to the Belbec, but so far up the stream as to be upon the high-road which connected Sebastopol with Baktchi Seräi. Lord Lucan had to approach the village by passing through a long defile which might have been easily defended against cavalry; but, although watched by Cossacks, he was not opposed. The village, when reached, was found to be in a nook shut in between the bank of the river on one side, and precipitous heights on the other. Finding the place unoccupied, Lord Lucan not only took possession of it—that might have been done by means of a picket—but kept his troops down in the nook for some hours. As far as was possible in such a situation, he strove to prepare against the event of an attack by placing three guns at each entrance to the village, and some scouts on the commanding hills; but he did not conceal from himself that his cavalry thus cooped down must be powerless, and exposed to destruction if attacked by infantry orartil-

lery.¹ The enemy did not seize the occasion, and at dusk Lord Lucan withdrew his troops to the high open ground above;² but certainly during some hours, our cavalry had been in peril.

Lord Lucan had been apprised that the Russians had had 2000 horse in the village of Duvanköi just before its occupation by our cavalry; and when he rose from his bivouac on the morning of the 24th, he saw bodies of Russian troops both in the direction of Sebastopol and near Mackenzie's Farm; but he was recalled into the general line of march before the enemy's movements were yet so developed as to enable him to make out their scope and bearing. If his orders had suffered him to remain in the neighborhood of Duvanköi, he might have found that the Russians in force were converging upon the very ground where he stood, and that in a village close by Prince Mentschikoff was to establish his Head-quarters.³

Excepting the cavalry which Lord Raglan had thus pushed on a day's march in advance, the whole of the Allied army bivouacked, as we saw, on the Katcha.

On the morning of Sunday the 24th of September, the Allies made ready to begin the march which was to bring them to the Belbec, and place them in presence of the defenses which guarded Sebastopol on its northern side.

They were checked. The reported existence of a fresh covered battery commanding the mouth of the Belbec had been already put forward by the French Commander as an obstacle which might force the Allies to swerve from their purpose;⁴ and now that the advancing armies were at last on the banks of the Katcha, the Marshal's avowed anxiety on the subject of this new field-work still hung in the way of the enterprise. The French, as we know, were on the right; or, in other words, next to the sea. Theirs was the part of the Allied army which (if the advance should be continued

Avowed cause of the anxiety which was creating hesitation at the French Head-quarters.

¹ Lord Lucan seems to have thought that the order to 'take possession of' Duvanköi made it his duty to place his main body in the village, and to keep it there during some 'few hours;' for he speaks of the occupation of the village which he had effected and continued till dusk as an act which had 'sufficiently carried out his instructions.'

² This last measure, as might well be expected, was fully approved by Lord Raglan.

³ The village of Otarköi. It was early on the following morning that Prince Mentschikoff in person reached the village.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 34, and *post*, chap. iv.

in the direction hitherto followed) would be brought opposite to the newly-formed battery; and, not unnaturally, they deemed it to be within their peculiar and separate province to judge of the importance of an obstacle which lay, as they thought, in their path. Moreover, it had now become known at the French Head-quarters that the enemy had sunk men-of-war across the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead.

At seven in the morning, Lord Raglan received a message from the French Marshal requesting that the march might be postponed till ten o'clock, not only for the purpose of considering the aspect of affairs as altered by the sinking of the enemy's ships, but also in order to give time for a farther reconnoissance of the field-work at the mouth of the Belbec.

The advance of the Allies delayed at the request of the French Commander.

The request was conveyed by Colonel Trochu, who brought a note signed by himself, which he left in the hands of Lord Raglan. In English the note runs thus: 'Last night news reached the French camp that the Russians had yesterday destroyed the entrance of the port of Sebastopol by sinking five ships and two frigates. Thence there results a new situation, on the subject of which the Marshal sends me to confer with his lordship Lord Raglan. Besides, the Russians have constructed in advance of Fort Constantine a battery which directly commands the mouth of the Belbec, where the siege materials and the supplies have to be disembarked, and where the line of march is which the French army would have to take. Pending the expression of opinion on this subject by his lordship Lord Raglan, the Marshal has adjourned the departure for some hours.'

Lord Raglan, of course, could do no otherwise than yield to the request, more especially on the last ground assigned; for the field-work to which it referred stood opposite—not to the English, but—to the Marshal's, line of advance, and (unless it were shunned altogether) would have to be dealt with by the French.

It seems to have been ultimately agreed that the Allies should continue their march upon the Belbec, though without committing themselves to an attack of the Severnaya, or encountering the new field-work; and accordingly, at about ten o'clock, the advance was resumed. Soon, crowning the

The advance at length resumed, but without any determination to attack the Severnaya, or

¹ Colonel Trochu meant the 'Star Fort.' It was common at the time in the Allied camps to call the 'Star Fort' 'Fort Constantine.' The real Fort Constantine, however, was a sea-fort at the mouth of the Sebastopol bay.

to encounter
the new field-
work.

Sebastopol in
sight.

Marshal St.
Arnaud.

His state.

ridge of the hills which divide the Katcha from the Belbec, and then, gazing eagerly southward, the two armies looked down on Sebastopol.

On this summit the Allies for a while remained halted. Marshal St. Arnaud quitted his saddle and lay upon the ground. According to the accounts of the French historians, he was within a few hours of the period when the physicians pronounced him to be suffering from cholera; and although, at this time, his appearance and manner spoke more of downcast spirits than of mortal disease, it may well be imagined that nothing other than bodily illness had made him joyless at this the moment of his first looking down on Sebastopol. He was unspeakably sad. Contrasting the hard enterprise before him with the work of happier days in the country of the Arabs and the Kabyles, he sighed as men sigh when they have to endure without hope.

Again the Allies marched forward; but by the time that their line of march was developed, an observer who knew the ground might have inferred, from the direction they took, that already they were swerving from their purpose. Shunning the imagined strength of the new field-work at the mouth of the Belbec, they began to bend away from the shore.

The ground at this time traversed by the invading armies was so thickly strewn with the marks of the enemy's hasty flight and confusion as to show that defeat had been lapsing into ruin, and that that which had entered Sebastopol was a hurried and fugitive crowd. Amongst the things abandoned there was even that cargo of kitchen implements which had supplied the table of the Russian Head-quarters. The Allies failed to read these signs, or rather they failed to read them with that kind of understanding which leads to clear inference and to accordant action. Indeed, it would seem that they had hardly at all treasured up and applied the narrative of that Russian panic on the Katcha which the vil-

lagers had been giving them on the foregoing night. Strange to say, that stand, or that mere semblance of a stand, which Kiriakoff had made at the close of the battle on the Alma, had raised up a vail so effectual, that it still served to screen the Russians from the eyes of their invaders. No fragments of the wreck, no accounts of eye-witnesses, were enough to coun-

Signs of the
ruined condi-
tion in which
the Russian
army had re-
entered Sebas-
topol.

Cause which
hindered the
Allies from ap-
prehending the
condition of the
Russian army
after the Alma.

tervail the effect which Kiriakoff had wrought upon the counsels of the Allies, by showing them a front for some minutes, and causing them to believe that the retreat which he was covering must be a retreat in good order.¹

The invading armies now descended into the beautiful valley of the Belbec. There was little that could yet be seen of the Russian troops. Lord Cardigan, with a couple of squadrons, reconnoitred a pass toward Sebastopol in the direct front of the English lines, and reported it impracticable, there being, he said, a marsh in front, then a causeway, and then a battery of heavy guns supported by a strong force of infantry and some cavalry.

To go hardly on with the old plan of the invasion, undertaking to carry at once whatever the enemy might have prepared by way of defense for his Star Fort, —this, however difficult, or however easy, was, at all events, an enterprise deliberately contemplated beforehand, and of such a kind as to be strictly consistent with the character of the expedition; for the attack was one in which (by aiding in the capture of the works at the mouth of the Belbec, and the intrenchments connecting them with the Star Fort) the naval forces of the Allies could take a great part. Besides, the condition of things was such that, if the Allies should determine to shun this encounter, their caution would be far from restoring them to the approved and recognized paths of scientific warfare. On the contrary, a tardy wariness in that direction could hardly now fail to be imprudent. The expedition had gone too far to leave open a choice between risk and safety. The choice was between two or more kinds of grave danger. This night, though the soldiery were gladdened by the beauty of the vale, and the wealth of the gardens and the villas, it could not but happen that the chiefs would be busied with anxious counsels.

The serious nature of a resolve to abandon the old plan of the invasion.

The design of operating

CHAPTER IV.

At the time when the deliberations of the Allies in Bulgaria resulted in their determining that the western, and not the southern, coast of the Crimea should

¹ The reason why the few minutes' stand made by Kiriakoff imposed so effectually upon the Allies was this: it happened that his line of retreat

against the defenses of Sebastopol from the north.

be looked to for the place of their landing, it was not so much settled in words, but rather taken for granted, that this resolve carried with it the ulterior design of moving on southward along the same western coast, and operating against the northern defenses of Sebastopol. The assumption was a natural one; for, because of the Sebastopol bay, it was only from the north that an invader remaining established on the western coast could attempt an attack.

Long before, and prior indeed to the actual commencement of the war, Captain Drummond of the 'Retribution' had ventured to give firm counsel upon this subject; and the knowledge which he had acquired by lying at anchor in the roadstead of Sebastopol enabled him to speak with great weight.¹ Both Captain Drummond and Captain Willis (who was acting with him at the time of the survey) conceived themselves able to report decisively in favor of an attack upon the Star Fort as a means of achieving the great object of the Allies;² but if, even before the invasion, they were warranted in fixing upon the Severnaya or 'North Side' as the true point of attack, much more was it now to be concluded in favor of such a choice, since the Allies, by their successful landing, followed up by the result of the Battle on the Alma, had fastened already upon that very part of the coast from which they could conveniently assail the Star Fort; and moreover, it was fairly to be reckoned, that if the Allies should go straight to their end, without at all turning aside, or interposing fresh marches between themselves and their prey, the momentum

Report of Captain Drummond of the 'Retribution,' made so early as January, 1854, in favor of the attack on the North Side; and of Captain Willis.

The landing and the Battle of the Alma brought great accession of weight to the reasons for attacking the North Side.

was so far diagonal, that when he took up his second position, some two miles in rear of the Alma heights, he was no longer opposite to the French line of battle (as he had been during the action), but to the English; and the consequence was, that his presence in order of battle, much aided by the nature of the ground, masked the confusion of that part of the Russian army which was retreating from its conflict with the English.

¹ Since the now published statements and comments of General Todleben tend very strongly to show that the 'North Side' was the true point to attack, it can not but be interesting to the friends of Captain (now Admiral Sir James) Drummond to see the words in which he reported to the above effect: 'I think that, on carrying the position of the "E" Fort [the Star Fort is marked "E" in Captain Drummond's plan], the place would fall immediately.'—*Captain Drummond's Report, 9th January, 1854.*

² Captain Willis says, in his Report: 'I think it is quite possible to destroy the arsenal with time and 20,000 soldiers, artillery, etc. The attack on the South Side should be a feint.'

they had gathered from their victory might carry them through the defenses without being put to a siege.

Bivouacking now on the Belbec, the Allies were at last within gunshot of the fortress they had come over sea to confront; and the period in which it had been possible to keep the question open being close to its end, they were called upon to determine whether they would at once prepare to deliver the attack, or give up their old plan of campaign.

It is now therefore time to see what there was in front of the Allies which might be calculated to turn them from the execution of their original design.

On the northern side of the Sebastopol bay, and facing the sea-forts which cover the town and harbor, there were not only other sea-forts of great size and power, but also some barracks, some magazines, and a factory worked by the Government. This aggregate of buildings, or the quarter in which they stood, was known amongst Russians by the name of the Severnaya; and the English have been accustomed to call it the

The Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol. 'North side of Sebastopol,' or, in language more short, the 'North Side.' If once the Allies could

make themselves masters there, they would be able to deal so heavily with the town and arsenal of Sebastopol, and would have it so completely in their power to burn every ship in the harbor, that thenceforth the main object of the invasion might be regarded as an object attained.¹

But even these were not all the advantages which might be expected to flow from a resolve to attack the Star Fort. By reason of the proximity of that field of action to the roads which converge near Mackenzie's Farm, the plan of operating against the north side of Sebastopol was compatible with measures for seizing the enemy's lines of communication.² And this was a priceless advantage; for although, in regard to material supplies, Sebastopol for the time might be sufficing to the needs of the Russian army, Prince Menschikoff was wholly dependent upon his lines of communication for the reinforcements which he believed to be of absolute necessity to him. General de Todleben has good means of knowing the degree of stress which must have been put

¹ I rest this assertion upon the authority of General de Todleben.—'De-fense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. p. 239. The General states his conclusion upon this point in decisive, unhesitating terms.

² Not only with the north, but with the south-east of the Crimea, where there were 10,000 men under Khomatoff.

upon the Russians by the loss of their lines of communication; and it is his judgment that, at this time, the establishment of an Allied force on the road to Baktchi Seräi must have brought the campaign to an end.¹

The forts, barracks, storehouses, and factory, which thus came to be of great worth in the eyes of the striving nations, were at the foot of a high plateau sur-
The plateau overhanging the North Side. rounded on three sides by water. Along the northern boundary of the plateau there flowed the stream of the Belbec; on the west its base met the Black Sea; and on the south, where the buildings were placed, it fronted the great bay of Sebastopol. The sea-forts were not so constructed as to be the means of defense against an invader coming down upon them by land from the north, but on the high ground above, though still at a distance of only a few hundred yards from the bay, there was a work—ill-contrived and dilapidated—which the English have called the Star Fort. The work had been constructed in the year 1818,

The Star Fort. with a view to secure Fort Constantine, and the other great sea-forts which lined the north of the roadstead, from being taken in reverse by marines or other forces landing on the west coast; but it stood in the path of any invader approaching Sebastopol from the Belbec, and could therefore be brought into use as a means of defense against him. It was an octagon, having sides of which each was from 190 to 230 yards long; and, of its eight angles, every other one was supplied with a little bastion or caponiere, having an earthen parapet, whilst three out of the four remaining angles of the octagon were furnished with small bonnettes and barbettes, each taking three pieces. At the flanks of the bastions, the lines of what would otherwise have been the curtain were so interrupted as to provide means of obtaining a flanking fire from some small guns placed in casemates. The profiles of the bastions gave 14 feet of height with 10 of thickness, and the other parts of the fort had a height of from 4 to 7 feet, with a thickness of from 3 to 7 feet. The bastion which looked toward the roadstead was retrenched at its gorge by a work called a cavalier. The fort was surrounded by a ditch 12 feet deep and 18 feet broad, with revetment in masonry and a glacis. It was covered on its south and south-eastern sides by two lunettes, but both of these faced the water, and were of no important use against an

¹ Expressed in his book, and—very positively indeed—in conversation with me.

enemy advancing from the Belbec. Of the 47 guns which armed the work, only 12 could be of service in the expected attack from the north. The fort was commanded, and even looked into, from the heights toward the north.¹

In and near this work, from the day of the landing, on the 14th of September, down to the evening of the 24th, the time of which we are speaking, the Russians had toiled night and day, and with a force of, at one time, some 1500 workmen. Their object was, not only to repair and strengthen the Star Fort itself, but also to provide generally for the defense of the plateau against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. By those who know that these hurried works went on under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben, it will be easily inferred that they were planned with a consummate skill; but what even he found means to achieve in ten days could not but fall very short of what was needed.

However, he threw up works on each flank of the fort in order to strengthen and extend the line of defense, taking care that all the approaches (some of which had before been quite out of harm's way from the fort) should now be liable to be swept by fire. Besides this, he erected two batteries on the crests toward the north-west, with the design of keeping off the enemy's ships; and two, if not three, out of the nine guns which ultimately armed these batteries were so placed as to command that part of the coast which lay toward the mouth of the Belbec. The earth-work prepared for the reception of those two guns was the apparition described to Lord Raglan in the morning by Colonel Trochu, and threatening, as we have already seen, to scare the Allies from their purpose. It does not appear that Todleben foresaw the effect which these two guns would have upon the counsels of the Allies. His general object was to take care that no ships should come within range without incurring fire; and he did not, it would seem, entertain any notion that, by

¹ It may be right to say that in the above account of the Star Fort I have not implicitly followed the description contained in the text of General de Todleben's work; but my words, I believe, will be found to agree with the plans which accompany his book. Those plans agree very well with the description contained in the admirable work which I have followed, the work of Gendre ('Matériaux pour servir,' etc.), but not with the words of General de Todleben's book. General de Todleben's book purports not to have been written, but edited by him; and I imagine he would be much more likely to allow mistakes to occur in the words of the narrative compiled under his auspices than to suffer any grave faults to appear in the elaborate maps and plans of fortifications which form so valuable a portion of the work.

refusing to the Allies the absolutely peaceful possession of the mouth of the Belbec, he might drive them to abandon their plan of campaign. He connected both of these north-western batteries with the Star Fort by means of trenches, which were to be lined by men using their musketry. In order to prevent the Star Fort from being looked into by the enemy, a great effort was made to increase the height of the parapet; but under the weight of the earth laid for this purpose upon one of the old parapets the revetment of the scarp gave way, and a breach was thus made by the defenders themselves. One of Todleben's objects was to throw up works which might prevent the enemy from turning the Star Fort on the eastern flank, but for the execution of this part of his plan there was no time.

By the morning of the 25th there were altogether twenty-nine guns in battery and available for the defense against the expected attack from the north. Amongst these were the nine pieces which now armed the two new north-western batteries, including the two 24-pounder carronades which commanded the coast toward the mouth of the Belbec. These two batteries, however, were liable to be destroyed by the guns of the Anglo-French fleet;¹ and the trench connecting one of them with the fort could be enfiladed and taken in rear by fire from the same quarter.² Indeed, the position of the ground and of the Russian works was such that in every stage of an attack undertaken against the Star Fort, the seamen and the ships of the Allies would have been able to take a great part.³

In order to cover the retreat of the Russians, some of their ships were placed in such positions as to be able to sweep with their broadsides the slopes on the north of the roadstead.

The form of the ravines descending from the Star Fort was such that upon two, if not three, of the approaches from the side of the Belbec, the assailants might come up to the ditch without first incurring a cannonade of any great might or duration.⁴

With regard to the forces available for the defense, it may

¹ Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol,' vol. i. pp. 233.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In the 'Defense de Sebastopol,' General de Todleben undertakes to show elaborately, and in full detail, the power and duration of the fire to which the assailants would be exposed.

Forces available for the defense.

be said that if the Allies had advanced against the Star Fort on the morning of the 25th they would have encountered there and on the ground adjoining a battalion of militiamen,¹ a company of sappers, and so large a body of sailors—withdrawn, for that purpose, from the ships and from the defense of the South Side—as

The force defending the position on the 24th and 25th Sept.

would bring up the whole number of combatants to 11,000.² The sailors were, for the most part, ill armed, some of them having old flint-and-steel muskets, and others, it seems, only pikes or cutlasses. This was the force which, extended along a front for a mile, was to defend the fort and the plateau against a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, supported and actively aided by their fleets. The defenders, however, were commanded by one whose name will be long illustrious in

Admiral Korniloff.

the annals of Russia. For the present, it suffices to say of Admiral Korniloff, that he was a chivalreus, resolute, and devoted seaman, who, with hardly a hope of any better success than that of an honorable death, had determined to defend the plateau and the fort to the last extremity.

Reasons for avoiding a more detailed account of the preparations for the defense of the North Side.

Of the reception so prepared for the Allies, I am content to say only this much, because, after all, it so happened that the Star Fort was never assailed; and although there is use in inquiring what would have been the probable result of an attack upon 'the North Side' from the direction of the Bel-bee, it chanced that this very question has already received an answer which comes with so much authority, and is, at the same time, so well supported by detailed statement and laborious demonstration, that it is well to give the conclusion without reproducing, in this place, the voluminous materials of proof on which it rested.³

We saw that the officer who planned and directed the works of defense was Colonel de Todleben. He it is who has now pronounced that the plateau and the fort could not have been successfully defended against the attack which the

¹ I continue to use the term 'militia' as a word for distinguishing what the Russians call their 'reserve' battalions.

² 11,350.—*Todleben*, vol. i. p. 227.

³ The passages in which General de Todleben maintains his conclusion will be found in pp. 230–33, 238 and 239 of his work; but I do not reproduce them, because they fail to deal with the really disputed question—*i. e.*, the question whether the position could have been advantageously defended by an army. The argument in favor of that last view (*i. e.*, Sir John Burgoyne's) will be found in the Appendix.

Allies had the means of making.¹ The situation of the defenders, he says, notwithstanding all they had done, and their heroic resolves, was nothing less than desperate;² and he declares that the complete success of the expected attack by the Allies would have been inevitable.³ He adds—and there were reasons which gave great importance to that part of the question—that their success must have been speedy.⁴ These conclusions he of course founds on his own complete knowledge of the defenses as seen from within; and it would not of necessity follow that the weakness of which he was cognizant would be visible to the Allies. But, then, General de Todleben goes farther. Supposing the Allies to have made full use of even those restricted means of observation they had, he says they must needs have learned that the attack was feasible.⁵

The opinion which General de Todleben says the Allies ought to have been able to form was come to in fact by Lord Raglan and Sir E. Lyons.

And, lest it be said that this, after all, was only the conclusion of an Engineer-officer standing on the sea-cliff, and thence undertaking to say how far the defenses could be judged of from the ships, it must be repeated that the conclusion to which General de Todleben says the Allies ought to have come was the very same as that to which Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons did come in fact. Sir Edmund, as commanding the in-shore squadron, would have been called upon to take a great part in any attack carried on along the coast, and therefore his judgment was that of a man preparing to act upon it. He, no less than Lord Raglan, was convinced, as we saw, that after the Alma the true policy of the Allies required an immediate attack upon the Star Fort.

The Allies were not ignorant that the possession of the North Side would at once enable them to cannonade the enemy's shipping.⁶ Nor again did they fall into the error of supposing the Star Fort to be of itself a formidable work.⁷ Indeed it may be said that the hindrances which stood in

¹ Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol,' vol. i., pp. 230–33.

² Ibid., p. 30. ³ Ibid., p. 233. ⁴ Ibid., p. 232. ⁵ Ibid., p. 239.

⁶ See chap. iv., p. 50. It is difficult for an Englishman to help thinking wistfully of the course things might have been likely to take if, the French claim to precedence being out of the way, the English had been on the right. In that case, Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons would have been operating, as it were, side by side, and the enterprise against the Star Fort would have given a good occasion for showing what can be done by the closely-combined action of land and sea forces.

⁷ See Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 68.

The objections which were urged against going on with the plan of attacking the North Side.

the way of the enterprise were all of such a kind that they must have been as clearly apparent to the minds of general officers whilst planning at Varna as now they were to the eyes of men scanning the work with their field-glasses. It is true, as we saw, that toward the north-west of the Star Fort a field-work had lately appeared, which bent round the shoulder of the hill, and in such a direction that two if not three of its guns, at a range of two miles, might bring their fire to bear upon the waters at the mouth of the Belbec; but the use of the spade and the pickaxe has been so long known in the world, and the crust of the earth has been so frequently used by man as a means of sheltering him in his efforts to harm his assailants, that if the Allies were to turn aside from a well-weighed plan of campaign at the sight of a newly-made battery, they would not only disclose a flexibility scarce consistent with the pretensions of aggressive States, but would be conceding to the power of the Defense, as compared with the power of the Attack, an ascendant which does not belong to it. Certainly, it was possible that by a gun in the new battery, discharged at a range of two miles, a vessel might be struck whilst engaged in bringing stores into the mouth of the Belbec; but it was not with a notion of being baffled by a contingency of this kind that the venturesome enterprise of the invasion had been planned or begun; and the work which thus threatened the entrance of the Belbec was not only open to attack by the land forces of the Allies, but was also so placed that the naval forces of the French and English ships could have taken their part in its capture.

Again, it was said that the position which the Russians would have to defend on the North Side was only a mile in extent, and that therefore their main strength might be concentrated with powerful effect upon a comparatively small space of ground.¹ It was also argued that, from the moment of the landing, the Russians must have inferred that the invaders intended to attack the Severnaya or North Side, and that, therefore, there was no hope of surprising the enemy by an attack at that point.² So far as they went, these two arguments were sound, but, taken alone, they had not sufficient cogency to warrant the abandonment of a well-matured plan of campaign.

Yet again, it was argued that the capture of the Sever-

¹ Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 68.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

naya or North Side alone, though involving the means of cannonading the Russian ships and their dock-yards, would not of necessity carry with it the entire possession of Sebastopol.¹ To this objection the answer is twofold: for, first, it is clear that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone would have enabled the Allies to attain at once the main object of the invasion; but, secondly, as we have already seen, the operations against the Severnaya might have been easily accompanied or followed by a measure which (unless General de Todleben errs) must have instantly given the Allies the whole of the prize they were seeking.²

By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the North Side was the want of a safe harbor on that part of the neighboring coast which was north of the Sebastopol bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be so driven from the coast by stress of weather as to put the Allies in peril for their supplies. Of course, this fear was one which applied to the idea of attempting any landing at all on the western shores of the Crimea; and, since it had been so far set at naught that, in despite of it, the Allies had both landed and established themselves in the country, it was hardly perhaps opportune to revive the objection at a time when the invaders had made good their footing in the peninsula by a decisive victory. The Allies did well to regard the want of a harbor as a grave evil; but apparently their most prudent mode of allowing this care to weigh upon their counsels would have been by treating it as a motive for shortening to the utmost the anxious interval, and determining—ay, even, if need be, at a painful cost of life—to carry the works of the Severnaya with a peremptory dispatch, whilst yet by title of victory they seemed to have might on their side. So inextricably were the Allies engaged in the expedition, and so deeply were they committed in the face of Europe to the duty of achieving their end, that, whatever may have been their wisdom originally in resolving to touch the Crimea, the driest prudence now seemed to command that they should follow up the victory with swiftness, and always in that venturesome temper which was the only one fitted to their enterprise. For refuge as well as for glory they needed the port of Sebastopol.

I do not understand that Sir John Burgoyne would vent-

¹ Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, *post*, p. 68.

² See *ante*, p. 47.

The grounds of Sir John Burgoyne's conclusion. are a negative answer to this question;¹ and if when this is acknowledged, it be asked once again why he counseled the Allies to avoid the Star Fort, the explanation is this:—Instead of regarding the Fort as a work which (along with its adjuncts) would be only defended by its mere garrison, he looked upon it as a part only of an extended line of defense. He looked upon it as marking the dominant feature of an intrenched position which, in his judgment, might be advantageously defended by an army; but having formed that opinion, he went on to infer that a like opinion would govern the decisions of the enemy, and that by a whole army accordingly the position would be defended. There, he erred. There was no intention on the part of the Russians to attempt to defend the position by means of an army; and it must be added that the mistake of believing the contrary was one that might have been cleared away by a careful reconnaissance.

Recapitulated statement of the objection to attack the Severnaya which was evinced by the French Headquarters on the 21st and the 22nd of September. But if the relinquishment of the North Side was not to be justified upon military grounds, there was still this to say for the measure:—it was a way out of trouble. We have seen that when, the day after the battle, Lord Raglan proposed to St. Arnaud ‘at once to advance to the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the forts,’ the Marshal answered that ‘his troops were tired, and that it could not be done.’² We also learned that on the following day, the 22nd, Lord Raglan was ‘again urging on ‘the French General to advance across the Belbec,’ and, for once in his life, was cast into a state of ‘low spirits,’ by hearing the Marshal reply, ‘that he had ascertained that the ‘Russians had thrown up strong earth-works on the banks ‘of the river; and though he (the Marshal) did not doubt that ‘the Allies could force them, as they had the works on the ‘Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed;’³ and, finally, we were enabled to perceive the way in which this refusal of the French to go on with the campaign as originally planned, was the cause which induced the Allies to halt—to halt with the whole of their forces—for two clear days on the Alma.³

¹ Although he has strongly argued that it would have been injudicious to attack the position of the Star Fort, he has done this on the expressed ground—ground now known to have been unfounded—that the position was defended by an ‘army.’—*Military Opinions*, p.238. It is Sir John Burgoyne himself who puts the word in italics.

² Statement of Sir E. Lyons, *ante*, chap. ii.

³ *Ibid.*

³ Instead of leaving merely a division to cover the embarkation of the

It must now be added, that the farther efforts of Sir Edmund Lyons to induce the Marshal to agree to an attack on the position of the Star Fort were attended with no success. Upon hearing from Lord Raglan that the Marshal had alleged the new earth-works overlooking the Belbec as an obstacle not to be faced, Sir Edmund put himself on board a small steamer, and ran in so close as to be able to reconnoitre effectually. He then ascertained that the newly-appearing works were of the kind represented by the Marshal, but that they had not yet been armed. Sir Edmund hastened to report the result of his survey to the French Commander, but could not persuade him to resume the idea of marching against the Star Fort.

Reconnaissance by Sir Edmund Lyons.

Failure of his endeavor to persuade St. Arnaud to resume the plan of attacking the Star Fort.

At first—and this was the cause of Lord Raglan's dejection—the whole enterprise seemed to be threatened with ruin by the refusal of Marshal St. Arnaud to go on in the execution of the plan of campaign with which the Allies had set sail. But the English General was by nature so constituted that no man could be better qualified than he was to lessen to the very utmost the acknowledged evil of a divided command; for, besides that his devotion to the public service was so entire as to exclude all thought of self, he was free from the vanity (if vanity it be) which makes a man desire that a great event should be traceable to his own conception: and he was not accustomed to ponder over warlike devices in such a way as to be likely to conceive a violent predilection for one plan, or a violent dislike of another. He plainly believed that, for an army endued with the strength which a victory always gives, an inferior or even rash plan, carried through with good will by each of the commanders, would serve the cause better than any other plan (however good in itself) which failed to win the cordial approval of both the chiefs. He was, therefore, well qualified to deal with the emergency in which the Allies would find themselves placed if the French should persist in their unwillingness to assail the Star Fort.

Lord Raglan's great power of lessening the evils arising from a divided command.

The evil was occasioned by the fact that, at a moment when (from causes which will be afterward spoken of¹) the French army was temporarily disqualified

Nature of the dilemma in which the

wounded, an expedient which would have consisted perfectly with the plan of advancing at once to the attack of the Star Fort. See *ante*, chap. ii.

¹ At the close of this chapter.

Allies were
placed.

for enterprise, that same army chanced to be the one which (by reason of its position on the right of the Allied forces, and therefore opposite to the Star Fort and its outworks) was called upon to perform an arduous duty. This accident, if so one may call it, being the true root of the evil which threatened the fate of the invasion, it followed that a way of escape from it might be found, if the hitherto adopted plan of campaign could be replaced by one which, for the moment, would present the laboring oar to the English instead of the French. Blending a technical phrase with words of common parlance, a man might say that the condition of the Allied army was this:—If, as first intended, it were called upon to operate ‘by its right,’ it would still be under the palsy which affected the French Headquarters. If, on the other hand, the Allied army were to operate against the enemy ‘by its left,’ it would instantly shake off all numbness deriving from Marshal St. Arnaud, and would practically come under the leadership of the English General.

It was possible to imagine a plan of campaign which would work this change. Though custom and foreseeing prudence have made it the practice of the great European Powers to obtain in peace-time full accounts and plans of the fortresses belonging to rival States, this (in common with many other of the warlike duties attaching upon her in peace-time) England had neglected; and it happened that, in the case of Sebastopol, there had been a like neglect on the part of the French War Office. Neither France nor England were authoritatively informed of the state of the land defenses of Sebastopol.

In the year 1835, Colonel Macintosh had given to the world an account of the then state of the land defenses of the place; and he had brought to bear upon this task not only a sufficing care and labor, but also so much sagacity, and so sound a knowledge of the military art, that to this hour it is curious to see how the nature of the struggle which was one day to gather about the Malakoff is foreshadowed in a book almost twenty years old.¹ When the war began to impend, General Mac-


Account of the
information
obtained re-
specting the
land defenses
of Sebastopol.

Information
supplied by
Colonel (now
General) Mac-
intosh.

¹ On the 16th of December, 1834, General (then Colonel) Macintosh, in a memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote: ‘It appears that the works intended to inclose the town on this side (it is now quite open) are meant to consist in a strong enceinte of revetted bastions. They are now laid out, and quarries opened to carry them on. . . . The new works are to extend as nearly as possible in the direction, *e e, e*, and

SEBASTOPOL.

Fac-simile of a sketch (taken from a Russian Survey) which accompanied General, then Col. Macintosh's memorandum addressed to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, on the 16th of Dec., 1834.



intosh imparted farther expositions of the subject to the authorities at the Horse Guards ; and it is now certain that the body of information and suggestive comment which he supplied would have been a wholesome study for the Allies ; for although it would have been necessary for them to make wide allowance for the changes which the hand of man might have wrought in a period of twenty years, the great features of the ground must needs be the same, and the plan of the defenses which (according to the showing of General Macintosh) the Russian engineers had traced out on paper was one so cogently dictated by the nature of the ground, that it might well be regarded as a useful indication of what the defenses would be even after a lapse of years. It was natural, however, that, being impatient of their strange want of knowledge concerning the actual state of the land defenses, and yearning after fresher information, the Allies should have given too little care to the result of old surveys and inquiries.

Our army is not constituted upon a plan which entices its officers to the pursuit of warlike studies or warlike inquiries having only a contingent usefulness ; and the power which England may be able to exert in appealing to arms depends a good deal upon the readiness with which she may be able to break down mere professional barriers, and bring to bear upon the great business of war the abounding zeal, energy, and skill of her whole people.

It was from the book of a young Scottish traveler that the Allies derived what knowledge they had of the state of the land defenses at Sebastopol.

Mr. Oliphant.

Mr. Oliphant had been gifted with an almost instinctive power, which showed him from afar where fields of action were opening ; and he was so prone to decide and dart forward whilst others were only pondering, that, however many there might have been with wishes and plans like his, yet commonly of late years he has been the first to alight upon the scene of coming events. So it happened that, before the home statesmen of the day had begun to take the alarm, this restless, sagacious traveler had half divined the war, and already was pacing those ridges and knolls and ravines upon which, a little while later, his country was to rivet her

‘ will completely cover the town and harbor. At present the inner harbor ‘ is commanded from the height *d*.’ By looking at the accompanying copy of the sketch which Colonel Macintosh sent with his memorandum of 1834, it will be seen that the ground there designated as ‘ the height *d*’ is the site of the Malakoff.

thoughts. For some time, it had been the policy of the Czar to withdraw Sebastopol from the eyes of Europe; and, in general, no traveler was suffered to enter the place. But an obstacle of this kind was sure to be overcome by the spirit of enterprise; and Mr. Oliphant not only found means to enter Sebastopol, but succeeded in informing himself of the then state of the land defenses on the south side of the harbor. Returning to England, he quickly made known the result of his observations, and caused to be published these words:—

‘But of one fact there is no doubt, that however well
 His report of
 the state of the
 land defenses
 of Sebastopol. ‘fortified may be the approaches to Sebastopol by
 ‘sea, there is nothing whatever to prevent any
 ‘number of troops landing a few miles south of the
 ‘town in one of the six convenient bays with which the coast
 ‘as far as Cape Kherson is indented, and, marching down the
 ‘main street (provided they were strong enough to defeat
 ‘any military force that might be opposed to them in the
 ‘open field), sack the town, and burn the fleet.’¹

This report not only did much to evoke the desire for an
 The effect it
 produced. enterprise against Sebastopol, but also caused men
 to see that, at all events, up to the period when the
 question of the Holy Shrines began to resume a grave aspect,
 little had been done to the land defenses; and that whatever
 obstacles might have to be encountered by an army attacking
 the place from the south, those obstacles, at the time of
 Mr. Oliphant’s visit, were not of a kind to make a formal siege
 needful. Moreover, as there was no proof that works on a
 great scale had been going on during the last eighteen
 months, there seemed to be fair ground for hoping that, so
 far as concerned the existence of regular fortifications in masonry,
 the land approaches to Sebastopol might be nearly in
 the state they were in when Mr. Oliphant saw them.

Before he left England, Lord Raglan did not fail to give himself the advantage of a personal interview with Mr. Oliphant, and afterward with Oliphant’s fellow-traveler, Mr. Oswald Smith. The result was, that the impression created by the passage in Mr. Oliphant’s book was strengthened. Henceforth the probability of finding Sebastopol weakly fortified on the land side never ceased to be kept in remembrance; and

¹ Oliphant’s ‘Russian Shores of the Black Sea,’ p. 260. Mr. Oliphant’s report was accurate. With the exception of throwing up a work near the water’s edge, which was more properly an adjunct to one of the sea-forts than a part of the land defenses, nothing had been done at the time of his visit toward fortifying the main town of Sebastopol on its south side. Mr. Oliphant’s book was published on the 15th of November, 1853.

it was only the supposed want of a convenient landing-ground on the southern coast of the Crimea which afterward caused the Allies to discard for a time the plan of attacking the place from that side.

At the time of the earliest deliberations on the subject,

Lord Raglan's leaning in favor of the plan of an attack on the south side.

The idea (though it had been laid aside when the west coast was chosen for the landing) now recurred to his mind.

Idea of a campaign by which the measure of attacking the south side of Sebastopol might be reconciled with the fact that the plan of operations hitherto followed had placed the Allies on the west coast of the Crimea.

The hazardous character of a proposal to defile round the east of Sebastopol.

Lord Raglan had been disposed to think that Sebastopol ought to be attacked on the south side; and although he had ceased to dwell on the idea from the time when the west coast was chosen for the place of landing, it recurred to him, as we saw, on the morrow of the battle, when he found himself encountered at the French Head-quarters by a refusal to attack the Star Fort. He then conceived that if the French should persist to the last in their refusal, he at least might avert that utter cessation and collapse of the whole enterprise which their determination threatened to produce by persuading them (as a substitute for the old plan which they were thus abandoning) to join with him in marching across the country to the south coast, and there establishing a new base of operations, from which to attack Sebastopol on its south side.

The hazardous character of such an undertaking as this has been masked, as we shall hereafter see, by a strange coincidence, and by the singularly happy immunity which that coincidence brought with it; but the plan now proposed was nothing less than that, in the presence of a Russian army understood to be concentrated in Sebastopol, the

Allies should break into a slender column, with a depth of many miles, and in that state defile for two whole days or more (through a forest unknown save by maps) round the eastern side of Sebastopol. It would seem at first sight that an army undertaking such a task would lay itself open to the danger of being cut into two or more pieces at the pleasure of the Russian Commander.

Some reckoned, indeed, that the defeat which the enemy had suffered might be expected to render him so tolerant that he would suffer the flank march to go on under his eyes without daring to undertake the seemingly easy task of bringing it to ruin; but to hope this was to found a great deal upon the moral effect of a victory; for the condition of troops and wagon-trains defiling through forest and mountain roads is exactly such as to give to a defeated army on their flank an oc-

casion to recover its boldness and self-respect by effecting successful though petty attacks upon the more helpless portions of the long, trailing column. Besides, it is obvious that if the enemy's prostration was so complete as to make him capable of suffering the Allies to defile by their left and march round him, it was still more likely that, in the event of a prompt attack upon the Star Fort, that same prostration of spirit would bring about the fall of the work. Indeed, one strong reason for discarding the plan was, that if the Allied army should once turn aside to make a circuitous march, instead of going on straight with its purpose against the Star Fort, it would lose a great deal of that priceless momentum which the victory of the Alma had given it.

Again, the configuration of the ground in the neighborhood of the Mackenzie Heights was of such a kind that if, as was proposed, the Allies should march round to Balaclava and the Chersonese with the whole of their forces, they would so forfeit their freedom of action that (except by undertaking a second invasion) it would become impracticable for them, however strong they might be, to press upon the enemy by offensive operations in the field.¹ Shut back in a narrow district, they would be liable to undergo the attacks of the Russian Commander whenever he might find it convenient to assume the offensive, and yet would be debarred from exercising a corresponding power themselves. The invaders had no acquaintance with the country into which they were going, except what they got from their map;² and although, so far as it went, this guide was not an unfaithful one, the language of the engraver, who represented with lines and shading the southward declivities of the Mackenzie range, did not have the effect of warning the Allies that there was there an impregnable position, and that, if they should leave it to the enemy, they would concede to him irrevocably an advantage of the greatest worth, by giving up their power to attack him in the open field, and compelling themselves to assail him, if ever they should assail him at all, in his lines of defense at Sebastopol.

¹ This, as we shall hereafter see, was effectually proved in the spring of 1855, when, in the hope of finding an escape from the almost intolerable predicament in which the Allies had placed themselves, the French Government was about to undertake a fresh invasion of the Crimea.

² A reprint, under the auspices of Major Jervis, of the map prepared by the Russian Government.

And last, it must be observed, that for the Allies to avoid the attack of the Star Fort, which stood within gunshot before them, and to move away to the south coast, was to fly from a task measured out, understood, well defined, and go off to confront things unknown. The weakness of the Fort itself as an aid to defense had been perceived by the Allies ;¹ and although they did not know that it had been abandoned by the Russian army to the care of the seamen, they were aware that it would be defended, if defended at all, by a force suffering under the depression of a lost battle, and having to attempt a stand with an arm of the sea in its immediate rear. Yet to the task of seizing this fort, and so at once gaining the north side of Sebastopol, and the means of destroying the enemy's fleet and dock-yards, they were going to prefer the unexplored forest and the mountain roads, with the necessity of having to debouch into a plain where the presence of a Russian army might be expected, and of afterward being forced to conquer for themselves new means of communication with the sea. On that, of course, their very existence was to depend ; and then, again, in the distance there would still lie before them the prospect of having to force the immensely strong position of the Sapounè ridge ; and not until that should be carried would they be able to begin attacking the southern defenses of Sebastopol—defenses of which, at this time, they knew very little. They had learned, indeed, that on its land side, some two years before, the place was open ; but in knowledge of what might since have been done for its defense their minds were almost blank.

The dangers and evils thus attaching to the plan of the 'flank march' were of the gravest kind ; but the truth is, that the unwillingness of the French Commander to persist in the plan of attacking the north side of the place had brought the affairs of the Allies to such a state that, supposing his reluctance to continue, very little freedom of choice could or would remain to Lord Raglan. He could not, of course, insult the French army by marching across its front to attack a work which was straight opposite to their lines, and away from those of the English. And, although Lord Raglan judged it to be his duty to uphold, to the last, the expediency of going on with the old plan of campaign, and attacking the North Fort, he also felt that there was a limit to the urgency which could

It involved the abandonment of a definite, practicable task, for one of unknown magnitude.

Little freedom of choice remained to Lord Raglan.

¹ See Sir John Burgoyne's memorandum, *post*, p. 68.

be appropriately exerted in that direction; for it was evident that to be beyond measure persistent in pressing and pressing the French Marshal to undertake an attack against his declared will and judgment was not only a course which held out small promise of good, but one which, if too far pursued, could hardly be otherwise than unbecoming, offensive, and impolitic. The thought of abandoning the expedition was not to be borne; and although it may be judged that the most politic mode of conquering the enemy's stronghold was by means of field operations carried on upon his lines of communication, yet the impatience of the English at home was so great, was so closely pointed to one object, and was, moreover, so hotly shared by their Government, that a resort to any plan of campaign, however wisely conceived, which avoided a direct attack upon Sebastopol, would have been almost looked upon as an abandonment of duty.

Well, but if for this reason field operations could not well be proposed as a substitute for a direct attack upon Sebastopol, then what choice was left? The truth is, that the unwillingness of the French to attack the north side of Sebastopol had brought the Allies into straits so hard that, with all its rashness, the plan of defiling round the east of Sebastopol might be regarded as the least of the evils from which a choice could be made. Rightly looked at, 'the flank march'—for so the movement is called—was a perilous, a desperate expedient, by which—that he might avert a collapse of the whole undertaking—Lord Raglan sought to find an alternative for the enterprise declined by the French. From causes which will be spoken of presently, the French army, without any fault of its own, was, for the moment, paralyzed; and the English army, on the other hand, being ready for action, and under a General resolved to force on the enterprise, there was great temptation to clutch at a plan which would relieve the French army from all immediate demand on its energies, and cast the load on the English. The plan of the flank march fulfilled these conditions; for it spared the French from the task which had seemed to await them on their right front, and invested the English General with the leadership and the virtual control of the proposed operation.

But although it was as an escape from a dilemma that the flank march is best to be justified, I do not represent that Lord Raglan himself thought ill of the measure. Without ever wavering in his opinion that the victory on the Alma should be followed

Reasons tending to justify the resort to the flank march.

Light in which Lord Raglan regarded the alternative of the flank march.

up by pursuing the old plan and attacking the Severnaya or North Fort, he yet thought that he saw such good features in the alternative plan as to be able to fall back upon it with a cheerful contentment. Apparently he was not much impressed with the hazardous character of the flank march; and, on the other hand, he certainly thought that, if once the Allies should be established on the south coast, they would there be on the best ground for attacking Sebastopol.¹

For the purpose of informing himself upon any question of military engineering, Lord Raglan had at his side an accomplished and gifted adviser. Sir John Burgoyne was a general of engineers now serving on the Staff of the army which Lord Raglan commanded. His experience of war went back to the great days. It began with the first year of this century at Malta. In 1806 he was serving in Sicily. He was commanding engineer with General Fraser's expedition to Egypt, and was at the assault on the lines of Alexandria, and the siege of Rosetta. He was with Sir John Moore at Messina and in Sweden in 1808, and was with him the same year in the Peninsula. He was at Corunna. He blew up the bridge of Benevente in the presence of the enemy. He was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1809, and attached to the 3rd (Picton's) Division. He was at the passage of the Douro. He served in the lines of Torres Vedras. He blew up Fort Conception in presence of the enemy. He was at Busaco, at the first siege of Badajoz, at Elboden, at Aldea del Ponte, and at the siege and capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, where he was present at the assault. He was at the second siege and capture of Badajoz, and was present at the assault and escalade of the castle. He was commanding engineer at the siege and capture of the forts of Salamanca, and at the battle. He was commanding engineer at the capture of Madrid, and the Retiro, and also at the siege of Burgos, where he was wounded. At Vittoria he had a horse shot under him. He was wounded at the assault of St. Sebastian. He conducted the siege of the castle of St. Sebastian as commanding engineer. He was at the passage of the Bidassoa, the Nivelle, at the Nive, at the passage of

¹ 'I have always been disposed to consider that Sebastopol should be attacked on the south side, and Sir John Burgoyne leaned strongly to the same opinion.'—*Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 28th September, 1854.* This must not be understood as implying—for that would be contrary to the fact—that Lord Raglan, when once landed on the western coast of the Crimea, did not anxiously desire and prefer that there should be an attack on the north side.

the Adour, the blockade of Bayonne, and the repulse of the sortie. He was at New Orleans, and was with the force dispatched to Portugal in 1827.¹ He had, therefore, a vast experience, connecting his name with a glorious period of England's history; and the value of this advantage was not, as so often happens, in the least counteracted by failure of energy. On the contrary, Sir John Burgoyne was gifted with a vigor of mind which made him in that respect the equal of those who were young. Furrowed by years, and the sheer labor of great wars, he still showed what mettle there was in the generation of men with which England began the century; for neither Egypt, nor the retreat to Corunna, nor the cares of Torres Vedras, nor the business of all the great sieges — Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, St. Sebastian — nor yet the discomfiture of New Orleans, had been able to imprint upon his features the marks of painful anxiety. To high intellectual power he added the firmness of a reasoner who holds that there can be no sect in mathematics, and that opinions carefully formed must not be dominated by mere results. As might be expected, he was master of the science of the military engineer; but his mind, ranging freely beyond his own branch of the service, had become stored with the many kinds of knowledge which concern the whole business of war. He wrote with clearness, with grace, and so persuasively that, having a pen in his hand, he was liable perhaps to be drawn into error by the cogency of his own arguments. He was daring and resolute; and since his mind had been formed at a time when England was not only in a robust and warlike condition, but also in some degree careless of the lives of common soldiers and workmen, it is probable that he could have easily brought himself to make a great sacrifice of life for a great purpose; and the power to do this, where a strong place has to be taken, is one of no little worth. Moreover, it is believed that Sir John Burgoyne was not without that wholesome ambition which, if the command of an army had chanced to fall to his lot,² might have impelled him to great achievements. It is possible that because he was the commanding engineer with Frasier's expedition to Egypt, and at the siege of Burgos, and because he was at New Orleans, and because he was advising in the business of trying to take Sebastopol at a time when the place did not fall, therefore some, in estimating his quality

¹ Hart's Army List.

² He was at one time the senior general officer serving under Lord Raglan, and, under possible circumstances, might have succeeded to the command.

as a general, might condemn him, after the manner of the Athenians, for not being fortunate; and supposing it to be insisted upon (as it would be by the more accurate Moderns) that a mere charge of lucklessness is no honest answer to a question concerning the capacity of a general, the objector, when thus driven home, might venture perhaps a surmise that Sir John Burgoyne's sureness of judgment was liable to be endangered by his too indiscriminate reliance upon the processes of close reasoning; for a method like that is most apt to lead man into fallacies, whenever he applies it to questions of such a kind that they need to be solved by the instinctive, the divining power, or even by coarse sagacity.

Still, the tenor of counsels, appearing at first sight to result from a too studious method of solving warlike problems, might be traceable, after all, to the nature of Sir John Burgoyne's position at the English Head-quarters, rather than to the original bent of his mind; for he who, without holding a command, was called upon to give advice likely to be accepted at the French Head-quarters, as well as by his own chief, was obliged to make proposals of such a kind that he could support them in argument; and that very necessity would be enough to prevent him from striking upon one of those daring yet happy conceptions which can be originated and pushed to great issues by a sole commander, although they are wanting in those smooth, placid features which would best recommend them to a council of war.

Of course, it was in the nature of things that the judgment of a man deeply versed in the business of sieges should be more or less warped by his science; and that, advising on the conduct of an enterprise much dependent on swiftness of action and on prompt use of the blessing of victory, the skilled engineer might be too ready to enter upon a war of entrenchments; but Sir John Burgoyne had so much breadth of view, and so general a knowledge of the warlike art, that he was as little likely, perhaps, to err in this direction as any other officer of the same calling in the French or the English camp.

Now, Sir John Burgoyne not only held that the project of an attack upon the south side of Sebastopol had many and great advantages over that of assailing the Star Fort, but even brought himself to believe that, for the sake of being able to exchange the one plan for the other, it would be wise to front all the hazard of marching the Allied armies to the east of the Sebastopol roadstead, and thence round to the south of the place. His opinion was

His opinion.

known to his chief; and when Lord Raglan perceived that the reluctance of the French to attack the Star Fort was strong, and firmly rooted, he hastened to obtain for the alternative plan which had occurred to him the sanction and persuasive support of Sir John Burgoyne. Accordingly, on the morrow of the battle on the Alma, he requested Sir John to put his opinion in writing; and in the course of the same day, the English Commander was furnished with this memorandum:—

MEMORANDUM.

‘CAMP ON THE ALMA, 21st Sept., 1854.

‘I would submit that, unless some impending circumstances occur which Sir John Bur- ‘can not now be foreseen, the combined armies should at once goyne’s Memo- ‘move round to the south side of Sebastopol, instead of attack- randum. ‘ing Fort Constantine;’ by which the following advantages ‘may be anticipated:—

‘1. That instead of attacking a position naturally strong and of limited ‘extent, to which a powerful support will be given by Fort Constantine,¹ ‘which is a permanent fortification, though by no means formidable, if in- ‘sulated, the enemy would have to defend a very extensive line, divided by ‘valleys, and, from every information, very imperfectly, if at all, intrenched, ‘and which would probably be forced rapidly.

‘2. As the advance is from the north, our attack will rather be expected ‘on that side, and not on the south.

‘3. Even supposing the Fort Constantine² to be taken, although it will ‘open the shipping, dock-yard, etc., to cannonading, it does not insure en- ‘tire possession of the important establishments until after a second opera- ‘tion, which may still require to move round to the south, while the enemy ‘will retain to the last free and open communication to the place.³

‘4. There is every reason to believe, from the appearance of the maps, ‘and what may be expected to be the formation of the ground, that there is ‘a very strong position between the sea at Balaclava and along the valley ‘of the Tchernaya, that would most efficiently cover the Allied armies dur- ‘ing the operation, but is too extensive to be taken up by the garrison.

‘5. That the communication with the fleet, which is, in fact, our base of ‘operations, would be far more secure and commodious by the small har- ‘bor of Balaclava and the bays near Chersonese, than on the open coast to ‘the north, and with the advantage of a good road from Balaclava to the ‘attacks, and a very flat country to pass to them from the bays near Cher- ‘sonese.

‘6. Under ordinary circumstances such a movement would have the effect ‘of exposing the communication of the army to be cut off; but in this case ‘the idea is, to abandon the communication from the north altogether, and

¹ By Fort Constantine Sir John Burgoyne means the Star Fort. Fort Constantine was one of the sea-forts, but at this period of the invasion the name was often applied by mistake to the Star Fort.

² See preceding note.

³ Possibly some words may have been here left out or miswritten, for, as actually worded, this last suggestion seems to be not only an error, but an inversion of the real state of the case. The attack of the *North Side* was the one which would have been compatible with plans for seizing the enemy’s lines of communication, whilst the flank march was on the contrary a final abdication of all power to operate in that way.

'establish a new one to the shipping in the south, which would be moved round for that purpose.

'J. F. BURGOYNE, *Lieut.-General.*'

Having completed this memorandum, Sir John Burgoyne was requested by Lord Raglan to go to the French Head-quarters, and there propound the plan of the flank march. He obeyed. His interview with Marshal St. Arnaud took place in the presence of the Marshal's Chief of the Staff and of General Bizot, the officers in command of the Engineers. Some other Staff officers were in the tent. When Sir John Burgoyne had explained the proposal recorded by his memorandum, and had answered the few questionings which were addressed to him, the Marshal at once, and without at all seeking counsel from the officers about him, declared, as Sir John understood, that he approved the plan and was willing to join with Lord Raglan in the determination to carry it into effect;¹ but it must not be understood that these words carried with them an unconditional decision. The Marshal apparently understood the proposal exactly in the same sense as that in which Lord Raglan had meant it to be submitted to him; and what his answer really imported was, that if he should persist in his objection to attack the North Fort, then, and in that event, he would consent to resort to the flank march. At all events, it is certain that the question of adopting the plan of the flank march remained open until a later period.²

Yet, even as early as the time when the Allies still lay on the Alma, the plan had won so much favor, that already, as we saw, it acted upon the arrangements of the Commanders, preventing them from leaving a detachment to cover the embarkation of the wounded, and, in that way, prolonging the halt.

And now, in the evening of the 24th of September, whilst the troops were establishing their quarters among the gardens and the villas on the Belbec, the Allies took their final resolve.

Lord Raglan, with some of his Staff, went to the camp of

¹ Letter from Sir John Burgoyne.

² See Marshal St. Arnaud's journal, under date of the 23rd and 24th September. Lord Raglan fixes the evening of the 24th, on the Belbec, as the time when the measure was adopted.—*Dispatch to Secretary of War, Sept. 28.* See also, *post*, an extract from a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written on the night of the 24th.

Lord Raglan's conference with Marshal St. Arnaud on the evening of the 24th.

the French Head-quarters. The interview was not a long one. Lord Raglan, in few words, and for the last time, submitted that the Allies should go on with their original plan of campaign, and assault the works on the north of Sebastopol.

Marshal St. Arnaud once more declined to agree to this. He said that the defenses of the Star Fort had revetments in masonry and that he would not undertake to attack such a work without laying formal siege to it.¹ This answer was

Determination to attempt the flank march.

treated as negating all farther idea of attacking Sebastopol from the north.² As regards the course which, in these circumstances, was to be

resorted to, Lord Raglan, as we saw, had himself proposed the alternative plan; and Marshal St. Arnaud, it seems, though not without some hesitation, had already made up his mind to accept it.³ On this subject, therefore, neither one nor the other of the two Commanders had need to use words of persuasion. They agreed to attempt the flank march.⁴

¹ Information from an officer present. In a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written just after this conference, and dated, 'On the Belbec, 24th Sept., night,' Lord Raglan says: 'We crossed to the Belbec this afternoon, and moved to the heights above it. I was anxious to have gone farther, but the French thought otherwise.'

² The mouth of the Belbec being commanded by the new battery thrown up near the Star Fort, it was conceived that no base of operations could be constituted in that region without first carrying the Star Fort, and that, consequently, any attacks on the Fort must be of a summary kind.

³ On the 24th the Marshal wrote in his private journal: 'We start at eleven o'clock. We shall turn the positions and the batteries by the left.' Lord Raglan's view seems to have been that the Marshal's assent to the flank march did not so much result from positive approval of the measure as from reluctance to go on with the original plan of attacking the Star Fort after hearing of the new works which commanded the mouth of the Belbec. In his private letter of the 28th of September to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan, after speaking of Sir John Burgoyne's memorandum respecting the flank march, says: 'The Marshal did not very readily adopt the idea in the first instance; but when he found that the mouth of the Belbec was commanded, and that strong works were erecting in front of Fort Constantine [meaning the Star Fort] which would impede the use of the river, he assented to the proposition without hesitation.' I imagine that the hesitation which Lord Raglan here ascribes to St. Arnaud must have shown itself *after* Burgoyne's interview with the Marshal, and *before* the discovery of the new field-work overlooking the mouth of the Belbec.

⁴ Statement by an officer present. Writing that same night of the deliberations between the French and the English Head-quarters, Lord Raglan says: 'We shall move again to-morrow morning, and we have nearly determined to attempt the attack of Sebastopol from the south side, abandoning our communication with the Katcha.'—*Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, dated, 'On the Belbec, 24th Sept., 1854, night.'* In qualifying his lan-

During the conversation, Marshal St. Arnaud sat rigidly up in an armed chair, and to some who observed it his bearing conveyed an impression that he wished to give to the interview an appearance of formality; but Lord Raglan perceived the truth. He had no sooner left the French camp than he said to one of his Staff, 'Did you observe St. Arnaud?—he is dying.'

This was the last time that the two chiefs conferred upon the business of the campaign. When Lord Raglan visited the French Head-quarters on the following morning, he found that the Marshal was no longer in a condition to be able to take part in affairs.

The decision the chiefs had come to was this:—that unless the reconnaissance which Lord Raglan was to make on the morrow should disclose good reasons for changing the plan, the English army first (to be followed in due time by the French) should endeavor to push round the head of the Sebastopol roadstead by gaining the Mackenzie Heights, with intention to descend thence into the valley of the Tchernaya, and recover communication with the sea by seizing the harbor of Balaclava.

At the time, it was hard to account for the Marshal's unwillingness to go on with the task of assailing the Star Fort, as well as for his ready acceptance of an alternative plan which, for the moment, would throw the leadership of the Allied army into the hands of his English colleague; and Lord Raglan acknowledged to Sir Edmund Lyons that he could not understand the Marshal's recusancy. But time has since thrown some light on what was obscure; and to me it seems that the theory which best explains the counsels of the French Head-quarters at this time is the obvious, the simple, the shallow one—the one which traces them to the bodily condition of Marshal St. Arnaud.¹ Without any accurate knowledge of the

Difficulty at the time of accounting for the Marshal's unwillingness to attack the Star Fort.

Lord Raglan's feeling of uncertainty as to St. Arnaud's motives.

Probable origin of the counsels which governed the French Head-quarters.

guage by the word 'nearly,' Lord Raglan, as I understand him, was adapting his statement to the fact that the execution of the plan was to be subject to the result of the reconnaissance he was going to undertake on the morrow. He did not, in any other sense, mean that the resolve was otherwise than final; and as the intended reconnaissance was to be in the course of the flank march, and, so to speak, a part of it, I can make, without qualification, the statement in the text to which this note is appended.

¹ This was the solution which Sir Edmund Lyons afterward adopted; but he also intimated that, at the time of the Marshal's refusal to go on against the North Forts, the state of his bodily health was not so far known to him

St. Arnaud's
bodily state.

successive maladies from which the Marshal was suffering, or of their singular intermissions, it is easy to see that, in the interval between the Battle of the Alma and his final determination to consent to the flank march, he was grievously ill in health, and was, from time to time, prostrated by his sufferings. But just as, in his African campaigns, he had more than once bravely resolved to drag his suffering body out of hospital that he might be acting with his regiment in some approaching engagement, so now, exerting himself to hold on in spite of his bodily state, he persisted in keeping his command. In the condition in which he was it was physically impossible for him to perform the laborious duties of a general who has to provide for the attack of such a place as the Star Fort. If it be said that he might have resigned his command, the answer is, that that was exactly the end which he was striving to avoid. With his old spirit of resistance to bodily weakness, he clung to his command, and apparently with the more tenacity from the time when he suspected that measures had been secretly taken to provide for the event of his becoming unable to remain at the head of the army. So when, as a substitute for the attack of the Star Fort, there came the proposal to resort to the flank march, he could see that the measure was one which averted the immediate necessity of his resigning the command, by shifting the stress of duty in the Allied army from its right to its left, and thereby enabling him to do now again what he had so happily done once before when he lay struck down by illness¹—that is, to leave the virtual leadership of the whole expedition for the time in the hands of the English Commander.

This way of explaining what passed is the more to be welcomed since it tends to disperse the seeming cloud that was thrown upon the French army by the counsels of its chief, and recognizes that singular power of fighting against bodily sickness which was one of the most interesting features in the character of Marshal St. Arnaud.²

If this final determination to turn aside from the Star Fort
The avoidance was in one sense a mere continuance of St. Ar-

(Sir Edmund) or to Lord Raglan as to enable them to see that that was the cause of the evil.

¹ During the voyage. See *ante*, vol. i. chap. xxxvii.

² Since I wrote the above I have had an opportunity of seeing that General de Todleben ascribes the avoidance of the Star Fort to the same cause—the maladies of the French Marshal.

of the Star
Fort was the
second of the
lost occasions.

naud's former refusal to march on and attack the work, still it took place under different conditions, and in circumstances which gave it the character of a distinct resolve. Thus regarded, it has to be ranged as the second of the lost occasions which followed the Battle of the Alma.

CHAPTER V.

The Allies
still in igno-
rance of the
enemy's plans
and move-
ments.

The critical
position of the
Allies.

THE night they lay on the Belbec, the Allies were still in blank ignorance of the enemy's plans; and although they supposed that the Russian army must be almost, as it were, in their presence, they did not know where it was posted. Of course, this still undispersed darkness in regard to the enemy's counsels and movements was of itself a source of grave danger; and unless they were largely reckoning upon the despondency or the unskillfulness of the enemy, the Allies might well believe that the circumstances in which they stood were critical even to jeopardy. Hitherto, each day's march had ended by relinking the (temporarily) abandoned communication between the land and the sea forces of the Allies; but now that the invaders had made up their minds to leave the mouth of the river on which they were bivouacked to the undisturbed control of the enemy, it resulted that, except by a retrograde march to the Katcha, or by an adventure across the country to the southern coast of the peninsula, they could no longer gain access to their shipping. On their right, there was the sea-shore, controlled by the enemy, and not approached by the succoring fleets. Before them, they had that Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol, which, since they had determined not to attack it, was as hampering to them as if it had been really impregnable. On their left, the Allies had a wooded and broken country, to them quite strange, though of course well known to the enemy; and the condition of things was such that it was competent to the Russian Commander, without hazard (and even without being seen till the work should be nearly done), to move his army at pleasure to any part of the Belbec which was far enough above the English lines to be clear of their outlying picket.¹

¹ The soundness of this observation is proved by the movement which was actually made by the Russian army in the night of the 24th and the morning of the 25th. See *post*, chap. vii.

If it could have been taken for granted that the troops which retreated from the Alma were still a coherent army, there would have been no reason why the morning's dawn should not show Prince Mentschikoff coming down in force upon the left flank of the Allies, and threatening to roll up their line. In that case the Allies—first the English and then the French—would have had to change their front, and to range themselves as best as they could, with the north side of Sebastopol on their right, and, at their backs, a sea and sea-shore no longer friendly to them, but controlled by the enemy's guns. The cause of their being in this plight was Marshal St. Arnaud's refusal to attack the work at the mouth of the Belbec; for if that had been taken or silenced, the attendant fleets would have approached, and the Allies, as before, would have been in communication with the shipping. This not being done, the fate with which the principles of the art of war seemed to threaten the Allies was—not mere discomfiture, but ruin. If two strategists for pastime, or for love of their art, were to wage a mimic war upon a map with pins and counters, the one who might find himself brought to the condition in which the Allies now lay would have to confess himself vanquished, and this notwithstanding that his counters might show him to be much the grosser in numbers. It was with better fortune that the Allies were destined to rise from their bivouac on the Belbec; for they had strength of a kind which the pins and the counters of the strategist could hardly symbolize; they were still under the shelter of their Wednesday's victory, and were favored beyond common measure by the unskillfulness of the Russian Commander.

About two hours after midnight, there was a good deal of musketry firing in a part of the Allied line; and when this came to be followed by the sustained roar of field-artillery, it was hard for young soldiers to avoid believing that a somewhat hot combat must be going on. Lord Raglan was not awakened. It was said that the false alarm which brought about all this firing arose in the Turkish lines.

When morning dawned upon the invaders there was no sign that the enemy was hovering upon their left flank; and although, as was afterward known, the army of the Allies and the Russian field army were drinking that morning of the same stream, there was between them a distance not hitherto

The cause which brought the Allies into an imperiled state.

The circumstances to which they owed their immunity.

False alarm in the night.

At dawn there was no sign that the enemy was on the left flank of the Allies.

pierced by the reports of scouts or deserters, and great enough to prevent their being seen the one by the other.

Virulence of the cholera on the night of the 24th. Demeanor of the sufferers.

During the hours of this bivouac on the Belbec, the cholera raged. In the morning, great numbers of the soldiers thus torn from the strength of the English regiments were laid in ranks parallel with the road. The sufferers all lay strangely silent.

CHAPTER VI.

I.

BEFORE he moved forward on the morning of the 25th, Lord Raglan saw Marshal St. Arnaud, but found him in a state of bodily suffering too acute to allow of his taking part in business.

Lord Raglan's visit to Marshal St. Arnaud. The Marshal's state of suffering.

Lord Raglan's dispositions for the flank march.

The resolve of the foregoing night was to be executed in the following way:—Leaving General Cathcart with the 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons on the Belbec, in order that, for a while, he might there maintain the communication with the Katcha, and be able to send the sick thither, Lord Raglan determined that the rest of his army, avoiding the marsh in front which Lord Cardigan had reconnoitered, and bending at once to its left, should move straight up to the ground overhanging the head of the Sebastopol bay, and try to keep such a direction as to be able to strike the high-road between Sebastopol and Baktchi Seräi at a spot described in the maps by the name of 'Mackenzie's Farm.' In that direction, accordingly, Lord Lucan was to proceed on reconnaissance with the cavalry division; and, the ground being woodland, he was to be supported by a battalion of the Rifles, under Colonel Lawrence. Upon reaching Mackenzie's Farm, Lord Lucan was to abstain from moving troops into the great road; but his instructions enjoined him to watch it both ways—that is, in the direction of Sebastopol on one side and Baktchi Seräi on the other. He was to report to Lord Raglan the result of his observations.¹

According to an indication given by the maps, there was a narrow lane or woodland road which led to Mackenzie's Farm; and in order to leave that route clear for the cavalry and artillery, our infantry were to make their way through

¹ See the written instruction in the Appendix.

the forest by following, as ships do at sea, the guidance of the mariner's compass. The direction in which they were to move was south-south-east from the point where the compass would first be needed.

Lord Raglan in person proposed to move forward in the general line of march until he should find himself on the commanding heights which overhang the head of the Sebastopol roadstead; but then, taking with him his escort—a troop of light horse—he intended to reconnoitre the ground and to determine with his own eyes whether there was any thing in the nature of the country, or in the visible preparations of the enemy, which might make it expedient to withdraw from the undertaking of the flank march, or to alter the way of effecting it. If he should judge that there was nothing which ought to hinder his enterprise, the advance of his whole army to Mackenzie's Farm, and thence to the Tchernaya and the south coast, was to go on. In that case, and as soon as the English cavalry, artillery, and wagon-trains should have so far defiled through the forest as to leave the road clear for other troops, the French army was to follow in the same direction. Accordingly, it may be said that, during the first hours of the march, the advance was a 'reconnaissance in force,' but a reconnaissance so arranged that Lord Raglan, by a word, could convert it into a definitive movement of the whole Allied army, which would be carried on to the top of the Mackenzie Heights, thence down to the Tractir bridge on the Tchernaya, and at last to the port of Balaclava.¹

At about half-past eight on the morning of the 25th of September, the flank march began. From the Commencement of the march. first, Lord Lucan's reconnoitering column was but little in advance of the main body of the English army for which it had to feel the way.² Lord Lucan's order of march was this: At the head of his column there moved a troop of hussars with which he was present in person. Half the companies of the Rifle battalion were placed in advance, and the other half in the rear of the main body of the cavalry, each regiment of which was covered by flankers of its own.

¹ See the Map, and the Plan of the country near Mackenzie's Farm.

² Lord Lucan (whose squadrons had bivouacked on the left of the English line) marched at about the same time as Head-quarters—i. e., at about half-past eight. It seems that in the earlier part of the morning the Rifle battalion had not reached the ground from which Lord Lucan was to move, and that, from that cause, the march of the reconnoitering column began at a later hour than would have been otherwise chosen.

After marching some miles in the right direction, this reconnoitering column of Lord Lucan's (though its route had been chosen for it by an officer of the Quartermaster-General's department, who rode with the force for this purpose) was led into a path which turned out to be a by-road diverging from the true line of march—a by-road degenerating after a time to a mere track, and at last disappearing altogether.¹ The troops were able, however, to make some way through the forest in the manner that had been prescribed to the infantry, by taking the compass for their guide, and moving, as nearly as they could, in a south-south-easterly course. Since Lord Lucan had a battalion of Rifles joined to his cavalry, and understood that he ought to keep his whole force together, he was unable, of course, to allow himself and his horsemen a greater degree of speed than the foot-soldiers with him could reach. Upon the whole, it resulted that, after awhile, the reconnoitering column was not (as Lord Raglan had of course supposed it would be) at the head of the advancing army.

By aid of the compass, and with great toil, our infantry divisions made their difficult way through the forest. The under-wood was in some places so thick as to leave but a very narrow choice of path, and in general it was found impracticable for the troops to preserve any kind of formation. The men of each battalion broke through as best they could, passing sometimes over ground where several could be working their way abreast of one another, but at other times compelled to break into Indian file. Still the plan of marching by compass was successful; and, so far as I have learned, no body of men fell out of the prescribed line of march in such a way as to become long divided from the rest of the army.

It was a laborious task for troops which were not at the time in the enjoyment of great bodily strength to have to tear their way through steep forest ground without a road or a path; and at one of the halts which took place with a portion of the Foot regiments already near the summit of the heights, some impatience broke out; for, there being no water, the men felt the torment of thirst. There arose a low, grave, momentous sound—the murmur of angered soldiery. Each man, whilst he sat or lay

¹ The officer charged with this duty was Major Wetherall, a man so able that no one ever thought of blaming him for choosing what turned out to be the wrong path. See, in the Appendix, Sir Edward Wetherall's statement.

on the ground, hoarsely groaned out the same intense word.

Their murmurs. The one utterance heard traveling along the lines was, 'Water! water! water!'

When Lord Raglan had gained the high ground on the east of Sebastopol, he diverged from the line of march which his army was taking; and having with him his escort, rode on along the shoulder of the hill which there bulges out toward the west.

When he stopped, he was at no great distance from the eastermost of those two light-houses which stand at the head of the bay.²

Then the prize, for the winning of which the Allies had come over the seas, lay spread out before him. Of such defenses as there might be on the land side of the place he indeed could discern very little; but the day being bright, and the ground so commanding as to give him full scope for his survey, he looked all the way down the great roadstead from the east to the west, and even could mark where the waves were lapping the booms at its entrance. He saw part of the fleet and the docks, the approaches of the Man-of-war Harbor, and the long-nurtured malice of the casemated batteries couched down at the water's edge. On the upland above the Severnaya or North side, he saw the Star Fort now left behind and avoided, and on the south the Karabel faubourg, with, beyond, the steep shining streets and the olive-green domes of Sebastopol. So glittered before him that 'priceless jewel'—for so the Russians declared it—now becoming the gage of a conflict not destined to end in his time.³

None foresaw, I believe, at the time, that the ground where Lord Raglan was standing would ere long acquire a strange worth in the eyes of the invading nations; yet before the next spring should warm into summer, the dominion of those barren uplands at the head of the Sebastopol bay was about to be accounted so precious that, in order by sheer might to win it, the great Powers of the West would be contemplating another armada, another descent on the coast, another and a greater invasion.⁴ But at this time, all was quietness. The Russians showed no troops; and not only was there no sign of their undertaking to obstruct the flank march, but it even

¹ This was not in the hearing of Lord Raglan.

² See Plan.

³ See the bird's-eye Plan. In a letter to his sovereign which will be spoken of hereafter, Prince Mentschikoff gives to Sebastopol the appellation of 'priceless jewel.'

⁴ This is an allusion to the plan which, as we shall see hereafter, was propounded with great eagerness by the French Emperor in the spring of 1855.

seemed as if hitherto they must either have been blind to the movement, or else so alive to its nature as to be willing to let it proceed and determined to abide their time.

The survey thus effected by Lord Raglan in person had disclosed nothing that could deter him from converting the reconnoissance into a definitive movement, but no report of the condition of things on the great road had yet come in from the cavalry. He turned his horse's head, and made for the line of march which his troops were pursuing, but with the intention of striking it at a point some way in advance.

Led by that instinctive knowledge of country which was one of his natural gifts, and neither having a guide, nor needing any fresh glance at the map, he at once chose his course like a rider who had been familiar with the ground all his days, and soon struck into the lane or woodland road which bends

up toward Mackenzie's Farm. The cavalry, as we saw, was moving through another part of the forest; but Maude's troop of horse-artillery, though in general commanded by

Lord Lucan, did not now form a part of the reconnoitering column; and having avoided the mistake which led the cavalry into a by-path, it was now

upon its assigned route, moving steadily along the woodland road. The road was just broad enough to allow the passage of a piece of artillery, with also one horseman alongside it; and at the time of the interruption which will be presently recorded, Lord Raglan, followed by his Staff in single file, was riding abreast of the foremost gun, or perhaps a few paces ahead of it.

Lord Raglan supposed that the reconnoitering column of cavalry and riflemen was in front of him, and from moment to moment, no doubt, he was expecting Lord Lucan's report.

If the cavalry had been leading the march through this lane, it would have been moving, of course, with the usual precautions, and an advanced-guard preceding the column by a sufficing distance, and perceiving a hostile force in its front, would have been quick to carry back warning to the main body. It chanced, however, as we saw, that our cavalry had missed the lane, and this is why it was that Lord Raglan came to be riding with none of his troops in front of him.

At length Lord Raglan reached a point in the lane where the light some way on could be seen breaking through in such way as to show that, a few yards

Lord Raglan strikes into the lane leading up through the forest to Mackenzie's Farm.

There he finds Maude's troop of horse-artillery.

Cause of the unguarded way in which Lord Raglan and the artillery-train moved on along the lane.

Lord Raglan's proximity to

the point where
the lane joins
the great road.

General Airey
moves forward,
and suddenly
finds himself
close to a Rus-
sian wagon-
train and a
body of Rus-
sian infantry.

in front, there must be an opening in the forest.¹ Observing this, General Airey asked permission to ride on a little way in advance, in order to see whether the ground was clear: and he moved accordingly; but in a few seconds he stopped; and without speaking held up his hand in a way which instantly showed not only that Lord Raglan and the whole column should instantly halt, but that there was need to be very quiet. Airey had, all at once, come in sight of the great road at the point where it crosses the lane almost close to Mackenzie's Farm.

There, and only a few paces off, there was a Russian wagon-train and a body of Russian infantry. The force, as we now know, was a battalion of foot-Cossacks escorting the wagon-train, but constituting also the rear-guard of Prince Mentchikoff's field army.² The men were halted—but not because they yet stood on the alert; they had halted as troops halt for rest in the midst of a toilsome march, and some of them were strolling along the road. Almost at the moment when they first caught sight of General Airey surveying them from his saddle, they must have heard the rumble of Maude's horse-artillery, and learned that an enemy's force was close upon them.

If two hostile forces thus came, as it were, by an accident to strike, one against the other in marching, the result was owing to two causes—to mere negligence on the part of the Russians, and, on the part of the English, to that mistake, already explained, which had led our reconnoitering column into the wrong path. To each of the bodies thus brought almost into contact the sudden presence of the other was a surprise; but the gravity of the danger they respectively incurred was far from being the same. A train of artillery marching up through a woodland lane, and the string of horsemen forming the Head-Quarters Staff, must needs have been almost helpless under the fire of a few foot-soldiers moving briskly into the wood.

But between the Russian battalion and the head of the English column thus by strange chance coming together, there was the difference that the Russian battalion, at the time, was apparently without the guidance of an officer having presence of mind, whilst the

Lord Raglan's
presence of
mind.

¹ See Plan of the country near Mackenzie's Farm.

² A battalion of the Black Sea Cossacks escorting an ammunition-train of the artillery, and the baggage of the 'Saxe Weimar' hussar regiment.

PLAN ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FLANK MARCH
AT THE TIME WHEN THE ENGLISH HEAD-
QUARTERS CAME UPON THE REAR-GUARD
OF PRINCE MENTSCHIKOFF'S FIELD ARMY.



English Cavalry, thus.....
English Infantry, thus.....

The Treaty
Bridge and thence
to Sevastopol and
Balaclava.

Scale of Miles.
0 1 2 3

Russian Infantry, thus.....
Guns in March along a Road, thus.....

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English Commander-in-Chief, who happened, as we have seen, to be present in person with this part of his army, was one whom Nature had gifted with the power to do at the moment just that which the moment requires. In a tranquil, low voice, Lord Raglan gave orders to bring up some of his cavalry;¹ and the officers whom he charged with this mission glided swiftly away; but he himself and the rest of his Staff slowly moved down the lane a few paces, then halted, and remained very still.²

Before the orders for bringing up the cavalry could produce their effect, some minutes must needs pass, and during this little interval the English Commander and his Staff, as well as Maude's artillery, could not but be much at the mercy of the enemy. Yet those of the Russians who were so placed as to be able to descry Lord Raglan through the foliage would never have been able to infer from the sight that he or his Staff were people who supposed themselves to be placed in any kind of jeopardy. Rather they would have been led to imagine, from what they saw, that the English General had just effected a surprise designed beforehand, and was inspecting the progress of an attack now about to be made on themselves.

Deceived by the tranquillity of the scene thus presented to them by Lord Raglan, or simply, perhaps, bewildered by the suddenness of the adventure, the Russians did not stretch out a hand to seize the gift which fortune was proffering. Minutes passed without bringing signs that the enemy's soldiery were moving into the wood; and at length Chetwode's troop of hussars came galloping up the lane in single file, the officers of the Staff making room for them by moving into the copse. Nor was this the only cavalry force now at hand. It chanced that Lord Lucan, who had been marching through the forest a little lower down on the right, had sent Captain Wetherall to explore, and Wetherall coming back to him quickly with tidings of the emergency which

¹ He dispatched, I think, two officers, of whom one, I suppose, may have been ordered to fetch the troop under Captain Chetwode which were on duty as Lord Raglan's escort, whilst the other was probably directed to endeavor to find Lord Lucan and the main body of the cavalry. According to the impression I formed at the time—and I believe I heard his words—he sent for any cavalry that could be found.

² I have seen it somewhere stated that Lord Raglan and his Staff came galloping back in haste. If they had done so, they would probably have brought destruction upon themselves. Neither Lord Raglan nor any of his Staff (except the officers sent to fetch the cavalry) moved out of a walk.

had occurred, Lord Lucan hastened to bring his cavalry division into the lane, and some of his squadrons were there almost as soon as the escort. Lawrence's Rifles, too, were up, and swiftly pushing forward. None of the horsemen stopped at all in the lane, but all as they came, and in single file, galloped on into the road where the enemy had been seen.

Lord Lucan in person was with the horsemen thus coming up. Naturally, Lord Raglan had been angered by finding that the cavalry was not in advance upon the main line of march; and when he saw the divisional General passing, he said to him, 'Lord Lucan, you are late!' Lord Lucan galloped on without answering.¹

But already the Russian soldiery who had undergone this surprise were in flight along the great road, and in a direction which took them away from Sebastopol, and toward the town of Baktchi Seräi. Our cavalry continued to come up, and by this time Maude's troop of horse-artillery had not only got out of the forest, but had unlimbered some of their guns on the great road, and brought them to bear on a part of the enemy's wagon-train in a way which stopped its retreat.

In order to cover his flank, Lord Raglan dismounted some of the Greys, and caused them to take possession of the wood by the roadside.

Our cavalry pressed forward, and at length came up with a small rear-guard consisting of some twenty of the enemy's infantrymen. These faced about boldly, and delivered a volley at the faces of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan and their Staff, then riding in front of our horsemen; but the Russians fired too high, and were presently, of course, overpowered, some running aside into the forest, others standing their ground so long that they failed to escape the edge of the sabre.

When our cavalry had reached the crest from which the road goes steep down into the plain beyond, Lord Raglan stopped the pursuit.

In the result, there were taken a few prisoners, including an officer of artillery, and numbers of ammunition-wagons. But besides these captures, there was found in the baggage-train of the Weimar hussars so great a quantity of things worth the trouble of carrying,

¹ The foregoing account shows the grounds which would have been available to Lord Lucan if he had afterward thought fit to tender an explanation of the way in which the reconnoitering column lost its place.

that almost every soldier coming up at this time was made happy with some piece of booty. The baggage of the Russian hussar regiment included the possessions of the officers, and thence it was that our soldiers got trophies of a kind which would serve for memorials and for presents. Without some knowledge of the soldier, and the simplicity of his nature, it would be hard to understand the full measure of the animation and delight which the troops were able to derive from this little capture of booty.

When Lord Cardigan had returned from the pursuit, he presented himself to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Raglan was still in anger at the thought of the disaster which might have been occasioned by the want of any cavalry force advancing in front of his army; and after mentioning the way in which the Head-Quarters Staff and Maude's artillery had been suffered to come, as it were, into contact with a hostile force, he said, 'The cavalry were out of their proper place. You took them much too low down.' It may be believed that Lord Cardigan bore with much fortitude the blame which he felt could be immediately transferred from his shoulders to those of Lord Lucan, and he readily answered, 'My lord, I am no longer in command of the cavalry.'

Almost close to the point in the road where the Russians had thus been surprised, there was the building marked in the maps as Mackenzie's Farm. It seemed to have been used as a temporary barrack, or resting-place for troops in march. In its precincts there were two wells, which yielded a grateful, though too scanty, supply of water.

From the crest just reached by our cavalry when they had to obey the recall, the eye commanded a far-reaching view of the plain beneath. Through this plain there passed the post-road which led to Baktchi Seräi and Simpheropol, and thence north to the main-land of Russia. Retreating along it, there could be seen a division of infantry, some cavalry, and a battery of field-artillery; but beyond, and beyond again, there were thick clouds of dust, which indicated the track of more distant battalions and of squadrons on the same line of march.

¹ The words 'no longer' may seem hardly intelligible; but Lord Cardigan had cherished the idea that his authority over the cavalry which landed with the army—*i. e.*, over the Light Brigade—was to be a separate command. See *post*, chap. xxi.

This 'incident of war'—so Lord Raglan called it at the time to one who rode near him—this 'incident of war' was the result of a singular chance which brought into contact of time and place two movements, each of them cardinal—the one the flank march undertaken by the Allies, the other a flank march also, in which the Russians were busied.

Of the extent and purpose of this Russian flank march we shall have to speak by and by; but, for the present, we are only observing so much of the then dim truth as was visible, at the time, to the English Head-quarters.

It might be thought that, from the sight of the enemy's retiring columns, from the nature of the captured baggage, and from the answers of the few prisoners taken (of whom one was an officer), a clue would be easily seized, from which to infer with some certainty the scope and extent of the operation going on under the eyes of our people. It was not so.

The officer who had been taken prisoner proved to be a captain of artillery. He was brought forward that he might be questioned, but it instantly appeared that he was in a condition which, for the moment, was of advantage to his country, for it baffled all endeavors to draw knowledge from him. He had brought himself to that stage and that kind of drunkenness which causes the patient to reel in curves from side to side, declaring his goodwill to his fellow-creatures, and incessantly proffering his friendship. Yet the time was midday, and the sun was shining. Lord Raglan's anxious regard for the personal dig-

Lord Raglan
pained and re-
volted.

nity of the officer and the gentleman had nothing of the narrowness which would confine its scope to those of his own nation, and it seemed that the feeling with which he looked upon the reeling captain was hardly short of distress. At all events, he was so revolted that, yielding to impulse, he broke away from the sight, abandoning all endeavor to draw from the prisoner the knowledge he might happen to have. If other attempts were made to get the truth, they were followed by little result; for it is certain that, even long afterward, the magnitude and the purpose of the movement which brought the Russian force to Mackenzie's Farm remained unknown at the English Head-quarters.

But whoever has formed any conception of the perilous character of this flank march will easily believe

Paramount

anxiety in regard to the recovery of the sea communication.

that, at this time, almost the whole stress of the English General's attention must have been brought to bear upon the object of recovering his communications with the sea.

The army again moved forward, and, in a little while, it had reached the southern crest of those Mackenzie Heights upon which, during many long months, the Great Powers of the West were destined to be gazing with the eyes of baffled desire. Moving down from the summit of these heights to their base by a steep mountain-road, the English army descended into the valley of the Tchernaya. Still pushing forward, but by a painful effort (for this day's was a long and forced march), the bulk of the army at last descended upon the Tchernaya, at the point where its waters were crossed by the Tractir bridge; but darkness had long set in before the bulk of the troops gained their bivouac on the banks of the stream, and some did not reach it that night. Lord Raglan's quarters were established in the little post-house which stood near the bridge.

The march resumed.

The Mackenzie Heights.

The army reaches the Tchernaya.

Whilst the main body of the English army thus lay on the Tchernaya, the road by which they had come was still crowded, miles back, by their trains; and the obstruction thus caused prevented the French from pushing the march for that night beyond Mackenzie's Farm; indeed, their rear-guard was not able to reach its bivouac there until three o'clock in the morning. The scanty supply of water remaining in the wells was exhausted by the first-comers, and the troops suffered thirst.

March of the French.

Cathcart, meanwhile, with his Division, was still on the Belbec, where he had been intrusted with the duty of covering the march, and sending back the sick to the Katcha. His position would have been one of some peril if there had been in the field an enemy watchful and enterprising. From the Belbec to the Katcha, where lay the fleets, there was a tract of hill country unoccupied by the Allies, and the trains sent thither with the sick were at the mercy of the enemy. One of the trains came upon a strong Russian picket, and Surgeon Inlong—himself a sick man—was only able to save the convoy by causing the strongest of the patients to get out of the wagons and feign the appearance of a baggage escort.

Cathcart's duties on the Belbec.

Communications with the Katcha now at the mercy of the enemy.

Divided thus by what might almost be reckoned as a two-

Lord Raglan on the Tchernaya.

Importance of being able to send a message to the Admirals.

The object effected in the night.

Purport of Lord Raglan's communications from the Tchernaya to the Admirals.

days' march from Cathcart's Division, and divided, too, from his shipping by a yet farther tract of country now left in the hands of the enemy, Lord Raglan, from his bivouac at the Tractir bridge, was anxious, as may well be supposed, to make known to our Admirals the success of his march on the Tchernaya, and his now unconditional resolve to seize the port of Balaclava. This object was effected twice over in the course of the night. Captain Hugh Smith was ordered by Cathcart to endeavor to carry a dispatch to Head-quarters; and although the Captain passed a Russian battery, which opened upon him and killed one of his orderlies, he was able to reach the Tchernaya, and thence bring back from Lord Raglan a message which Cathcart was to send on to the Katcha. Colonel Windham, intrusted by Cathcart with the duty of carrying on the message, succeeded in reaching the Katcha, and delivered it safely to the Admiral. Also, Lieutenant Maxse, dispatched from the 'Agamemnon,' was able to find our Head-quarters on the Tchernaya, and to bring back, during the night, Lord Raglan's message for Lyons. Lord Raglan did not choose to risk a dispatch, lest it should fall into the hands of the Russians; but the message, repeated in duplicate, which he had thus been enabled to send, informed the Admirals of the progress of his march, and of his now final determination to move to the south coast, conveying, at the same time, his hope that a naval force would come round to Balaclava, and be there to meet him.

Rightly looked at, the need that there was for resorting to ventures like these will help perhaps to disclose the hazardous character of the Flank March, and the weakness of the posture in which the Allied army lay on the night of the 25th of September.¹

On the morning of the next day, Lord Raglan resumed his march, and crossing, after a time, the now famous Woronzoff Road, was at length upon ground where, unless the maps were deceiving him, he must needs be very near to Balaclava. But the country which lay before him seemed closed up at every point by towering hills, and there was not the least sign of an opening in which to look for a sea-port. Soon he came upon a village, but a smiling, and ap-

The march resumed on the 26th.

Lord Raglan before Balaclava.

¹ See the Plan.

parently inland village, having the porches of its cottages richly laden with clustering grapes, and disclosing no sign of its being a place near the sea. This was Kadiköi. The villagers were questioned a little, and they said that Balaclava was undefended. They seemed to speak like people who had nothing they cared to withhold.

The Rifles were already ascending the hills which lay toward the south, but, upon the road by which he was moving, Lord Raglan, at this time, had no advanced-guard before him. As at the Alma, when he gained the knoll looking down upon the enemy's reserves, and as yesterday at Mackenzie's Farm, when he all but struck in upon the rear-guard of a Russian army, so to-day, and for the third time in this singular campaign, it once again happened that of the whole Allied army he himself was the foremost explorer. A bend in the road brought him to the edge of what seemed to be only a small inland pool with a rivulet trickling into it; for the rest of the sheet of water to which he had come lay hidden behind the fold of the hill. Beyond the pool, but still very close at hand, there rose a barrier of steep, lofty hills; and one of them was crowned, as it seemed, with an antique castle in ruins.¹

All at once, from a mortar in the ancient castle, fire was opened, and, in the next moment, a shell dropped plumping into the pool. This shot was followed by more, and one of the shells which came down sank into the earth—without bursting—at a spot very near the chief. Lord Raglan looked angry, imagining, I believe, for a moment, that the villagers of Kadiköi had meant to deceive him when they said that Balaclava was undefended. He ordered that the two flanking heights should be occupied by the Light Division, and by a part of Brandling's troop of horse-artillery. The ground at a few paces distant afforded more or less shelter from the fire of the castle; but pending the operation intrusted to the Light Division, Lord Raglan had to await its result, and in the mean time submit to remain shut out from the haven on which he had marched.

To an army engaged in the hazardous operation of marching across the enemy's country in order to find and conquer

¹ The castle was on the left of the two flanking heights; but from the way in which the hills interfolded, the contrary seemed to be the case. Codrington with his brigade ascended the hill on our right and encountered no opposition, but had the happiness of reassuring some gentlewomen who had fled thither in terror from Balaclava.

for itself a new base of operations, any unlooked-for hindrance, even though it may seem likely to be of short duration, can hardly fail to be a subject of anxiety.

Presently, and sounding as from beneath the old castle on its southern side, there roared out the thunder of ships' guns that peals from a gun of majestic calibre. Then again; then again. The whole landscape, being closed in abruptly toward the south by the form of the hills, bore a thoroughly inland aspect; but men knew, as it were, by his voice, the tried friend whom they could not yet see. They said, 'There is Lyons!' The Admiral was keeping his tryst.

The officer in charge of the castle which had opened fire on our Head-Quarters Staff was Colonel Monto. He had no force under his orders except a few Greeks of Balaclava, who had been formed into a kind of local militia; and before our light infantry had time to crown the two hills, he found means to show that he surrendered. When afterward asked by Lord Raglan why he had taken upon himself to open fire without having means to attempt a real defense, Colonel Monto answered that he had never been summoned. He said that if he had been summoned he would have surrendered at once; but he thought that, until he should be either attacked or summoned, it was his duty to offer resistance.¹

Upon learning the surrender of the castle, Lord Raglan once more rode forward, and presently entered the little street which formed the main part of Balaclava.

The people of the place were alarmed when they thought of the consequences which might be brought upon them by Colonel Monto's show of resistance. Their notion of what should be done may have been formed on the exigency of the moment, or else may have come down to them with their Greek or Asiatic traditions of conquering armies and suppliant towns. At all events, these poor people found a mute, touching way of declaring their submission and praying for mercy. Leaving clear a lane in the centre for Lord Raglan and the horsemen

¹ The Russians ascribe to Colonel Monto one of those heroic speeches which people are accustomed to invent in time of war; but I am sure that the above is the real purport of the Colonel's answer, for Lord Raglan so represented it to me just after having received it. Lord Raglan, I remember, said there is often a good deal of practical difficulty in summoning.

who followed him, and the troops coming after, they went down upon their knees, and so remained, holding up, all the time, loaves of bread in their outstretched hands. They seemed to take heart when they lifted their faces and scanned the gracious looks of the English Commander; but still he was what their imagination represented as terrible—the capturer of a place which had greeted him with fire—and they could see—because of his arm—he was one who had known other wars.

Riding forward to where, on his right, the way opened down to the water, Lord Raglan approached the pool or basin which lies parallel with the little street; but, shut in, as it was, by steep, lofty hills toward the south, the water still looked like a tarn or small mountain lake; and whilst some who had studied the maps were only now at length convincing themselves that what they saw must be indeed the port of Balaclava, there occurred a conjuncture of the kind which a dramatist makes free to create, but one too signal and too aptly timed to be commonly met with in the confusions of the actual world.¹ Lord Raglan had scarce stopped his horse, and was glancing across the small sheet of water before him, when from between the enfolding hills a vessel came gliding in, and she carried the English flag. Once more, after a hazardous time of separation, the land and the sea forces met.

The words which Lord Raglan spoke at this moment disclosed that quality of his nature which made him ever thoughtful of others. It was in concert with Lyons that against every kind of obstacle he had forced on this bold invasion in obedience to the Government of the Queen; and now when, after the temporary severance occasioned by the flank march, he again touched the helping hand which the navy afforded, his first utterance was the expression of a wish that Lyons were enjoying the happiness of being there to greet him. ‘If Lyons were here,’ he said, ‘this would be perfect.’ The greeting soon followed, for Lyons, in the ‘Agamemnon,’ was close outside.

¹ To an observer standing at Balaclava or approaching it from the north, the port seems to be much more closely land-locked than could be easily supposed possible by one deriving his impression from maps and charts. And although it may be true that mensuration does not err, no one seemed to be prepared to find the port looking so exceedingly diminutive as it did. Its length is stated to be as much as 1400, and its breadth 230 yards.

From on board the vessel which had run in, soundings were quickly taken, and, small as it was, the pool proved deep enough to float a ship of the line. In a little while the harbor was crowded with shipping, and the town with English soldiery.

Smallness and depth of the harbor.

Harbor and town quickly filled.

II.

The next day, when one of the French Divisions came up, there was an inclination to remonstrate, and not without reason, against the occupation of the whole of Balaclava by the English. The French said that, according to the understanding with which the flank march was agreed to, Balaclava was to be for the Allies, and nor for one of them only. However accurate the maps and charts may have been, they had failed to convey to men's minds beforehand the exceeding smallness of the place; but now when the basin was thick crowded with masts, when the landing-place swarmed with busied men, and the little street overflowed with the red-coated soldiery, it was evident that Balaclava was too diminutive to bear being divided between the French and the English. If the place was to be assigned to one of the two armies in exclusion of the other, the French were entitled to say, that in the Allied line they had hitherto taken the right, and that unless the precedence so conceded were to be withdrawn from them, Balaclava must needs be theirs, because it was the easternmost of all the possible landing-places on this part of the coast, and the Allies, when arrayed against Sebastopol, would have to face toward the north.

Remonstrance on the part of the French.

Its justice.

Impracticability of dividing the place between the French and the English.

Claim of the French to Balaclava on the ground of their having hitherto taken the right-hand side.

The French acted, however, with great forbearance; and nothing, indeed, could be fairer than the course which Canrobert took.¹ He justly represented that the French had hitherto had the right side on the Allied line, and that, of necessity (on account of the position of the place), the army which was to be on the right must have Balaclava as the port of supply which would be in its immediate rear; but seeing the English already installed in the port and the town, and inferring that to call upon them to move out and make way for the French would be likely to create ill blood, he generously and wisely proposed to give Lord Raglan his choice. Either

Forbearance of the French.

The choice offered to Lord Raglan.

¹ General Canrobert, as will be afterward stated, had at this time acceded to the command of the French army.

Lord Raglan might continue, as before, to take the left place in the Allied line, with an understanding that, in that case, he would have to give up Balaclava to the French, or else he might keep Balaclava, but, as the consequence of doing so, must take his place on the right of the Allied line. To take the right was to add to the toils of the siege the duty of withstanding any enterprises which might be undertaken by the enemy's field army; to take the left was to be sheltered from molestation on all sides except that of the town. But, on the other hand, the privilege of occupying Balaclava seemed, at the time, to be one of great value, because the fitness and the ample advantages of the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch had not been then recognized.¹

Before he made his choice Lord Raglan consulted Lyons, and Lyons urged with a great earnestness that Balaclava should be retained by the English. There, and there only, as he thought, could there be a sufficiently sure communication between the fleet and the land forces. As experience proved, he was wrong; but upon a naval question—and such this question was—his opinion, of course, had great weight. It prevailed. For the sake of retaining Balaclava, Lord Raglan elected to take the right in the Allied line, with all its burdens and perils.

It seems probable that, if Lord Raglan had chanced to prefer the other alternative, the subsequent course of events would have borne but little resemblance to that which in fact took place.

Pursuant to the understanding between the two chiefs, the French marched on to the westward; and the forbearance they had shown was rewarded, for it proved that the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch yielded excellent means of landing supplies for an army.

Thus the French gained the vast advantage of having

¹ Yet it might have been. In the memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople in 1834 (see note and plan, *ante*, p. 57), General, then Colonel, Macintosh wrote: 'Immediately after passing the light-house on the point, there is an extensive bay which branches out in several directions—an excellent landing-place, but it is above four miles from the town.' The inlets thus described are those of Kamiesh and Kazatch. In November, 1853, General Macintosh called the attention of the Horse Guards to his memorandum of 1834, and wrote: 'The large bay, marked D in the sketch [see copy of it, *ante*, p. 57], at once suggests itself as the most suitable place to land a battering-train and siege stores, but it is very probable that it is now also fortified.'

It was from their own choice, and not from any selfishness on the part of the French, that the English were induced to take the right.

ample, convenient ports, together with all the comparative ease and immunity of being on the left of the Allied line, whilst the English, with one diminutive harbor, were taking a post which seemed to involve them in the double duty of covering the siege and taking part in its labors; but this allotment resulted from the free (though mistaken) choice of the English, and not from

any endeavor to overreach them on the part of General Canrobert.

The Allies, pushing forward, proceeded to establish their besieging troops upon a line passing from east to west across the centre of that district of high ground on the south of Sebastopol which goes by the name of the Chersonese; and the English, for the reason just given, accepted the east or right side, whilst the French, keeping more to the westward, consented to take the left.

Having, in the course of the 25th, sent back all the convoys of sick to the Katcha, and having sent forward what remained of the baggage-trains into the general line of march, Cathcart, on the following day, left the Belbec, moving up to Mackenzie's Farm, and descending thence to the Tchernaya. For some thirty hours or more Cathcart had been left so far isolated as to make it seem likely that he would have occasion for showing his quality as a commander, and he contemplated the eventuality of being attacked in a way which would oblige him to burn his baggage and cut his way through; but the enemy forbore, attempting nothing against him.

After gaining the Tchernaya on the 26th, Cathcart did not, on the following day, pursue the track of the other divisions; but, pursuant to Lord Raglan's orders, moved up by the Khantor Pass to the top of the plateau, and so at once came into line with the rest of the Anglo-French army, then ranging in front of Sebastopol.

Thus ended a venturesome movement. Whether the measure was really, as some have imagined, a wise one, or whether it was of so perilous a nature as only to be rendered warrantable by the exceeding stress of the predicament which caused its adoption, the Allies had at least the fortune to reach the goal they had sought, and even to reach it unhurt; but it must not be thought that, in any other sense, the flank march bore the test of experience; for we shall see by and by that,

Success of the flank march.

Reason why the success of

the measure afforded no sufficing test of its prudence. though master of the country around him, and having some 3000 horse, Prince Mentschikoff suffered himself to remain unacquainted with the march of the Allied army then proceeding in open day close to where he had brought his own troops; and that, even when his rear-guard was touched by Lord Raglan, and attacked by our horse and artillery, he ascribed the collision to a French or English patrol, and still preserved his clean ignorance of all that was going on. From this, the blindfolded state of Prince Mentschikoff, it resulted that the flank march did not undergo the perilous trial which seemed to await it; and therefore the success of the movement does not make it at all an example of what may be wisely dared in the presence of an enemy accustomed to use common watchfulness, and able to seize an advantage.

But, even without the interposition of an enterprising foe, a march of this kind might have been brought to ruin by any faltering or mismanagement on the part of the Allies. As it was, the march prospered. When once it had been agreed on the Belbec that this venturesome movement should be attempted, and that the English army should lead the way, it resulted from this arrangement, and from Marshal St. Arnaud's increasing weakness, that Lord Raglan got for forty-eight hours the practical leadership of the whole Allied army; and the effect of the change soon showed itself in the speed and the firmness with which the flank march was executed. As at sea, after the 10th of September the illness of Marshal St. Arnaud gave a great momentum to the invasion, by placing the virtual guidance of the armada in the hands of Lord Raglan during several critical days, so now, when, from similar causes, the virtual leadership of the Anglo-French army fell once more, for a time, to Lord Raglan, it instantly felt the advantage which results from undivided command.

III.

The night the French lay on the Tchernaya, Marshal St. Arnaud ceased to hold his command. Naturally, the policy of the French Emperor had inclined him to put the army, as far as was possible, under officers concerned in the slaughter which placed him on his throne; and it must be acknowledged that in this respect General Canrobert was but too

Cessation of Marshal St. Arnaud's command. Night between 26th and 27th Sept. Policy of the French Emperor with respect

to the command of the army.

General Caurobert.

The dormant commission intrusted to him.

The existence of this was to be concealed from St. Arnaud.

well qualified by the part which he had had the misfortune to take in the massacre of the Boulevard; but it is also true, as we have seen, that the brilliant reputation which the General had established in African warfare gave him a more honorable, though not more cogent, title to be trusted with high command. To him the French Emperor had secretly confided a dormant commission which was to put him at the head of the French army, if any event arising out of sickness or war should prevent the Marshal from keeping the command. This dormant commission was to be kept hidden, it seems, from the Marshal.¹ Monsieur St. Arnaud seems to have

had an instinctive suspicion that something of the kind had been planned, but he was not made acquainted with the truth until the 13th of September, the day next before the landing. The Marshal had sent for General Morris, the officer next in seniority, and General Canrobert then thought it was time to disclose the existence of the commission. St. Arnaud had already requested the Government to appoint his successor as soon as Sebastopol should fall; but it would seem that his discovery of the dormant commission tended rather to increase than to lessen the singular tenacity with which—struggling always against mortal sickness—he still clung to the command. However, on the 26th—the night the French lay on the Tchernaya—he became so weak that the attending physician thought fit to make his patient's state known to Colonel Trochu, the officer understood to be intrusted by the Emperor with the function of advising at the French Head-quarters. The Colonel then conceived it his duty to act. Entering the Marshal's tent, he strove to break his purpose with all the tenderness and kindly feeling which words could express, but ended by telling the sick man that the time had come when, in order to obtain the repose which he needed, he must have his mind free from anxiety.

Interposition of Colonel Trochu.

vising at the French Head-quarters. The Colonel

then conceived it his duty to act. Entering the Marshal's tent, he strove to break his purpose with all the tenderness and kindly feeling which words could express, but ended by telling the sick man that the time had come when, in order to obtain the repose which he needed, he must have his mind free from anxiety.

¹ It will be observed that in speaking of this dormant commission, and of the illnesses, resignation, and death of Marshal St. Arnaud, I avoid the language of positive statement: and I may say that for the means of making the statements I do on this particular subject I am mainly indebted to the work of M. Bazancourt. Through General Yusuf and M. Henry, who were constantly at the side of the Marshal in his last days, M. Bazancourt had peculiarly good means of knowing what passed, and his account bears internal evidence of being accurate. What I say, however, of Lord Raglan's last visit to the Marshal, is drawn from Lord Raglan's private correspondence.

For an instant the Marshal only fixed his eyes upon the Colonel; but then he said, 'Yes, I understand you; send for General Canrobert:' and in the next hour he resigned the command into the hands of his preordained successor.

It seems that on this night the Marshal had thrown off the cholera, but other ailments still caused him from time to time cruel suffering alternating with periods of prostration. From the moment when he resigned, he longed with great intensity to be away from the Crimea, but before he embarked Lord Raglan went to his bedside to bid him adieu. The Marshal, at that time, could only speak in a whisper, and his mind, as Lord Raglan thought, was wandering. 'I must say,' Lord Raglan wrote—'I must say I deeply regret him. Although he occasioned me many difficulties from time to time, he never varied in his determination to be upon good terms with me; and, personally, he was all kindness to and consideration for me.'¹

It must be remembered, however, that when Lord Raglan thus wrote, he had not become acquainted with the contents of the dispatch which Marshal St. Arnaud had thought fit to address to the Emperor on the morrow of the Alma.² After learning the contents of the dispatch, Lord Raglan, in very warm terms, expressed his approval of the indignant remonstrance on this subject which our Ambassador, as we shall see by and by, had made to the French Government;³ and it will therefore, of course, be inferred that his perusal of the Marshal's narrative must have more or less changed his opinion of the writer.

Among the troubles to which Lord Raglan referred as having been brought upon him by Marshal St. Arnaud, there were some which had threatened to shake the Alliance, and others to mar the campaign; but however much it might be owing to his own peculiar gifts that Lord Raglan, in the face of these dangers, was able to ward off all fatal disagree-

¹ Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 8th October, 1854.

² See *post*.

³ He speaks of the communication narrating the remonstrance and the grounds for resorting to it as 'perfect;' and considering how choice Lord Raglan was accustomed to be in his language, this word coming from him was a strong one.—*Private letter from Lord Raglan, 3rd November, 1854.* And see *post*.

ment from the camp of the Western Powers, and to prevent the invasion from collapsing, it was the generous quality of the Marshal's temper which made it possible for the English General to achieve these results without leaving bitterness in the heart of his colleague.

Whether the feeling with which St. Arnaud was regarded by the French army sprang from the circumstance of his suffering himself to be interfered with by the Emperor, or whether it arose from the intrigues of rivals, or from honest distrust and reprobation, it is certain that the Marshal was without due ascendancy in his own camp. Under his command, the French army was never the powerful instrument which the numbers and the prowess of its components seemed able to make it; for although, after the Battle of the Alma, he suffered himself to imagine that victory had won him at last the full confidence of the troops, his bodily health from that time was hardly in such a state as to enable him to try the strength of his authority.

It was only in the early days on the Bosphorus and in Bulgaria that the troubles St. Arnaud occasioned were of a kind resulting from his ambition or encroaching spirit. From the time when, during the voyage, the French officers sent in their protest against the intended descent on the Crimea, down to that when the whole Allied army was turned aside from its purpose by the bare apparition of an earth-work descried by the French on the Belbec, it was never, I think, mere ill-will or perverseness on the part of the Marshal, but always his want of authority, or else his failing health, which stood in the way of the enterprise.

Almost the last of the Marshal's acts whilst on shore gave proof of that freedom from vindictiveness which was spoken of in an earlier page as one of the features of his character. Before he embarked, he offered a present—his Russian carriage and horses—to General Bosquet, an officer, as we know, of great repute and station in the French army, who, even at that parting moment, was regarded by the Marshal as his enemy.

Covered by a tricolor flag, the Marshal, on the 29th of September, was carried on board ship by the seamen of the 'Berthollet,' and placed in the cabin prepared for him. There, the Abbé Paratère, who had been summoned to do the part of the Church to a dying Catholic, was left alone with the sufferer; but, 'After some instants'—so runs the account—'the 'Abbé came out, and said, "The Marshal is ready to die a

Token of the
Marshal's
good-will
toward one
whom he
regarded as
an enemy.

The Marshal
carried on
board the 'Ber-
'thollet.'

Is attended by
a priest, and
dies.

“Christian.” This was in the morning. The ‘Berthollet’ put to sea. Marshal St. Arnaud no longer suffered from acute pain, but between noon and sunset he died. In an earlier volume I recounted some of his actions.

CHAPTER VII.

I.

WHEN two hostile armies are parted by only a few miles of ground, the plans adopted in the one camp must commonly have close relation to what is there known of the other; and in such case, the narrative of operations conducted by either force must be more or less blended with accounts of what its adversary is doing or intending. But in this campaign it strangely happened that, even after their victory, the Allies could not scatter the mist which had shrouded the enemy’s strength; and, except from vague rumors, and the marks of a hastened retreat which they tracked all the way to the Belbec, they knew nothing of Prince Mentschikoff’s army, till, by sheer chance, our Head-quarters touched it on the road by Mackenzie’s Farm. Even then, the sudden and incomplete knowledge thus flung upon the mind of Lord Raglan did not bring him to change his designs; and therefore it is that we have been able to follow the march of the Allies from the Alma to the Belbec, and from the Belbec away to the south round the head of the Sebastopol bay, without being forced to break in upon that part of the story with accounts from Prince Mentschikoff’s camp.

Yet during those seven days which were passed by the Allies in caring for their wounded, and in marching to the southern coast of the peninsula, men faithful to their Czar and their country, and so endued with courage as to be able to exert their whole power of mind and body under a weight of disasters which seemed hardly short of mere ruin, were entering upon a task of great moment, and destined to be famous in history. Expecting the attack of a victorious host, and abandoned by their own defeated army, an admiral with some thousands of sailors and workmen, all guided by the skilled engineer whose achievement has made him illustrious, were preparing the defense of Sebastopol.

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A fair apprehension of the nature of the conflict which those brave men undertook must be based upon some acquaintance with the features of the ground, and the resources available for defense.

The preliminary knowledge required for apprehending the nature of the conflict.

The roadstead of Sebastopol.

Toward the south-western extremity of the Crimea there is an arm of the sea, with a breadth of from a thousand to fifteen hundred yards, which stretches in from the west to a distance of three miles and a half. This deep, narrow bay is the roadstead of Sebastopol.¹

On the north the roadstead is bounded by the slopes and ledges on which stand the forts and buildings constituting the Severnaya or 'North Side of Sebastopol;' and it may be remembered that of the state of the land defenses in that quarter we spoke in an earlier page. There was there shown ground for believing that, even so late as the 25th of September, though much had been done since the day of the landing, the Star Fort, the key of the North Side, could not have been successfully defended against a resolute attack by the Allies; and on the 14th—the day to which we are now going to revert—the Severnaya was still less capable of offering a formidable resistance.

State of the land defenses on the North Side.

On the south and south-west of the bay there is a high plateau or table-land, having much the shape of a heart or Saxon shield, with its top toward the east and its pointed end toward the west. This plateau is called the Chersonese.² It is much higher toward the east than toward the west. Along its eastern or landward side, it is abruptly divided from the plain by an acclivity rising to a height of from five to about seven hundred feet, and so extending from north to south, for a distance (in a straight line) of about eight miles, as to form a continuous battress to the plateau. This acclivity, as well as the easternmost crest of the table-land or plateau at its top, is called Mount Sapounè. The only great break in the steepness thus dividing the table-land of the Chersonese from the plain is at the point some three miles from the southern coast, which was called the 'Col de Balaclava.' Along a distance in a straight line of about four miles, beginning from its north-easterly angle near the Inkerman bridge, and going thence westerly,

The plateau on the South Side, called the Chersonese.

¹ The Allies were much in the custom of calling the bay or roadstead of Sebastopol 'the great harbor,' or sometimes only 'the harbor;' but I follow the more accurate language of the Russians, who called the great bay 'the roadstead,' and the man-of-war's creek 'the harbor of Sebastopol.'

² That is, according to General de Todleben's nomenclature.

the plateau is washed, for the first half-mile, by the Tchernaya, and lower down, by the waters of the Sebastopol bay; but the rest of its water boundary is the open sea. The side of the Chersonese which lies toward the north is deeply jagged by creeks or bays throughout its whole length, from the Inkerman bridge on the east to Cape Chersonese on the west; but on the south and south-western side of the plateau its shore-line has a different character; for a seaman coasting along it from Cape Chersonese to the eastward would have on his larboard side a wall of rocks so unbroken that, although he might land a boat near the Monastery of St. George, he would look in vain for a sheltering bay like those which abound on the other side of the Chersonese, and it could be only after passing the plateau that he would be able to find an inlet. The port he would then find is Balaclava. The length of the plateau, from its easternmost side to Cape Chersonese, is about ten miles.

Throughout its extent the plateau is scarred by ravines. Some of these are deep and precipitous. They run, for the most part, in a direction from the south-east to the north-west, and several of them are prolongations of the openings which form the many creeks and bays indenting the north and north-west of the plateau.

Of these creeks there is one which, stretching deep in from the roadstead in a direction from north to south, had become the port of Sebastopol, or, as the English used to call it, the 'Man-of-war Harbor.' In this port mighty fleets could lie sheltered, and its waters were so deep even home to the shore, that the seamen of line-of-battle ships could pass from their decks to their barracks without taking to boat. It was in this harbor, and upon the ground on either side of it, that the Allies had to seek their prey.

Including that eastern suburb which is called the 'Karabel' faubourg, Sebastopol may be regarded as standing upon a semicircular tract of ground, subtended by the great bay or roadstead, and split into two segments by the Man-of-war Harbor, in such manner that the western segment included Sebastopol proper, with the Admiralty, the public buildings, the arsenal, and town; whilst the eastern segment—that is, the Karabel faubourg—contained, among other buildings, the docks, great Government store-houses, some barracks on a large scale, and a church. The separation of the town from its faubourg was rendered the more complete by the steepness and depth of the ravine

The Man-of-war Harbor.

Position of Sebastopol.

which descended into the heart of the Man-of-war Harbor, for if a man, being in the town of Sebastopol, desired to go into the faubourg without passing over the water, he would not only have to go down, and go round by the Péressip at the head of the Man-of-war Harbor, but would be forced to ascend the eastern side of the ravine by a steep and difficult road. The configuration of land and water which thus split off the faubourg from the main town was a great source of embarrassment to the defenders, and was not the only obstacle in the way of their lateral communications, for there was another ravine which subdivided the town, and another again which cut the suburb in two. These ravines, as well as the ridges and knolls on which the place stood, sloped down with more or less abruptness to the water's edge. The long hill on which stood the main part of the town is 200 feet above the level of the sea, and it descends with some abruptness toward the Man-of-war Harbor on the east, and on the west toward the deep ravine which divides the main town from its outskirts on the west of the Artillery Bay.

Of the streets in the town two were spacious, and in these stood the principal buildings of the place. The rest of the streets were narrow and unpaved.

The highest spot in the town was the one where stood the Naval Library. On the top of the building there was an observatory which (designed as it had been for recreation rather than for State purposes) men used to call the 'belvedere.'

This Naval Library was the place to which officers were accustomed to go when they sought to meet one another; and thence it was that one of the most momentous changes in the progress of the strife was destined to be first described.

In the times immediately preceding the invasion the numbers collected within the town and its suburbs had been in general about 42,000, but 35,000 of these belonged to the fleet or the army.

When Count Pozzo di Borgo, in 1828, warned his Government against the eventuality of an attack upon Sebastopol by an English fleet,¹ his words, it would seem, were not written in vain; and during the years which followed, the works judged to be needed for the seaward defense of Sebastopol were carried on upon a vast scale. The result was, that at the time of the invasion, the portals,

¹ See *ante*, vol. i., p. 354.




Diagram illustrative of descriptions contained in the text with reference to the positions of the Allies before Sevastopol.

both north and south, of the great bay or roadstead, and both its shores within, to a distance of more than two miles, were studded with fortified works. Of these, some, indeed, were only great earth-works, but others, and those the chief ones, were huge casemated forts, having stone-work revetments. These sea-forts and batteries, were: on the north side, Fort Constantine and Fort Michael, both stone-works; the work called 'Number Four,' the 'Twelve Apostles,'¹ and 'Paris;' and, on the south side, the Quarantine Sea-fort,² Fort Alexander (a stone-work), the Artillery Fort,³ Fort Nicholas, and Fort Paul (both stone-works); and, lastly, the Sviatoslaw Battery. Three of these, the Twelve Apostles, the Paris, and the Sviatoslaw Battery, were constructed so late as the beginning of the year 1854. It was to cover Fort Constantine on its landward side, and to prevent the enemy's ships from approaching the shore, that, after the breaking out of the war, the Volokhoff Tower (surnamed by our people the 'Wasp'), and the 'Kartaschewsky,' or 'Telegraph' Battery, were erected on the high ground between the Star Fort and the open sea. In all these sea-forts and batteries, without including that Star Fort of which we heretofore spoke, there were mounted, at the time of the landing, 611 guns, for the most part of heavy calibre.⁴

The Black Sea fleet, which lay in the harbor or in the roadstead, consisted of 14 line-of-battle ships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brigs, and 11 war-steamers, besides some smaller vessels. It carried 1908 guns, and was manned by 18,500 seamen. Of course, this naval force could be so placed as to be able to take part with the sea-forts and batteries in repelling from the first the incursion of a fleet, or else in preparing a reception for such of the enemy's ships as might break into the mouth of the roadstead despite all the power of the forts.

It was not the fate of the Black Sea fleet to prove its worth by engaging in any sea-fight with the ships of the Western Powers; but from the ceaseless pains which, since the last war, had been taken to make the fleet strong—from

¹ Not to be confounded with the man-of-war of the same name. The earth-work was named after the ship.

² Called by the Russians the 'Number Ten.'

³ The Fort thus called by the Allies included that front toward the roadstead which the Russians called the 'Number Eight Battery' and also the Work for landward defense which the Russians called the 'Number Seven Bastion.'

⁴ 'Matériaux pour servir,' etc. Todleben, I think, gives 610 as the number. For the details of the armament, see table in the Appendix.

the love and reverence with which the seamen clung to the memory of the commander who had been foremost in laboring to this end¹—from the sailor-like spirit and the evident love of the sea service which had been engendered—from the faith the sailors had in the power of their fleet—and, above all, from the courage with which Korniloff and his seamen, when forced to take to the land, stood fast to the defense of a place which Prince Mentschikoff and his army had abandoned,—there is ground to infer that, whatever may still have been wanting to fit the Black Sea fleet for great encounters at sea, it would not have been wanting to itself in the less complex duty of fighting to extremity in the roadstead.

Across the roadstead, at some distance from its entrance, there was a boom. Before the day of the Alma

The presumed efficacy of the sea-forts and the fleet for the defense of the roadstead.

(when alarm brought about the resort to a new and mournful expedient), it was believed by the Russians that these defenses alone were fully enough to make the roadstead secure against an attack from

the sea; and after the sinking of the ships at the mouth of the bay, the Allies acquiesced in this judgment, abstaining throughout the war from any attempt to break in with their fleets. So it resulted that both the north side of the place and the whole of Sebastopol itself, including the Karabel suburb, were safe from the attacks of the Allies in every part fronting the roadstead or the Man-of-war Harbor. Nor were even these all the advantages which the defenders of Sebastopol drew from their hold of the roadstead and its creeks; for on its eastern side the Karabel suburb was so bounded by the Careening Bay, and the deep ravine at its head, that, in that quarter also, the dominion of the water by the Russians was an obstacle to any attack. Thus relieved from apprehension of attack from the side of the water, the garrison would be enabled to bring almost their whole strength to bear upon the land defenses.

The extent to which the safety of the roadstead tended to assure the safety of the town.

suburb, were safe from the attacks of the Allies in every part fronting the roadstead or the Man-of-war Harbor. Nor were even these all the advantages which the defenders of Sebastopol drew from their hold of the roadstead and its creeks; for

on its eastern side the Karabel suburb was so bounded by the Careening Bay, and the deep ravine at its head, that, in that quarter also, the dominion of the water by the Russians was an obstacle to any attack. Thus relieved from apprehension of attack from the side of the water, the garrison would be enabled to bring almost their whole strength to bear upon the land defenses.

Of such of those land defenses as covered the north of Sebastopol from attack on the side of the Belbec we have already spoken;² and what we now have to observe is the strength of the ground which hemmed in on the landward side not only the town of Sebastopol but also its Karabel faubourg.

On the western side of the town of Sebastopol there was

¹ Admiral Lazareff.

² *Ante*, chap. iv.

Nature of the ground on the land side of Sebastopol. a wide and deep ravine, running parallel with the boundary of the place, which could not but be a grave obstacle to besiegers; and, upon the whole, the configuration of the ground was of such a kind that works on a moderate scale might suffice to prevent an enemy from choosing, in that direction, his point of attack. It was toward the south and south-east that the defenders of the place were least helped by nature. Even in those quarters, however, the configuration of the ground was in some respects favorable to the defense: for the ravines descended into the place in a way which laid them open to the fire of the garrison, especially to fire from the ships; and every one of the intervening ridges along which the assailants could best come to push their attacks was so formed by nature as to offer to the defenders of the place an advantageous position for the erection of a fortified Work.

On the other hand, the place was commanded by the ground which would be under the dominion of besiegers established on the Chersonese. Then also the length of the semi-circular line which had to be defended throughout was as much as four miles; and finally, it must be understood that of the defensive posts which might be most advantageously established along this extended line, there were three, at the least, so circumstanced that the loss of any one of them would be likely to carry with it the fall of the place.¹

There existed other sources of embarrassment which however—though not in an equal degree—were common to the attack and the defense. Besieged and besiegers alike were sure to be put to great stress by the depth of the ravines, which would more or less split their strength by hampering all lateral movements; and, in the event of the conflict taking a form which should make it depend much on earthworks, both the garrison and their assailants would have to encounter the difficulty of trying to gain cover from ground which was simply hard rock, coated over, where coated at all, with a very thin layer of clay.

¹ The positions subsequently occupied by the Malakoff, the Redan, and the Flagstaff Bastion. Todleben even says that the loss of the 'Central,' or of the 'Land Quarantine' Bastion, called by the Russians 'Number Six,' would also have been fatal.

II.

With the exception of an adjunct¹ to one of the sea-forts which faced in part along shore, the whole line of landward defenses traced out in the year 1834 had been suffered to remain in the condition of a mere project down to the autumn of 1853, and certainly on its south side, at that time, the place lay quite open; but after the rupture of friendly relations with the Western Powers, which followed upon the action of Sinope, some works were begun upon a part of the projected line of defense. At first, however, it was only against the eventuality of a sudden landing in one of the neighboring bays, and an incursion thence into the town, that the engineers were apparently plying their task; for an enterprise of that kind, undertaken as a measure merely auxiliary to an attack from the sea, was the utmost in the way of a land attack that Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief, had hitherto believed to be at all probable.² So, although in the beginning of February, 1854, the works planned for the defense of the west side of the town had been begun, the whole of the Karabel suburb, and even the approach from the south leading into the heart of the place, remained untouched by the spade.³ After that period, however, some works sprang up; and on the day when the Allies effected their landing, the state of the land defenses was as follows: So much of the project of 1834 as had for its immediate object the defense of Sebastopol proper had been almost carried into effect; for at intervals along a curved line beginning from the Artillery Fort and ending at the ground overhanging the head of the Man-of-war Harbor, there now stood this chain of works: the Artillery Fort, the Land Quarantine Bastion,⁴ the Central

Absence of land defenses on the South Side in the autumn of 1853.

Works commenced after the rupture following the action of Sinope.

State of these works on the 3rd of February, 1854.

State of these defenses at the time of the landing, 14th Sept., 1854.

¹ This was an adjunct to the work which the Allies called the Artillery Fort, and for the Russian names of which see the foot-note, p. 102, *ante*. The adjunct seems to have been intended to secure the flank of the sea-fort called by the Russians 'Number Eight,' with which it was connected; but as the work has been counted amongst the land fortifications, I have thought it right to speak of the adjunct mentioned in the text as an exception to the statement there made.

² Todleben, vol. i. p. 121.

³ The approach which was afterward barred by the Flagstaff Bastion.

⁴ The same work as that which the Russians called the 'Number Six' Bastion. I call the work the *Land Quarantine Bastion* from a fear that there might be a tendency to confound it with the sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we have always been accustomed to call the *Quarantine Fort*.

Bastion, the Schwartz Redoubt, and the Flagstaff Bastion. With the exception of the Central Bastion, which was still in course of construction, these works had reached their completion, and were connected with one another by a naked, loop-holed wall, which passed with but little interruption along the whole of the curved line from the Artillery Fort to the head of the Man-of-war Harbor. Besides these works, the isolated sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, and also the Artillery Fort, had been so closed at their gorges by earth-works as to be turned into redoubts, now defended on the land side as well as on the side of the water.

In the Karabel suburb, less had been done; but there also, along a curved line extending from the head of the Man-of-war Harbor to the mouth of the Careening Bay, there were already the Redan, the Malakoff Tower, the Little Redan, and, finally, a single-faced battery for four guns in connection with the stone building, in the form of a cross, which stood near the mouth of the Careening Bay, and was made to serve as a cazern or defensible barrack. The works thus defending the Karabel faubourg were not as yet connected by any intermediate intrenchment; and the Malakoff, afterward so formidable, was only at this time a naked, horseshoe-shaped tower, having five guns on the top, but without the glacis and the outworks which were soon to rise folding around it.

The armament of the works. It seems that the tower was built at the expense of the Sebastopol traders. At this time, the number of guns in battery for the defense of the south side of Sebastopol on its land side amounted to 151. Of these, 128 pieces were applied to the defense of Sebastopol proper, and only 23 to that of the Karabel suburb.

III.

Supposing General de Todleben's history to be free on this point from all error, the strength of the Czar in the Crimea, on the day when the great armada of the Allies was seen to be approaching the coast, may be taken to stand as follows: The land forces then occupying the peninsula were 54,000 strong.¹

¹ 54,208, thus made up:—

Strength of the army (Todleben, p. 140).....	51,500
Artillery appropriated to the coast defenses (ib. p. 110).....	2,708
	<hr/> 54,208

I include the artillerymen appropriated to the coast defenses, because, as

Of this force, some small portions, consisting, it would seem, of about 1000 men, were local troops; and another portion, to the number of 2700, was a body of artillerymen permanently stationed at the batteries of the coast defenses; but the rest, amounting in numbers to more than 50,500, were troops belonging to what the Russians call their 'active army,' and were available for operations in the field wherever their services might be needed. Of these Prince Mentschikoff had under his immediate personal command a force of 38,500 men.¹ These lay posted partly in Sebastopol and partly at other places, but all were so nearly in hand as to be capable of being assembled in time for the battle. The rest of the regular land forces in the Crimea amounted in number to about 12,000,² and were stationed under the command of General Khomoutoff in the south-eastern part of the peninsula; but even these most distant troops were not so far beyond reach as to make it impossible to call them in to headquarters before the critical moment.³

Besides these bodies of men, which were all in strictness land forces, there were some bodies of marines, which at this time had been stationed in a permanent way, partly at the several sections into which the land defenses had been divided, and partly in furnishing guards for the Admiralty and the hospital. These stationed marines were not men withdrawn from any of the ships in the roadstead. They amounted in number to 2600.⁴ There were, besides, four 'landing battalions,' amounting in number to 1800 men, which were posted along the lines of defense. These 'landing battalions' were marines withdrawn from the fleet, and efficiently organized for land service. Including these, it may be said that independently of the army and of the local companies, and independently, also, of the men appropriated to the coast defenses, and without counting any of the naval forces remaining on board ship, there was a body of upward of 4000 men⁵ specially charged with the duty of holding the land defenses, and guarding the Admiralty and the hospital.

The seamen of the Black Sea fleet lying in the roadstead

a matter of fact, they were on the ground; but as they remained, it seems, constantly at their batteries, it may be considered that they were kept in check by the naval forces of the Allies.

¹ 38,597.—*Todleben*, p. 140.

² *Ibid.*

³ This was proved by the forced march of the Moscow Regiment, which, having been ordered up soon after the appearance of the Allies on the coast, was on the field of the Alma on the morning of the battle.

⁴ 2666.—*Todleben*, p. 141-43.

⁵ 4466 including the gunners, or 4048 without them.—*Todleben*, p. 143.

Prince Mentschikoff's double command.

Causes of the facility with which the crews of the ships were brought into use for land service.

or in the harbor numbered, as we have seen, 18,500 men. Prince Mentschikoff, as High Admiral, was in command of the fleet as well as the army; and this, his double authority, may help to account for the exceeding ease and readiness with which, in the progress of the siege, the crews of the ships, one after another, were turned into good battalions; but it is also evident that some of the arrangements peculiar to the Russian navy were conducing in the same direction. The Russian seaman (whose home is partly on shore and in barracks) has always been subjected to a good deal of the discipline and instruction received by the land forces.

In the absence of the Prince, Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the chief of the staff of the Black Sea fleet, was the first in authority over the naval forces in the roadstead and the harbor of Sebastopol. The fleet was divided into two squadrons, of which one was commanded by Korniloff, and the other by Vice-Admiral Nachimoff, the officer whose squadron had destroyed the Turkish ships at Sinope.

From the time when Sebastopol was chosen as a military harbor, great works, such as docks and forts, had been almost constantly in course of construction; and it seems that the numbers of workmen whose services could be obtained for the defense of the place amounted to 5000. Including these (and as they were obedient to military discipline and were even of more worth than soldiers for the works which would have to be raised, it seems fitting to do so), the force which Prince Mentschikoff had in the Crimea at the time of the landing was 76,000 men.¹

Sebastopol, as might be expected, was rich in warlike stores. Thousands of guns of heavy calibre were contained in the arsenal; but it is stated that either because of the age and make of some of this ordnance, or else for want of the corresponding ammunition, a chief portion of these pieces were useless; and there is no

¹ 76,375, thus made up:—

The army.....	51,500
Local companies.....	1,000
Stationed marines	2,666
Seamen of the Black Sea fleet.....	18,501
Artillery men appropriated to the coast defenses.....	2,708

need to push inquiry on the subject, because, in the event which happened, the whole resources of the fleet became available for the land defenses; and not only all the ships' guns—some 1900 in number—not only the ammunition, the iron, the timbers, the cordage, the spars, the tanks, the canvas—all, in short, that a great fleet could need, with vast quantities of stone already detached from the neighboring rocks,—but also the cranes, the gins, the engines of all kinds by which man inforces his dominion over things of huge bulk and weight, and all the machinery, implements, and materials which had been in use either for the ordinary business of the dockyards, or for quarrying and carrying on great works in the way of excavation, embankments, and masonry;—all these things were not only at the disposal of the defenders, but close by, and most apt to the hands of the men,—some 26,000 in number,¹—who had long been accustomed to wield them.

In the midst of all these vast resources, which General de Ammunition. Todleben speaks of as almost inexhaustible, there was a comparative scantiness in the supply of engineering tools; but it does not appear that this want existed to a degree which prevented it from being effectually met by the measures which were taken for the purpose, or that, for want of the requisite implements, any work was even delayed. Indeed, the order to the Government factories for fresh and abundant supplies shows, in passing, the variety and the greatness of the mechanic resources to which the defenders could look.

For all the early necessities of the defense there was a vast abundance of ammunition; and it being impossible for the Allies to invest the place, fresh supplies could be always poured in. We may therefore evade that task of inquiring as to the quantity of ammunition in store, which might be necessary for understanding the condition of a city which was really beleaguered, and the same reason dispenses with the necessity of any detailed statement

¹ Seamen.....	18,501
Stationed marines.....	2,666
Workmen.....	5,000

26,167

² The almost reckless way in which the Russians used to squander their ammunition at the early period of the siege, is proof that at the time they could have had no apprehension of the possibility of finding it run short. In Todleben there will be found minute and ample details on the subject.

with respect to the supply of food in Sebastopol; but it may be worth while to say that, in the matter of bread, the fleet was provisioned for seven months, and the army for four and a half.

Between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the 13th Sept. The 13th of September, men using their glasses at armada seen from Sebastopol. Sebastopol were able to see on the horizon two line-of-battle ships, and, behind them, a darkness of such a kind that it could hardly be any thing else than the smoke of a great fleet of steamers. About noon, the telegraph from Loukoul announced that a fleet visible to the N.W. was drawn up in three columns, and was standing E.N.E. By intelligence sent from the neighborhood of Cape Tarkan, Prince Mentschikoff also learned that seventy vessels had there been seen, and it now appeared sure that the Allies had troops on board, and had come with intent to land.

Prince Mentschikoff lost no time in giving the orders which were to assemble his army on the heights of the Alma. He stopped all the works at the port of Sebastopol which were unconnected with the strengthening of the place, giving orders that the men should be employed at the defenses. He directed that the men should be mustered at the batteries, that they should be practiced at the guns, and that all should be held ready for action.

It was ordered that the fleet should prepare to make sail; but on this day it blew from N. to N.E. in the bay, and apparently N.W. in the offing, and these winds were adverse to any project for sailing out to attack the armada.

From time to time the increasing numbers of the approaching ships were announced; and at half-past eight in the evening the telegraph said, and said truly, 'The enemy's fleet is casting anchor.'

The next day was calm; and Sebastopol knew that, without hindrance, the Allies were landing their troops. The Russians were men so constituted as to be able to derive a faint pleasure from the mere date of the event, and even, it would seem, to found upon the coincidence a happy augury; for they ever had thought with pride of the war which they are accustomed to call 'the war of the twenty nations,' and the 14th of September was the anniversary of Napoleon's entry into Moscow. In the roadstead of Sebastopol, and at the mouth of the Man-of-war Harbor, the two squadrons of the Black Sea were ranged in the order deemed best for sailing to meet the enemy.

14th Sept. Sebastopol knew that the landing was going on.

Coincidence of date observed by the Russians.

The adverse winds had been followed by calm; but it does not appear that there was any continuance of that yearning to venture a naval attack which seems to have been felt the day before. The Russian fleet was so much weaker than that of the Allies in many respects, but especially in point of steam-power, that, unless it should chance to succeed, any attempt of the kind would be liable to be condemned for its rashness. It is probable that upon this subject the orders of Prince Mentschikoff were peremptory. At all events, there was no thought, it would seem, on this day, of undertaking to disturb the busy scene in Kalamita Bay by breaking into the midst of the flotilla whilst the French and the English were landing.

There was now withdrawn from some of the ships a number of men sufficing to add four more battalions to the strength of the mariners already turned into soldiers; and a day or two later, heavy guns, to the number of thirty, were taken out of the men-of-war, and brought into use for the land defenses.

All this time, the five thousand workmen at the command of Prince Mentschikoff were busily employed, and the works on the North Side especially were pushed on with ceaseless energy; but it was not until after a week from the landing that these approached their completion. On the South Side, the defenders were busied with a field-work connecting the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions, but except in regard to the progress thus making at a single point, the land defenses continued to be, for some time, in the state already described.

When Prince Mentschikoff had established himself on the Alma, he intrusted the defense of the North Side to Rear-Admiral Istomin, and the defense of the South Side to Rear-Admiral Panfiloff, at the same time enjoining these seamen to apply to Lieutenant-General Möller, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces at Sebastopol, for special instructions. Prince Mentschikoff also directed that, in the absence of Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the command of the fleet, and any troops on board it, should be assumed by Vice-Admiral Nachimoff, the senior officer in the roadstead.

Means were taken for perfecting the telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and the covering army.

Abandonment of any intention of attacking the armada.

Farther withdrawal of men from the fleet for land service.

Progress of the works for the land defenses.

The state of these works on the 20th Sept.

Distribution of authority at Sebastopol after the 18th Sept.

Perfecting of the means of

telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and the army on the Alma.

Strength of the forces left at Sebastopol when Mentschikoff had completed the withdrawal of all the troops ordered to join him on the Alma.

When Prince Mentschikoff's orders for assembling his troops on the Alma had been carried into effect, the only portion of the 'active' Russian army then left at Sebastopol was a body of four militia battalions. The rest of the combatants who helped to form the garrison were the gunners attached to the batteries of the coast defenses, the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, the 2600 stationed marines, and the 18,500 seamen. If, to all these forces, there be added the 5000 workmen, it would result that when Prince Mentschikoff had advanced to the heights on the Alma with the whole of the forces which there afterward encountered the enemy, the number of men still forming the garrison of Sebastopol, or aiding it in its labors, amounted to some 32,000.¹ Of these, however, there were none, except the gunners at the coast defenses and the 3000 militiamen, who could be said to form part of the army.

CHAPTER VIII.

I.

SUCH was the condition of things at Sebastopol when, on the 20th of September, the telegraph announced to the garison that the Allies were advancing to assail Prince Mentschikoff in his position on the Alma heights. At half-past one, the cannonade which marked the opening of the battle was heard in the town, and at two there came from the telegraph at Cape Loukoul a message, destined to be its last—"The army is engaged with the enemy." Already Korniloff was on horseback, and riding with Colonel de Todleben toward the sound of the guns.² We shall see by and by

¹ Without reckoning the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, and which, appearing to be nine in number (see Todleben, p. 139), were probably 1000 strong, the exact number would be 31,875—thus made up:—

Four militia battalions.....	3,000
Gunners at the coast batteries.....	2,708
Stationed marines.....	2,666
Seamen of the fleet.....	18,501
Workmen.....	5,000

31,875

² Without distinguishing from others those facts which I owe to personal

that, from a distance of 3000 miles, the care and the sagacity of a news-dealing company on the banks of the Thames had enabled it to point out the day as well as the place of the expected encounter; and it might be thought that, since Korniloff was within cannon-sound of the Allied camp, and in hourly communication with Prince Mentschikoff, he would hardly need prophecy to prepare him for the 20th of September. Yet, in speaking of the reasons which made him believe that this 20th of September would prove to be the fated day, he gives the first place to the predictions of an authority—in his eyes apparently a kind of periodical apocalypse—which he calls the ‘Athenian Calendar.’ Two days before, he had been at Prince Mentschikoff’s tent on the Kourganè Hill, had seen the great strength of the position, and had not only observed the army to be in excellent spirits, but had found the Prince easy in his mind and cheerful. Yet now, as he rode toward the scene of action, he could not but be agitated, he says, by the thought that the fate of Europe ‘was to be decided on Cape Loukoul or ‘on the Alma.’

By degrees, he was forced to apprehend, and then to see only too plainly, the result of the encounter. ‘As I approached,’ he says, ‘the firing grew slack, and I soon perceived that our army was retreating, but retreating in order.’ A sad picture it certainly was, but the will of the ‘Lord is inscrutable to us.’

Amongst the troops which Korniloff and Todleben thus met retreating, there approached an officer on horseback, not marching on duty with any particular regiment, nor yet having with him the staff which would denote the presence of a general. He was bowed forward, as though very weary. This horseman was Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief of the defeated army, and of all the military and naval forces in the Crimea. Since the time when he sat by his tent on the slope of the Kourganè Hill, indulging a happy belief in the strength of his ground on the Alma, some eight hours only were passed; but these had come heavy upon him. When Korniloff

Their meeting
with Prince
Mentschikoff.

communications from General de Todleben, I wish to acknowledge generally the immeasurable advantage which I have derived from the repeated, lengthened, and most interesting conversations with which the General honored me.

¹ It was at a later period in the day that there occurred, along the road descending to the Katcha, the scene of confusion witnessed by Chodasiewicz, and described in a former volume of this work.

and Todleben had come up and spoken with him, they turned their horses' heads, and the three, in company, rode down to the Katcha. It seems that the torment of mind which might well be supposed to be assailing the Prince was at all events masked, and even perhaps superseded, by the extreme of bodily weariness which he was suffering.¹

But if the Prince was thus bowed down by fatigue, and unwilling or hardly able to speak many words, he had formed a momentous resolve, and could still wield that strength of will which was needed for giving effect to it. He enjoined Korniloff to close the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead (where the Black Sea fleet lay at anchor); and it was understood, if it was not expressed in words, that this was to be done by sinking some of the ships. The import of this order was, that the Czar's famous navy of the Black Sea,—the result of patient energy continued from generation to generation, the long-cherished instrument of conquest, the terror of the Moslems, the hope of the Christians in the East,—was to abdicate its warlike mission upon the approach of danger, and shut itself in forever—a fleet foregoing the sea. And the officer instructed to execute this ruthless order was the virtual commander of this same fleet, the man who had toiled during years and years to fit it for the business of war. The emotion with which Korniloff heard the

words addressed to him may be inferred from their mere purport, as well as from the spirit of resistance which he made bold to show on the following day; but it seems that, at the time, he spoke little. He could not say he thought well of this measure of desperation, and he did not, he could not, reply that he would obey the command; but, on the other hand, he respected the anguish of a defeated commander, and indulged his chief's bodily weariness by refraining, for the time, from words of dispute and remonstrance.

When first Prince Mentschikoff found himself in full retreat from the Alma, he conceived the idea of attempting a stand on the left bank of the Katcha;

¹ I do not know whether Prince Mentschikoff, in the course of the foregoing night, had imposed upon himself any labors which would account for this excessive fatigue. Including all his hapless untimely rides from the east to the west, and from the west to the east, of the battle-field, he had not traversed much ground in the course of the day. Mentschikoff was not a young man; but I imagine that, in part at least, his prostration of strength must be ascribed to the stress which care and grief can put upon the bodily frame.

of attempting
a stand on
the Katcha.

The state of the
Russian army
was not com-
patible with
the execution
of that plan.

but although it would be an error to suppose that the spirit of the Russian soldiery was crushed by the defeat it had suffered, it is not the less certain that the loss of officers killed and wounded in the battle was greater than could be well borne, and that, from this and other causes, the army was for the moment in a disorganized and helpless state.

Prince Mentschikoff therefore dismissed the idea of mak-

Prince Ments-
chikoff's plan
of taking up a
flanking posi-
tion in the
country of the
Belbec.

ing a stand on the Katcha, and imagined a plan which (supposing that the ground should prove fit for the purpose) was well adapted to the object of enabling the army, though defeated and inferior in numbers, to try to cover Sebastopol. The

Russian Commander proposed to take up such a position in the country of the Belbec as would enable him to menace the left flank of the Allied army whilst engaged (as he assumed that it presently would be) in attacking the Star Fort, and at the same time allow him to communicate freely by

The instruc-
tions given
with that ob-
ject to Colonel
de Todleben.

his rear with the great road through Baktchi Seräi to the interior of Russia. With this view, he now intrusted to Colonel de Todleben the task of sur-

veying the country on the morrow, and trying to find a ground upon which it would be prudent for the army to take up a position.

At ten o'clock at night, Korniloff was once more in Sebas-

The sounds of
the battle at
Sebastopol and
the subsequent
suspense.

topol. As there heard, the sound of the firing at half-past one had come from the left of the position on the Alma, had gradually rolled to the eastward, at half-past four had slackened, and then

ceased altogether. From that time, until night, the hours were blank, bringing nothing for men to learn; but it does not appear that the booming of the guns or the still suspense

Bearing of the
inhabitants
during the peri-
od of suspense.

which came after raised any of that kind of stir or emotion which signs of such import might be likely to create in a city devoted to the arts of

peace. The people in the place were soldiers or sailors for the most part, and the rest of them were virtually amenable

Preparations
for the recep-
tion of the
wounded.

to military rule. Things went on in their accus- tomed way, but preparations were made for trans- porting wounded men from the North Side to the

South, and for carrying them thence in litters to the hospital.

To aid the work, the road up the hill along which the wound-

Prince Ments-
chikoff's re-
turn to Sebas-
topol.

ed would have to be carried was strongly lighted up. Prince Mentschikoff, it would seem, reached Sebastopol at about eleven o'clock at night, but al-

Tidings of the defeat.

Wounded soldiery brought in during the night.

ready the rumors of the defeat had begun to creep into the town. At a late hour, boats coming across from the North Side began to discharge their freight of wounded men; and afterward, all the night long, the dark shadows seen moving up by the illuminated road to the hospital bore dismal witness of what must have been done in those three hours when the firing was heard at Sebastopol.

It would seem that when Prince Mentschikoff and his naval vicegerent had reached Sebastopol, bodily fatigue put off to the morrow nearly all farther action and counsel; for, except the dispatch of an aid-de-camp to St Petersburg,¹ nothing more is chronicled having been done or resolved on that night.

II.

The next morning, Korniloff assembled a council of admirals and captains to determine what should be done in the straits to which things were brought by the loss of the battle. Prince Mentschikoff himself was not of the number assembled, but there is ground for inferring that to some of those who were there he had imparted at least his opinion, if not his final resolve.²

Korniloff addressed the assembled admirals and captains. 'Our army,' he said, 'is falling back on Sebastopol, and therefore the enemy will easily occupy the heights on the south of the Belbec. He will extend his forces as far as Inkerman³ and "Holland"⁴ (where the intended tower has not yet been completed), and, commanding from those heights the ships of Nachimoff's squadron, he will force the fleet to leave its present position. By thus altering our order of battle for the fleet, he will make it

¹ Major Greig, dispatched to St Petersburg that night by Korniloff, in obedience to orders from the Prince given him on the Katcha.

² For much of the information on which I base my statements respecting Admiral Korniloff and the Russian navy, I am indebted to a most admirable collection of materials by Captain Gendre, an officer who was upon the Staff of Admiral Korniloff. I, in general, refer to the work by the description of 'Matériaux pour servir.' It is in Russian, but the great kindness of Admiral Likhatcheff, who was himself on Korniloff's Staff, and also of Mr. Michel of the Admiralty, has overcome for me this obstacle.

³ In Russian nomenclature, the 'Inkerman heights' do not mean the ground where the Battle of Inkerman was fought, but the eastern heights overhanging the head of the roadstead.

⁴ The ground thus designated was between the Star Fort and the head of the roadstead.

'feasible to force the entrance of the roadstead; and if, at the same time, his land forces should take the Star Fort, no resistance on our part, however heroic, will save the Black Sea fleet from ruin and disgraceful capture. I therefore propose

His proposal to put to sea and attack the Allied fleets. 'to put to sea and attack the enemy, crowded as he is off Cape Loukoul. I think that, fortune

'favoring us, we might disperse the enemy's armada, and thus deprive the Allied armies of supplies and reinforcements. In the event of failure, we shall be able to avoid a disgraceful capture; for, supposing that we do not succeed in boarding the enemy's ships, we can at all events blow them up when close alongside, together with our own.

'While thus saving the honor of the Russian flag, the seamen will be defending their port; for the Allied fleets, even if victorious, would be so weakened by the loss of many ships, that they would not dare to attack the strong seabatteries of Sebastopol; and, without the co-operation of the fleet, the Allied armies could not capture the town, if fortified and defended by our troops, until the arrival of a fresh army from Russia, and then, with united exertions we might crush the enemy.

'The absence of all order in the disposition of the enemy's fleet during the landing and off Cape Loukoul—the carelessness of their cruisers, which have not yet captured even one of our steamers on the Black Sea during the whole summer—the carelessness of the Allied admirals, who have allowed our squadrons to cruise freely in sight of Sebastopol, and missed an opportunity of attacking the "Three Holy Fathers," which lay aground on the 9th of June for above twenty-four hours out of reach of our batteries—who have even allowed the steamer "Taman" to leave Sebastopol and to cruise, caring little for the countless steamers of the enemy, on the lines by which the Allies communicate with the Turkish ports,—all this plainly proves that against such an enemy success is not impossible.'

From the tenor of what the speaker next said, it is to be inferred that he was interrupted at this point by an expressed or anticipated suggestion, importing that the time for a bold irruption into the midst of the enemy's great armada was surely on the morning of the 14th, when the ships were still encumbered with troops, and the crews engaged in the business of the landing; for the rest of Korniloff's address seems meant to answer an objection of that kind; but the speaker, as I judge from his words, became confused by his endeavor to go on recom-

Tenor of the latter part of Korniloff's address.

mending a desperate enterprise, when he found himself forced to acknowledge that the right time for a venture of the kind had been suffered to pass.

The assembled admirals and captains received the proposal of Korniloff in blank silence; and it presently appeared that, although there were some few who assented to the proposal, the rest disapproved it, and were already bending their thoughts to a measure of a very different kind. All probably knew beforehand that this other measure was to be proposed, and that it had the sanction of Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief.

Reception by the council of Korniloff's proposal.

The measure which, before being actually proposed, seemed to be engaging the attention of the council.

The period of Korniloff's great ascendancy was close at hand, but it had not yet come; and great as we shall see him to be in the days which were approaching, it may be acknowledged that, whatever good there might be in his desperate plan of attack, if peremptorily ordered and fiercely pushed through to the end by a resolute commander, it was hardly one which could be usefully submitted to a numerous assembly of admirals and captains who knew that it was disapproved by the Commander-in-Chief. And the reasons by which Korniloff tried to support his proposal were surely weak. Because the Allied fleets kept no formal array, they were not therefore in confusion. There was always, at the least, one vessel of war standing sentry over the prisoned fleet of the Russians; and the ships of the Allies, though somewhat dispersed, were well enough linked by signals and by their great steam-power. Even before the landing, when an irruption into the midst of the crowded and busy armada could have been best attempted, the seamen of Dundas's off-shore squadron were not only ready for such an encounter as the very one for which their services were specially reserved, but were even part cleared for action. And again, it was wild to build the hope of surprising the whole Allied fleet upon the furtive success with which a small single Russian steamer had now and then cheated the watchfulness of the Anglo-French cruisers.

Question whether Korniloff's measure was one which he could usefully propose in the council.

The value of the reasons by which he supported it.

The rejection of Korniloff's measure was followed by the open proposal of that other and very different plan of action which was already engaging the thoughts of the council. It was Captain Zorin who submitted this counter-proposal to the assembled admirals and captains; and it will be observed that, although

Captain Zorin's counter-proposal.

submitted in this way as the advice of one of the captains, the plan was the one which Prince Mentschikoff, on the evening before, had ordered Korniloff to execute. That which Captain Zorin proposed was this: to sink some of the oldest of the ships across the mouth of the roadstead, and employ the crews of the sunken ships, as well as those of the rest of the fleet, in reinforcing the garrison.

When this proposal was made, many, knowing apparently that it had the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, and would therefore be adopted, began to shed tears. And now there was loud speaking.

He who records what passed does not undertake to give the words, or even the tenor of what was then said, but in his own language—he was himself an officer of the Black Sea fleet—he utters the grief of the officers to whom the appeal was addressed: ‘How to decide on

‘such a cruel measure? To bar the port, and shut ourselves up, is it not tantamount to a solemn confession of our inability to fight at sea? Is it not tantamount to our abdicating the very name of seamen, so dear to the men of the Black Sea fleet? By the love we have borne to our

‘profession, by our unanimous co-operation in the noble efforts of our ever-memorable chiefs, we have brought our ships to a high state of perfection in manœuvring, in gunnery, and general management; and now, when we might justly boast of our creation—when the fleet has grown strong and formidable—we are to sacrifice these fine ships, and sink them with our own hands in the waves of their native port! Such a proceeding is next to suicide. The question is not to offer upon the altar of our country our wealth, our material interests. No; the sacrifice is of a higher kind. We are to crush with a merciless hand every thing upon which we have concentrated our moral efforts, in which we have been accustomed to see our calling and our future.’

Korniloff expressed his dissent from the counter-proposal, but perceiving that the majority of the officers present approved it, and still holding to his own opinion, he dismissed the council, and with these words: ‘Prepare for putting to sea. A signal will be given to point out what every one has to do.’

But he spoke, the narrator says, with a heavy heart, for he had little hope that the Commander-in-Chief would change the resolve he had imparted to him the evening before.

Korniloff, however, went to Prince Mentischikoff, and de-

The grief with which the counter-proposal was heard.

Loud speaking.

Captain Gendre's expression of the feelings with which the officers and men of the fleet regarded the measure.

Korniloff dismisses the council with directions to prepare for putting to sea.

Korniloff's interview with Prince Mentschikoff.

The Prince's orders to close the harbor by sinking ships.

Korniloff's refusal to obey it.

Prince Mentschikoff's rejoinder.

Korniloff's withdrawal of his refusal to execute the order.

clared his intention of putting to sea. To this the Prince peremptorily objected, and he reiterated the order he had given Korniloff the evening before on his ride from the Alma—the order to close the entrance of the roadstead by sinking some of the ships. Korniloff answered that he would do no such thing. Prince Mentschikoff replied, ‘Well, then, you may return to your post at ‘Nicolayeff,’¹ and send for Admiral Stanneovitch in order to give him the necessary instructions.’ Then Korniloff said: ‘Stop a moment. It is suicide what you are compelling me to; but now —to leave Sebastopol surrounded by the enemy is impossible. I am ready to obey you.’²

And Korniloff obeyed. The order he issued pointed out the places to be taken by all the ships of the fleet, including the five line-of-battle ships and the two frigates, which were to be brought to the mouth of the roadstead and held in readiness for sinking.

It directed that when the ships should be sunk their crews should be formed into battalions. It ordered that, with a view to the event of its becoming necessary to give up the town, the rest of the fleet should be held in readiness to be sunk. In the mean time, however, they were to be ranged in an order which would enable them to pour their fire upon the slopes descending from the North Side. The order directed that, upon the mere appearance of the enemy on the heights to the south of the Belbec, two of the roadstead batteries on the north, the ‘Paris’ and the ‘Twelve Apostles,’ should be destroyed. A separate order directed that vast quantities

21st Sept. Removal of stores from the North Side.

of the ammunition and other stores should be transported from the North to the South Side.

All day, the numbers of vessels employed in obeying this order were crossing and recrossing the roadstead. The timely removal of these stores tends to show that the defense of the North Side against the Allied armies was regarded at the time as an almost desperate undertaking.

It was not until the afternoon of this day that Colonel de Todleben had completed the survey intrusted to him the evening before by Prince Mentschikoff. For eight hours he was riding over the ground,

Colonel de Todleben's report of his survey.

¹ Under ordinary circumstances, Nicolayeff was the place where Korniloff, as chief of the staff of the Black Sea fleet, would be stationed.

² ‘This conversation has been reported by Prince Mentschikoff himself.’—*Note appended to the account of the conversation in the ‘Matériaux pour servir.’*

and studying it, as may well be supposed, with anxious care. Upon his report the whole tenor of the rest of the campaign was depending. At length he formed his opinion, and with a confidence which freed him from all misgiving. In order apparently to receive Colonel de Todleben's report, Prince Mentschikoff had come back to the North Side, for there—in the Lodge that he had close adjoining the Number Four Battery—Colonel de Todleben waited upon him, and reported the conclusion to which he had come. Todleben's conclusion was, that in the country he had been ordered to examine, there was not to be found any line upon which it would be wise for the Russian army to take up a position. There was no ground—otherwise suitable—which offered good means of retreat.

Prince Mentschikoff listened to this report in the way that might be expected from one who had ready an alternative plan; but that other plan, whatever it might be, he withheld from Colonel de Todleben. The Prince did not say much. Presently he got into a small boat and crossed over to Sebastopol, leaving Todleben without instructions in regard to the next duty, if any, which he was to undertake. After reflecting a little, Colonel de Todleben determined that he would return to the task from which he had been summoned, and go on with his endeavors to strengthen the works on the North Side. This he did.

Prince Mentschikoff, at this time, was very secret in regard to his ulterior plan for the disposition of his army; but, for the present, he allowed his troops to continue the movement which divided them from the field of the Alma, and retreat fairly into Sebastopol.

In a weakened and tired condition of body, but not, it is said, in a state of dejection, the troops in the course of the day were all brought over the water and into the town. Thence they were moved to a ground outside, which was called the Koolikoff field. There they bivouacked.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, the ships of the fleet, including those which were doomed, began to move into their places, and at half-past ten at night all were there.

He communicates it to Prince Mentschikoff.

The Prince's reception of the Report.

The army, continuing its retreat, passed over into Sebastopol.

Arrival of the defeated troops, and their passage across the roadstead.

Their bivouac on ground adjoining the town.

The ships moved into their prescribed places.

III.

Early in the morning of the next day (the 22nd), the top-gallant masts of the condemned ships were struck and their sails unbent. Deserving five ships and two frigates ranged across the entrance of the roadstead, and either not seeing that the sails were unbent, or failing to observe the change in the way that leads to inference, the French were led to imagine that the enemy was coming out to give battle, and, accordingly, there was a joyous expectation that day on board their fleet. All that day, the condemned ships remained in their places across the mouth of the roadstead.

22nd Sept.
Impression created on board the French fleet by the appearance of the doomed ships at the mouth of the roadstead.

Korniloff had not yet absolutely despaired of saving the ships, and he again pressed Prince Mentschikoff to spare them. The Prince, however, had by this time made up his mind to that flank march of which we shall presently speak, and he conceived that the sinking of the ships was an essential part of the plan to which he meant to resort. According to that plan he was to remove the army from Sebastopol, abandoning to the seamen the charge of the land defenses; and he rightly enough judged that, as long as there should be the prospect of an irruption of the Allied fleets into the roadstead, it would be impossible to withdraw to the shore the whole energy of the crews.

Farther effort of Korniloff to save the ships, and its failure.

The way in which Prince Mentschikoff's determination to sink the ships was connected with his plan of a flank march.

The Naval Library, as we saw, was the place where officers used to gather. Thither Korniloff came at six o'clock in the evening. He was in a state of deep sadness. It had been arranged that, when the measure of sinking the ships should be irrevocably determined upon, the national flag should be hoisted as a signal to all that the sacrifice was to be accomplished. The dooming flag was run up. Korniloff went on board one of the ships, and when afterward he returned to his house, he found awaiting him there some naval officers, men zealously devoted to the service. They had come to entreat that he would avert the blow which was aimed, as they said, at their calling; and they probably sought to make him know, that if he should undertake to resist the destroying orders, he might not be without support.

6 P.M. Signal announcing the final determination to close the roadstead by sinking ships.

Naval officers awaiting Korniloff at his house.

Their endeavor to stay the act of sinking the ships.

Korniloff's answer to them. They urged their prayer. Korniloff answered, 'We must submit to necessity.'

In his address to the seamen, Korniloff explained a part of the grounds for resorting to the measure, but omitted all mention of the intended withdrawal of the army, and even spoke of the land forces as having come back to Sebastopol in order to defend it to extremity. He then said: 'It is no doubt painful to destroy our own work! We have used many efforts to put these doomed ships in a state to excite the envy of the world. But we must submit to stern necessity. Moscow was burned, but Russia was not ruined by it. On the contrary, she only grew the stronger. God is merciful. No doubt he is even now preparing a similar destiny for his faithful Russian people. Let us, then, offer up our prayers to the Lord, and not suffer a mighty enemy to conquer us!'

In the night, the orders for the scuttling of the ships were obeyed, and at dawn on the morning of the 23rd there were only to be seen some bare masts in the places where the 'Sizopol,' the 'Varna,' and the 'Silistria' had been lying the day before. Soon afterward, the 'Ouryil' and the 'Selaftroil' went down; and at eight o'clock the waves passed over the 'Flora,' but the 'Three Holy Fathers,' a 130-gun ship, was still erect. The water rushed in through the openings which had been made in her sides, near the water-line, but, despite the unnatural wounds, she did not yet sink. Her steadfastness caused men to think how faithfully she would have served in honest fight with the enemy. In the minds of the seamen of the fleet, the sight of the grand ship thus clinging to life added horror to grief. Amongst such of the officers as were free from superstitions, the pain, it would seem, was akin to that which men feel when they force themselves to see the blow given to one of the brute creation who is an old and faithful servant, condemned to have his days ended; and the commander of the steam-frigate the 'Thunder-bearer' was commanded to fire into her sides, in order—as the naval recounter of the scene expresses it—in order to 'shorten her agony.' But this last spectacle was more harrowing than all that had gone before. In the idea of the seamen, and many, perhaps, of the officers, the sacred name of the ship, and the notion that some holy emblem or relic must still be remaining on board her, aroused a belief or surmise that what the heathen-

In the night between the 22nd and 23rd, the doomed ships were scuttled.

Morning of the 23rd Sept.

State of the doomed ships.

Tenacity with which the 'Three Holy Fathers' resisted the endeavors to sink her.

Feeling excited by the spectacle.

ish 'Thunder-bearer' was doing might be a deed unspeakably impious. At a quarter before one, the sacred man-of-war reeled. For a moment—so pious men thought—the waves fell away recoiling, then closed, and bore the ship down.

The destruction of the ships already condemned was only a part of the sacrifice; for it could not but be that the policy which had sunk seven ships and closed the entrance of the roadstead, was bringing to an end the career of the whole Black Sea fleet, and turning its crews into soldiers. The seamen knew that to change thus was to fall.

The policy which closed the roadstead was ending the career of the whole Black Sea fleet.

The fall to which the seamen would be made liable by becoming transferred to the land service.

The too mechanic state to which the Russian army had been brought.

In the capital of many a state there sits an industrious clerk—a sovereign he may be or a minister—working hard at the task of giving a base uniformity to bodies of armed men, and never remitting his toil till at last he is taught by disaster that the mind and the soul he has labored so hard to keep down are amongst the main needs of an army in time of war. If he sees a body of troops having some distinctive accoutrement which helps to sustain its individuality in the midst of an army, and connects itself, in the minds of the men, with the pride they take in their regiment, he hastens to tear off the mark which makes the corps differ from others; and when there is a regiment which glories in its ancient name, connecting it vaguely with great traditions, and founding upon the cherished syllables that consciousness of power which is a main condition or ascendancy in war, then the army clerk suffers such pain from the want of that sequence which he has long observed in an orderly series of numerals running on like 'one,' 'two,' and 'three,' that he takes from the regiment its proud historic name, and orders that for the future it shall be called by a number in the way that is used with convicts.¹ But of all the clerks who thus labored at the

¹ This particular illustration of the silly and noxious lengths to which an army administration may be carried by its love of uniformity was not fetched from St. Petersburg, but from our own Horse Guards, though not, I believe I may say, from the Horse Guards as at present administered. The Russian regiments are officially called by names or descriptions not founded on numerals; but many a one has been subjected to the practice of taking away the old name of the regiment, in order to designate it as the possession of some mere prince. Thus, for instance, the 'Borodino' regiment had a name which the Russians have ever held to be one of great glory to their nation; but it got instead a wordy, cumbrous designation, describing the regiment as the property of one of the Emperor's sons, and sounding more like a tiresome extract from a court almanac than the honest name of a regiment.

business of making armies by extinguishing men, none had been more ruthless than the one who toiled at St. Petersburg; for, devoting himself to the merely military as distinguished from warlike pursuits, and being little short of a madman in his love of things uniform, the Emperor Nicholas for years had been lowering and lowering the Russian soldiery in the scale of humanity, with the intent of bringing his army to a base mechanic perfection; and this policy had been carried to such baneful extremes that the most illustrious of Russia's living generals has assigned it as one of the causes which exposed the Czar's troops to defeat.¹ But in the fleets of the empire the perverse energy of Nicholas had failed to complete the mischief it tended to work;

Comparative
freedom of the
naval forces
from this evil.

and although more or less he tormented his sea-men with drill, and marched them, and wheeled them, and put them in barracks, and divided them into bodies of the size of battalions, with a number belonging to each,² he could not altogether extirpate from the sailors the true sailor's spirit. There was a strength in the nature of things which withstood him; for happily—and this is a main source of the glory attaching to the sea service—the ever-changeeful exigencies which the winds and the waves create must be met by the individual energies of the very men who encounter them, and not by mere codes of regulation sent down from an office. The sailor of the Black

The seaman
ennobled by
his calling
would have
reason to de-
precate his
transfer to the
land service.

Sea fleet could not but feel that his calling ennobled him. He could not but know that if he were to be withdrawn from his ship for land service, he would be in danger of falling to a lower estate.

It is true, as we shall very soon see, that although put to fight on shore, the seaman did not fail to display his ever-ready resource, his merry love of danger, his agile and flexible energy, his devotion to warlike duty, and, above all, that valor which could be proof against the sense of being abandoned and sacrificed; but some, at least, of the qualities thus brought to light on shore, were qualities derived from the sea, and the more the sailor was gifted

¹ Todleben, vol. i. p. 204. I have reason to know that the unsoundness of the policy in this respect of the Emperor Nicholas is fully recognized by the present Government of Russia.

² These bodies were numbered and called 'crews,'—a somewhat misleading term, because the numbered crew, though composed of men belonging to the ships' companies, was not a body identical with that which formed the crew of any particular ship. The numbered crew consisted of about a thousand men belonging to different ships.

with these, the greater would be his fall and his loss of self-respect, if—not merely for the one struggle then going on, but for all the rest of his time—he were to become a land-service man, reduced step by step to the mechanized state of the Russian soldier, with nothing but memory, and perhaps some small, cherished relic, to remind him of his good old ship, and the nobler life he had lived in the days of the Black Sea fleet.

Therefore more than one train of thought was conducting, it seems, to the grief with which the men saw the ships sunk.

But it must be acknowledged that this sinking of the ships was a wise measure. It fulfilled two great purposes. It closed the entrance of the roadstead against the Allies; but also, by putting a sure and visible end to the career of the fleet at sea, it brought to bear upon the land defenses that strength of 18,000 fit men, and those almost boundless resources in the way of things material which the navy was able to furnish.

And it seems to be plain that, such as it is, the whole merit of designing the expedient, and forcing it into effect, belongs of right to Prince Mentschikoff. Except by adducing this instant of firm and opportune action, it would be hard to show a fit ground for ascribing to the Prince any share of that kind of capacity which is needed for the business of war; and mankind will be loth to agree that the martial renown of a commander, when devoid of all other foundation, can be rested upon the single act, however timely and fortunate, of closing an arm of the sea. But still this Prince Mentschikoff's idea of at once shutting out the invading fleets and turning his own navy into a town garrison by the short expedient of sinking some ships, was a conception so boldly, so ruthlessly formed—it was so simple—it was so well adapted to its twofold end—it was carried through with so strong a will, and, withal, was so signally justified by receiving the crown of success, that, if it had been imagined and executed by a great commander, the measure might have been honestly cited as one bearing marks of his genius.

CHAPTER IX.

SINCE the troops, overthrown on the Alma, had retreated all into Sebastopol, leaving no other body to dispute with the invaders for the dominion of the

The power the
Allies had of

seizing the enemy's line of communication with the interior of Russia.

Prince Mentschikoff's grounds for dreading this.

The Allies not using their power, the Prince saw a way of recovering his communications.

His plan.

Its advantages.

His justification for the abandonment of the garrison.

So far as concerned the defense from within, the charge was to be mainly left to the sailors.

country outside, it followed that the Allies, by inclining to their left with the whole or a part of their forces, were enabled, if so they should choose, to lay hold of the enemy's line of communication with the interior of the empire; and this, it would seem, was a measure which Prince Mentschikoff had good reason to dread; for his pressing need of re-

inforcements made it vital for him to be able to keep the command of the great homeward road through Baktchi Seräi and Simpheropol, as well as the means of communication with Khomoutoff's force in the south-east of the Crimea. Therefore, when he observed that, instead of seizing this road, the invaders were keeping their whole strength together, and slowly advancing upon Sebastopol along the sea-shore, he conceived that he might escape from the predicament of being cut off from his succors by darting upon the precious ground which the policy of the Allies had left open to him. With this view, he resolved that he would withdraw his army from Sebastopol at night, move it by a south-easterly march to the valley of the Tchernaya, cross the valley, turn northward, ascending the Mackenzie Heights, and place himself upon the high-road which leads thence by Baktchi Seräi to the interior of Russia. Once there, he hoped to be

able to keep open the way to the interior of Russia, and give the hand to his expected reinforcements from Odessa, as well as to those coming up from the neighborhood of Kertch: but this was only a part of the plan which he professed to have formed; for by way of justification for the withdrawal of his army from Sebastopol, he engaged to hang upon the flank of the Allies, and to do this so formidably that his attitude would be sure to hinder them from undertaking any resolute attack against the north side of the fortress. Except in so far as he might be aiding the cause in this collateral way, the Prince was to leave the main defense of Sebastopol to the sailors; for, save only 5000 militia-men and one battalion of sappers, he proposed to withdraw from the place the whole of his army.

When Korniloff was apprised of this resolve by Prince Mentschikoff, he protested and said, 'That it would be impossible to hold Sebastopol if the troops were to leave it; that a handful of seamen would not be able to resist the onset of the numerous army

Korniloff's remonstrance against the plan.

'of the Allies on the northern fortifications, and, these being 'carried, they would not be able to hold out long in the 'town itself.'

Prince Mentschikoff replied, 'The enemy can not under-
 take any energetic attack upon the northern for-
 tifications, having our army on the flank and rear.'¹
 Persisting in his resolve, he ordered Korniloff to
 form battalions out of the ships' crews for the de-
 fense of the place.

There was much that seems politic in this plan
 of operations; but the thought of abandoning
 Sebastopol at such a time, and leaving to the
 sailors the main defense of the place, was only to
 be justified by keeping it always coupled with
 that other part of the plan, which provided that
 the army thus stealing out of the fortress should
 operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the
 invading armies; and it will be seen that, although this last
 duty was in terms undertaken by Prince Mentschikoff, he did
 not make haste to perform it.

With a view to the execution of the intended flank march,
 Kiriakoff was intrusted with the delicate and im-
 portant task of observing the enemy at a very
 critical time; and accordingly, on the 23rd, the
 day before the march of the main army, he was
 sent toward the Belbec, taking with him, it seems, 12 bat-
 talions, 20 guns, and 400 Cossacks.

There is some obscurity in regard to the instructions with
 which General Kiriakoff was furnished;² but at half-past
 four in the afternoon his troops were so near to the Belbec
 as to be able to see the English cavalry on the other side of
 the river; and in the evening he learned that Lord Lucan's
 force had occupied the village of Duvanköi. Thereupon, and
 the same night, Kiriakoff fell back upon the Inkerman bridge,
 crossed the river, ascended the Sapounè Heights, moved
 southward along the road on their crest, descended once
 more into the valley of Tchernaya, recrossed the stream by a
 ford, ascended the Mackenzie Heights, and was thenceforth
 on the same line of march as the rest of the evading army.
 One of his battalions, however, in consequence of some mis-
 take, fell out and returned to Sebastopol.³ In the night of

¹ 'This conversation was related by Korniloff on the evening of the 11th [23rd] of September.'

² See Todleben, vol. i. p. 242 *et seq.*, comparing the note and the text.

³ The 3rd Taroutine battalion.

Prince Mentschikoff defends it, insisting upon the effect he would produce by placing his field army on the flank and rear of the enemy.

His final resolve and orders to form the ships' crews into battalions.

The consideration which justified the plan as proposed.

23rd to 25th Sept. The operation intrusted to Kiriakoff.

Night of the 24th. The main army marches out of Sebastopol.

Progress of the march up to the time of the encounter at Mackenzie's Farm.

the 24th the main army moved out of Sebastopol, crossed the valley of the Tchernaya, and ascended the Mackenzie Heights. At the moment when, on the forenoon of the 25th, Lord Raglan came suddenly upon a Russian battalion and wagon-train, all the rest of the army then marching under Prince Mentschikoff, including Kiriakoff's force, had already passed to the eastward of Mackenzie's Farm.

zic's Farm.

After first providing for the way in which the command of the forces left at Sebastopol should be distributed during his absence, Prince Mentschikoff in person departed from the place; and at eight o'clock on the morning of the 25th he reached Otarköi, a village on the Belbec, lying only about six miles above that part of the stream on which the English were then bivouacked.¹ From that village of Otarköi, a half-hour's ride of the Prince's cavalry scouts along the road through Duvanköi would have brought them in full sight of the English army. At the village of Otarköi, Prince Mentschikoff remained a great part of the day; and at about eleven o'clock in the morning, both he and his army were so placed, that those commanders who pass much of their life in sighing after the great occasion which comes but too rarely, would be likely to regard him, in that forenoon of the 25th of September, as a man to be keenly envied.

His whole army, with all its train, except a few wagons and a small rear-guard, was already on that part of the road which is to the eastward of Mackenzie's Farm; but, at the same time, no part of it was distant enough to be out of his reach; so that, if he should see reason to stop the march of his more advanced columns, and assemble his army in the neighborhood of Mackenzie's Farm, he would be able to do this by an early hour in the afternoon. His troops carried bread; and his trains, reduced, for the purpose of the march, to a moderate scale, were moving with the rest of the force.

Now, the English army, it will be remembered, began the flank march this same day, at half-past eight in the morning; and supposing that Prince Mentschikoff—who was master of the intervening country, and of ample cavalry

¹ I say *then* bivouacked, because the time spoken of is eight A. M., and the foremost column of the English army did not march till half an hour later.

forces—had been taking only those common means for ascertaining his adversary's movements which, even in days not regarded as specially critical, the customs of warfare prescribe, he would have learned, by the time we are speaking of, that Lord Raglan was moving in force toward Mackenzie's Farm; and only a little later, if not indeed some time before, he must have come to know that the whole Allied army was following the flank movement of the English General. The orders which the Prince might have issued, after making this discovery, would have enabled him to stay the march of his army toward Baktchi Seräi, to face it about, and to dispose it in such way as he might think fit in the woodland and broken ground lying east of the paths by which the Allies had to cross the mountain. He then would have had at his back the country traversed by the great road to Baktchi Seräi, and opening to him his communications with the interior of Russia; whilst, before him, he would have seen the Allies moving painfully across his front in all the helplessness of an army broken up into a trailing column, with a depth so great as to make it a day's march from the rear to the van, and a front so narrow as to consist of one gun and one horseman—and all this defiling through forest or steep mountain-paths. Some of these roads, too, and especially the mountain-road descending from the Mackenzie Heights to the valley of the Tchernaya, there would have been time to break up or obstruct. To add to his advantages, the Russian army would have had abundant water in its immediate rear, whilst the Allies, after draining the last turbid cupful from Mackenzie's Farm, would have been condemned to bear the torment of thirst, with a liability to have their sufferings aggravated indefinitely by the detention, and the labor which the necessity of having to combat, or prepare for combat, could not fail to occasion.

Nor can it be rightly said that any inferiority in point of numbers, or any depression occasioned by late defeat, unfitted Prince Mentschikoff's army for operations against the uncovered flank of a lengthened string of soldiery and wagons pursuing its difficult way through woodland or mountain-roads; for during at least some hours, the bare numbers of an army thus caught in the process of journeying, with a day's march between van and rear, would have no more served to repress an enemy assailing its uncovered flank, than the length, the mere length, of a far-stretching thread can avail it against a knife; and the enterprises to which the occasion invited were exactly of the kind which may be use-

fully undertaken with a brave though discomfited army, because they could be carried through by the personal boldness of a few men, and without exposing great masses to have their coherence tested. The conjuncture was such that, by reason of their effect in challenging and delaying a force to which long delay would be fatal, the smallest successes of the assailants might be fraught with great results; and it is to be observed, too, that there was a collateral advantage deriving from attacks of this sort, to which the Prince might have looked: for experience has taught that a series of even the pettiest triumphs, down even to those which may be won over stragglers and drivers of wagons, is of great worth as a means of restoring self-respect and confidence to troops which have suffered disaster.

Although the Allies encountered no sort of resistance, it cost them, as we saw, a painful march from morning to midnight, and again another march the next day, to traverse the ridge which divided the Belbec from the Tchernaya; but if Prince Mentschikoff, perceiving and using the power which fortune offered him, had so wielded his army as, from time to time, to constrain the invaders to prepare a front, and gather their means of resistance, the duration of their perilous march must have been proportionately lengthened; and they were forces to which dispatch was life, for they abandoned, as we know, their old base of operations, and were traveling by map and compass in hope of finding another. It would seem that even slight ventures undertaken that day by the Russians must have put the Allies in grave danger.

Such was the occasion which fortune stood proffering to Prince Mentschikoff from the morning of the 25th of September to the forenoon of the following day. But in vain; for on the 25th he had not only suffered himself to remain in sheer ignorance of the movements of an army of between 50,000 and 60,000 men, which had bivouacked at a distance of half an hour's ride from his quarters, but was even so content with his state in this respect that he avowedly postponed to the morrow the business of seeking this precious knowledge.¹ His sloth was the more extraordinary, since it is

Prince Mentschikoff's want of acquaintance with the movements of the Allies.

¹ I am informed, on very high authority, that the cause of Prince Mentschikoff's ignorance of the enemy's movements, was his reliance on Kiria-koff, and the failure of the operation to him intrusted; but the language of Prince Mentschikoff's letters seems to me inconsistent with that supposition; and there are many reasons which tend, as I think, to make the explanation invalid.

evident that (either from deserters or from some other source) he had gathered reason for surmising that the Allies might march to the south;¹ yet, even with such added motives for desiring information, his mind on this subject remained so blank, and his desire of knowledge so languid, that, at a time when the English were marching at a distance of but three or four miles from his desk, he was able to write thus to Korniloff: 'Bivouac near the Otark village, on the Belbec, 13th [25th] September, 1854. We arrived here at eight o'clock in the morning, and sent some Cosacks in advance. Our farther movements will depend upon the position of the enemy, and it would be therefore desirable to get, from time to time, some information from Sebastopol as to the position of our adversaries. We neither see nor hear any thing of the enemy here.' So that, being himself within half an hour's ride of the English bivouac, he sent back all the way to Sebastopol, and asked of the sailors there left to their fate some news of the enemy's movements. Here again, it would seem, there was proof that a too-labored military system has a tendency to unfit men for warfare; because, after owning thus that he knew not where the invading armies were, nor what they might be doing, the Prince went on to speak of a military process for acquiring the needed information, which was to be commenced with all form and ceremony—not then, but—on the following day. 'I hope,' he writes, 'the advanced posts will meet to-morrow for the first reconnaissance.'

At a later hour, Prince Mentschikoff learned how the rear of his army had been suddenly attacked by English horsemen at Mackenzie's Farm; but even when he knew this had happened, he still kept himself blind to the truth which the incident seemed fitted to teach him; for he ascribed the collision to 'a patrol,' and remained unacquainted with the fact that, all day, the whole Allied army had been defiling, and

¹ This we know because, almost immediately after quitting Sebastopol, Prince Mentschikoff sent back to the garrison urging precautions which could only be needed on the supposition that the Allies would march to the South. These injunctions, however, disclosed a surmise that the Allies, if they should march to the south, would take the lower road by the mouth of the Tchernaya; for the Prince directed that the passage by that route should be obstructed and fortified. He also sent back recommending that efforts should be made to strengthen the Malakoff Hill and the ground between that and the Careening Bay, and his anxiety could not have been ranging in that direction unless he had apprehended that the Allies would march to the south coast.

was still continuing to defile, at a distance of but three or four miles from his quarters.¹

If Prince Mentschikoff had been surrounded by a force like the Cossacks of 1812, it would have been hardly possible for him to have remained unacquainted with the movements of a hostile army which bivouacked on ground six miles from his quarters, and had since been marching toward him; but although there were abundance of horsemen still called by the name of Cossacks, the spirit of military organization had changed all these into bodies having no more spontaneous energy than the rest of the Russian cavalry.

In the course of the 25th, Prince Mentschikoff, with the whole of his force, took up a position in the neighborhood of Otarköi; and the next day, after leaving a detachment² in the country of the Upper Belbec, he yet farther withdrew the main army, and completed his retreat to the Katcha. There, day after day, as we shall see by and by more minutely, he remained with his army in a state of seclusion, concerting no measures with the people he had left in Sebastopol for the defense or relief of the place—nay, suffering the garrison to live on for a time in sheer ignorance of the region where he and his troops were reposing; and all this while the Prince was so far from threatening, or even observing, the invaders, that not only did he not know on which coast of the Crimea (the west or the south) they were operating, but when at last he once more put himself in communication with the garrison, it was to them that he looked for his tidings, requesting them to send him back word, and tell him where the enemy was.³

Completion of Prince Mentschikoff's flank march, and his retreat to the Katcha. The state of seclusion in which the Prince and his army remained.

¹ He ascribes the capture effected by the English at Mackenzie's Farm to 'a mounted patrol and two guns.'—*Second note from the Prince to Korniloff, dated '13th [25th] September.'* Lest it should seem, for even a moment, that Prince Mentschikoff's ignorance concerning the Allies was paralleled by their ignorance of his operations, it may be right to say that, whilst there was nothing to prevent Prince Mentschikoff from gathering all requisite knowledge of the movements of the Allies, his own flank movement carried on from behind Sebastopol to the mid-valley of the Tchernaya, and thence northward to the Mackenzie Heights, was far out of the reach of any degree of reconnoitering zeal which the Allies could exert on the 24th from the region of the Lower Belbec; and with respect to the condition of things on the morning of the 25th, when our army was marching, the circumstances which on that day prevented the English cavalry from effectively reconnoitering in front of the advancing column, in accordance with Lord Raglan's desire, have been already stated.

² A force of cavalry and infantry under Jabrokritsky, amounting altogether to 13,000 men.

³ It will be observed that, in a summary form, this sentence contains a

CHAPTER X.

I.

UPON withdrawing his army from the scene of the threatened attack, Prince Mentschikoff had distributed amongst three commanders the authority which was to be exercised at Sebastopol during the period of his absence.

Prince Mentschikoff's distribution of the command to be exercised at Sebastopol during his absence.

The command of the few land forces left in the place.

To General Möller he had left the command of the small body of land forces which was suffered to remain in the place, that is, of the one imperfect battalion of sappers, and the 5000 militia-men.

Of the officer thus placed at the head of the town garrison, it can not be said that he had disclosed the qualities needed for any momentous charge; but, at all events, he was so constituted as to be able to show his devotion to the public service, by a generous abandonment of every pretension and right which might clash with the general good.

General Möller.

The Prince ordered that all the seamen who had been withdrawn from the fleet for the defense of the south side of the town should be under the orders of Vice-Admiral Nachimoff.

The command of the seamen landed for duty on the South Side.

Admiral Nachimoff.

This commander, though fully as willing as soldier or sailor should be to part with his ease, and encounter all dangers for the sake of his sovereign and his country, was of too desponding a nature, and too distrustful of himself, to be equal to the stress of a high command at a time when the emergencies requiring to be dealt with were not only momentous, but also of a kind quite novel. He had made it the rule of his life to try to avoid engaging in any undertaking unless he could make himself sure beforehand that he was qualified to go through it well; and imagining that he was hardly competent to command

whole cluster of assertions, all having a bearing upon the question of Prince Mentschikoff's competence for the command of an army in the field. The proofs of these assertions will be given in the next chapter; and there also, there will be found an exposition of the way in which Prince Mentschikoff's flank march has been justified.

forces acting on shore, he waited on Prince Mentschikoff, before the Prince's departure, and told him that 'he was ready to die for the good of his country, that he was willing to place himself under the orders of a junior, and that, in that way, he would be happy to lend his co-operation, but that he could not be himself a good general of land forces.' Prince Mentschikoff answered that he did not consider this speech as a refusal, and made no change in his arrangements. Besides having the charge thus forced upon him, Nachimoff remained in command of one of the two squadrons into which the Black Sea fleet had been divided.

Vice-Admiral Korniloff continued to be the 'Chief of the Staff' of the Black Sea fleet, and remained in command of his naval squadron; but, independently of these functions, the Prince, upon quitting Sebastopol, intrusted to Korniloff the command of all the forces, both naval and military, which were to operate on the North Side.

This North Side was the ground where the whole weight of the victorious invaders was expected to fall; and any attempt to defend it was regarded by Korniloff as a merely forlorn undertaking; but, for that very reason the more, he was swift to accept the command; and those who knew him the best ascribe his joy at the time to a heroic exaltation of spirit which hardly needed the prop of any hope this side the grave.

Without holding supreme command, but acting as chief of the staff, Vice-Admiral Korniloff, for a period of some five years, had had the main direction of affairs in the Black Sea fleet; and it was during that time that he had been able to engender the zeal, the trustful affection, which now, in the hour of a great disaster, brought round him a band of undaunted seamen resolved to stand by his side in the void which the army had left. He was destined to be cut off when the period of his sway over events had lasted scarce twenty-six days; but this space included a time when the failing of the organized forces which people had hitherto trusted made room once more in the world—nay, made room in so straitened a place as a Russian garrison town—for a man having strength of his own.

The wars undertaken by Russia having always been waged against nations of other creeds or other churches, the religion and the patriotism of the people had been blended, as we saw, into one sentiment, giving force and steadfastness

to the nation;¹ but there were few, I imagine, who lived more absolutely under the governance of this kind of religious patriotism than did this brave Admiral. Indeed, it would seem that a main source of his strength was his faith in that Divine Power which he humbly believed to be taking part with 'Holy Russia' in her struggle for a cause which seemed to him to be a righteous one. 'May the Lord,' he writes—'May the Lord bless our cause! To the best of our understanding it is a just one. Of course, all depends on God. God will not forsake those who are righteous. Therefore await the issue calmly and patiently.'

So, against all the cares which were worldly, and therefore subject to limits, he ever could bring that strong faith, which—having its source in the Infinite—was not an exhaustible power; and as often as the trials he was facing grew heavier and heavier, he only clung so much the more to the aid of Heaven. Thus, although he was too loyal to suffer himself, even, perhaps, in thought, to cast doubt upon the capacity which directed affairs at Head-quarters, it still can be seen that, whenever he strove to look cheerfully upon the prospect of what might be achieved under Mentschikoff's personal direction, he was careful to base his structure of hope upon strictly religious grounds.

From the traces we have of this chief it can hardly be shown that he was gifted with original genius, still less with a piercing intellect; and the soundness of his judgment in the business of war may well be denied, or, at all events, brought into question; but it is not from the mere tenor of his words, nor even, indeed, altogether from his acts, that the quality of his soul is to be gathered, but rather from the visible effect of its impact upon the souls of other men. As one man to whom many look may be passing through a distant assemblage unseen and unheard himself by those who gaze from afar, and yet his course can be tracked by the movement and the cries of devotion which his presence arouses, so, in part, our knowledge of Korniloff must rest upon the perception of what people did when they felt the impulsion he gave. At a time when there seemed to be no room but for despair and confusion, he took that ascendant which enabled him to bring the whole people in the place—inhabitants, soldiers, sailors—to his own heroic resolve. In a garrison town of the empire which had carried the mania of military organization to the most preposterous lengths, all

¹ *Ante*, vol. i. chap. iv. p. 56, and the reference there to Dean Stanley's work on the Greek Church.

those straitened notions of rank and seniority, and, in short, the whole network of the formalisms which might have been expected to hinder his command, flew away like chaff at the winnowing. By the fire of his spirit there was roused so great an energy on the part of thousands of men as has hardly been known in these times; and he so put his people in heart that not only the depression created by defeat, but the sense of being abandoned and left for sacrifice by the evading army, was succeeded by a quick growth of warlike pride, by a wholesome ardor for the fight, by an orderly, joyful activity. And, even when he was dead, there continued to be still growing proofs of the power he had had over the minds and affections of those around him; for men whose pride it was that they had served under his immediate orders in the last—in the glorious—month of his life, were content to engage in great toil for the sake of making known to their country the worth of the chief they had lost.¹

If this were all, it might be said that Korniloff's nature was of the kind which people call 'enthusiastic,' that the effects he wrought upon other men's minds were exactly those which 'enthusiasm' is used to produce, and that, therefore, that single word would suffice to disclose what is meant. Yet this would be hardly strict truth, and at all events might mislead. The 'enthusiast,' in general, is a man very prone to hopefulness, and the flame he is able to impart to others is that which burns in his own bosom. With Korniloff it was not thus. The hope, the assurance of victory, with which he could inflame other men, he did not at all share himself; for though he was very sure that in the ultimate designs of Providence the triumph of 'Holy Russia' must needs be secure, he believed that bloody disaster must first come; and he seemed to have made up his mind that—for himself, at all events—there was no issue out of the trouble except an honorable death. In truth, it may be gathered that, although to others his presence brought joyful promise of success—of success to be had in this world—yet in his privacy he was more the resolute martyr than the confident and half-careless seaman. But, whatever was the true source of his power over the warlike temper of other men, the power was there. He had soul.

¹ This is in allusion to the great (Russian) work of Captain Gendre, one of the most attached and most valued of Korniloff's Staff. I may here express my lively sense of the service which has been rendered me by Admiral Likhatcheff, who most kindly translated for my use the portions of the work which relate to the earlier period of the siege.

Vice-Admiral Korniloff was an able administrator, and excellently versed in the duties pertaining to a naval commander; but the faculty of designing apt plans for the conduct of war was not in the number of those with which he was known to be gifted; and, in this respect, no guiding help was to be got from General Möller, nor yet, it would seem, from any of the officers on duty whom Prince Mentschikoff had left in the place.

But if the army was wanting in this the time of trial, and the seamen were without the skill needed for planning defenses on shore, there had come, as a guest, to Sebastopol, a man so gifted by nature as to be able to fill the void, and able, moreover, to make people bend to his judgment, confessing that his was the guidance which best would meet the emergency. The officer who planned the defense of Sebastopol has already been spoken of as one whose authority in his engineering art is of almost resistless weight; but, until some four or five weeks before the time we are dealing with, the name of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben had scarcely been heard of at Sebastopol.

Colonel de Todleben was born in one of the Baltic provinces lying within the dominions of Russia, and to Russia accordingly he has ever devoted himself; but by race, and name, and feature, and warlike quality, he is the fellow-countryman of Count Bismarck and of some of the most formidable of the troops which conquered at Sadowa. Whilst the empire he serves is the Empire of the Czars, the power he represents and almost seems to embody is the power of North Germany.

The honor of placing this gifted man upon the scene in which he was destined to achieve his renown must be given to Prince Michael Gortschakoff. The keen and piercing intellect of the Prince had enabled him, in his quarters with the army of the Danube, to distinguish between true and false rumors, and to read the signs which foreshadowed an approaching invasion of the Crimea. Therefore, when he came to learn that the General and High Admiral commanding in the Crimea was refusing to believe in the likelihood of a descent, Prince Gortschakoff resolved to make an effort to awaken the sleeper from his dream of security. But this was only a part of what his foresight enabled him to do; for, having discovered the capacity of Colonel de Todleben, and knowing how likely it was that the issue of the conflict which he perceived to be impending might be governed by a skillful application of the engineer's resources, Prince

Gortschakoff determined that he would not only intrust to the Colonel the duty of conveying his warnings to the Headquarters in the Crimea, but would introduce him to Prince Mentschikoff, as an officer capable of being of great use to him in the business of fortification. This the Prince might well do; for Colonel de Todleben was master of the art of military engineering. His devotion to the study of his profession had been unstinted; and indeed there was a period when his practice of the business of mining had kept him mainly underground during a third part of each year; but although his craft had been learned at all this vast cost of toil, he was saved from the mistake of overvaluing it by his strong common sense, but also, perhaps, by his wholesome experience of the trenches before Silistria, and the rough tasks of war in the Caucasus. Therefore, whenever his art was not really applicable, it did not seem so in his eyes. How and when to apply it to the business of war he exactly knew. He was about thirty-seven years old.

On the 22nd of August, Colonel de Todleben reached Sebastopol, and presented to Mentschikoff the letter with which he came charged. He afterward, it seems, said all that he appropriately could in support of the warnings contained in the letter; but Prince Mentschikoff would not see the coming invasion. From the first, he had withheld his belief in the rumor which foreshadowed the armada, and the lateness of the season was added now to the grounds on which he rested his disbelief. It was too late, he said, for an invasion that year, and before the next summer there would be peace. Prince Mentschikoff, it is true, gave heed to that part of the letter which spoke of De Todleben's merits; and the Lieutenant-Colonel was not only received with all courtesy and kindness at Headquarters, but was armed, it appears, with full power to examine the defensive resources of Sebastopol. Prince Mentschikoff, however, had been habitually a rigid economist of the public treasure, and he was still unwilling to incur expense in providing against a danger which he believed to be chimerical. Colonel de Todleben's inquiries elicited the want that there was of engineering tools; but although there were Government factories from which it would have been easy to get the required supply, the Prince did not yet see the need of obtaining them in the ample quantity which prudence seemed to demand.

Nor was this all. As though to protect his repose from farther assaults, Prince Mentschikoff took a step which, if he had had his way, would have produced consequences beyond

the reach of his imagination. He recommended Colonel de Todleben to quit the Crimea. Coming from the Commander-in-Chief, this recommendation was almost a mandate; but, for a time at least, compliance might be evaded. Todleben contrived to avoid or defer the necessity of departing for some days, and then, the armada appearing, he remained and defended Sebastopol.

It is certain, however, that even during the three weeks which elapsed between the arrival of Prince Mentschikoff's visitor, and the appearance of the armada on the coast, Colonel de Todleben was not only making himself minutely acquainted with the field of the approaching conflict, but also beginning to earn that rare confidence which afterward enabled him to guide into a right direction the valor and strength of the garrison. The momentous charge intrusted to him on the evening which followed the Battle of the Alma shows that even at that early time his genius had obtained great ascendancy.¹

Toward the creation of all this confidence, both his manner and his expression of feature were conducing. For although, as might be expected from his race and his Courland birthplace, he had that Northern, that North German conformation of head and countenance which denote a man fitted for violent bodily conflict lasting out to the death, and although he even seemed to be one to whom the very labors of fighting, and of exterminating the weaker breeds of men, must be an easy and delightful exertion of natural strength, he had joyous, kind-looking eyes, almost ready to melt with good-humor, and a bearing and speech so frank and genial, that people were instantly inclined to like, and, very soon after, to trust in him. From his looks and demeanor it could not at all be inferred that he was a man who had devoted his mind to a science; and, for this very reason, perhaps, he had the less difficulty in making people yield to his judgment. No one who had so much as seen him could imagine that his power of doing the right thing at the right time had been at all warped by long study of the engineering art. No one who had once conversed with him could doubt that, body and soul, he was a man of action; nothing more, nothing less. A race, corrupted by luxury and the arts of peace, knows instinctively that it must succumb to a nature of this kind. I imagine that few men of great intellect have ever attained so closely as he did to that which

¹ The task so intrusted to him is stated *ante*, chap. viii.

the English describe when they speak of a man as being 'practical.'

It was supposed at one time in Europe that Todleben had made discoveries which altered and expanded the old science of fortification. This is hardly true. It was in applying his science—in applying it to novel and changeful circumstances—that his excellence lay. He had the power of instantly recognizing and at once understanding all the material conditions upon which from time to time he had to found his resolves. If these conditions were new and startling, he did not the less hasten to accept them. If they were of such a kind that they threatened to dislocate his plans, and turn to nought his past labors, he did not for that reason fail to give them, and give them at once, their just place in his reckonings. That which most tries the powers of a commander is not the mere solution of any problem laid clearly before him. His harder task is to learn in good time that he has a problem to solve, and then to see what it is. For the questions which he ought to be deciding are very many; they are, some of them, strange and startling, and they spring up—often suddenly—from day to day, from hour to hour—nay, in battle, from minute to minute. It avails him but little to be able to see any truth unless he can marshal and place it in due relation with the existing conjuncture. He needs the swift judgment, and the firm encompassing grasp which enable a man to lay out of his sight the conditions no longer material, and to gather clean into one problem the terms which really belong to it. There are few who, in war, can thus steadfastly look upon the present, discarding those things in the past which have only just lost their import. And often the most industrious man is the one least able to exert this power; for when change of circumstance comes, it finds him carrying on with a great momentum in a direction which has ceased to be the right one, and he can hardly at once change his course. It was not so with Colonel de Todleben; for although he had been gifted, as we shall see, with rare energy, his mind was at the same time so nimble that the force with which he had been acting in one direction did not hinder him from acting in another, the moment a change of action was called for by a change of conditions.

The way in which Colonel de Todleben applied himself to his very first undertaking, is perhaps a too simple illustration of the accuracy and completeness with which he read problems in war; but although, for that reason, it will neces-

sarily fail to indicate the scope of his power, it may still convey some idea of the nature of the quality in which he excelled. Before the time of Todleben's arrival, the Star Fort had been examined by engineers, and it was soon ascertained to be so faulty in construction as to be likely to be of comparatively little use. Seeing what the faults of the work were, and seeing what ought to be done in order to make it a good fort, the engineers at once went on to commence the works which were needed for the purpose. But one of the conditions in which they were called upon to act, they failed to bring into their reckoning. They left out the condition of time. To bring to an effective state the works which they thus undertook, would necessarily cost a labor of several months; but on the other hand, the attack of this Star Fort, if it should take place at all, might be expected in a few days. Therefore the labor going on was labor in vain. When Colonel de Todleben attained to his sway, he at once stopped the works in hand, and brought the energies of the defenders to bear upon the construction of other works of easier construction, which, however imperfect they might be, should at all events have the merit of being in time. If it be said that the necessity for taking time into account must have been obvious to all, the answer is, that, for days and days together, that necessity remained unperceived by the military authorities who had the ordering of the works. A simple truth of this kind lies often unseen or scarce heeded until it comes under the light which genius is able to shed; and thenceforth the wonder is that any one ever was blind to it.

What was said of a lusty English statesman, may be said once more in the same words, and applied to this Colonel of Sappers: All that was fanciful, or for any reason impractical—all that was the least bit too high for him, or the least bit too deep for him—all that lay, though only by a little, beyond the immediate future with which he was dealing—he utterly drove from out of his mind, and his energies, condensed for the time upon some object to which they could be applied with effect, were brought to bear upon it with all their full volume and power.¹ It was certain that he would strive to do the very utmost of what could be compassed by mortals; and nothing more. Under guidance so firm and sure there could be no waste of energy, no waste of bodily labor.

¹ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 285.

But besides that he was able to withhold his own mind from the pursuit of things not to the purpose, Colonel de Todleben, after a time, grew strong enough to be able to repress in others any inclination to wander from the true path. It was at Korniloff's table that he achieved this. There was mention there, one day, of a fanciful method which some projector had imagined for the defense of the place; and Korniloff seemed to be interested by the suggestion. Colonel de Todleben interposed. 'There ought,' he spoke to this purport—'There ought to be no listening to suggestions of this kind. The way of doing what is possible toward defending the place lies clear before us. We must not make waste of our time, and disperse our energies by thinking of other plans. All the minutes we have we want.' And all the commanders and officers on duty had been made so wise by the discipline of imminent peril, that they bowed to the words of the great volunteer thus laying his weight on their counsels. Thenceforth his strong sense did more than prevail. It prevailed without question. He had made it supreme.

When the Russian field army undertook its flank march, Colonel de Todleben remained at Sebastopol. Admiral Korniloff and he had come to be as one man. They lived in the same room. What Todleben judged to be right, the Admiral impelled men to do. If Korniloff was the soul of the cause, the great Engineer was its mind. Whilst the sentiment which Korniloff inspired was one so exalted that men might call it holy, the robust sanguine nature of Todleben, and the immense vital forces he had at command, brought joyousness, nay, even brought mirth, to help the toil of the defenders. The enthusiasm kindled by the Admiral might more or less cause men to look for heavenly aid; but the very presence of Todleben was enough to assure them that even in this world there was something at least to hope for, and plainly a great deal to do.

The character in which Colonel de Todleben acted, and (till long afterward) continued to act, was that of a volunteer.¹

¹ This General de Todleben himself told me.

The perfect accord between Korniloff and Todleben.

The force exerted by their conjoint powers.

II.

On the 24th of September—the day the Allies were marching on the Belbec with the then apparent intention of attacking the Star Fort—Korniloff assumed the command of the North Side, and Colonel de Todleben, whilst still continuing to direct the works there going on, was now also charged to post the troops in the way he deemed to be the best for resisting the expected assault. In the course of the day some additional battalions of sailors were moved from the South to the North Side; and we have already seen that, on the morning of the 5th, the time when the Allies might be expected to begin their attack, Korniloff had on the North Side two militia battalions, and so great a number of seamen as to bring up his whole force to eleven thousand.¹ Korniloff did not seriously imagine that, with this force, or any fresh numbers of seamen which he might draw from the ships, he could offer a successful resistance to a resolute attack directed against the Star Fort by a victorious army with a strength of between fifty and sixty thousand. Colonel de Todleben did not deceive him, and he did not deceive himself. It is true he had accepted the command with eagerness, and even with a kind of joy. But his joy was the joy of one who looks beyond the grave. He apparently put but a measured trust in Prince Mentschikoff's promises of help from without; and it did not occur to him to look to the enemy—to look to the probable effects of a divided command—for the means of encouragement which his own camp failed to supply. 'From the North Side,' Korniloff said to Captain Gendre—'From the North Side there is no retreat. All of us who are there will also find our graves. Death does not terrify me. Only one thing makes me uneasy. If wounded, one can not defend one's self, and to be taken prisoner!' He was anxious that his flag-officers should be spared the fate of perishing with him in what he regarded as a hopeless undertaking; and although Captain Gendre (who was one of them) represented that they would

Korniloff assumes the command of the North Side.

Duties undertaken by Todleben.

Additional forces moved to the North Side.

The strength there on the morning of the 25th Sept.

Korniloff's despair of being able to defend the North Side.

The spirit in which he prepared for the expected conflict.

¹ See *ante*, chap. iv.; where will be found an account of the state of the defenses at this time on the North Side, and references to General de Todleben's views as to the possibility of defending the North Side against an attack.

all be bitterly mortified at the notion of being parted from their chief in the hour of danger, the Admiral clung to his desire. 'I should not like,' he said, 'to see all fall with me;' and he then proceeded to assign to his Staff some duties which would detain them, all except one, on the South Side.

The morning of the 25th brought with it no signs of the expected advance of the Allies against the Star Fort; but as though to add to the helplessness of the people abandoned in Sebastopol, Prince Mentschikoff had left them without the cavalry required for reconnoitering the enemy, and it seems that the garrison remained unacquainted with the momentous operation in which the Allies were, that day, engaging, until it was almost noon. And then, strange to say, they learned the truth without seeking it. They learned it as a man learns some incident with which he has no concern, by chancing to look out of the window.

From that Naval Library of which we have heard as standing upon a high knoll in the town of Sebastopol and commanding a far-reaching view, some officers extended their gaze toward a quarter not hitherto thought of as the probable scene of any English or French operations. They looked toward the heights overhanging the head of the roadstead. There, scarlet and glittering under a bright noontide sun, they saw regiments and regiments of the English soldiery moving up along the skirts of the forest to the Mackenzie Heights, and afterward descending southward into the valley of the Tchernaya. All day, the march was seen going on; and before evening, the heights where the English had first been descried were observed to be alive with dark-coated troops moving on in the same line of march which the scarlet battalions had taken.

The import of this movement could hardly be doubtful. It must mean that the Allies were abandoning the valley of the Belbec with design to attack Sebastopol on its south side. It followed that the Severnaya, which before had been regarded as doomed, was now safe, and that the danger had, all at once, shifted from the north to the south of the place.

The morning of the 25th. The garrison had been left without a cavalry force with which to reconnoitre.

The sight accidentally observed from the Naval Library.

Evident import of the operation undertaken by the Allies. The shifting of the danger from the North Side to the South.

III.

We saw that on the south, the now threatened side, the seamen were commanded by Admiral Nachimoff. Of these, for the moment, there were but few; for out of the battalions already withdrawn from the ships no less than eleven were on the North Side, and of land forces there were none except the militia battalions. Nachimoff was a brave, devoted man; but the courage he now evinced was of that forlorn sort which consists with blank despair. By cutting apertures in the ships' sides—to be filled up until the last moment by stoppers—he strove to insure to himself the power of sending his whole squadron to the bottom with little delay; but he had become so passionately intent upon this idea of destroying his ships, that after making ready to scuttle them, he could not think he had done enough. He therefore placed about them tarred hoops and such like combustible materials, in order to be able to fire them at the chosen moment; and he arranged a dismal code of signals for insuring dispatch in the transmission of his dooming orders. One signal was to mean 'Sink your ship,' another was to mean 'Fire your ship.' For himself and his seamen he hardly seemed to wish more than that he and they might die fighting. It was in this spirit that he issued his address to the seamen: 'The enemy is approaching the town, in which there is but a very small garrison. I therefore find myself under the necessity of sinking the vessels of the squadron intrusted to me, and of reinforcing the garrison with men armed with boarding-pikes and cutlasses. I have the fullest confidence in the captains, officers, and crews, and am certain that every one of them will fight like a hero. In all we are about three thousand.¹ The rallying-point will be the Theatre Square. I herewith make it known to the squadron.'

¹ In giving so low a number as this, Nachimoff must be understood to refer only to the seamen who had been withdrawn from the ships for the defense of the South Side, and not to include either the 'militia' battalions, as I call them, or the 'stationed marines.'

IV.

The despair of Nachimoff was founded in part upon the assumption that Korniloff, being intrusted with the charge of the North Side, would not only there remain, but would continue to keep gathered around him the whole or great part of the force which he had assembled for the defense of the Star Fort. And such, indeed, was the course of action which might have been expected to follow from Prince Mentschikoff's determination to go away from the Sebastopol region himself, and leave the command of things there perversely split into two.¹ The measure was fitted to neutralize one of the greatest of all the advantages which Nature had given to the defenders of Sebastopol.

Nachimoff's despair was founded in part upon the assumption that Korniloff, obeying his orders, would concern himself only with the North Side.

This a result which Prince Mentschikoff's way of splitting the command was calculated to produce.

Russian troops could be ferried across from the North Side to the South, or from the South to the North, in half an hour; whilst the assailants, if they should be minded to change the place of attack from the North to the South, or from the South to the North, could only do this at the cost and peril of a difficult two days' march round the head of the roadstead. But by appointing one man to command the North Side and two others the South, with no one in authority over them, and retreating himself to so great a distance from Sebastopol as to be without the means of exchanging quick communications with the garrison, Prince Mentschikoff did what man could to counterwork the advantage which Nature had offered to the defenders, and prevent them from bringing the united resources of the North Side and the South to the seat of danger.

In a country where men's minds had been weakened by habits of overweening respect for official superiors, and where, also, the bondage of a vast, yet straitened military system perversely kept up in peace-time had done much to benumb the warlike prowess of the nation, it was hardly to be imagined beforehand that the error of the chief would be neutralized by the devotion, the patriotism, and the wise dis-

¹ Viz., Korniloff on the North, and on the South, Nachimoff and Möller. The command was really split into *three*, because Möller had an independent command of the land forces on the South Side; and if the text speaks of the command as being split into only *two*, it is because the South Side is there treated as a unit. In that aspect, the separate commands of Nachimoff and Möller resulted from a *sub*-division of authority.

obedience of a subordinate. Intrusted with the command of the North Side at a moment when that was the ground believed to be in peril, Korniloff now saw the Allies so plainly committing themselves to the enterprise of attacking the South Side, that the North, for the time, was clearly safe. So far as concerned the charge committed to him, he could breathe freely ; and if he thought only of obedience to orders, he might henceforth stand at his ease until such time as his absent chief might cast upon him some new duty. That, as matter of course the commander of the North Side would so act, Nachimoff did not doubt.

But Korniloff was of that noble calling which seems to defend those who follow it from the stunting power of a military despotism continuing through long years of peace ; and, moreover, he had so much greatness of mind, and was of so generous a nature, that despite the straitening effect of the formalism then predominant in Russia, he was able to understand the occasion. The army, and the commander of all the forces both military and naval, had abandoned the place to its fate. The navy was prisoned. The peril which beset Sebastopol was great, was imminent. On the other hand, Korniloff's orders, if only they were to be obeyed, would prevent him from acting upon the scene of the approaching conflict, and rivet him fast to that North Side which was no longer threatened. Far from accepting the

He at once gives up the command of the North Side to a subordinate, and withdraws 11 battalions of seamen to the South Side ; and goes to consult with Nachimoff for the defense of the South Side.

Meeting of four officers at Korniloff's lodgings.

repose thus enjoined by his instructions, Korniloff at once turned away from the quarter whence the danger had passed, and went straight to where the danger was coming. Giving up the command of the North Side to Captain Bartenoff, and leaving orders for the transport of his eleven sailor battalions from the North to the South, he went on board the 'Twelve Apostles,' in order to consult with Admiral Nachimoff for the defense of the main town and arsenal, now all at once threatened ; and for the same purpose Korniloff afterward assembled at his lodgings Admiral Nachimoff, General Möller, and Colonel de Todleben.

There, arrangements were made for distributing what forces they had along the lines of defense on the South Side. But this was not all that the assembled chiefs did. They came to a great resolve.

Forgetting their mere rank in the army and the navy,

Korniloff requested to take charge of the arrangements for the defense of the place.

He accepts the command thus offered to him.

Arrangement for insuring the obedience of the land forces to Korniloff's orders.

and remembering only the welfare of their common country, General Möller and Admiral Nachimoff requested Admiral Korniloff 'to undertake the general arrangements for the defense of the town.' And Korniloff did not shrink from accepting the command thus proffered him by the judgment of his comrades. He observed, it is true, that the land forces would not be under an obligation to obey his orders; but General Möller met this objection by appointing Korniloff the Chief of the Staff of the Sebastopol garrison, and by publishing an instruction which enjoined obedience to all the orders which Korniloff might give the land forces.

The Russians take a just pride in tracing the glory of their defense of Sebastopol to the political courage and the generous self-denial which thus secured unity of command in the gravest hour of danger.

V.

No sooner was Korniloff thus invested with command than

Korniloff proceeds to use, and even extend, his power.

Nachimoff, still despairing, issues the final orders for the destruction of his ships.

he proceeded to exert, and even to stretch, his power, without at all shrinking from the duty of having to overrule one of those very chiefs who had just placed him over their heads. When Nachimoff joined in ceding to Korniloff the whole charge of defending the town, he did not intend to abdicate his authority as an admiral commanding one of the two squadrons into which the fleet was divided; so, having already taken the measures we spoke of for the eventual destruction of his squadron, and being still in the despairing mood, he now issued the final orders for sinking his ships.

Korniloff was suddenly informed, not only that the final order had been issued by Nachimoff, but that, in obedience to it (this was not yet true), one of the ships had been actually sunk, or was sinking. Korniloff instantly called Captain Gendre, one of his flag-officers, and said to him, 'Go to all the ships' captains, and tell them that if one single under-mark stopper be opened without my orders, I will declare the captain of that ship a traitor to the country, and send him in chains to the Emperor.' Gendre went on board all the ships except the 'Twelve Apostles' (where Nachimoff's flag was flying), and delivered Korniloff's message. He added that

no signal for the sinking or burning of the ships was to be attended to unless it came from Korniloff's flag-ship. No vessel was sunk.

VI.

The destruction of the ships having thus been averted, Korniloff and Todleben at his side, devoted his whole energy to the all but desperate purpose of attempting to defend the South Side. The march of the Allies to the south coast was a surprise upon a garrison which had assumed, since the day of the Alma, that the attack would be delivered against the Severnaya, and their energies having been directed in the main to that quarter, they had not found time to do much on the South Side. There, the principal change which had been effected since the landing was the completion of the Central Bastion ; and although the lines along the Karabel suburb were fully equal in their military value to those which took in the main town, they had received but little accession of strength since the day of the landing. The Battery of the Point had indeed been begun, and preparations had been made for strengthening the position of the Malakoff Tower ; but little had been hitherto done in this quarter, and the Malakoff, on the 25th of September, was a mere naked tower, without a glacis, exposed from head to foot, unsupported by the powerful batteries which were destined to flank it, and uncovered as yet by the works which afterward closed up round its base. There were no intermediate intrenchments along the lines of the Karabel suburb which connected with one another the four works there begun or established. Those four works afforded but a weak defense to the great intervals of ground by which they were divided. Upon the whole, it may be said that along all the arc of four miles which encompassed the place on the land side, the part which reached from the Artillery Bay to the Central Bastion was the only one which could be regarded as tolerably secure. All the rest of the line of defense, including that occupied by the Flagstaff Bastion, and all the works of the Karabel faubourg, were weak, and could be easily forced. They afforded hardly any cover for infantry, not even for the reserves ; and the gunners at the batteries, having for the most part mere barricades to shelter them, or having to serve guns which

Korniloff and Todleben devoted themselves to the business of attempting to defend the South Side.

The movement of the Allies to the south coast had been a surprise upon the garrison.

The slight changes in the works on the South Side which had been effected since the landing.

Weak state of the defenses.

fired over the parapets, would have been ruinously exposed, at that time, to the eye and the ball of the rifleman.¹

To defend this weak line Korniloff had indeed as many artillerymen as he needed; but it seems that the whole number of other combatants which he could employ in the defense of Sebastopol was only 16,000.² In this force there was an imperfect battalion of sappers, and a body of 5000 militiamen.²

The rest consisted of seamen withdrawn from the ships, and had been formed into sixteen battalions, of which four, and four only, were well trained and well armed. The remaining battalions, it seems, were but slightly instructed in the duties of the land service, and portions of the force were ill armed, some carrying old flint muskets, and some having no better weapons than pikes or cutlasses.

With sixteen thousand combatants of this description, it was hopeless to try to defend a line of four miles against such an attack as might be made by the victorious army of the Allies; and this the more, since the garrison, split into two by the Man-of-war Harbor, and the deep ravine at its head, would be

unable to concentrate upon any one endangered quarter the little strength that it had. In the opinion of Todleben, it was

impossible that the attack of the Allies could be repelled by even the most valiant defense. The 26th, it is true, passed away without showing that the Allies (who had this day seized Balaclava) were preparing an attack for the morrow; but on the other hand, it brought no tidings of the evading army. 'Of the Prince,' writes Korniloff on this day, 'nothing is to be heard.'

Hopelessness of the endeavor to defend the lines with this force against a determined attack.

No signs on the 26th that the Allies would attack the next day.

On the other hand, no tidings of Prince Mentschikoff and the army.

¹ Todleben, vol. i. pp. 256, 257.

² Including the Taroutine battalion mentioned in the next note. Todleben speaks of this body of 16,000 as representing the whole force of 'combatants' available for the South Side; but an examination of his details, and a comparison of them with a former chapter, will show that he must mean to include in the 16,000 those only who were serving as infantry, and not the gunners. Korniloff (forgetting to reckon the Taroutine battalion) calls the force only 15,000. It must not be supposed that the small body of 16,000 soldiers and sailors represented the whole military and naval strength of the place. The strength was about the same as it was on the 20th of September (see *ante*, chap. vii.), except that there were now about 2000 more militiamen, and also some companies of sappers, which were not in the place on the 20th.

³ In the night the third Taroutine battalion, which had lost its way, and was supposed to be cut off, came back into Sebastopol, and there remained. It was only as the consequence of a misadventure that this solitary battalion of regular infantry came to be in Sebastopol during the last days of September.

VII.

On the morning of the 27th, the garrison was still without tidings of Prince Mentschikoff and his army. Morning of the 27th, the garrison still without tidings of the army. 'Thus,' so Todleben writes, 'the defenders of Sebastopol had no help that they could reckon on. It has been seen that it was absolutely impossible for them to repel the enemy with only the force the garrison consisted of. So there remained to them no alternative but that of seeking to die gloriously at the post committed to their bravery.'

Supposing it useful and fitting for a people, in the time of their peril, to strive to approach the Almighty by help of bishops and priests, the solemnity enacted by the Church on the 27th of September was indeed opportune. Todleben's view of the desperate position in which the garrison were placed. It was not upon the issue of a battle, nor indeed upon things material, that the fate of Sebastopol was hanging that day. It was hanging upon the resolve of three or four men in the enemy's camp, who would be trying to govern events by dint of thought and hard reason. Therefore, even amongst those Russians who could hardly make bold to expect the corporeal intervention of Heaven in the conflicts of mortals, there well might be some who trusted that at the prayer of the Orthodox Church, the Lord would so far vouchsafe to chastise a schismatic, an impious enemy, as to cloud his mind with surmises and reasonings, give him cleverness instead of wisdom, incline his heart to delay, and in short make him weak of counsel. It was along the lines of defense that the ceremony had been ordained to take place.

At an early hour, the troops stood ranged in order of battle, some battalions being in extended order, and forming a chain along the line of the ramparts, whilst other battalions were drawn up in columns of companies, and others again in columns of attack. Then the priests, with images,¹ gonfalons, and crosses, walked in procession along the lines, and performed divine service at each of the bastions, and the troops were sprinkled with holy water. 'Let the troops first be reminded of the Word of God,' said Korniloff, 'and then I will impart to them the word of the Czar.'

To pious, obedient Muscovites, the way in which Heaven

¹ It is a Russian writer and a Russian translator who gives me the word 'images;' but he must refer only to the flat, or basso-relievo, representations of sacred beings which are used by the Greek Church.

Impression produced, especially upon pious minds, by the way in which Korniloff had been raised up to meet the occasion.

Enthusiastic devotion to him.

people, a

Devotion to him on the part of the men of the land service.

had raised up a man to meet the occasion was of the nature of miracle. Without having lawful authority, Korniloff had suddenly come to be the unquestioned ruler whom all rejoiced to obey—whom all, wherever he rode, were pursuing with blessings and cheers. By the seamen of the fleet, as we saw, Korniloff had long been known, had long been beloved and trusted; but at this time there was glowing, in the hearts of the whole people, a sentiment of enthusiastic devotion to the elected chief. None caught this feeling more warmly than that small body of land-service men which Prince Mentschikoff had left in the place. Abandoned by the Prince and his evading army, these men, it would seem, had come to be proud of the fate which left them to fight under an admiral, and alongside of mariners, in a cause thought too desperate to allow of its being upheld by the strength of Prince Mentschikoff's army.

Of a certainty, the fire and the thorough devotedness of Korniloff's nature were the main sources of the power which he was thus exerting over the minds of men never bred to the sea. But, also, it was given him to seem what he was. Unless the portraits deceive, his face was of classic mould; for although, near the eyes, there were signs of a blood deriving from the North, the rest of his features had that kind of beauty which belonged to the great Bonaparte in the time of his first Italian campaign, whilst yet his face remained lean. According to those who knew Korniloff, it was not only in his features that the wearing, consuming energy of the man was expressed, but also in an eager bend forward, which his ardor had rendered habitual. It chanced that he had an accomplishment which delighted the soldiery. Like the Bedouins seen in the ranges of the Atlas, he was accustomed to gallop at speed either up or down heights so steep, and over ground so rugged, as to make the feat seem a wonder; and it charmed the people and the garrison, but most, the men of the land service, to see the chief flitting thus from one post of defense to another.¹ But, above all, he had eloquence of that peculiar kind which touches the heart of the soldier.

When the religious ceremony had ended, Korniloff, array-

¹ To one who has never seen such feats before, it is extremely interesting and surprising to see what a horseman can do in a rugged, mountainous country. Certainly I had not the least conception of what was possible in that way until I saw what the Bedouins could do in the ranges of the Atlas.

At the close of the religious ceremony, Korniloff rode along the lines, and harangued the troops. ed in the brilliant uniform of an Adjutant-General,¹ and followed by a numerous Staff, rode along the lines; and to every separate body of men he addressed some words of harangue. As might be expected, the words of these brief speeches were from time to time varied, but each of them, it is said, had words to this effect: 'The Czar hopes that we shall not give up Sebastopol. Besides, we have nowhere to retreat to. We have the sea behind, the enemy in front. Prince Mentschikoff has deceived our enemies, and got round them; and when they attack us, our army will fall upon their rear. Remember then—believe in no retreat. Let the bands forget to play the retreat! Let him be a traitor who sounds the retreat! And if I myself give the order for retreating, kill me with the bayonet!' In his addresses to the men of the land service, he added words to this effect: 'Your business will be at first to receive the enemy with a well-directed fire of musketry; and if they should try to mount the batteries, receive them in the Russian style. You well know the work—at the point of the bayonet!'

To the battalion of Captain Vinck, which contained many sailors who had served under him when he was Captain of the 'Twelve Apostles,' Korniloff said that he had long known them as gallant fellows, and that to such there was no need of much talk. Indeed, he in general spoke less to the sailors than to the men of the land service. He was more sure, it seems, of the steadiness of the sailors.

The harangues which seem to touch soldiers do not often embody a new and lofty conception;² but they utter some thought which all can partake; and by merging each man's love of self in the aggregate feeling of the regiment, the brigade, or the army, they make opinion set in with all the volume and weight which can be given to it by a multitude of human souls when they bend their whole forces one way. Therefore, speeches to soldiers are not to be wholly judged of by weighing the thoughts they contain, but rather by watching to see how they work on the hearts of the men.

Tried simply by this latter test, the harangues of Korniloff

¹ As is well known, it is customary in Russia to give army rank to men of distinction who are not by profession soldiers.

² The grand apostrophe of Bonaparte at the foot of the Pyramids, when he said to his soldiery, 'Forty centuries look down upon you!' was addressed to a body of troops—all children as it were of the great Revolution—who, in point of intellectual and imaginative power, were not at all of the same quality as the ordinary armies of Europe.

Effect produced by Korniloff's harangues.

must be held to have had a great worth; for witnesses of different callings, and observing what passed from different points of view, are not only agreed in speaking of the enthusiasm which flew from battalion to battalion along the whole line of the works, but also in connecting this outburst of national sentiment with the eloquence they ascribe to the chief. His zeal spread like flame. The minds of men were exalted; and although it is certain enough that the garrison had been grieved, if not angered, by the untimely evasion of the army,¹ the sense of abandonment, the sense of being men offered up, and left, as it were, for a sacrifice, was so far from making them sullen with their cause, that rather it gave them just pride—not unlike the pride of the martyr—and filled them with admiring love of the chief whom Providence, as it seemed, had given them for their ruler. There was rapture, the hearers

The emotion with which Korniloff was regarded.

declare, in the sound of the bursting 'Hurrahs!' which tracked his career through the lines. And this rapture, it seems, was scarce short of worship. In the minds of a religious and unlettered people, the ascendant of a mortal exerting his power for purposes judged to be good is more commonly traced to the special interference of Deity than to the original of the Divine scheme; and it would seem that the emotion with which the garrison looked up to their chief was much of the kind which first led people to say that the king set up to rule over them was king 'by the grace of God.' Amongst those entitled to boast that they were with Korniloff at this time there are able and gifted men who know and respect the true import of words: yet, speaking and writing now in cold blood, these witnesses say that every one at the time looked up to the chief as to a man 'inspired.' Nay, they still hand it down, and declare that in those last days of September—the glorious days of his life—he was not as other men.

VIII.

Totleben did not believe that any efforts of the garrison could de-

Colonel de Todleben was too deeply versed in things material, too familiar with the rigid calculations of his engineering science, to be liable to the error of ascribing undue force to all this exaltation of spirit. He did not believe that any efforts of the

¹ My Russian accounts do not tell me, in terms, of any such grief; but they enable me to infer it by recording the joy with which, at a later time, the reappearance of the army was hailed.

send the place
against a de-
termined at-
tack.

garrison, however heroic, could, at this time, make good the defense against a determined attack.¹

Nor, again, was he caught by the hope that any thing he could do within a brief compass of time would enable the sailors and landsmen then left in the place to resist

But there was
room for the
hope that the
sight of prepa-
rations for a
desperate de-
fense might
shake the ene-
my's counsels.
Totleben saw
plain what
had to be done.

a determined attack without the aid of the army; but, on the other hand, he was of a strong sanguine nature; and there was room for the hope that those same works which were needed for the merely desperate purpose of enabling the garrison to sell their lives dear, might also do a more wholesome service, by shaking the enemy's counsels. In either aspect, the course to be taken was the same; and Todleben saw plain as day what had to be done.

As before in providing for the defense of the Star Fort, so He kept steadily before him the condition of time. also in this emergency, he looked steadfastly to the condition of time; and, conceiving that the Allies might make their attack at once, he took care that his endeavors to push forward the works toward that ulterior degree of perfection at which he was aiming should be always subordinated to the object of preparing them for the event of an assault taking place on the very morrow. Thus, for instance, he said it was better to be ready in time with the guns of a battery ill covered, or even not covered at all, than to have, at the moment of the assault, a work designed for great things, but marked by the fatal defect of not as yet being armed.

The other con-
dition with
which he had
to deal.

In this necessity of looking to the question of time there was nothing novel; but another of the conditions with which the garrison had to deal, was one which may be called unexampled, and of so startling a kind that no common man would have been likely

even to perceive it, still less to found upon it a course of action. Korniloff and Todleben were not only able to see and understand this condition, but to accept it with all its conse-

The emergency
had placed at
his and Korn-
niloff's com-
mand all the
resources of
the fleet.

quences. They comprehended that, the fleet being prisoned in the roadstead, and Sebastopol—the sole hope and shelter of that same fleet—being in the extreme of danger on the land side, there had come an emergency in which, without lawful

authority, but for the good of their country, and even for the good of the fleet itself, they—an Admiral absent from his as-

¹ 'Yet neither the exaltation of the troops, nor their resolve to fight to the last extremity, could have saved Sebastopol, if the enemy had attacked it immediately after his passage of the Tchernaya.'—*Totleben*, vol. i. p. 257.

signed station without leave, and a volunteer Colonel of Sappers—could take upon themselves to break up and dismantle the whole Black Sea fleet, and apply its vast warlike treasures to the purpose of the land defenses. As soon as they came to see this—they did not take in the whole truth quite at once, but they did by rapid degrees—they had upon them the full burthen of men to whom much is given. They had grace to see that because they could, therefore they must. Todleben judged that especially he ought to labor toward making the greatest and most rapid use of this mighty resource; that he ought not to suffer the land defenses to wait for any one thing which could be supplied by stripping the fleet; and that, in particular, he must be sure to use to the utmost the great guns of the ships. Governed, as he says, by his perception of these two conditions—stress of time on the one hand, and, on the other, the command that he had of all the ships' guns and munitions—he went on to frame his plan for strengthening the lines of defense, and, with that

Todleben's view, resolved 'to choose a position as little exposed and as near to the town as the nature of the defenses. 'the ground would allow, and to arm its principal points with a formidable artillery; to connect these points 'one with the other by trenches to be defended by musketry; 'to establish there separate batteries, each armed with some 'pieces of cannon, and in this way to concentrate upon all 'the approaches of the town a powerful front and flank fire of 'artillery and musketry, endeavoring to sweep with as much 'fire as possible all the bendings of the broken ground by 'which the enemy might approach."

The object of the works to be undertaken on this general plan was to provide against the event of an assault at whatever part of the line it might be attempted;¹ but the way in which they were to produce their result was to be by enabling the garrison to meet every column of assault with a slaughtering fire. Whilst some thought much of the obstacles to assailants which the engineers' art can contrive, and others, remembering Suwarroff, spoke rather in praise of the bayonet, Todleben was always steadfast in declaring that against an assault of the Allies the garrison had but one defense. According to him, that one defense lay in the volume of shot which the garrison might be able to pour into bodies of troops coming on within

The object which Todleben kept in view.
The way in which his works were meant to produce their result.

¹ Todleben, vol. i. p. 259.² Todleben, vol. i. p. 264.

grape-shot range; and one single word, he used to say, at the time, was enough to describe his main purpose—‘Mitrail!’¹ The round-shot, the shell, the bayonet, and the rifleman’s far-ranging bullet had each, he acknowledged, its use; and now too, if ever in war, the spade and the pickaxe were needed; but still, in his mind, these things were chiefly of worth because they either tended to avert the assault, or else, more or less, were auxiliary and conducing to his one cherished purpose—to his one cherished purpose of meeting the assaulting column, whatever the time, whatever the point of attack, with a pelting blast of mitrail.

This was one of the aspects of the conflict in which the garrison were engaging; but, consistently with full adherence to Colonel de Todleben’s plan of defense, and even, indeed, resulting from it, there

was open to the defenders of Sebastopol another and a more hopeful view of the future. That which can kill may also deter; and it was possible, as has been part said already, that the very sight of preparations for resistance might not

only bring the enemy to adopt counter-measures for neutralizing those same preparations, but might even perhaps for that purpose incline him to delay his attack. In other words, it was hoped that the enemy might be induced to refrain from taking Sebastopol, with a view to besiege it instead.

The problem, as stated by one who toiled at Korniloff’s side,² was, to maintain a line of four miles against powerful armies with only a small body of sailors and militiamen; whilst the way to attempt its solution was by making the defenses so formidable as to induce the enemy to forsake the idea of an immediate assault, and proceed to a regular siege.

But whether men looked to the very end, and the actual

¹ Originally, it seems, ‘mitrail,’ or, as the French spell it, ‘mitraille,’ meant ‘canister’ shot specially; and even now, perhaps, in strictness, it describes only grape and canister; but in common parlance—and it was so that Todleben used it—the expression includes all the components of that hail which drives through the air when rifle or musket balls are flying along with grape and canister. It must be acknowledged that the word thus chosen by Todleben, as sufficing to denote his main purpose, is one which (in French) has great power; for, besides that its mere sound helps somewhat to make it expressive of destructiveness, this word has the quality of indicating that the shot of which it speaks is in considerable volume, and is—not in the mere inert state of ammunition, but—cutting through the air, or actually striking.

² Gendre, ‘Matériaux pour servir,’ chap. iii.

In either aspect, the work to be done was the same.

Nature of the work to be done.

crash of mitrail, or whether they rather drew hope from the pressure which might be put upon the mind of an English or a French engineer by their visible means of slaughter, the work to be done was the same. Besides the task of connecting the still isolated works by intermediate intrenchments, it was necessary to deepen the ditches, to thicken and raise the parapets, to erect traverses, and to strengthen the ground by a great number of new batteries. But also, as we saw—if only the enemy should give enough time—the armament of the works along the whole line of defense was to be changed, and the lighter artillery replaced by heavy guns brought from the ships. The preparations for effecting this change of armament could be carried on up to almost the last moment without being perceptible to the enemy; and, in the mean time—though it does not, I think, appear that such a result was designed—the modest calibre

The small calibre of the guns which were left for the time in the batteries was likely to mislead the Allies.

of the guns which the garrison showed for the moment, was a snare which might cheat the Allies; for perhaps they would argue and say, 'If we were to storm the place to-day or to-morrow, our columns would be exposed to heavy loss from the fire of artillery; and yet that same artillery is so light that we should be able to silence it easily with the very much heavier metal which we have close at hand on board ship; we will therefore land our siege-trains.'

Totleben's way of adjusting the labor.

His way of adjusting it to proximate as well as to more remote objects.

Colonel de Todleben determined that the works should go on simultaneously along all the weak parts of the line; and each day's toil was to be so adjusted (a difficult problem this seems) that it would not only effect a due approach toward the perfecting, after a time, of the work which had to be executed, but would also bring the pending improvements to such a state every night, that, in the event of an attack the next morning, they would still subserve the defense; so that, if the enemy should grant a long respite, or if, on the other hand, he should assault in three days, or in two, or on the very morrow, the works—whether grown to full strength, or assailed whilst yet frail and weak—might in each case do all the good which the limit of time would allow.

IX.

And now, by the ardor and consuming energy of Korniloff and Todleben, all things and all people within the place or the roadstead were turned to the business of the defenses. Even in this time of extremity, the men of the desk were surely astonished by the boldness with which Korniloff laid open to the orders of Colonel de Todleben all the engines, stores, and materials to be found in the arsenal and dockyards. Wagons, carts, phaetons, and carriages of all kinds, belonging to private citizens, were employed in drawing up loads to the batteries. In terms which would seem at first sight to be meant for our own English sailors, eye-witnesses speak of the merry, the ceaseless energy with which (in ways strange to landsmen) the crews of the ships dragged up great guns to the front. Of the citizens, some formed themselves into volunteer corps, undertaking to do duty as guards and patrols in relief of the soldiers. Others toiled at the works. The women, the children helped. Men just let loose from prison—they had been loosed, as I gather, on account of the desperate nature of the emergency—came and entreated that they might be suffered to take part in the common labor. The people toiled cheerily, and indeed, as it seems, with a most joyful animation, each laborer working intent, as though he saw plainly the object which all were seeking in common, and also understood, without doubting, what he himself had to do. There was no ceasing. The people worked by relays. From dawn to sunset, between five and six thousand men were busy along the lines of defense. By help of torches, other men, in less numbers, carried on the work through the night.

Before this, of course, the people of the place and the garrison had shared with their fellow-countrymen the beliefs and the affections which are the foundation of patriotism; and they had, most of them, obeyed some orders connected with the service of the State; but now, for the first time, they knew the sacred emotion which kindles in the bosoms of men when, coming to toil or to fight for the land of their birth, they come of their free accord.¹ Long held in subjection to a military

All resources in men and things brought to bear upon the business of the defenses.

The exceeding alacrity with which the work was carried on.

The people now knew what it was to come of their own free-will to the defense

¹ Of course, the soldiers and sailors composing the garrison (and prac-

of their country. system which had never ceased to be fiercely and cruelly obtruded upon them until there came this time of danger, they now had to face by themselves a task thought too hard for the army. Therefore, if they could not claim the birthright belonging to men in free States, at least they had now cast upon them the first and the proudest of the burthens which freedom imposes, for they stood defending their country against foreign invasion. They were worthy of their charge. He who guided their energies at the time, and afterward recorded in history the things they had done, breaks loose from his engagement to adhere to dry soldierly language, and declares that their devotion to their country's cause was sublime in its strength. Yet this zeal, all the time, was under wise rule, and taking its direction, like some governed force in mechanics, from the will and the mind of one man.

Colonel de Todleben, it would seem, was instinctively conscious that the power he was wielding depended very much upon his actual presence. He never wrote. He did not even read the communications which poured in upon him; for, believing that he saw his way clear without the help of others, and being, it would seem, accustomed as an engineer to let his thoughts take the form of estimates and reckonings, he made, as it were, a computation, by which he assured himself that the probability of there being superlatively important matters in the papers before him was not great enough to compensate the distraction and the expenditure of most precious time which must be occasioned by reading them, and that, therefore, if he were to leave them unheeded, he would avoid a waste of power.¹ It was with his own eyes, with his own voice, that he defended Sebastopol. At a later period, when the besiegers could rest their field-glasses on the gabions which covered their batteries, they grew to be familiar with the aspect of an officer on a black charger, who was constantly seen in the Russian lines of defense; and

tically also, I imagine, the dockyard laborers) were acting under orders; but the accounts make it evident that, taking the whole movement together—the movement of soldiers, sailors working on shore, other laborers, private citizens, women, and children—it was, in a sense, spontaneous; and that the hand of authority, though used to give direction to the energies of the people, was not needed for the purpose of compulsion.

¹ When the conflict was over, the mass of unopened letters and papers which had accumulated was examined. It then appeared that there were three or four papers which, at the time they were sent, might have been read with advantage, but that the perusal of the rest would have done no good.

they more than once pointed their ordnance with design to extinguish that untiring activity of one man, which (even from across the space which divided besieged and besiegers) they could perceive to be of value to the garrison. In that ceaselessly diligent horseman, as we now know, they saw the great volunteer whose brain was defending Sebastopol.¹

X.

Although the spirit which Korniloff roused in others was

Korniloff did not share the hopefulness which he had imparted to others.

one which forbade dismal fears, he himself, it would seem, in secret was living almost without hope. The encouragement he had given the garrison, by speaking of aid from the army, was not warranted by any tidings which had reached him.

The whole of the previous day, the 26th, had passed away, as we saw, without bringing him a word of account concern-

On the 27th, as on the day before, there were no tidings of Prince Mentschikoff or his army.

ing Prince Mentschikoff; and on the 27th it was the same. 'Of the Prince,' he wrote on that night, 'nothing is still to be heard.' What rumor had told him before, and told him only too truly, was, that the Russian field army had retreated to Baktchi Seräi, and the distance thus interposed was too great to allow of his believing that any assault on Sebastopol, which the Allies might at once undertake, would be checked or embarrassed by a flank attack from Prince Mentschikoff. In his

Korniloff's secret reflections upon the position in which the garrison was placed.

privacy Korniloff wrote: 'The troops are longing for adventurous deeds, but all this can only increase the carnage without preventing the enemy from gaining access.'² And again: 'We strengthen our position as much as possible. What, how-

ever, but defeat can be expected when we have only a handful of troops, scattered on an immense extent; and what are fortifications which we have thrown up in the course of a fortnight? If I had foreseen this, I would never have consented to sink the ships, but would rather have stood out to sea and fought the enemy, though they were double our numbers. The catastrophe may be enacted to-morrow. Even fighting to the last man will hardly advance our cause.

¹ It was during General de Todleben's visit to England in 1864, and in the course of conversation which passed between him and some of his former adversaries, that he was ascertained to be the officer on the black charger, whose movements had often been watched from the trenches. One of the shots specially directed against him struck the ear of his horse.

² Private Journal, 14th (26th) September.

‘The ships and all the vessels are ready for sinking. Let the enemy have their wrecks. The evening passed in gloomy thoughts about the future of Russia.’¹ Still, however, the Allies were giving respite. In the course of the day they were seen on the Chersonese, but they undertook no attack.

The day, however, the 27th, passed without any attack on the part of the Allies.

XI.

When the morning of the 28th had dawned, it still appeared that the Allies were undertaking no instant attack. They were afterward seen reconnoitering the defenses of Sebastopol;² but for that day at least—had the prayers of the Church then been heard?—the place was to be spared from assault.

And, on this 28th of September, the deserted garrison of Sebastopol got tidings at last from the army. Prince Mentschikoff had suffered himself to remain so strangely unacquainted with the movements of the Allies, that he supposed them to be still in that mountain region to the east of Sebastopol through which they had made their flank march, and the officer instructed to carry his messages to the garrison made his way from Head-quarters at night, and on foot; thus passing, as if by stealth, through a country which had long been quite free from the invaders.

Lieutenant Stetzenko was the officer intrusted with this mission; and (meeting, of course, no obstruction from the Allies, who lay far away from the scene of his night journey) he reached his destination the following morning. He had been ordered to ‘inquire about the state of Sebastopol;’³ but he also brought

The tidings brought by Lieutenant Stetzenko the messenger.

¹ Private Journal, 15th (27th) September, written at the close of the day when the religious ceremony and the harangues to the troops took place.

² General de Todleben remarks that, in his judgment, this reconnaissance of the Allies was not carried close enough to enable them to come to sound conclusions; but the General is mistaken in supposing, as he apparently does, that the reconnaissance of the 28th was the one which led the Allies to delay their attack. The reconnaissance on which the Allies founded their decision had taken place the day before, the 27th, but it seems to have been completed without exciting the observation of the garrison. Of course, it was incumbent on the Allies to be every day striving to improve their knowledge of the Sebastopol defenses; but the reconnaissances which they effected after the 27th were not the ones which supplied them with the basis of their main decision.

³ ‘Matériaux pour servir,’ chap. iii.

news that Prince Mentschikoff had been reinforced by the arrival of 10,000 men under Khomoutoff,¹ and was hourly expecting from the north fresh accessions of strength.

The messenger also imparted to Korniloff the way in which Prince Mentschikoff intended to employ the army thus augmented in numbers. That last—the chilling part of the communication—Korniloff kept secret; but the fact that he was once more in communication with the army, and that the army was heavily reinforced, he did not fail to make known; and, to do this the more impressively, he took Lieutenant Stetzenko with him along the lines, presenting him to his people as the messenger who had come with the glad tidings from the army, and even, it seems, giving out (though this, as will be presently seen, was the opposite of what had been really determined upon by the Commander-in-Chief) that, according to the intelligence thus brought from Head-quarters, the Prince would immediately attack the Allies.

Korniloff conceals part of the intelligence brought by Lieutenant Stetzenko; but makes known to the troops the fact of his being once more in communication with the army, and the fact that the army had been reinforced.

He also gives out (though this was contrary to the intelligence he had received) that the Prince would forthwith attack the Allies.

Prince Mentschikoff's real determination, as communicated by Lieutenant Stetzenko, was to take up a position on the Belbec.

So long as this resolve should last, Prince Mentschikoff would be excluding himself and his field army from all interference in the strife.

Korniloff understood this.

Korniloff knew that this could not be the present intention of the Prince; for he had learned from Lieutenant Stetzenko that what Prince Mentschikoff had resolved to do was to take up a position on the Belbec; and this was a resolve which, so long as it should last, would establish a state of mere peace between the Russian field army and the invaders of the Crimea; for those invaders were now cut off by long, difficult marches from the country of the Belbec; and, consistently with the detention of the Russian field army in so distant a region, it would not be possible for Prince Mentschikoff to take any part in the impending strife at Sebastopol.

All this Korniloff understood but too well; and it seemed to him that, since the Russian army was to establish itself in the now peaceful region of the Belbec, it was fitting for the deserted garrison to turn for succor to Heaven. On the evening of the very day when he had cheered the troops by presenting Stetzenko, and holding out promise of a diversion from Prince Mentschikoff, he set down in the gloomy account which he kept in

¹ The force which was in the south-east of the Crimea at the time of the landing (see *ante*, chap. vii.) with the exception of the Moscow regiment, which was marched to the Alma in time for the battle.

His private reflections. secret, that the Prince 'was to take up his position 'along the heights of the Belbec between Otarkia 'and Schooli;' and then, as though writing in mournful irony, he immediately adds: 'Meanwhile the enemy is advancing 'on Sebastopol..... There are three or four ways by 'which a passage may be easily effected; for there are but 'few defenders—10,000 sailors and 5000 reserve soldiers.' 'May the Lord bless and fortify us !'

XII.

On the 29th, the Allies were still refraining from an attack. Encouragement derived by the garrison and people of the town from the spectacle of the works they had achieved. The next day, the 29th, the Allies were seen to be again reconnoitering, but again refraining from an attack; and the people of Sebastopol as well as the garrison were now beginning to draw encouragement from a new and a wholesome source. They were cheered by the mere sight of the wonders which had been wrought by the work of their own hands. For a time, of course, there had been a great deal of the labor—as, for instance, the making of platforms—which went on in work-yards, in factories, on board ships, in numbers of places, not reached by the public gaze; but the immense contributions toward the general scheme, which had thus been going on separately, and, as it were, out of sight, were now fast added, and added to the lines of defense; and, upon the whole, the result was so vast as to be astonishing to most people, and, in the eyes of some, almost magical; for, except the engineers, who could reckon these things by arithmetic, there were few who imagined beforehand the greatness of the works which might be done in three days by several thousands of men working always by day and by night, and under guidance so skillful that no man's toil was in vain.

Changes wrought in the defenses between the evening of the 25th and that of the 29th Sept. Of the changes which were wrought in the defenses during the interval between the evening of the 25th and the evening of the 29th September, a rapid indication is all I am willing to give. Along the line between the Artillery Bay and the Central Bastion nothing was done; but from the Central Bastion to the Flagstaff Battery, and thence down to the bottom of the great ravine, and thence up to the Redan, and from the Redan to the Malakoff, and from

¹ 'It may be remembered that the troops described by the Russians as 'reserve' soldiers are those which I have called 'militia.'

the Malakoff to the Little Redan, and thence home to the Battery of the Point, the defenses received great accessions of strength. The works already constructed were extended and improved; those remaining unfinished were completed; the long and hitherto empty spaces which divided them one from the other were studded, in some places, with powerful batteries, in others, were seamed with intrenchments intended for covering infantry; and already the armament of almost the whole line of defense was beginning to undergo change; for the lighter artillery, which had been lying as a snare for the Allies (by making them imagine themselves the stronger in cannonading power), was now giving place to great guns brought up from the ships.

It was at the Malakoff, and the ground which flanked it on either side, that the greatest wonders were wrought. Admiral Istomin, who there commanded, knew that the post was vital; but also he had been frankly told by Korniloff that it was weak. He had toiled with a ceaseless care, looking close into things of detail with his own eyes, and guiding the labors of the multitude which had swarmed night and day round the work.

That simple white tower, the Malakoff, now famous in history, was fast losing its height from the ground, for already the summit of the knoll where it stood had been so changed in shape by the industry of the last three days, that it now closed high up round the centre or waist of the building, and had not only begun to take the form of a glacis annexed to the original work, but was also the site of a new semicircular battery, which covered the front of the tower. This last battery was connected by intrenchments with the other new works thrown up on both flanks of the Malakoff.

Nor was it only along the line of the works that Korniloff and Todleben were expending their care. Ships of war were so placed in the creeks that their fire could search the ravines which descended into Sebastopol. To ease the passage between the town and the Karabel suburb a floating bridge was constructed. Between all the chief posts along the line of defense there was arranged a perfected system of communicating by signal. Provision was made for the care of men wounded. So far as can be gathered from the narratives of those who took part in these labors, nothing was forgotten, nothing neglected. Hardly four days had passed since the sight of the English on the Mackenzie Heights disclosed to men gazing from the windows of the Naval Library

the peril then suddenly coming upon the south side of Sebastopol; but, as far as was possible in so scant a time, the garrison had now been put in a condition for using to the very utmost their means of slaughter; and, on the night of this 29th of September, the great Engineer, who had yearned to be in readiness along the whole line with his pitiless storm of mitrail, might almost lie down to his rest with the contentment of one who has made his purpose sure.

The general result which had been attained.

XIII.

But, so far as concerned the power of the small garrison then occupying Sebastopol to withstand a determined assault, Colonel Todleben's exertions had, after all, only provided that the defenders should be enabled to sell their lives dear. The hasty labors bestowed on the lines of defense had not, of course, changed an open town into a 'fortified place.' What had been achieved was this: there had been formed 'an intrenched position'—an intrenched position, extending four miles along the arc of a half-circle and covering Sebastopol on its land side.

Todleben's exertions had, after all, only provided that in the event of an assault the garrison would be able to sell their lives dear.

He had covered Sebastopol by an intrenched position.

Now, although it is true that a fortified place may be defended for a time by a garrison vastly inferior in numbers to the besieging force, a merely intrenched position, and especially an intrenched position four miles in extent, has no such attribute; and if it is resolutely attacked by a powerful army, nothing less than another army can defend it. Deriving support from its intrenchments, the defending force need not, of course, be equal in numbers to its assailants, but it must be really an army, and an army so strong as to be able to sustain a pitched battle with forces attacking it on its prepared ground. To the garrison of Sebastopol, at the time I am speaking of, this, the main condition of a hopeful defense, was wanting; for their body of 16,000 foot, composed for the most part of sailors unused to the land service, could hardly in any sense be called an army, much less an army competent to join battle with the invaders upon a line four miles in extent. It is true that, within a day's march, there was a Russian army, and one, too, which in point of numbers could hardly be thought too weak for the exigency; but, nine days before, this army had undergone a defeat, and its

To defend such an intrenched position there must be an army.

This condition was wanting.

commander was persistently withholding it from the scene of the expected conflict.

In this point of view, the very success with which the garrison had busied itself was calculated to become an embarrassment to Prince Mentschikoff when apprised of what had been done; for now that Sebastopol was covered by an intrenched position, it might seem hardly tolerable that the troops required to defend it should be refused by a general who was lying a few miles off with a disposable army of between 30,000 and 40,000 men. The growing strength of the works made it less and less easy to urge that the task of concurring with the garrison in defending the place was one too desperate to be undertaken by the field army. Be that as it may, the Prince still clung to his design of withholding from Sebastopol the succor required for defending it.

Yet the Prince still clung to his design of withholding succor.

On this 29th of September, nothing was heard of the army until the evening. Then there came a dispatch from Head-quarters to Korniloff, announcing that the advanced-guard of the field army, under the command of General Jabrokritsky, would be on the North Side the next morning; but the rest of the note went to show that Prince Mentschikoff was persisting in his resolve to hold his army aloof from the defense of Sebastopol; for it directed that the heavy baggage of the army (which had been left in the town when Prince Mentschikoff undertook his flank march) should now be transported to the North Side. The measure was one which could only be accounted for by supposing — a painful hypothesis for the garrison to have to adopt — that the separation of the field army from Sebastopol was now meant to be lasting.

This day, 29th Sept., nothing was heard of the army till the evening.

Purport of the communication then received by Korniloff.

The inference to be drawn from it.

XIV.

When morning broke on the 30th of September, it showed that the Allies were still abstaining from any attack. This was the sixth of the days which had passed since Prince Mentschikoff's army had been withdrawn from Sebastopol.

Morning of the 30th. The Allies still abstaining from the attack.

In the course of the day the advanced-guard of the Russian army, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, appeared on the North Side; and the sight of his troopers imparted great joy to the garrison and inhabitants of Sebastopol, by causing them to im-

The advanced-guard of the Russian army appearing on the North Side,

spread great joy in Sebastopol.

But, at the time, this joy was ill founded.

agine that the field army was returning at last to share in the perils and the glory of striving to defend the place. But this joy, at the time, was ill founded; for although some of Mentschikoff's troops had thus come once more within sight of Sebastopol, and could freely communicate with the town by crossing the ferry, their presence on the north of the roadstead was still far from really meaning that Prince Mentschikoff had resumed active warfare. Unless these newly-seen troops should be suffered to cross the water—and the prospect of such a movement seemed to be shut out by the order for transferring the army's heavy baggage from the South to the North Side—there would still be long, difficult marches to divide them from the enemy.

In the course of the day, Prince Mentschikoff in person came down from the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, but did not pass over the water. Supposing him still determined to withhold all succor from Sebastopol, it was natural for him to avoid the pain and embarrassment of going into the midst of a garrison which he meant to leave to its fate. He rested in the Severnaya at that North Side Lodge which he had adjoining the 'Number Four' Battery. There he received the devoted Admiral who, since the two men last saw each other, had been forced by his love of country to usurp the command of Sebastopol.

His interview with Korniloff.

His way of treating the arrangements which had raised Korniloff to the supreme command.

His intention of still keeping the army aloof, and leaving Sebastopol to its own resources.

Impliedly, if not in positive or generous terms, Prince Mentschikoff gave assent to the arrangements which had created, in his absence, a kind of dictatorship; for he treated it as quite natural that Korniloff should have been raised to the supreme authority.

With respect to the question of succoring Sebastopol by means of the field army, Prince Mentschikoff disclosed the intentions he had formed. After complaining of the weakness of his army, and declaring his belief that the enemy was in great strength, he intimated that he was about to make another movement, and caused Korniloff to understand that he, the Prince, meant to leave Sebastopol to its own resources.¹

¹ 'The Prince complains very much of the weakness of his troops, and 'supposes the enemy to be very strong; he is about to make another movement, and to leave Sebastopol to its own resources.'—*Korniloff's Private Journal*, written on the evening of the day when the interview with Mentschikoff took place.

Korniloff remonstrated, and said: 'If that takes place, then farewell to Sebastopol! If the Allies decide on some daring action, they will crush us.'¹

Korniloff's remonstrance.
Prince Mentschikoff undertakes to summon a council of war.

Prince Mentschikoff then said that he would summon a council of war.

XV.

As propounded by Prince Mentschikoff himself before he undertook it, his flank march was at least a well-promising measure; for he announced it as an expedient for enabling him to act with advantage against the flank of the invaders; but the plan he professed to have formed bore little enough of resemblance to the one which he really adopted; and the proposition which has to be demonstrated by him who would defend the Russian Commander is nothing less than that the Prince was not only warranted in abandoning Sebastopol, with all its brave garrison of sailors, but also in standing aloof from the war for days and days together without disturbing, without threatening, nay, even without seeing, the invaders, or learning where they were posted.

With apparently a friendly desire to give all the shelter he could, General de Todleben has brought his great name to the aid of the Russian Commander.

After speaking of the painful condition to which the army would be reduced by the loss of its communications with the interior of Russia, and showing that, even with the aid of the army, the endeavors to defend Sebastopol at this time against an attack by the Allies would be likely to fail, General de Todleben says: 'Having well weighed all these circumstances, Prince Mentschikoff, convinced that his army had not it in its power to save Sebastopol if the enemy should direct an attack against that town, judged that it was better to take the most effectual measures, and employ the most energetic efforts, for the defense of the peninsula of the Crimea.'² But surely, for the purposes of the war,

Todleben's explanation of Prince Mentschikoff's course of action.
Inquiry as to its validity.

¹ He probably added (though this he does not expressly say) words equivalent to those which he inserted in his journal as words of private reflection: 'To hold Sebastopol with troops is very possible; nay, it is possible even to hold out long; but without troops—that alters the case!'—*Korniloff's Private Journal*.

² Todleben, vol. i. p. 242. The passage in the text is immediately followed by this one: 'Nevertheless he still preserved the hope that, if the irresolution of the Allies and the desperate courage of our sailors should make

the whole worth of the Crimea lay centered in the fact that it included the mighty fortress which sheltered the Black Sea fleet; and, for the General to let Sebastopol fall that he might husband his means for the defense of the peninsula, would have been, as it were, to stand by acquiescing whilst the heart was torn out, with a view to keep the strength needed for defending the rest of the body.

And again, when the all but hopelessness of an endeavor to defend Sebastopol is assigned as the justification for the withdrawal of the troops, it is hard to see why some 20,000 brave seamen, withdrawn from their natural element to do the work of land forces, should have been left to meet their fate in a conflict which was thought to be one too desperate to allow of its being undertaken or even shared in by the army under Prince Mentschikoff.

Apparently, the soundest defense of Prince Mentschikoff's plan of a flank march was the one which he himself offered when he assured Korniloff that the adoption of it would enable him to operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the enemy; and the omission to execute that, the vital part of the undertaking, is the thing that has to be justified.

When there is no hope of being able to defend a place for such a time as may allow of the siege being raised by forces coming to its relief, the custom of even the most warlike nations permits and favors surrender; but for a general, with a field army 30,000 strong, to leave in the fortress some 25,000 brave men, who understand that they are to defend the place to extremity—to assure them that they will have the active support of the field army, which will be assailing the besiegers in flank and in rear—to go out by night from the south of the fortress when the enemy is approaching it by the north—to move away to a distance of some eighteen miles from the fortress and nearly as much from the enemy—to remain in that state of seclusion for days and days together, without even knowing or laboring to know where the enemy might be, and in this way to break from the promise which engaged him to aid the defense by pressing upon the enemy in the open field,—this seems to be a course of action which, though it may be capable of explanation on grounds connected with the state of the army or its want of supplies,¹

¹ 'it possible to keep the enemy in check before Sebastopol for some time, 'the army, after receiving reinforcements, might be able to stop the ulterior 'successes of the Allies.' General de Todleben's apology for Prince Mentschikoff's flank march will be found at length in the Appendix.

¹ Todleben, in the place where he says that the main body of the army

is not to be excused in all its stages by saying that, in the belief of the general who adopted it, the aid of the army which he thus kept aloof would have failed to make good the defense against a determined attack. Where some 25,000 men stand to defend a place to extremity, the desperate character of the service intrusted to them is, even at first sight, an astonishing reason to give for depriving them of the aid of a field army 30,000 strong, and withdrawing it from the scene of danger to a place of peaceful seclusion; but a closer look makes the reason seem still more unfitting. Far from being one of those places in which a few brave defenders can do as well as many, Sebastopol was a fortress with miles of ground to be guarded, and the very thing needed for a hopeful defense of the place was the army which Prince Mentschikoff withdrew. It is true that from without, even better, perhaps, than from within, he might have brought the power of that army to bear upon the defense, but down to this time, he gave no aid to the garrison in either one way or the other.

It would be difficult to excuse Prince Mentschikoff's seclusion by alleging his want of supplies;¹ but although I am without the knowledge which would warrant me in speaking with certainty, I can hazard a surmise which would account, in some measure, for the Prince's abstention.

Surmise tending to account for Prince Mentschikoff's conduct.

From the first, the Russian army in the Crimea had been scantily provided with skilled officers in the higher grades;² and when it happened on the day of the Alma that out of the number who were competent a large proportion was killed or disabled, and that of the officers of rank not thus stricken down some at least were in great measure shorn of their due authority by the comments and the blame and the recriminations which too often follow defeat, it resulted that, for the time, the army was much out of gear³—nay, was hardly, I think, in a state to be manœuvred in sight of the enemy, still less to be brought into action; and although

remained on the Katcha until the 28th, adds that it was there 'awaiting the supplies which were to reach it from Simpheropol' (vol. i. p. 245).

¹ Because there was an accumulation of stores at Simpheropol as well as at Sebastopol (Todleben, p. 148); and there did not occur any incident of war or of weather which could have frustrated the arrangements necessary for supplying the army.

² Amongst the other wants of this kind there was that of a sufficing Headquarters Staff.

³ It may be observed that up to this point in the sentence I speak with certainty. I do so on good authority.

the full stress of this want of officers was perhaps so imperfectly felt by Prince Mentschikoff, whilst still he remained in Sebastopol, that he thought he could safely promise to operate with effect upon the flank and rear of the Allies, yet what seems probable is, that the discovery of the weakness of his army in point of officers was afterward so cogently forced upon the Prince by the incidents of the march (as, for instance, by the failure of the manœuvre intrusted to Kiriakoff, no less than by the sudden encounter with the English at Mackenzie's Farm) as to make him think it a duty to withhold his army, for a time, from the sight of the enemy's outposts. At all events, there is no sound reason for believing that the spirit of the soldiery drooped; and unless my surmise be ill based, it was nothing but the want of commanders which hampered, for a time, the mechanism of the army, and made the Prince shrink from the hazard of bringing it again into conflict before its defects were repaired.¹

XVI.

It is time to be passing again to the camp of the French and the English; but I hardly could turn away yet from the lines of defense at Sebastopol unless I might trust that I have suffered full light to come in upon what was there ventured and done in the last six days of September. For although they all passed away without either the event of a battle, or any cannonade or assault on the part of the Allies, those, nevertheless, were the days when the heaviest stress was put upon the courage and the devotion of the defenders. From first to last, it is true, the place was defended with tenacity, with valor, and with a rare, pliant skill; but in the later period of the conflict, the strength of the garison, for the most part, was proportioned, or more than proportioned, to its task. In the six days I speak of, it was otherwise. The army had stolen away in the night-time, and for days was not to be heard of. The fleet, so to speak, was aground. What remained attempting defense

The merit belonging to that portion of the defense of Sebastopol which was comprised in the last six days of Sept., 1854.

¹ I have already intimated that this explanation of Prince Mentschikoff's conduct is not the one put forward in print by General Todleben (*ante*, p. 170); but it does not follow that the General would disapprove it, though reasons of a personal kind might naturally enough prevent him from assigning the want of competent officers as the cause of Prince Mentschikoff's inaction. General Todleben, however, does not, I think, say any thing which would contravene the explanation above suggested.

was a scant number of people—militiamen, sailors, and workmen—men unused, for the most part, to the duties of fighting on shore. But then all these men were parcel of one people, obeying one monarch, professing one faith, speaking all one tongue, and being all instinct with the life, the passion, the will, which belong to a mighty nation. Therefore it was that the default and retreat of the mere army at the moment of the enemy's approach did not cause, as a natural result, the instant fall of the place. That which remained at the post abandoned by the Commander-in-Chief and his army was a steadfast people. The showy façade had come down, but behind it there stood walls of granite.

Korniloff could not tell his people with truth that there was either an army which would stand by them in the hour of danger, or a fleet which would be suffered to go to sea; but, with handfuls of men of various callings, yet having a common country, he could and did say, 'There shall be 'a Russian defense.'¹

Although the chiefs knew that a determined resistance to a determined assault must needs result in the slaughter of the garrison, they still prepared for a conflict which promised this dismal end with the spirit, the care, and the energy which men are accustomed to evince when they are abounding in strength and full of hope. The men of the garrison might well enough think they had been shamelessly abandoned by the evading army, but it seems they observed a brave silence in regard to the hardship of their fate, and only made themselves heard when they greeted their chosen Commander, or echoed his solemn engagement to hold out the place to the last. And that same love of country which filled the void left by the army was also sufficing to raise up a chief and ruler when the Czar's vicerent was wanting. The emergency perhaps, in a sense, created the chief; but there was a generous, patriot spirit in that forbearance and suppression of selfish desires which inclined men high up in soldierly rank to submit themselves to Admiral Korniloff as their chosen dictator. Nor less was there wisdom and loyalty in bending to the counsels of a volunteer Colonel of Sappers, who owed the power he wielded to the sheer ascendant of genius.

¹ It is in Korniloff's Private Journal that I find this expression; but I infer that he had been using it in speaking to the garrison and inhabitants.

CHAPTER XI.

WHOEVER has learned the condition in which Sebastopol was left during those last days of September, will be ready to ask why it was that the invaders, now able to gaze at their ease on the domes of the coveted town, still did not move forward to seize it.

The inquiry suggested by observing the condition in which Sebastopol was left at the end of September.

On the 27th of September—the day the French completed their flank march, and the second of the days during which the deserted garrison had been left without tidings of Prince Mentschikoff's army—both the French and the English pushed forward some troops toward Sebastopol, and effected their first reconnaissance of its defenses from the southern side of the place.

27th Sept.
First reconnaissance by the Allies of the defenses on the south side of Sebastopol.

They had little difficulty in finding spots of ground from which, in a general way, though not yet, of course, with minuteness, they could examine Sebastopol on its southern side; and the impression they were able to gather of the nature and strength of the defenses was, upon the whole, a sound one.¹ Indeed, it may be said that when this day's reconnaissance was complete, the Allies, though unacquainted in detail with the condition and resources of the place, still knew the

main facts which were needed as a basis for their next resolve. The evasion from the town of the force led out by Prince Mentschikoff they had seen with their own eyes; and although there was a surmise amongst the English that the column which our Head-quarters had touched at Mackenzie's

Upon the completion of this reconnaissance, the Allies had the knowledge on which to found their next resolve.

Farm was no more than 16,000 strong, the concurring testimony of the Russian prisoners, together with the

¹ It may seem at first sight that this could not have been the case; for whereas the front of defense was in reality a semicircular arc of four miles, Sir John Burgoyne regarded the enemy's general line as 'virtually a straight 'one,' and only 'about 2500 or 3000 yards in total extent' (Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne of the 20th November, 1854). But his apparent misapprehension can be explained. Sir John Burgoyne regarded both the flanks of the line of defense as virtually impregnable, and applied his words to that part of the line with which alone, in his judgment, the Allies could have any practical concern. He spoke, in short, only of that part of the arc which fronted toward the south and the south-east.

known fact that Prince Mentschikoff was present in person with the evading force, went far to disclose the full truth. Upon this, it would seem, the French were in no state of doubt, for in their reasonings they justly assumed that the force which the Prince had with him on the road to Baktchi Serai was nothing less than an army. The Allies had good means of computing approximately the strength which must remain for the defense of Sebastopol after the withdrawal of Prince Mentschikoff's army, and their estimates were not wide of the truth.¹ Seeing the entrance of the roadstead blocked up, they were not without means of inferring that the resources of the Black Sea fleet, both in men and material, must become, in a measure, available for the land defenses; and they were themselves sure witnesses of the energy and haste which the garrison thought it needful to exert in trying to strengthen their lines; for upon the spots where their field-glasses had been pointing there were thousands of men and women at work. Of the motive, indeed, with which Prince Mentschikoff had withdrawn his army, and of the policy which was guiding the labors of the garrison, the Allies, as might be expected, could only judge by inference; but, upon the whole, it may be said that what they knew of the truth was enough to have served them as the basis of a right conclusion; so that, if they determined aright, it is to their own discernment that the merit seems due, and if they went wrong, their error was not that of men who have to move in the dark, but one which resulted from the default of their collective judgment.

Whether the Allies should now follow up their hitherto victorious march, and endeavor to carry Sebastopol by a prompt and determined attack, or whether they should consent to give the enemy a breathing-time, and begin upon a slow plan of warfare resembling what men call a siege—this, in reality, was the cardinal question which had to be solved; but it did not present itself to the attention of the Allies as one they must needs determine at their first reconnaissance; and although the deliberators all looked on Sebastopol

The question which really needed solution.

It did not present itself in

¹ The error of those who supposed that no more than 16,000 men had been withdrawn from Sebastopol was counterbalanced by that of underrating the numbers of the sailors; so that, upon the whole, the Allies did not exaggerate the number of armed men, including sailors, who were defending Sebastopol. Sir John Burgoyne did not reckon that number at more than from 25,000 to 30,000.—'Military Opinions,' pp. 197, 201, 240, in which last page the estimate is only 20,000 to 25,000.

this light at the time of the first reconnaissance.

The chiefs hardly probed their own intentions in regard to expenditure of time.

The counsel of Sir Edmund Lyons.

with a concurring desire to attack the place sooner or later, there were few who so probed their own meaning as to know to what length they were willing to go in the perilous expenditure of time.

But before the day closed, bold counsel was tendered; and it seemed, at first sight, to originate with the vehement sailor whose words had always found welcome at the English Head-quarters.

Few, however, will believe that, upon the vital question of an immediate assault, the mind of Lord Raglan could have been a blank awaiting the impress which the first adviser might give it; or that Lyons would have urged his own opinion upon others, without first assuring himself that Lord Raglan approved it. On the other hand, it was of great moment that proposals liable to be overruled by the French should not be too closely identified with the name of the English General. There is, therefore, some ground for surmising that the germ of what Lyons proposed may have sprung from his intimate conversations with the Commander of our land forces, and that when he submitted this counsel he was echoing the thought and fulfilling the wish of Lord Raglan. Be this as it may, the recorded fact is that, having made himself acquainted in a general way with the state of the defenses which covered the land front of Sebastopol, and concluding them to be imperfect and weak, Lyons urged at the English Head-quarters the expediency of an immediate assault.¹ Lord Raglan was of the same mind; but he found himself met by the counter-opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who remonstrated against the notion of an assault without first getting down the fire of the place by means of heavy artillery.² It is the lot of mankind to be blind to the future; and, unless Lyons errs, Burgoyne sup-

¹ The MS. authenticated as described *ante*, chap. ii. The time assigned in the MS. as that at which this counsel was given by Lyons to the military authorities is, 'immediately after their arrival at Balaclava'—and this coincides very satisfactorily with the words, 'the day after our arrival here,' which are quoted in a note, *post*, p. 178, from a different source, both records tending to show that the 27th of September was the day. I am disposed, however, to assign the afternoon or evening as the time of the conversation; because Lyon's advice proceeds upon a knowledge of the state of the defenses, which he could hardly, I think, have acquired until after the reconnaissance effected on that day.

² *Ibid.* It must not be necessarily understood that the discussion was carried on between Lyons and Burgoyne personally. What I rather imagine is, that, in eliciting Burgoyne's opinion, Lord Raglan did not say what he himself and Sir Edmund Lyons thought of the question. See Memorandum by Burgoyne, 20th November, 1854, and his 'Military Opinons,' pp. 199, 202.

ported his opinion by arguing that an immediate assault would cost the Allies a loss of 500 men.¹ Another of the arguments used was founded upon a suggestion that the assaulting forces would be exposed to slaughter from the fire of the enemy's men-of-war lying moored in the harbor beneath. To that Lyons replied by proposing to seize the position of the Malakoff—the knoll was then like an ant-hill, all creeping with busy labor—and there establishing a battery which must soon drive off all the ships.²

Lord Raglan agreed with Lyons in approving the plan of an immediate assault; and, notwithstanding the objections of Sir John Burgoyne, he submitted it for consideration to the French.³ General Canrobert, however, refused to adopt the measure. He said that his men could not be restrained or kept together, and that from that cause alone, in the event of there occurring a check or reverse, the safety of the whole army would be imperiled.⁴

So now the Allies took a measure, not in itself decisive, but tending to govern their fate, by withdrawing their minds from the all-vital question of time, and placing them, as it were, upon a path—smooth and easy enough at first sight—which yet might lead into trouble. They requested the naval commanders to land the siege-trains. Their purpose was to open the way for an assault by first getting down the enemy's fire.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. The proposal was to seize the position of 'The White Tower,' the then name of the Malakoff amongst the Allies.

³ In allusion, as it would seem, to this proposal, the Narrative of one of the French Generals of Division says: 'On était si loin d'attendre aux difficultés que l'on allait rencontrer, qu'il fut question de ne pas débarquer ce matériel, et qu'on parut disposé à tenter une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol.'

⁴ An officer who was present assures me (October 19, 1865) of the accuracy of this statement; but, as the impressions of all men are liable to be varied by lapse of time, it is satisfactory to know how his words were noted in writing at a time much more near to the deliberation of which he speaks. Writing in the Crimea on the 31st of August, 1855, Romaine, after naming the same officer, says: 'He told me that the French refused to make an attempt upon Sebastopol the day after our arrival here. They said that their men could not be restrained, and if any check or reverse followed they could not be got together, and the safety of the whole army would be compromised. This was whilst St. Arnaud was alive.' The 27th of September, 1854, would be the day designated by the words 'the day after our arrival here,' the English having occupied Balaclava on the 26th.

⁵ See Burgoyne's 'Military Opinions,' p. 181.

trains commenced.

Opportunity of considering the decision toward which the Allies were driving.

The next day, the 28th, the seamen were busily engaged in landing the siege-trains, but the process was not a short one; and the men who gave counsel in the Allied camps had leisure to weigh the soundness of the conclusion to which they had been driving.

September (apparently the 28th). Sir George Cathcart's suggestion for stealing into the place.

It was at this time that Sir George Cathcart began to urge—and that with some eagerness—that the attack upon Sebastopol should be one of a summary kind. Upon completing the flank march he had been ordered, as we saw, to move his division straight up from the Tchernaya to the heights on the south of Sebastopol, without going down to Balaclava in the track of the main English army; and he established himself upon the ground confronting the Great Redan, from which he looked down upon the head of the Man-of-war Harbor, seeing no small part of the town and yet more of the Karabel faubourg. Judging that he had discovered a way by which it would be feasible for the Allies to steal at once into the place, he addressed to Lord Raglan a note, dated '1½, Height, mile from the head of the Man-of-war Harbor,' in which he says: 'I am in the strongest and most perfect position I ever saw. "Twenty thousand Russians could not disturb me in it with my division; and if you and Sir John Burgoyne would pay me a visit, you can see every thing in the way of defenses, which is not much. They are working at two or three redoubts, but the place is only inclosed by a thing like a low park wall, not in good repair. I am sure I could walk into it, with scarcely the loss of a man, at night, or an hour before daybreak, if all the rest of the force was up between the sea and the hill I am upon. We could leave our packs, and run into it even in open day, only risking a few shots whilst we passed the redoubt. We see the people walking about the streets in great consternation. I send this by Lieutenant Ravenshill, who will explain every thing."

The impression under which Sir George Cathcart thus

¹ The note is not dated (except in a way showing the place and the hour), but I think that the 28th of September is the day on which it was most probably written. I have hit upon no trace of what was done in consequence. Sir John Burgoyne was not invited by Lord Raglan to go up and test the supposed opportunity of 'walking into' the place. It may be that Sir George Cathcart's change of opinion took place in time to enable him to countermand his request for a visit. I ought to say that I do not find the original note amongst Lord Raglan's papers, but take the words from a draft in Sir George Cathcart's writing.

wrote, was created by the survey he had been able to make from ground in front of his camp; but when, as presently happened, his division was moved farther east to the ground we now call 'Catheart's Hill,' he had means of examining the defenses from a fresh point of view, and thenceforth, unless I mistake, he ceased to insist that the Allies could slip through the defenses in the easy and costless way which he at first supposed to be possible; but, in lieu of his plan for 'stealing into' Sebastopol, he now, it seems, counseled Lord Raglan to undertake a determined assault.¹ He gave it as his judgment that the place might best be wrested from the enemy's grasp by pouring in battalion after battalion, until the end should be accomplished.²

And at this time once more Sir Edmund Lyons gave Sir George Catheart's subsequent suggestion—probably on the 29th Sept.—for counsel.³ He did not disguise from himself that the loss resulting from an assault must now be much greater than that which might have been expected to follow from such an enterprise if vent-

¹ I know of no written record of this second suggestion of Catheart's; but the memory of the officer who heard it made is fortified—diplomats are the people who best know the value of a clue of that kind—by the quaint and homely simile with which his proposal was met. The simile, however, is not one worth repeating.

² With a view to disprove the fact of Catheart's having advised an assault, or to show that, at all events, any such advice, if ever given, could not have been adhered to, the following extract of a letter from Catheart has been printed ('Official Journal of the Royal Engineers,' p. 18), date assigned being the 8th of October: 'To attempt an assault without mounting our heavy guns, would not be certain of success, but liable to a great loss of men.' It seems to me, however, that in that letter, Catheart's disapprobation of an immediate assault belongs to the time when he was writing—*i. e.*, to the 8th of October—and does not at all prove that he may not have approved an assault at an earlier day. My view of his meaning is supported by a letter which he wrote to Lady Georgiana Catheart six days before—*i. e.*, on the 2nd of October; for there, after describing the part he had taken in the flank march, he proceeds to say: 'I then came on and secured an important post within fire of Sebastopol, and have held it for three days, with my division quite unsupported. If they had all been up we might have taken the place. Now, we have given them time to prepare and land their ship-guns, and we must have a long regular siege.' It seems that Catheart's proposals, whether for 'stealing into' the place or assaulting it, were never made known to Sir John Burgoyne.—'Military Opinions,' pp. 199, 202.

³ The day when Sir Edmund Lyons tendered this advice for the second time, was on or before the 29th of September. It is stated by him to have been given 'a day or two after' the time when he, Sir Edmund, first proposed the assault of the South Side. MS. described *ante*, chap. ii. Those words would seem to point to the 29th as the day; and a note from Sir Edmund, which will be afterward quoted, fixes the 29th as the day on which Lord Raglan was to submit the proposal to Canrobert.

storming the place. ured some two days earlier; for in the interval, both by day and by night, the garrison and the people of Sebastopol had been incessantly busied at the works; but, notwithstanding his perception of the now increased peril of the undertaking, he submitted to Lord Raglan the expediency of an assault. Lord Raglan was willing; and asked Lyons how he would proceed. Lyons answered to this effect: 'The Russians must think by this time that we are going to lay regular siege to the place. Let them be encouraged in this belief. Send numbers of men to the front with pickaxes, or something that will look like pickaxes, and make a feint of turning up the ground, and then when the enemy, deceived by the sight, shall be least expecting an attack, rush in.'

Sir Edmund Lyons again gave counsel. Lord Raglan agreed with Lyons in desiring to proceed to an assault.

Whether Lord Raglan approved the stratagem of feigning the commencement of siege-works, I am unable to say. What has been recorded is, that he shared with Lyons in his desire to proceed by assault.¹

In the course of the conversation which elicited this agreement of opinion between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir Edmund had expressed his conviction that, unless the place were at once assaulted, it would not be taken at all except after grievous loss, and that the men then composing the army 'would not live to do it.' In later days, when the strength of the English army had dwindled, and still was dwindling, and in yet later days when great reinforcements had more than supplied all the losses, Lord Raglan, in conversation with Lyons, used often to revert to that saying.

But it seems that the opportunity for farther deliberation failed to elicit any change of opinion in the camp of the French. Apparently they were all of one mind; and the opinion they entertained was not only shared at the time by Sir John Burgoyne, but has ever since had the support which his authority gives. This opinion was, that it would be rash, that it would be wanton, nay even, as one chief said, that it would be criminal, to attempt to carry the place without first endeavoring to get

Unanimity of opinion amongst the French. Their opinion shared by Burgoyne. What the general opinion was.

¹ The testimony of Sir Edmund Lyons in regard to Lord Raglan's desire for an immediate assault, has been fully confirmed to me by one who enjoyed the close confidence of his chief—I speak of General Airey. See in the Appendix extracts from letters of Lord Raglan, from which, as I there submit, an inference to the same effect may be drawn.

down the enemy's fire by the use of the siege-guns; and the following, as I gather, is the tenor of the reasonings on which the conclusion stands based: 'The works which cover the place, though not at all strong in themselves, are nevertheless well placed and powerfully armed. The line of these defenses is unassailable at both flanks. The ravines descending into the town and the suburb are all of them open to a raking fire, either from the land batteries or from the broadsides of the ships for that purpose moored in the creeks; and it is along one or more of the intervening ridges that the assailant would have to advance. Of the ridges available for such an attempt there are three; but each of them is powerfully defended—the first by the Flagstaff Bastion, the second by the Redan, and the third by the White Tower.¹ Our troops, in approaching either of those three works, would have to move under the fire of the enemy's batteries for a space of some 2000 yards. They would have to traverse ground quite unknown to them. Any attack upon the enemy's defenses must be made from an extended, diverging circumference; and besides, our assailing forces would be so split by these deep, intersecting ravines as to become divided into isolated bodies of men incapable of giving one another any mutual help.²

'Including the sailors now acting as a land force, the garrison is probably from 25,000 to 30,000 strong;³ and, within a day's march of us, Prince Mentschikoff is in the field with an army which might act formidably upon our flank and rear—which might attack us whilst in the act of assaulting the place.⁴ To storm an intrenched position thus held by a force 25,000 strong, and to provide at the same time against any enterprise on our flank or rear which Prince Mentschikoff might undertake, we have only some 50,000 men. In case of failing, we should find ourselves in danger of being driven into the sea.⁵ If we were to storm at once, we should have to do this with nothing but

¹ Afterward called the Malakoff.

² The above arguments were in substance urged by Sir John Burgoyne.

³ See 'Military Opinions' of Sir John Burgoyne, pp. 197, 201, 240, in which last page, however, the estimate is from 20,000 to 25,000; and also the Narrative of a French Divisional General, given in the Appendix.

⁴ This seems to have been the argument which most pressed upon the minds of the French; and its effect in bending their counsels should certainly be remembered by those who undertake to criticise Prince Mentschikoff's flank march.

⁵ Narrative of French Divisional General referred to above.

'field-pieces at our command, and our troops would be exposed, for a distance of upward of a mile, to a galling fire of more than a hundred pieces of artillery, besides the guns of the shipping. Remember that the force engaging in such an attack would be without any retreat in case of a reverse.¹ The place appears to be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and with so much apparent confidence, engaged in improving it, that, with a fine battering-train on board ship close at hand, we ought not for a moment to contemplate so rash an act as that of storming at once.² To do so would be utterly unjustifiable;³ would indeed be almost a crime.⁴

Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they have all passed away; and, except to the extent already shown, I have no acquaintance with the reasons by which any of them might have been prepared to enforce proposals for an immediate assault; but, partly by becoming acquainted with the events of the campaign which followed, and partly by help of the criticisms which later years have produced, it is practicable to discern the nature of the argument which the united counsels of the French Head-quarters and of Sir John Burgoyne might well have provoked at the time:—

Argument in favor of assaulting at once. 'Before engaging in the main argument, it is convenient to examine some of your lesser and collateral reasons for objecting to a prompt assault. And first, you are wrong in imagining that the embarrasment created by the ravines is one which would only be felt by the assailants. These ravines descend into Sebastopol, dividing the town from the faubourg, and again subdividing into fractions both town and faubourg. It is plain that the difficulty in the way of lateral communica-

¹ The arguments contained in this and the preceding sentence I understand to be Sir John Burgoyne's.—*Official Journal of the English Siege Operations*, p. 17.

² Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 20th November, 1854. In this paper Sir John says: 'On arriving before Sebastopol, after the Battle of the Alma and the taking possession of Balaclava, the place appeared to be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and with so much apparent confidence, engaged in improving it, that, with a fine battering-train on board ship close at hand, no one for a moment contemplated the attempt of so rash an act as to storm it at once.'

³ 'The place was in such a state when the army first appeared before it as rendered an attempt to storm it by a *coup de main* utterly unjustifiable.'—*Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 30th December, 1854.*

⁴ This last, I believe, was one of the forms in which General Canrobert expressed his opinion of the idea of storming without first using the siege-guns.

'tion created by this configuration of the ground must be so sure a source of weakness to the garrison as to be equivalent to a great deduction from their actual numbers. You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, that you yourself perceived this clearly enough, from the indications in Colonel Jervis's map; and when you advised the flank march, you were so far from looking upon these ravines as an evil to us, that you spoke of the embarrassment they must necessarily put upon the garrison as one of the reasons for bringing us round to this South Side.¹ And your reason, so far as it went, was a sound one; for a difficulty in the way of lateral communication must of necessity be more embarrassing to the defenders than to the assailants, who can choose the ground where the real conflict shall take place. Besides, we hold the heads of the ravines, and there our lateral communications are free. Look at the part of the Harbor ravine which the enemy occupies. It is of such a depth and steepness that the defenses which cover the Karabel suburb are quite sundered from those which cover the town; and apparently a body of troops engaged in meeting an assault upon one of these two districts could not be supported at need by forces withdrawn from the other one.²

'You speak of our want of good means of retreat in the event of a discomfiture; but this is a source of danger inherent in the enterprise to which, whether wisely or not, we are now committed. We encountered it at the landing, we encountered it in our march from Old Fort, we encountered it on the Alma; but on that last day we greatly reduced its gravity by proving our ascendant in the field; and now that, with our victorious armies, we approach the goal of our enterprise, it can hardly be wise to revive the old objection, and to refrain from attacking Sebastopol on the theory that, if we were to be repulsed, we should need to abandon the Chersonese, and yet be unable to secure our retreat. If the attack of the place we came out to take is, in other respects, prudent, we must not forego the occasion on account of a danger which belongs to the very nature of our enterprise, and is not to be evaded by delay. If we are already so circumstanced as to be unable to effect a good retreat after undergoing discomfiture in an assault on Sebastopol, how can we expect to be better prepared for a like contingency when we have taken upon ourselves the

¹ See *ante*, p. 68, Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum of the 21st Sept.

² General Todleben insists, with great force, upon this as one of the greatest of the evils with which the *besieged* had to deal.

'additional task of saving and re-embarking our cumbersome siege-trains?

'You acknowledge that a main portion of the force now constituting the garrison consists of sailors. We do well to take it for granted that these men will work the guns perfectly well, and line the intrenchments, where needed, with a diligent fire of musketry; but it is a perverse use of the imagination to picture these crews from the ships as battalions of infantry coming out to manœuvre on the open plateau, and driving into the sea a hitherto victorious army of 50,000 prime troops.

'In truth, it is certain that, however efficient this sailor garrison may be in defending the ramparts, it can not be capable of engaging in offensive operations against us on the open ground; and if we bear this in mind, we hardly need shrink from the necessity of having to operate upon an area more extended than that which the enemy holds. Besides, what is there in this peril of what you call an "extended circumference" which time will help to remove?

'But now to come rather more close to the task which lies before us. Sebastopol, on this, its land side, is not a fortress.¹ The enemy is in an intrenched position—a hastily intrenched position—four miles in extent. To defend such ground as that, the one thing needed is an army. Nothing less than an army can be competent. Well, but the only army the enemy has at his present disposal is the one which has marched off to Baktehi Seräi, having with it Prince Mentschikoff in person, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Czar's forces in the Crimea, both military and naval. We do not accurately know the strength of the detachments which Prince Mentschikoff may have left in the place;² but whether they be great or small, it is, of course, a huge advantage to us, in assailing an intrenched position, to have to do with some mere fractions of an army instead of with the army itself. Prince Mentschikoff may have been led to withdraw his army from a despair of being able

¹ Sir John Burgoyne says, 'It was, in fact, not a fortress, but an army intrenched on a very strong position, along a line of moderate extent, with its flanks perfectly secure' ('Military Opinions,' p. 197). In that sentence Sir John well describes the position, but misdescribes its defenders. The sailors, and the 5000 'reserve,' or 'militiamen,' at that time left in Sebastopol, were not 'an army.'

² We do now: five thousand militiamen, as I call them, and some companies of sappers. There was, besides, a battalion which lost its way in the course of the march toward the Belbec, and came back at night into the town.

‘to save it alive by any less ugly expedient;¹ or he may have been acting, in part, from a cogent desire to insure the junction of expected reinforcements;² or, again, he was perhaps impelled by the blended force of both motives; but every supposition which seeks to explain his withdrawal, invites us to be prompt and summary—invites us to storm the defenses whilst yet the field army is absent.

‘It is surmised—and this especially in the French camp—that the Prince may have withdrawn from Sebastopol with a determination to attack us in flank.³ Well, certainly, if we entangle ourselves in a lengthened siege, there may come a time when the Russian Commander will be so largely reinforced as to be able to take the offensive, and assail us up there on the plateau in a way to imperil our armies. But, as yet, we hear nothing of any such reinforcements; and, in the mean time, an opportunity of encountering such an attack would be the best thing that could happen to us; for an army, greatly inferior to us in numbers, and defeated last week in a chosen and prepared position, could hardly yet come and assail our forces in the open field without giving us a fair occasion for inflicting upon it a great disaster—a disaster of such a kind as would be likely to bring about the immediate fall of the place.

‘But then you, our French friends, say that Prince Mentschikoff may attack us whilst in the act of storming Sebastopol.⁴ Surely this apprehension is a chimæra. We can choose our own moment for the assault: we are not without cavalry: the Prince is distant from us between twenty and thirty miles; and supposing him to be marching by daylight, his advance during many, many hours, would be under the eyes of our people. If we wish to be superlatively wary, we may so far guard ourselves against the apprehended contingency as to avoid storming at the very moment of daybreak; but that surely is the utmost extent to which we ought to be deflected in our counsels by the existence of a Russian field army established near Baktchi Seräi.

‘You, it seems, Sir John Burgoyne, are much impressed by the energy with which the enemy is laboring at his defenses;⁵ and you infer, from this display of zeal, a resolute determination to defend the place; but surely this inference

¹ It was so. See *ante*, chap. x.

² This also was one of his motives for the step. See *ibid*.

³ Narrative by one of the French Generals of Division, given in the Appendix.

⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵ Sir John Burgoyne insists strongly upon this in his writings.

‘of yours is the very one the enemy must wish us to draw, ‘if that which he wants is time and respite. Besides, the ‘very haste with which we see these thousands of people ‘now toiling at the works shows plainly enough what the ‘garrison think of the existing state of their defenses. There ‘would not be so much doing if it were not that there is ‘much which has hitherto been left undone. The evident ‘anxiety of the enemy to bring his works to completion ‘should incline us to shorten the respite of which we see him ‘making so eager a use.

‘Imperfect as are the enemy’s works, they still, no doubt, ‘will enable him to inflict cruel loss upon our assaulting columns; but this objection, grave—or rather painful—as it is, ‘has a general application to all attacks upon prepared positions; and unless there be something exceptionably formidable in the works before us, and some very obvious advantage to be gained by delay, it can not be commonly prudent for us to hold back and give time. Well, but the one ‘great exceptional circumstance which marks the existing ‘condition of things is the evasion of Prince Mentschikoff’s ‘army; and this is an event of such a kind as to be a cause ‘of despair to the garrison, unless they can get some delay, ‘and an encouragement to us, if only we act at once. For, ‘if it be true that to defend this intrenched position of four ‘miles, nothing less than an army is needed, and that the ‘only army which could have been looked to for this duty ‘has marched out and departed, along with its Commander-in-Chief, then it follows that the sailors, and the rest of the ‘people thus left to their fate who may prove so brave and ‘resolute as to be willing to take upon themselves the work ‘of a whole army, and resist to extremity the attack of our ‘victorious battalions, will be acting in a spirit of desperation. You say that, in defense, a spirit of mere desperation ‘is sometimes formidable. That may be in a street, or a ‘mountain defile; but it is hardly within the competence of ‘the spirit of desperation or any other emotional impulse to ‘hold a line of four miles against the resolute assaults of an ‘army.

‘Nor, indeed, is it clear that the work we see going on is ‘undertaken with the single purpose of enabling the garrison to give us a hot reception. The chiefs at Sebastopol ‘who are directing these labors may rather be striving to ‘prevent us from venturing the assault at all until it shall be ‘too late. Their main object may be—and in that they ‘would be wise—to deter us from assaulting at once by a

‘show of energy and resolution.’¹ It is consistent with all ‘we see them doing, to believe that they are preparing a solid defense against any attack we may make three weeks hence, and are, all the while, acting with a full conviction that resistance to an immediate attack would be hopeless.’²

‘You say you will land your battering-trains. The primary use of such implements is to break a way through physical obstacles; but what is it that you want to knock down?’³ Engineers are accustomed to say that when a place is guarded by nothing but earthworks, the lines of defense are one universal breach. It is not, therefore, for the purpose of breaching any walls of defense that you are landing your siege-guns. What is your object? You answer that by means of your siege-guns you can so get down the enemy’s fire as to facilitate your assault. That being your plan, it follows that, until you are ready to make use of your siege-guns, you will delay the attack. Well, but have you formed a clear conception of the time that will pass away before you can put your siege-guns in battery? If indeed you can now at once use your siege-guns as means of getting down the enemy’s fire, such a measure, it must be acknowledged, will be a good preparative for the assault; but is that what you will really do? When you have landed your siege-guns, will you not want to provide cover for the batteries in which you intend to range them? You confess that you will. Your confession simplifies the question. It is now at last clear that you are really entering upon the business of trenches, with the prospect at least before you of “approaches,” and first, second, and third parallels, and all the laborious processes by which men attack a great fortress. Call the task what you will, you are going to undertake a siege; and this, though you know that you must omit what ought to be the besieger’s first step. Without the possibility of investing the place, you are going to sit down before the South Side of Sebastopol. It will not be in less than three weeks from the day when we first came down here to Balaclava that your batteries will open their fire.’⁴

¹ This was the case. See *ante*, chap. ix.

² This was the case. See *ante*, *ibid*.

³ This is not an imaginary question. In the evening of, I believe, the 28th of September, Lord Raglan rode up to the 4th Division camp and told Sir George Cathcart that it had been determined to land the siege-trains; whereupon Cathcart said, ‘Land the siege-trains! But, my dear Lord Raglan, what the devil is there to knock down?’

⁴ The Allies completed their flank march on the 27th of September, and their batteries did not open until the 17th of October. The time they took

‘Three weeks! and from the day of the Alma a month! You are startled, as though this were an extravagant estimate. Reckon then for yourselves. . . . You have reckoned. Our figures agree. Well, but now that you have computed the length of the respite you are giving the enemy, go farther, and try to make out whether all this momentous delay is good for him or for you. First, how will delay be likely to tell, for a time, upon the relative numbers of the invaders and the invaded? By sending us upon this enterprise, far away from the mainland of Europe, and in bold disregard of the German Powers, our French and English Governments have brought about the insertion of a neutral army betwixt the Danube and the Pruth, thus releasing the Czar from all care in the direction of his Bessarabian frontier;’ and we ought to assume that a large portion, if not indeed the whole strength, of Prince Gortschakoff’s army is at this moment rapidly marching upon Simpheropol. Any troops which may have been previously stationed in the more distant parts of the Crimea will probably have been called in with all speed; and Prince Mentschikoff’s march to Baktchi Seräi seems to show that anxiety to give the hand to his expected reinforcements must be one of the motives which urged him to the singular measure of abandoning Sebastopol. On the other hand, we must know that, for some time at least, we can not hope to receive accessions of strength at all proportioned to those which the army of Bessarabia will afford to the Russian commander.² Therefore, so far as concerns the relative strength of our armies in point of numbers, lapse of time will be telling against us.

‘Even more will delay tell against us in reducing our moral ascendant. It is almost certain that an enemy who has undergone a great defeat—a defeat which obviously dislocated his whole scheme of defense—must above all things need time and respite. Are we to give him what most he wants? Your victory on the Alma gives you a mighty power, but a power which was vastly greater last week than it is now—a power which will be less the day

was not lengthened by stress of war, or by accidents of weather, or of any other kind, and therefore it is legitimate to suppose that the number of days required for the merely mechanical operations preparatory to the opening of the fire might have been computed in the last days of September with a fair approach to accuracy.

¹ The Austrian army was the one interposed in this way.

² The soundness of this view was soon afterward proved by the result; but there was nothing in the imaginary prediction which might not have been inferred from known facts so early as the closing days of September.

'after to-morrow than it is to-day — a power which will
'dwindle to nothing if it is not to be exerted till the middle
'of next month ; for the Russians are a firm, courageous people ; and as soon as they shall have filled up the chasms,
'and repaired the confusion which the defeat inflicted upon
'them, they will be vastly more formidable than it is possible for them to be at this moment.

'It is a common saying in war, that when, for the defense
'of a stronghold, a pitched battle is ventured and lost, the
'place falls ; but this maxim rests upon the assumption that
'the victor will be prompt to lay hold of the prize which
'the fortune of battle has offered him ; and we shall be forfeiting what we won at some cost on the heights of the
'Alma if we not only allow the place three weeks of respite,
'but suffer it, all this time, to be in free communication with
'the roads by which troops and supplies can be brought to
'its succor.

'But if time is thus so well fitted to enable the enemy to recover from his weakness in point of numbers, and from the
'stress of a great defeat, much more is it favorable to him in
'enabling him to strengthen his works of defense. You say
'that we too can work ; but in labor of this kind how can
'we compete with the enemy ? We have at our disposal
'the few weary and too often sickly men whom we can tell
'off for fatigue duty from the already diminished strength
'of our regiments. The enemy has thousands of strong,
'healthy sailors, he has bands of dock-laborers, all well supplied with food, clothing, and shelter. In point of tools,
'engines, timber, and other materials, and even in point of
'great guns, we must not compare our resources with those
'of an enemy who has close under his hand all that can be
'furnished by an arsenal, by a dockyard, by a town, by a
'whole fleet renouncing the sea. The time we shall take to
'put twenty pieces in battery will enable the enemy to confront us with forty ; and with works better fitted for covering both batteries and infantry than any we can hope to
'construct in the same time.¹

¹ So early as the 8th of October Lord Raglan had perceived that the business of 'subduing the enemy's fire' by superior cannonading power was 'an almost hopeless task.'—*Private letter (quoted more at length, post, p. 201) from Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.* In a letter addressed by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert at the close of the year, he had occasion to speak of the day when the besiegers opened fire, and he describes the cannonading power then exerted by the enemy as amounting to 'at least double that of the Allies.' It may be said that nothing but actual observation and experience sufficed to teach the Allies their inferiority in cannonading power, and

‘ Yet again, think of the policy of delay as affected by the season of the year. We are nearly at the end of September. These warm, sunny days that we have had ever since the 14th, will be followed by the winds, the rains, the cold of autumn. Nay, force yourselves to think of the winter, for if once you come to the business of a siege, no man can say how long it will last. In means of providing against the rigor of the season, there is no approach to equality between the enemy and ourselves. The enemy will have at his back a whole town, with hundreds of buildings of all kinds, including barracks and hospitals, and supplied with the stores that are needed for keeping an army in health. Our troops, on the other hand, with no other shelter than tents, will be lying on this bleak ridge at the mercy of the rain, the snow, the biting frost. If, therefore, the respite you are giving to the Russians should carry you into a siege not destined to end in two months, your decision will put the winter upon the side of the enemy.

‘ You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, that one of your reasons for advising the flank march was founded upon the hope that by this unexpected movement to the South Side we might surprise the garrison.¹ Well, the hope, we now know, has been realized. By our sudden march round to this side of the place the garrison has been clearly surprised. But how will this avail us if we leave to a garrison, surprised for the moment, an immunity of two or three weeks?

‘ When you resolve to forego the present opportunity of carrying the place with a view to commence a siege, you act as though you supposed that you were relatively weak in the number and power of your troops, and relatively strong in your means of cannonading. But of these two suppositions each is ill founded; for at present you have a great superiority over the garrison in the number² and quality of your troops, and the ascendant which victory

that, therefore, the argument in the text could not have been used. I reply that, from the time when the Allies knew of the sinking of the ships across the mouth of the roadstead, they had before them the data from which it was competent to them to infer the great amount of power which would or might be developed by the enemy's batteries.

¹ See the paragraph No. 2 in Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum of 21st September, *ante*, p. 68.

² Sir John Burgoyne thinks that, including the sailors, the forces constituting the garrison at this time might be reckoned at 25,000 (see ‘ Military ‘ Opinions’); and he is not very far wrong, though Todleben cuts down to 16,000 the forces available for the defense of the South Side.

'gives; whilst, on the other hand, the enemy, it can hardly
'be doubted, has ample means of establishing greater batter-
'ies than you can command. Therefore, to forego the pres-
'ent use of your victorious battalions, and engage in a war
'of trenches, is to give up the ascendant you enjoy, and enter
'upon that very kind of warfare in which the enemy, for
'a long time to come, will be abler and stronger than you.

'Of course, it is a painful task to have to order an attack
'upon a prepared position; for, whatever may be the ex-
'pectation of final success, some portions of the assailing
'troops must almost necessarily be engaged in what, for
'them (though not for the army generally, of which they
'form a part), is a hard, unequal conflict; but, circumstanced
'as we are, we must not abstain from this assault on the
'mere ground that it is a great evil to have to undertake it.
'The question is, whether the evil which we should bring
'upon ourselves by refraining from an assault would not be
'still greater. We are under the eyes of all Europe; and
'unless the war comes to an end, we can never go home
'without having executed our appointed task.

'Here, on this barren shore, we stand fastened—inexorably
'fastened—to the duty of taking Sebastopol; and for an army
'in such a predicament as this, the adoption of even a very
'hardy measure may not only be free from the charge of rash-
'ness, but may be commanded by the strictest prudence.

'Although the idea of this expedition to the Crimea was
'one of exceeding boldness, it is perhaps defensible (as events
'have hitherto tended to show), upon the supposition that
'it was meant to be carried through with dispatch, and in a
'venturesome spirit corresponding with the audacity of the
'original conception; but it is only on that supposition that
'our invasion of this province of Russia can be justified;
'and we shall run into grievous danger if we become too
'slow and too cautious in the execution of a plan essentially
'hazardous in its nature. The very safety of our forces has
'come to be so dependent on our spirit of enterprise, that we
'shall be guilty of a false prudence equivalent to actual rash-
'ness, if, after our landing and our victory, and our daring
'flank march, we now give the enemy respite, allowing him
'to recover from the blow he has received, and to draw to
'himself all the strength which the armies of the Czar may
'be able to afford him in two or three weeks from this time.
'To give the enemy so great an advantage is surely more
'hazardous than to strive to end the campaign at once by a
'timely assault. His position, no doubt, is intrenched; and

‘defended by numerous seamen as well as by a detachment of land-service troops ; but it is a position four miles in extent which has no army to hold it.’¹

These, I say, are some of the arguments which might have been adduced on one side of the question ; for they are, all of them, based upon knowledge which had reached the Allies on the 29th of September ; and that, it seems, is the day on which the proposal to assault Sebastopol was submitted by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert for the second time.² General Canrobert, it seems, reserved his decision until the following day ; but ultimately the French adhered to their former opinion.³ They still judged that there ought to be no assault without first getting down the fire of the place by means of their battering guns.

To prevent all constraint in the expression of men’s thoughts, but also, I imagine, in furtherance of his desire to ward off the semblance of antagonism between Canrobert and himself, Lord Raglan, soon after the completion of the flank march, had negotiated a proposal made to him for recording in manuscript the purport of the conferences then about to take place between the French and the English.⁴ Far from wishing to record, he sought to obliterate all trace of the differences elicited by interchange of opinion. Evidently, this determination was a whole-some one ; but it tended, of course, after even a small lapse of time, to throw some obscurity over what passed in conference between the French and the English Head-quarters ; and the information I have does not enable me to give—not to give even ever so slightly—the

29th Sept.
Second proposal
for the assault
of Sebastopol
submitted by
Lord Raglan to
the French.

30th Sept. Its
definitive rejection
by the
French.

Lord Raglan’s
negative to the
proposal for
having the ten-
or of the con-
ferences with
the French re-
corded in writ-
ing.

The effect of
this in casting
some degree of
obscurity over
what passed.

¹ In the following November, both the French and the English engineers felt the strength of the meshes in which the Allies had entangled themselves by undertaking a siege, and came back, after all, to ‘enterprise’ and ‘audacity’ as offering the best means of extrication. (See Extracts from Memoranda of Sir John Burgoyne in the Appendix.)

² The date is fixed by the following words of a private letter, dated the 30th of September, and addressed by Lyons to Lord Raglan : ‘I shall be ‘anxious to know the effect produced upon Sir John Burgoyne’s mind by his ‘reconnaissance yesterday, and also the result of Canrobert’s night reflection ‘upon the proposition of yesterday ; and I will wait on your Lordship after ‘breakfast.’

³ ‘He’ (Lord Raglan) ‘would have been very willing to do it by assault, ‘but he was not supported in the proposal by the French General, nor by his ‘own engineers.’—*MS. Memorandum quoted ante*, p. 183. I believe that Sir John Burgoyne was not present at the conference of which I am speaking.

⁴ Information given me by the officer who made the proposal to him.

tenor of the few words in which Lord Raglan elicited the opinion of his French colleague.¹

But the language used by General Canrobert has not been forgotten. His arguments were adduced so un-
The speech of Canrobert. interruptedly, and were also so well put, that they not only constituted what men call a 'speech,' but a speech of much ability.

If the memory of one who was much impressed with the speech at the time can be safely trusted, it was somewhat to this effect:² First, Canrobert drew the attention of his hearers to the existence of a field army under Prince Mentschikoff which might seize any fit occasion for assailing the Allies in flank and rear; and although he acknowledged that Prince Mentschikoff's strength could not be accurately estimated by the Allies, he insisted upon the imprudence of regarding it as otherwise than formidable. He spoke of the sacrifice of life to which the Allies must submit if they were to storm the place at once, without first breaking down the strength of its defenses; and he insisted that whilst entangled in such a struggle—nay, even at a later time, whilst pushing their way in the streets of the town—the Allies would be exposed to grave danger from the enterprise of Prince Mentschikoff's field army. He asked his hearers to imagine that army establishing itself on the plateau, and the Allies beneath in a hole, so placed, so engaged, so out of the controlling power of their commanders, as to be all but helpless.³ He showed the disasters, the ruin, which must follow upon such a condition of things. Then, and with the happy skill of an orator, he opportunely reversed the picture. The perils he had indicated need not be faced. Instead of the ruin he spoke of, there might be a glorious triumph obtained at but a small cost of life. Happily the forethought of the two Home Governments had provided the Allied armies with magnificent siege-trains. By the help of these the Allies could so break down the defenses of Sebastopol that their forces would be enabled to en-

¹ My conjecture is that, both on this occasion and on the one which offered itself two days before, Lord Raglan avoided any thing like a lengthened argument, and even perhaps avoided any declaration in set terms of his own opinion, but submitted the proposal as one commended to attention by Lyons. His probable reasons for desiring that on this subject there should be no visible difference of opinion between Canrobert and himself will be seen *post*, pp. 195-96.

² Information from an officer present.

³ In speaking of the Allies as 'in a hole' (*dans un trou*), he meant to indicate the low and straitened position of Sebastopol as compared with the plateau above.

ter the place without incurring grave loss, and without even risking that sure dominion of the plateau above, on which their existence depended. For himself, he declared that, if he were to incur the appalling risks of which he had spoken, when, as he maintained, this cruel necessity could be averted by putting in battery the magnificent siege-train which the Government had placed at his disposal, he would be condemned by the voice of his conscience, and the Emperor would never forgive him.¹

In listening to his colleague at a conference of this kind, Lord Raglan would of course try to see whether Canrobert, with a mind yet open to conviction, was feeling his way toward a right conclusion, or whether he was adducing arguments in support of a determination already formed. In the one case, it might be Lord Raglan's duty to endeavor to persuade; in the other, to hold his peace. Evidently the tenor of Canrobert's speech was not such as to leave room for doubt. He had made up his mind.

Canrobert's speech left no opening for attempts at persuasion.

Without the concurrence of Canrobert there could, of course, be no assault. He had refused to concur—had refused in such terms as to show the hopelessness of any endeavor to shake his decision. The question was ended.²

It ended the question.

The duty of thus submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault, was one which had to be performed with exceeding care, and, if possible, in such a way as to guard against the evil that must result from an overt difference between the French and the English Commanders. Supposing, as the event happened, that the alternative of entering upon siege-work should be the one adopted, it would obviously be perilous to the good understanding, and even to the discipline of

The care required in submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault.

¹ The rapidity of this transition from 'the voice of conscience' to the French Emperor will be apt to remind people of a celebrated refusal which amused wicked London and afterward Paris some few years ago,—'Jamais! *'Dieu le defend, et mon mari ne le permet pas!'*

² It is just that before men cast blame upon General Canrobert personally for a want of opportune daring at this conjuncture, they should know the tenor of the very peculiar general instructions under which the French army was acting. The instructions are before me; but considering the circumstances under which they were imparted to Lord Raglan and the Queen's Government, I am not sure that it would be right for me to publish them without the assent of the French Emperor. The instructions were communicated to Lord Raglan at the Tuileries so early as the 13th of April, and almost immediately afterward the English Government became apprised of their contents. Our statesmen were therefore forewarned.

the two Allied armies, if the English soldiers, when enduring the toils and the hardships of protracted siege duties, should be able to say: 'Our Commander has brought this upon us' by letting the foreigners have their way. He himself was 'for assaulting the place; and because the Frenchmen would not agree, here we are on the clay and the snow.'

But if this was a danger attending the crisis, no one living could be more competent to guard against it than Lord Raglan. Even in eliciting Burgoyne's opinion he did not, it seems, disclose his own;¹ and although, as we have seen, he twice over submitted to Canrobert the expediency of an assault, he found means to do this without at all putting himself forward as a biased partisan of the measure. He probably did no more than utter the few syllables which were necessary for inducing the French General to declare his opinion.² If he had found the least sign of a doubt in the mind of Canrobert, or any division of opinion in the French camp, then possibly he would have judged that the prospect of bringing round others to his own inclination was hopeful enough to warrant him in resorting to argument, and incurring the certain evil of 'discussion' for the sake of the possible good that might emerge from it. But no such occasion arose; for, Canrobert and Burgoyne being the two men whom Lord Raglan must needs have desired to see in agreement with him upon this question, it presently appeared that each of them was resting his opinion upon grounds of such a kind as to leave no opening for persuasion.³ Indeed it might be said that discussion was almost forbidden, when Canrobert had based one of his reasons for not assaulting upon ground appertaining to the conscience.⁴

His success in warding off the appearance of differences between Canrobert and himself upon the question of assault.

The effect of Lord Raglan's care was, that although he had caused the question to be considered, and although it had been determined in the way which he thought the wrong one, still the camp did not see in him a general overruled by his colleague; and, on the other hand, the common cause of the Allies was sheltered from the dangers to which it must have lain exposed if the soldiery could have

¹ See the words, 'No one,' etc., quoted *ante*, p. 183, note, from Burgoyne's Memorandum of 20th November, 1854, and 'Military Opinions,' p. 199.

² See conjecture in note, *ante*, p. 194.

³ See Canrobert's speech, *ante*, p. 194. With regard to Burgoyne, it may be said, in his own words, that he looked upon an assault at the time in question as 'utterly unjustifiable.'—*Memorandum by Burgoyne*, 30th December, 1854.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 195.

said that it was Canrobert who prevented an assault by his resistance to English counsels. The attainment of this convenient result was perhaps, in some measure, helped by the publicity of Cathcart's proposals;¹ for, to meet the exigency of camp gossip, in its search after those who desired to assault, there was needed at least some one man with whom to connect such a project, and the account of Sir George's advice came apt to the moment. Rumor fastened itself on his name, so content with a morsel of truth that it failed to catch what had been passing between Lord Raglan and Canrobert.

When once General Canrobert had definitively declared his opinion to be against assaulting, it followed that he would prevail. Many English, no doubt, at this time were entertaining a notion that, in warlike alliances no less than in common addition, one and one when united must have all the value of two; and that, because the old rivals stood

shoulder to shoulder fast linked in the bonds of a treaty, they were equal to what, in hard algebra, a man might call 'England plus France;' but the world in general knew that there were fallacies in such a computation, and that one of them was the fallacy of omitting to allow for the effect of divided counsels. Independently of all the other

The certainty that Canrobert's opinion against assaulting, when definitively declared, must prevail.

Tendency of divided counsels to end in the rejection of vigorous measures.

evil they breed, divided counsels have a perilous tendency to result in the adoption of the Negative; for when each of two men is independent of the other, any joint undertaking by the two must be founded, we know, upon concert; whilst, in order for them both to remain in a state of inaction, or comparative inaction, no agreement at all may be needed. Therefore, when they differ, the stress of their mutual relations must tend to make them delay; and when at last they force themselves to come to some kind of agreement, and to choose between two or more courses of action, they will incline to prefer the one which most nearly approaches to nothing. In other words, the least vigorous of any proposed plans will be the one chosen, not because it is the best, but because, as compared with the others, it has so much more of the negative character that its adoption involves a less ample surrender of opinion. Thus, supposing that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert (whilst resolved, for the sake of the Alliance, to abstain from all separate courses of action)

¹ Of my own knowledge I can speak to the publicity of Cathcart's proposals; and it is certainly curious, though not the less true, that Burgoyne did not hear of them.

were each of them to cling to his opinion with an equal tenacity, it could not but be that Lord Raglan's desire to assault must be defeated by Canrobert's desire to do no such thing. The mere words which express the tenor of such a negotiation serve to show its inevitable result. 'I propose an assault.' 'I decline the proposal.' 'I again propose an assault.' 'I definitively refuse to concur.' Plainly the question ends; and as it ends with the non-adoption of the proposal, the objector prevails. He does not prevail because he is unduly obstinate, but because he has on his side that force which in any joint counsels must always belong to the Negative.

But, independently of this consideration, it must be acknowledged that, in every proposal to assault the place at once, Lord Raglan was overborne by a great weight of what may be justly called legitimate authority. The French had always been more careful students of the arts of war than the English; and, for any thing that transpired to the contrary, there was but one opinion in their camp. They condemned the idea of storming the place without first getting down its fire by means of the siege-guns; and we saw that General Canrobert, their Commander-in-Chief, placed his objection on grounds of so positive a kind as almost to forbid discussion. Besides, the question was one upon which the opinion of military engineers must needs be of great weight; and it happened, as we already know, that Sir John Burgoyne not only adhered to the same conclusion as the French, but went so far as to think that the opposite counsel was of too wild a sort to be, even for one moment, tenable.¹

Seeing that he could not hope to make his own inclination prevail against all this concurrence of opinion, Lord Raglan seems to have thought that the next best course for him was a frank and earnest adoption of the measure recommended by the French as well as by the head of his own engineers; but also he determined apparently to do all he truthfully could toward concealing the difference of opinion which had arisen between General Canrobert and himself. Not only did he avoid all recurrence to his words, but he even so comported himself as to ward off from camp the idea of his having been overruled by the French.²

¹ See *ante*, p. 183, and the second and third notes, where the words of Burgoyne are given.

² Those who were in the English camp at the time will remember, as is

The great weight of authority by which Lord Raglan was opposed.

Upon the rejection of his proposals for the assault, Lord Raglan was frank and earnest in his adoption of the alternative measure.

Nor was this all. I include the whole period from the Battle of the Alma to the time now reached by my narrative, when I say that, with a refined and thoughtful loyalty, which was characteristic of his nature, Lord Raglan withheld from the Home Government all such disclosures of opinion as might show him to be more enterprising and more in favor of summary methods than the men who ruled at the French Head-quarters.¹ He could not but know that, whatever he might write to the Secretary of State, whether in the form of 'secret dispatch' or private note, would necessarily, and indeed legitimately, be imparted to several others; that the number of people thus legitimately apprised was subject to be a little augmented by the exigencies of the marriage-tie; and that round the large group thus intrusted there always hovered the newsman, eager to hear, determined to tell, his mere presence suggesting a mart where tons of newspaper eulogy could be had for three grains of State secret. So, upon the whole, Lord Raglan could not but deem it probable that if he were to disclose to the Home Government his desire for an immediate assault, with an intimation that his wishes had been frustrated by General Canrobert and the Engineers both English and French, he would become the object of a brief popular applause in England, but applause of a kind which must be jeopardizing to the Alliance and hurtful to the prospects of the war. To one constituted as Lord Raglan was, it would be quite easy and natural to apprehend all these probable consequences, and (as a mere common, evident duty) to avert them by observing silence. It is thus that I account for his reserve.

But the opinions of a commander are sometimes inferred from the conduct and language of the men who most closely surround him; and as it happens that General Airey, in this campaign, was constant at the side of Lord Raglan, and so devoted as to be the last man who would put his mind into a state of—even argumentative—antago-

His reserve on the subject of the differences between the French and himself.
 Probable clue to the opinion which Lord Raglan had formed as to the effect of the decision just taken.

observed, see *ante*, p. 196, that in current conversation the proposals for an assault used always to be attributed to Cathcart, never to Lord Raglan. Cathcart's name helped to mask the truth.

¹ The two lines written at night on the Belbec (*ante*, chap. iv.) were probably an unpremeditated and almost unintentional deviation. Notwithstanding the restraint which he thus imposed upon himself, Lord Raglan could not altogether disguise his perception of the evil which was resulting from the plan of giving the enemy a respite. Proof of this is given in the Appendix.

nism with that of his chief, it is possible that, in the absence of more direct indications, the act and the words of the subordinate will be regarded as enabling us to conjecture the opinion of Lord Raglan himself in regard to the consequences that must result from refusing at once to assault. Be that

Communica-
tion from Gen-
eral Airey at
the time to the
Commander-in-
Chief at the
Horse Guards.

as it may, Airey ventured a step, at the time, which shows that he had caught the full import—nay, already had divined the consequences of refusing to assault Sebastopol. What he did, indeed, was only to write some two lines in a private letter; but, considering the place and the time, the purport of his communication, the personage to whom he addressed it, the events of the closing autumn, the appalling time which followed, the complaints that soon rose in Whitehall of the dearth of all warning information from the English Head-quarters, and, finally, the return of the spring, bringing with it accessions of strength—his words were, at the least, a singular forecast; and to any who know how unlikely it was that he would be forming, and sending home, an opinion opposed to that of his chief, the letter will convey some idea of the light in which Lord Raglan may have regarded the decision just taken. On the third day from that when the French definitively rejected the proposal for an assault, Airey wrote to Lord Hardinge, the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. He did not presume to question the wisdom of the counsels which the Allies had been following; but he gave to the chief of the army at home what he judged to be the probable consequence of the decision just taken. ‘My own opinion,’ he wrote—‘my own opinion is that we are here for the winter, maintaining only a strong position until we can be reinforced.’¹

The determina-
tion to forego
the plan of
assaulting did
not result from
a careful
weighing of
the question.

Causes which
averted full de-
liberation.

If the determination to reject all proposals for an assault was too easily formed, the causes which averted full deliberation can be well enough seen. In the first place, the insidious form under which the question presented itself gave a dangerous smoothness to the process of forming a resolve. ‘We have our siege-trains, and shall we not use them to get down the enemy’s fire before we deliver the assault?’ This seems to have been

¹ Private letter from General Airey to Lord Hardinge, 3rd October, 1854. I never heard General Airey insist, or even, I think, mention, that he had been able to take this clear-sighted view at so early a day; but after the death of the late Lord Hardinge a quantity of papers which had been in his possession came into my hands, and amongst them I found the note above cited.

the question which men thought they had to deal with; and, supposing it to be understood too narrowly, and without a perception of the ulterior consequences to which it might lead, the plan was dangerously easy of acceptance. All those, of course, could adopt it who approved the idea of entering upon engineer operations more or less resembling a siege; and, on the other hand, those who would have recoiled from the imprudence of willfully conceding to the enemy a respite of twenty days, might unwittingly assent to a measure which did not, in terms, do more than add some heavy artillery to the other resources of the Allies; for at this time apparently no trustworthy estimate had been made of the number of days it would take to land the siege-trains, to get them up to the front, and to provide earthen cover for the projected batteries.¹

Another of the circumstances tending to avert discussion was one which has been already referred to for another purpose; and that is, the exceeding confidence of the Engineers, whether English or French, and this, upon a subject which—partly, at least, if not altogether—lay within the range of their special science. They not only judged that the idea of an immediate assault was one of so rash a sort as to be actually unworthy of discussion,² but were also very sure, at the time, that their plan of getting down the enemy's fire by means of their siege-guns would bring about the fall of the place.³ Add to this that the opinion of the Allied Engineers was supported, as we have already seen, by the authority of General Canrobert, and apparently by the unanimous, or all but unanimous, judgment of those who had weight in the counsels of the French army.

And, again, it would seem that the judgment of the Allies was in some measure governed by a foregone conclusion.

¹ For the reasons showing that such an estimate might have been made see the foot-note *ante*, p. 188.

² This was Sir John Burgoyne's opinion; see *ante*, p. 183 and note. With respect to the opinion in the French camp, and the determination of General Canrobert, see the quotation from the Narrative of the French General of Division, quoted *ante*, p. 178, and given in Note to the 'Expédition de 'la Crimée,' p. 300.

³ In a private letter addressed by Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle he says: 'Since I wrote to you this morning I have had a serious conversation with Sir John Burgoyne. He was very sanguine of success at first, and considered that we had no very great obstacles to contend against, but he has gradually arrived at a different conclusion; and he now apprehends that the force we can command is wholly inadequate to the real attack of the front of the place to which we are opposed.'—*8th October*, 1854.

By some, unless I mistake, the expediency of making use of the siege-guns, then in process of landing, was hardly in form decided, but rather taken for granted.

The error which criticism ascribes to those who condemned all proposals for the immediate assault, is that of exchanging their power to seize the stronghold at once for an opportunity of merely besieging it, and that too with inadequate means.¹ Being men, they could hardly be blamed for not seeing into the future; but the impeachment is, that they did not so read the facts lying plainly within reach of their knowledge as to be able to obtain a clear sight of the conditions in which they were placed. Thus, to take but one instance, they failed to see how they were bound by the vital condition of time.

In adopting a measure which was only the first and the easiest of a long, arduous, and bloody undertaking, the men who got the sway of the question were blind, or half-blind, it would seem, not merely to the probable effect, but to the then present import of what they were doing. They conscientiously, no doubt, resolved that, before attempting an assault, they would make a good use of their siege-guns; but then they were not really going to put all this ordnance in battery without first getting some cover for it; so that what they in truth undertook was to open some trench-work in which to plant their great guns, and with those to cannonade the fortress. In other words, they were determining—they hardly knew what they did—to enter upon the siege of Sebastopol.²

It was with a hope of inducing the Allies to come to this very resolve that the defenders of Sebastopol had been toiling.

The great Engineer who directed the labors of the garrison has declared, as we saw, that the place, at this time, could not have been held against such an attack as the Allies had the power to make;³ and this is the judgment of one who, compared with all other men, had the fullest understanding

The error ascribed by Todleben to those of the Allies who opposed the assault.

The real purport of their determination.

It was with the hope of bringing the Allies to this resolve that the defenders of Sebastopol had been toiling.

¹ Todleben.

² In saying parenthetically that the opponents of the proposal for assaulting entered upon the siege without knowing it, I am warranted, I think, by the language of Burgoyne, and those who have followed his view. No 'approaches' were at this time meditated, and, for that reason, there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of the engineers to acknowledge that the intended process was a 'siege.'

³ Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol,' General de Todleben's opinion ap-

and knowledge of the question on which he was writing. General de Todleben is fallible;¹ but unless he has underrated the defensive resources of Sebastopol, which he himself was preparing in the four last days of September, the determination of the Allies to give the garrison respite will have to be ranged as the third of the lost occasions which followed the Battle of the Alma.

The third of
the lost occasions.

CHAPTER XII.

OF the conditions which surrounded the Allies in this their siege of Sebastopol, there were some of so general a kind, and so constant in their application to each varying stage of the conflict, that it seems right to speak of them here. And especially—for this condition held steadfast from the beginning to the end of the siege—it will be useful to convey an idea of the kind of help that was to be got from the presence of the Anglo-French fleet, and to mark out beforehand the bounds which were destined to confine its dominion.

The extent of
help that was
to be got by the
besiegers from
the presence
of the Anglo-
French fleet.

It can not be said that the conclusion of those who judged Sebastopol safe against an attack from the sea was ever upset or shaken by the subsequent course of events. It is equally certain, however, that nothing occurred which could be used as proof by experiment that the place was impregnable against an attack from the sea, for no irruption into the roadstead was ever attempted by the Allies;² and the mere fact that an Anglo-French fleet lay hovering over the prey for a year and a half without breaking in to seize it, has hardly so close a bearing upon the question as it

plies to the state of the defenses on the 29th of September, and even to their state at a much later time; but a great change had been wrought in the two days preceding the evening of the 29th. An attempt to defend the place at the time when the Allies first appeared on the South Side would have been even more desperate than it was on the 29th.

¹ General de Todleben's most interesting arguments upon all these questions are in some measure vitiated by his errors in attributing to the Allies a greater numerical strength than they really had; but it will probably be considered that his conclusion upon the particular question above referred to would not be displaced by a mere correction of the numbers he gives.

² Since the naval cannonade of the 17th of October was undertaken as a diversion, and not with any design of forcing the entrance of the roadstead, it forms no exception to the statement in the text.

might seem to have at first sight; for, powerful as is the separate navy both of France and of England, there are causes from which it seems to result that the united fleets of the two Powers are of less account for attack than the fleet of one acting singly. It may be that the difficulty of founding decisive action upon piebald councils of war is even more fatal to naval enterprise than to the operations of land forces. But, whatever be the cause, the lessons of history have hitherto gone to show that one of the ways in which England may carry on war without gaining naval renown is by yoking herself with France. In the days when a base Stuart king was hired to engage his people in alliance with France, the English navy was strong, and so was the navy of France; yet the battles of Solebay and Schonveldt gave proof that, acting together, the French and the English fleets might be hardly a match for the Dutch. So, whatever may be the reasons for believing Sebastopol to be impregnable by sea, they did not receive decisive confirmation from the fact that an Anglo-French fleet was lying outside for a year and a half without making any attempt to force its way into the roadstead.

Seemingly, however, the reasonings of those who concluded that the place was impregnable by sea were as sound as reasonings of that kind could well be; for if an artillery adept bends over a plan of the roadstead, and marks out with ruler and pencil the scope of the fire from the forts as well as from the ships of the Russians, he finds his radii converging so thickly upon the mouth of the roadstead, and upon the waters leading on toward the Man-of-war Harbor, that even though no obstruction be supposed like that of sunken ships, he sees pointed out upon paper the assurance of ruin to a fleet which might strive to break in. Still it is of necessity that calculations of this kind should leave unreckoned the effects which may be wrought by smoke, confusion, miracle; by panic, by genius, by even that blind strength of will which in war sometimes gains over fortune; and, rightly or wrongly, the always empirical English are accustomed to think that a forecast which needs must leave out all these perturbing elements has no conclusive worth. They like that the boundary of what is possible should be sought for by actual trial—should be fixed, so to speak, by exploring, instead of by mere calculation; and it was hardly to be expected that their desire to have the experiment made would be brought to an end by their learning that the entrance to the roadstead had been closed by sunken ships; for the age was one

in which physical obstacles had been much overcome by the art of the civil engineer; and many who might not under-rate the power of the enemy when engaged in active defense, were still somewhat loth to believe that the heart's desire of a people who had made smooth their ways through mountains and beds of rivers, could be baffled by the inert resistance of six or seven drowned ships.

However, there stands the fact, that whatever might have been possible to a man such as Cochrane invested with the sole command, and untrammelled by the fetters of an alliance, the Commanders of the Anglo-French fleet agreed with the Russians in believing that Sebastopol was safe against an

The limits of the dominion possessed by the Anglo-French fleet.

attack from the sea. Therefore, for the purpose of understanding the limit — not of what might be possible in the abstract, but — of what could be done by invaders impressed with this belief, it may

be taken for granted that, although the Anglo-French fleet ruled unchecked over all the high seas, its dominion stopped short at the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead. For securing the undisturbed maritime transport of supplies and reinforcements, whether entering Balaclava, or Kamiesch, or Kazatch, the Anglo-French shipping was all-powerful, nay, indeed, so completely unchallenged, that from the beginning to the end the waters of the Euxine were peaceful; and besides, we shall always be seeing that, so far as was consistent with the maintenance of a sure efficiency at sea, the generous zeal of the sailors, together with such of those things as could be supplied from ships' armaments or ships' stores, was from time to time brought without stint to strengthen and comfort the land forces; but it has to be said once for all, that, as means of breaking through that part of the enemy's line which consisted of seaward defenses, the fleets were of no avail. In the roadstead and all its creeks the Russian was master. Nor of this was there ever much question, for in judging the limits to which the Allied fleets could push their dominion, the invaders and the invaded were of one mind.

Two other conclusions may be mentioned in which the

After the establishment of the Allies on the south coast, the North Side was regarded as secure against any descent from the ships; and also against any attempt of the

contending belligerents were able to agree. From the time when the Allies were established on the south coast, they did not at all hope, and the Russians, on the other hand, did not at all fear, that the North Side of Sebastopol would ever be carried by means of a descent from the ships; and with fully equal certainty, and on much better grounds, the belligerents knew it to be out of the

Allies to attack it by reversing their flank march.

The trying conditions under which the siege would have to be carried on.

The North Side remained free of access to the garrison, without at all absorbing their resources or giving them care.

Along its whole front on the water side the place was secure without needing troops to defend it.

No actual investment of the place was practicable.

question for the Allies to attempt to reverse their famous flank march, by moving back any of their forces round the head of the bay to their old bivouac on the Belbec. Our recognition of these three conclusions—not necessarily as sound in themselves, but—as conclusions in which the Allies and the Russians agreed, will help to put in full light some of the most trying of the conditions which embarrassed the siege of Sebastopol.

For, first, it resulted that, from the time of the flank march,

the North Side remained always free of access to the garrison, assuring them their free communication with the interior of Russia, and this without ever absorbing any material portion of their defensive resources. From the moment when it was known that the invading army had established itself on the south coast, the Russians, discharged of

all care for the safety of the Star Fort and the whole North Side of Sebastopol, were free to bring their full strength to the scene of the actual conflict.

Next, it followed that along every yard of the line which

defined both the town and its suburbs on the side of the water, the defenders were so absolutely secure as not to need there for defense the presence of a single battalion.

But, independently of that configuration of land and water immediately adjoining Sebastopol which served to aid the defense, there were features in the neighboring country which could not but hamper an enemy who might advise himself, as the Allies were now doing, to sit down before the place on its south side. Since Sebastopol

was upon the shore of the bay which bears its name, and since also the whole bay was left in the unchallenged dominion of the Russians, it followed that, in order to the investment of the place, the bay itself must be surrounded; and it being on the west, and there only, that the Allied navy was master, the task of surrounding the bay in all other directions was one which could only be performed by land forces. Now the bay, as we saw, stretched inland for a distance of three miles and a half; and the number of troops required for encompassing such an arm of the sea on the north, on the east, and on the south, would have ranged far beyond the resources which England and France could command. Therefore the actual investment of the place—and this, be it always remembered, is the first indispensable

step in the process of a regular siege—was a thing which could not be attempted.

It may be said, and on sound authority, that a virtual investment of the place was at one time practicable; for if, in the month of September, the Allies had established a force on the great road which connected Sebastopol with the north, they would have done much toward putting the fortress in a state of isolation; and we have already seen ground for believing that from such a measure the immediate fall of the place would have resulted;¹ but this opportunity was forfeited by adopting the plan of the flank march, and abandoning to the enemy, first the free enjoyment, and then the absolute and unchallenged dominion, of his great line of communication between Sebastopol and the interior of Russia. From the moment when the enemy—much doubting at first, and slow to believe his good fortune—was suffered to make himself master on the Mackenzie Heights, the Allies were no longer able, except by a fresh invasion, to intercept the succor which thenceforth, at the convenience of the Russians, could be freely poured into Sebastopol. Before the flank march, the enterprise against Sebastopol was a swoop at rich prey, forming part, it is true, of a mighty empire, yet seated in an outlying province, and liable to be torn off by force, if force could be used with due swiftness; but, so soon as the Allies had abandoned to their foe his great line of communication, and had also made up their minds to engage in a plan of slow warfare, then, in the full sense of the phrase (and without having means for their task), they became the invaders of Russia. Till that time, they had had to do with a provincial governor, far away from the centre of power, incredulous of the rumors which heralded their coming, surprised by their descent on his coast. Now—for so they had chosen—they were going to be confronted by the gathering strength of a nation. Now—and hardly before—they were brought face to face with the Czar.

Nor were these the only embarrassments which resulted from the flank march. When, on the 25th of September, the Allies began to descend from the steep sides of the Mackenzie Heights into the valley of the Tchernaya, they little imagined that they

The opportunity there had been of isolating Sebastopol was forfeited by abandoning to the enemy the great road to Baktchi Serai.

The change in the character of the enterprise which was brought about by abandoning to the enemy his great line of communication, and entering upon a slow plan of warfare.

The way in which the flank march resulted in giving security and freedom of movement

¹ *Ante*, chap. iv.

BLACK SEA

SEBASTOPOL

KARABEL SUBURB



Ship-Town

EXPLANATION.

Ground which the Allies treated as unsuitable thus
Waters which the Allies treated as unsuitable thus
Line which the Russians had to defend thus



To Balaklava

Robert's
Bridge

Mecklenburg's Farm

Robert's Street
and the village of
RUSSIA

to the enemy's field army; were abdicating their power to operate aggressively against all Russian forces which might approach Sebastopol by the great road from Baktchi Seräi. Yet so it was. From the head of the roadstead to the Mackenzie Heights, and thence on far to the eastward, beyond the reach of forces besieging Sebastopol, the ground was so strong that an army stationed or moving on any part of the range could look down and defy the attack of those who would assail from the south. The result was that, whilst the general in command of a relieving force would be in free and safe communication with Baktchi Seräi, Simpheropol, and the interior of Russia, would be able to march to and fro at his pleasure between Sebastopol and the great road to the north, and would have it in his power to engage the besiegers whenever he might wish to join battle, he himself all the time—supposing him to keep to his heights—would be quite secure from attack. If, even whilst thus cooped down by the strength of the ground given up to the relieving army, the besiegers should be so reinforced as to become invested with a numerical superiority over the enemy, they would have to bear the torment of learning that, for the purpose of operating aggressively in the open field from the base they now had on the coast, their strength could avail them nothing.¹

We just now perceived how it happened that the Allied armies got to be pitted—no longer against the Prince-governor Mentschikoff, but — against the whole State of Russia; and we now come to see that (by reason of the impregnability of the roadstead, and of the heights ranging eastward from the mouth of the Tchernaya) the line upon which this great empire had need to prepare for conflict, was the arc of only four miles which compassed Sebastopol and its suburb on the land side. Nay, even from that narrow front a deduction would be practically warrantable, because, toward its flanks both east and west, the position of the garrison was so strong as to leave no more than a belt some 3000 yards long as the space really likely to be fought for. Of course, it is no more than the common lot of a besieger to find himself thus confined in his choice of the ground he can attack; but, in general, he compensates this evil by subjecting the

The small space of ground upon which the Russians were enabled to concentrate their efforts.

¹ This will be made evident enough when I come to speak of the efforts which the Allies were ready to make in the spring of the following year, with a view to recover their power of undertaking offensive operations in the field.

The double impediment which stood in the way both of field operations and of an effective siege.

garrison to the stress of an investment; and what made the plight of the Allies such a hard one was, the double impediment which hindered them from operating aggressively in the open field, and also stood in the way of an effective siege.

The condition of things in the Crimea after the Alma was favorable to the Allies upon the supposition of their pushing their advance swiftly; and formidable to them from the time when they made up their minds to a siege.

It will be observed, however, that great as these obstacles were, and much as they would be sure to embarrass the invader in a lengthened siege, not one of them was of a kind to hinder the Allies, whilst still on the Belbec, from attacking the north of Sebastopol, or even to deter them from assaulting the place on its south front as soon as they had made their flank march. In truth, the condition of things in the Crimea, after the Battle of the Alma, was such as might well have contented the Allies if they had looked upon the expedition as one to be carried through swiftly in the first week

after the victory; and yet would be likely to tell hard against them from the moment when, setting themselves against the judgment of Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they reasoned away their first boldness, and willfully suffered the enterprise to degenerate into a siege.

CHAPTER XIII.

IN adapting the disposition of their troops to the undertaking now about to begin, the Allies had two objects before them: they had to provide for the duties of the intended siege; and also to secure all their forces, as well as they could, from interruption on the part of the enemy.

With this twofold purpose in view, General Canrobert divided his army into two bodies, each consisting of two French divisions. Of these two corps, one only—consisting of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, and placed under the orders of General Forey—was charged with siege duties. It encamped with its front toward the town of Sebastopol, its left resting on the sea, by the gulf called Streleska Bay, and its right extending to the Harbor ravine. The French forces drew their supplies from the bays of Kamiesch and Kazatch.

On the other hand, Lord Raglan devoted every one of his

The English
force charged
with siege
duty.

infantry divisions to the business of the siege;¹ but his troops, as will be seen, were so posted, that whilst they had thus cast upon them the duty of pursuing the siege, they were also liable, as we shall presently see more exactly, to be summoned to the task of defending the Chersonese at its north-eastern angle. The English army had its left at the crest of the ravine which divided our lines from the French, and thence it extended eastward to ground not very far distant from the crest of the Sapounè Ridge.² The English army drew its supplies from Balaclava, and at first by two routes; for, until the 25th of October, the Woronzoff road, as well as the way by the Col, was open to the besiegers.

The defensive
arrangements
of the Allies.

The extent to
which these
were favored
by the nature
of the ground.

In the task of securing their armies against attacks in flank and rear, the Allies were much favored by the conformation of the ground; for the besieging forces were all upon the Chersonese, and the Chersonese was so bounded by the sea on the one hand, and the Sapounè Heights on the other, as to offer good means of defense. Except at the pass by the Col de Balaclava, and at the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese where accessible spurs are thrown out, jutting down into the Inkerman valley, the Sapounè Heights were by nature so strong as almost to form of themselves a sufficing rampart of defense; but, in order yet farther to assure their

Works of cir-
cumvallation
on the Sapounè
Ridge.

hold on that part of the ridge which was committed to their charge, the French not only threw up some works to line the jaws of the pass, but also—with a care hardly needed because of the strength of the ground—carried on their line of intrenchment several miles along the crest of the ridge.³ At first, too, an effort was made to strengthen the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese by throwing up works on the acclivity which descended into the Inkerman valley; but the forces there in charge were the English, and they—with small, dwindling numbers, and being eagerly intent on the siege—did not much persist in applying their scanty strength to a purpose which was one of precaution; so, after the first few weeks,

¹ The infantry forces detached were only one battalion, the 93rd, and some weakly men not in a condition for hard duty, together with one field-battery.

² Lord Raglan to Secretary of War, Dispatch, 3rd October, 1854.

³ The prodigal labor bestowed upon that part of the field resulted from the fact that the powerful force under Bosquet—the half of the French army, with, besides, the Turkish battalions—was there established as a corps of observation, not busied with any siege duties.

this, the weakest ground that there was along the whole course of the Sapounè Ridge, no longer remained defended by any work armed with artillery.¹

The task of covering the siege, by defending the Col, and the greater part of the Sapounè Ridge, was assigned to that moiety of the French army which consisted of the 1st and 2nd Divisions; and Canrobert intrusted this force to the command of General Bosquet. The Turkish battalions under the orders of the French Commander took part in the same duty. General Bosquet, however, did not occupy the more northerly part of the Sapounè Heights; for there, the right wing of the English, though also engaged in the siege, stood charged to defend the position.² This anomalous distribution of burthens was so cogent in its effect that it ought to be understood and remembered.

Disposition of the French force charged with the defense of the Chersonese on the south-eastern side.

The part of the field in which the English (though also engaged in siege duty) were charged with the defense of the position.

The Allied armies were to be covered by the sea on the north-west as well as the south; and on the more southerly portion of the Sapounè Heights they were to be defended by Bosquet's corps; whilst against any sortie from Sebastopol directed upon the French or English trenches, the besieging forces of course would be their own defenders.

Thus, except in one quarter, the defenses of the Allies on the Chersonese were all to be soundly constituted. But against any Russian attack directed upon the north-east of the table-land, there was neither the obstacle of the sea, nor the barrier of interposed trenches, nor the defense that can be afforded by a corps of observation exclusively charged with such duty; and in these circumstances, there was heaped upon the English siege forces the additional and separate task of providing for the security of the Allied army in what

¹ The 'Sandbag Battery' was very efficient as long as it remained armed; but, for want of the infantry force needed for its support, it was judged liable to be cut off, and was therefore dismantled. It was after the dismantling of the work that its site became famous in history.

² The English army at first was posted in manner following: On the extreme right, in a somewhat retired position, there was camped the 2nd Division, supported by the 1st Division, or rather by five out of its six battalions (the 93rd being at Balaclava); and on the left of the 1st Division, but divided from it by a ravine, there was the Light Division. These troops were destined to support that portion of our siege operations which was called the 'Right Attack.' The 4th and the 3rd Divisions were encamped on the ground to the south-west of Cathcart's Hill, and were to support 'our Left Attack.'—*Official Journal of the English Siege Operations*, p. 23. Changes were afterward made, as will be seen in future chapters.

would have been otherwise an undefended part of its narrow dominions. Besides answering for the three ridges on which they meant to establish siege batteries, our people had charge of the ground which formed the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. This ground, if so one may speak, had been half chipped off from the rest of the table-land by the deep and almost impassable ravine which descended into the Careening Bay; and it was only by an isthmus or neck of high land that the triangular quoin thus formed was joined on to the main bulk of the plateau. It would be in vain to claim respect for the geographical nomenclature which prevailed before the war; for as long as there shall be any memory of the fight that was fought on that wedge of high ground, the English at least, if not others, will give it the name of 'Inkerman.'¹ At first, the English cleaved somewhat jealously to this Inkerman Mount; but their eager desire to press the siege with alacrity soon caused them to grudge all the strength that was spent on collateral objects. Thenceforth, a strong picket was all they could spare for asserting the dominion of the Allies on that half-severed angle of upland where, four or five weeks afterward, a battle was destined to rage.

The English could only spare a strong picket for the occupation of the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese.

The want of means sufficing for the occupation of this part of the ground was the more vexing, since it appeared that the formation of the spurs descending into the Inkerman valley was so favorable to defense as to allow of their being held by a few against many.

From these dispositions it resulted that, whilst Forey's corps had only to do with the siege, and Bosquet's had nothing to do except to defend a part of the ridge, the English were so posted as to have cast upon them the double duty of carrying on the siege and also defending the Chersonese at its most assailable point.

These dispositions effected a complete division of labor in the French army; but threw upon the English the two-fold duty of carrying on the siege, and also defending the plateau on its most assailable point.

Upon the whole, the result was that the position of the Allies on the Chersonese was a position of exceeding strength at all points except one; and that there, though measures were taken

¹ According to the geographical nomenclature prevailing before the war, and still adopted by the Russians, the 'Inkerman' Heights were on the other side of the Tchernaya, being those which descended from the region of the light-houses and the adjoining highlands; but I have avoided in the text every such application of the word 'Inkerman,' as tending to unsettle and confuse the impressions of Englishmen.

Strength of the position of the Allies on the Chersonese, except at one point.

There, no defense provided.

Sir John Burgoyne's representations on this subject.

for watching the ground, no actual defense was provided.

Sir John Burgoyne pressed earnestly for a change of these arrangements, and urged that, by placing a powerful reserve in an advanced position upon this part of the ground, and thence pushing forward strong outposts to occupy the spurs which project into the Inkerman valley and the ground at the head of the bay, the Allies should

take care to enforce their dominion in the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. This he desired, not only for the sake of securing the Allies in their position, but also because he perceived that their power of pushing the siege against the Karabel suburb would be grievously straitened by the presence of the enemy on that part of the ridge which flanked the approaches to the Malakoff. But he urged in vain. The French, it would seem, had resolved that the bulk of their corps of observation should remain concentrated along that part of the Sapounè Ridge which lay south of the Woron-

Reasons why his suggestions were not complied with.

zoff road; whilst, so far as concerned the English, no force could be spared for the desired object without taking troops from the immediate business of the siege, and that was a sacrifice which Lord Raglan would not make; for he was impressed with the importance—the growing importance—of time, and conceived that the actual attack on the place which the Allies were preparing should be made with their full might. It is obvious that a single general, having charge of the whole Allied army, would not have been at all likely to commit the error of accumulating a needless amount of force along the stiffest part of the Sapounè Ridge, and leaving without defense its more accessible slopes. Still less would he have been willing to do so, when he remembered that, except toward the north, the Sapounè Ridge was well covered by the plain of Balaclava where the English Horse camped and patrolled. The fault was one of the many which resulted from a divided command.

Such, then, were the arrangements made for the defense of the Chersonese; but so long as the English should continue to look for supplies to the port they had hitherto used, it was necessary, of course, that Balaclava should be also secured; and this place, though close to the south-eastern angle of the Chersonese, and lying indeed at its foot, was on the outside of the natural rampart which guarded the table-land. It therefore required

Separate system of defense required for Balaclava.

a separate system of defense. For this, so far as concerned its eastern approaches, the steep lofty hills—which soon came to be known as the ‘Marine Heights’—were so well fitted as to be capable of being rendered formidable by even the slight works which could be quickly constructed for the purpose; and a redoubt with a line of breastwork extending athwart the entrance to the gorge by the village of Kadiköi, was to complete the ‘inner line’ of the Balaclava defenses. It was afterward determined that an ‘outer line’ of defense should be constructed by throwing up a chain of small redoubts upon the low range of heights which stretches across the plain at a distance of about a mile and a half from the gorge leading into Balaclava.

The way in which this object was favored by the ground.

Works devised for strengthening the inner line of defense; and for forming the outer line of defense afterward planned.

With 1200 men commanded by Colonel Hurdle, and belonging to the force which gave its name to the hills, Lord Raglan found means to garrison the works on the Marine Heights, providing at the same time for the defense of the gorge of Balaclava by placing at Kadiköi the 93rd Highland Regiment, with a field-battery withdrawn from the 3rd Division; and he eked out the defense of the town by assigning for guard duty there some four or five score of men who were in too weakly a state to be competent to harder labors. The chain of redoubts which our engineers destined for the ‘outer line’ of defense was to be constructed and manned by some bodies of Turks newly placed under Lord Raglan’s orders.¹

Lord Lucan with his cavalry and horse-artillery was stationed in the plain to the north of Balaclava, with orders to patrol to the Tchernaya, and also in the direction of the gorges leading into the valley of Baidar.

With the exception of this division of cavalry, the whole of the scant forces intrusted with the defense of Balaclava was placed under the orders of Sir Colin Campbell.² The appointment elicited proof of the light in which his quality as a soldier was re-

Appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command at Balaclava.

¹ A portion of these—two battalions—had been placed at Lord Raglan’s disposal by the courtesy of General Canrobert; and the remainder, amounting to about 3500, was a force which, at the instance of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Sultan had consented to place under Lord Raglan’s orders.

² The various arrangements described in this chapter were not, of course, all made at the same time, and were not permanent, for they were altered

garded. For several days, and not without somewhat of reason, men at Head-quarters—I speak not of Lord Raglan himself—had been surmising that Balacclava was far from secure; but as soon as the Chief made it known that the place was in charge of Sir Colin, people went to an extreme of confidence, and ceased to imagine that ground where he was commanding could now be the seat of danger.¹ And certainly it was from no mere friendliness toward Campbell that all this confidence sprang; for his energy—a disturbing, and not always popular quality—together with the singular enmity he used to bear toward the Guards, was enough to prevent him from being liked in proportion to the trust he inspired. But that trust was deep. The business of defending Balacclava with the slight means assigned for the purpose was no longer a problem nor a topic. Men knew the old soldier was there, and turned all their thoughts to the siege.²

Both the French and English Head-quarters were established on the Chersonese—the English in a farmhouse a little to the north of the pass which led up from Balacclava, and the French at a spot farther

after the battles of Balacclava and Inkerman. They were carried into effect between the 27th of September and the middle of the following month. The appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command of Balacclava was made, I think, on the 13th or 14th of October. The 14th was probably the day; for that I see is the one assigned by Colonel Sterling.—*MS. by Sir Anthony Sterling*, p. 108.

¹ The extent to which this extreme confidence was warranted will be better judged of when we come to the Battle of Balacclava. It will probably be thought that some of the arrangements for maintaining the outer line of defense were faulty or incomplete.

² A day or two after the appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to this command, a conversation with Lord Raglan turned upon the strength that every body supposed to be given to the Balacclava defenses by the presence there of one man; and it was remarked that the sense of security which the appointment created enabled a reader of the Wellington dispatches and letters to feel the force of those expressions of the Duke's, in which he used to speak of himself as dependent for his repose upon the presence of some one man—upon the presence, for instance, of Murray as his Quartermaster-General, or upon the absence of Massena as his opponent. Lord Raglan seemed much gratified by hearing of the moral effect produced by the appointment, and then said that he had been greatly pleased at the way in which Campbell accepted the charge. He said that upon his asking Campbell to take charge of Balacclava, Campbell, though he supposed at the moment that he was to be subordinated to Lord Lucan, replied, without the least hesitation, 'Certainly, Sir; I will place myself at once under Lord Lucan's orders.' Lord Raglan said he immediately explained to Sir Colin that his was to be an independent command.

west.¹ Lord Raglan was advantageously placed; for whilst he could communicate quickly both with his besieging forces and with Balaclava, as also with General Canrobert, he was also so near to the crest of the Sapounè Heights as to be able in a few minutes to obtain a commanding view of the plain of Balaclava, the valley of the Tchernaya, and those neighboring heights toward the east and north-east, from which, if bent on an enterprise, a Russian field army might come.

CHAPTER XIV.

Now at once—wharves had to be made for the purpose—the Allies went on in all haste with the toil of landing their siege-trains. But also there presently met them the yet harder task of bringing up from the shore to the front heavy guns, great stores of ammunition, and the loads and loads of material required for the business of siege work, besides all the usual supplies which were needed for the support of their armies.

The French had spacious landing-ground in their Bay of Kamiesch, with an easy approach to the ground where their siege-corps was camped; and it does not appear that they encountered any great difficulty in bringing to the front their stores and their battering-trains. It was otherwise with the English; for now there came to be felt the first stress of that want which was destined to be the cause of cruel sufferings to their army, and to wring the hearts of their brethren at home with a grief which soon turned into anger. Our forces, encamped on the Chersonese, were near, it is true, to their port of supply, but not in contact with it. There was a distance of six or seven miles which had to be conquered. And how? The means of land transport were so slight in proportion to the enormous need, that the mere counting of the carts that they had and of the beasts fit for draught might well have induced the Allies to go back once more into council, and ask themselves yet again whether it was commonly prudent for them to forego or postpone their assault of the place for the sake of undertaking a mighty siege business without sufficient resources.

¹ It was on the 5th of October that the English Head-quarters were moved up from Balaclava to the heights.

It would seem that the only means of transport available to our Engineers were some light bullock-carts of the country, amounting at first in number to forty-six, but reduced by the 12th of October to twenty-one; and that the way in which this scant command of draught-power had to be augmented was by pressing into the service every spare ammunition and baggage horse.¹ Having those poor means of land transport, the English proposed to drag their stores to the front—a distance of six or seven miles—and there, sitting down as besiegers, to pit themselves against the garnered resources of Sebastopol and the vast empire lying behind it. With means of land transport not more than enough for a raid, they were invading an empire and undertaking an inland siege. It is true that by dint of toil long continued it was possible for them to drag up to the front the material for a day's cannonade; but then that consumption of time was the very sacrifice they could least afford—the very one which, in every battery and every church of Sebastopol, the devout Russian prayed they might make.

From on board the Allied fleets large bodies of men were landed; and they were ordered—or rather permitted, for the men were burning with zeal—to take part in the active operations against Sebastopol. The brigade of English seamen thus placed at Lord Raglan's disposal was under the orders of Captain Lushington, and Captain Peel undertook a battery with a number of his men from the 'Diamond.' Moreover, large quantities of the armament and other material resources of the fleets were freely devoted to the same purpose. Numbers of ships' guns of heavy metal were taken from the decks of the men-of-war, and afterward dragged up to camp by the bodily power of the sailors.²

In the eyes of those who have witnessed the contrast, as shown and developed by the business of war, it seems hardly short of a wonder that the same nation should be able to send out, to toil and fight for her cause, two bodies of men, each so devoted, each so excellent, yet parted the one from the other by a breadth so great as that which divides our soldiers from our sailors. It is true that the soldier engaged in campaigning is too often in a lower state of health than that which the sailor enjoys; but, even after recognizing that physical cause

Aid given both in men and material resources by the Commanders of the Allied fleets.

Distinguishing characteristics of the English soldier and the English sailor.

¹ 'Official Journal of the Siege Operations,' p. 26.

² For details of the assistance in men and material which our Navy afforded, see Appendix.

as accounting for some portion of the difference between the two men, the contrast still keeps its force. For the mind of the soldier is so weighted down by the ceaseless pressure of Method, that he has little enough of resource except what he finds in his valor and discipline: he is patient, and, in some circumstances, strangely uncomplaining: he is grave, and calm: he has made himself famous in Europe for his power of confronting an enemy's column with what the French used to call his 'terrible silence.'¹ On the other hand, the sailor, thrown suddenly into the midst of new conditions, is full of resource as Crusoe in his island. He does not hold himself at all bound to suffer without complaining. He freely tells his sorrows to his officers. His courage is of the kind that enables him, in the midst of slaughter, to go on cheerfully swearing, and steadily serving his gun—whilst in boarding, or any kind of assault, he finds a maddening joy; but he would hardly enter into the spirit of an order which called upon him and his mates to stand still in straight lines under fire, keeping silence, and not rushing forward. With the performance of his duties he blends a wild mirth. As though in his infinite tenderness for all that he deems weak and helpless, he loves of all things to come ashore, with his exuberant health and strong will, to give a help to the landmen. Sometimes in those early days of October, whilst our soldiery were lying upon the ground weary, languid, and silent, there used to be heard a strange uproar of men coming nearer and nearer. Soon, the comers would prove to be Peel of the 'Diamond,' with a number of his sailors, all busy in dragging up to the front one of the ship's heavy guns.² Peel has died—has died young—in the service of his country; but such was his zeal, such his energy, such his power of moving other men, that upon the whole his share of the gift of life was full and rich. Apart from the mere beauty of his form and features, there was a fire in his nature which gave him in that time of war an all but preternatural radiance. But whilst he was guiding the labors of his people with eye and hand and joyous words of direction or encouragement, the sailors used always to find their own way of evolving their strength.

¹ If I rightly remember, it was General Foy who, in the spring of 1814, assigned this observance of silence—'ce terrible silence'—as the cause which, in his judgment, had given the ascendant to the English infantry. He said the French could not stand it. See General Trochu's most interesting account of the demeanor of British infantry in the crisis of a fight—'L'Armée Française.'

² Captain William Peel, a son of the late and brother of the present Sir Robert Peel. His guns were 32-pounders.

This they would do by speaking to the gun as to a sentient, responsible being, overwhelming it with terms of abuse; and, since it commonly happened that the stress of their pull at the ropes would get to be in some measure timed by the cadence of their words, it followed that at each execration the gun used to groan and move forward, as though it were a grim sullen lion obeying the voice of his keepers.

This process of landing battering-trains and bringing them up to the front was too difficult to be got through in the short space of time that was probably reckoned sufficing at the period when the Allies were resolving to enter upon a siege; and before they had yet got in readiness to open their first trench the enemy's field army began to show signs of intending to change the attitude to which its chief had condemned it since the day of the Alma. Prince Mentschikoff must have been told by his own officers, so early as the 28th or the 29th of September, that the Mackenzie Height was clear of the invaders, but his mind, it would seem, had been so put awry by disasters, as to become almost inaccessible to good tidings;¹ and until several more days were past, he had confined the movements of his field army to those peaceful regions on the Belbec, in which it was impossible for his troop-

7th Oct.
Signs of
change in the
attitude of
Prince Ments-
chikoff's field
army.

ers to find a single battalion or squadron, either French or English. Nay, unless General de Todleben errs, Prince Mentschikoff's determination to move his army to the north of Sebastopol was actually a consequence of his learning that the Allies had marched off to the south.² But, by the 7th of October,

the Russians had begun to appreciate the fact that, after all, they were once more the masters—the undisturbed masters—of the Mackenzie Range, including every road, every pathway which connected it with the valley of the Tchernaya. So

Prince Ments-
chikoff resumes
the dominion
of the Macken-
zie range of
heights; and
pushes his re-
connoitering
parties into the

now, at last, their Commander accepted the priceless dominion of territory which had been given up to him by the Allies some ten days before, and not only resumed the full ownership of those Mackenzie Heights which secured his communications with Sebastopol and the interior of Russia, but

¹ On the 28th of September Prince Mentschikoff sent two squadrons of regular cavalry and two of Cossacks to the Mackenzie Heights.—*Todleben*, p. 267.

² 'The information which they [the cavalry patrols] gathered in their march proved it certain that the enemy had definitively passed to the south side. In consequence of this report, Prince Mentschikoff began to concentrate his army on the north side of Sebastopol.'—*Todleben*, p. 268.

plains of the
Tchernaya
where the En-
glish were pa-
troling.

pushed his reconnoitering forces down into the plain, and home even to the banks of the stream where the English horsemen patrolled. It was a patrol under Cornet Fisher which first felt the presence of the enemy in the country of the Tchernaya. The Cornet was surprised in the early morning by finding himself in contact with part of a powerful force which had come down into the valley ;¹ and three of his men were made prisoners.

At this time, moreover, it began to appear that the forces which constituted the garrison of Sebastopol were daily becoming more bold ; for (supporting them in some instances by field-guns) the enemy now kept his outposts so firmly on ground far in front of his works, as to hinder the Allies in any attempt to establish batteries at a moderate distance from the place, and prevent their engineers from obtaining that minute knowledge of the ground which they wanted for the planning of their works. We shall see that the repression of this encroaching hardihood on the part of the enemy was the first in that series of measures now devised by the invaders which constituted their plan of attack.

The garrison
at the same
time were daily
becoming more
bold, and occu-
pying ground
far in advance
of their defen-
sive works.

The part of the enemy's defenses which offered to his assailants the obvious 'front for attack' was that slightly curved belt, which included the Flagstaff Bastion, the Redan, and the Malakoff Tower. This last work, or rather the ground on which it stood, had been pronounced by Sir John Burgoyne upon first surveying the ground to be the key of Sebastopol ; and none indeed could well doubt that the capture of the Malakoff would carry with it the conquest of the other defenses ; for it took in reverse all the works on the eastern side of the Man-of-war Harbor, and its position on a high, commanding knoll seemed to offer to him who might once be there lodged good means of repelling assailants. But the Malakoff was not 'the key' in such sense as to import that it was the only key of Sebastopol ; and it is the opinion of General de Todleben that—for reasons not altogether dependent upon the mere scope of fire from each site—the capture of any one of the three works—the Malakoff, the Redan, or the Flagstaff Bastion—must have carried with it the fall of the place. He likewise judged that the loss of either the 'Central' or the 'Land Quarantine' Bastion must have proved fatal ; but those two

The front for
attack.

¹ A whole division of cavalry, supported by several battalions of infantry and three batteries.

last were not works which the Allies could attack with advantage.

Whatever extent of dominion the possession of the Malakoff might be capable of affording, the Allies, at this time, did not even attempt to include it in that road of havoc by which they proposed to break through the enemy's line of defenses. Their reason will be apparent to those who remember that, for want of the numerical strength that would have been needed for the purpose, the English were prevented from occupying in force the Inkerman Mount; for, without being able in that way to secure their right flank from aggression, they could not advance upon the Malakoff by the ridge which connected it with the plateau; and (except by the long-ranging fire of their Lancaster guns) all they could yet attempt against this work was to assail it with shot thrown across the intersecting ravine from the slopes of the adjoining ridge—that is, from the Woronzoff Height.¹

Straitened thus in their choice of the 'front for attack,' the Allies determined that they would devote their first efforts to the object of carrying the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan; for they saw that, if they could there break through the enemy's line of defenses, they would complete that severance of the town from the faubourg which the very form and position of the Man-of-war Harbor with the deep ravine at its head had alone gone far to effect; and they hoped that the mastery which might thus be attained would insure, with but little delay, the fall of the Malakoff itself, and all the other defenses.

It was by the eventual assault of the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan that the French and the English expected to be able to carry them; and, to prepare the way for the enterprise, they were not only intent to get down the fire of those two works, as well as of all the intermediate batteries, whether planted on shore or ship's decks, which helped the defense of the place on its land front, but also—for the enemy's works were disposed upon the principle of what is called 'mutual support,' each one giving strength to its neighbor—it was their object to do all they could toward silencing, on the one side, the Central Bastion, on the other, the Malakoff Tower.

But since, after all, it was mainly with earthen intrench-

¹ Called by the English 'Frenchman's Hill,' the site of 'Gordon's,' or the 'Right Attack.'

ments that the Allies had to deal, and not with those stone-work defenses which oppose to the assailant in addition to other means of resistance a steep, inert, physical barrier, they did not hold it necessary to consume precious time in working on to what against masonry would be the right breaching distance by laborious, patient approaches; and their plan—the plan of both the French and the English—was to provide cover for their siege ordnance in positions near enough to the place to allow of a cannonade which should prove effective against the enemy's (chiefly earthwork) defenses, and yet so distant that each position might be seized and fastened upon at once (under shelter of darkness) without the necessity of having to creep down to it gradually by dint of pickaxe and spade. After that cannonade, if it should prove as destructive as they expected, the Allies did not mean (as is done in regular siege) to dig their way on to close quarters, and there establish new batteries, but at once to undertake an assault.

The French were to establish their siege-guns in a single line or system of batteries upon the crest of the hill called Mount Rodolph; whilst the English intended to plant their 'Attacks' on two separate ridges, one upon 'Green Hill,' and the other on the 'Woronzoff Height.'

The first step toward the execution of this plan was, as the Allies at the time expressed it, to 'draw the investment closer,'² in other words, to push forward some of the infantry battalions to ground more near to the place; and this with a view to obtain for the Engineers better means of reconnoitering, and also to support the working-parties in their endeavor to open trenches at a moderate distance from the enemy's works. This measure seemed to be rendered the more necessary by that increased and increasing boldness with which, as we know already, the enemy was maintaining his outposts on ground far in front of the place.

In order to give effect to that part of the measure which

¹ Generally called by the English 'Frenchman's Hill.' It is in conformity with the language of the English Engineers that each system of batteries constructed by them has been called an 'Attack.' The expedient of the capital letter is resorted to as a means of indicating that the word is used in its technical, and not in its usual sense.

² Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, 8th October, 1854. After all that I have said as to the impossibility of investing the place, it is barely necessary to observe that the 'investment' here referred to extends only to that partial 'investment' which was effected by the position the Allies had taken up on the Chersonese.

7th Oct. With a view to effect this operation, Lord Raglan assembled his Infantry Generals of Division.

Their resistance to the proposed measure.

was to devolve upon the English army, Lord Raglan, on the 7th of October, assembled the Generals of his Infantry Divisions, and announced to them what he wished to have done;¹ but they, some of them, spoke a good deal, and they were unanimous in opinion that, without cover, they could not maintain an advanced position but at a cost beyond what it would be right to risk.²

In declaring against the idea of putting his Division in a more advanced position, Sir George Brown suffered himself to become vehement. I do not suppose—indeed I know it could not have been—that this vehemence arose from any spirit of antagonism to Lord Raglan; for he was a man of a good and warm heart, much attached to his chief, and intending to walk loyally according to such lights as he had. The consulted Generals were, no doubt, aware that the desire to place our besieging forces on ground more close to Sebastopol had been submitted for adoption by Sir John Burgoyne; and it was rather, perhaps, in resistance to him, than with any notion of opposing Lord Raglan, that Sir George Brown spoke as he did. His mind was of the quality of those which are liable to be much impressed by the distinctions which separate one branch of the service from another; and I believe that he probably disliked the sensation of being directed and propelled by an officer of Engineers.

For appearance' sake, Lord Raglan caused the assembled Generals to express (in terms void of special significance) their willingness to aid in the siege to the best of their means; but the practical conclusion attained by the council

It seemed at the time that this resistance on the part of the English Infantry Generals of Division would oblige Lord

was the rejection of Burgoyne's proposal for a closer investment of the place.³

After hearing the unanimous opinion which his Generals of Division opposed to the idea of pressing closer upon the enemy by moving our infantry to positions more in advance, Lord Raglan

¹ These Divisional Generals, it may be remembered, were Sir George Brown, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, Sir Richard England, and Sir George Cathcart. Taken literally, Lord Raglan's words would indicate that he had called together all his Generals of Division, but I do not imagine that he meant to include the Commander of his Cavalry Division.

² Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, marked 'Most confidential,' 8th October, 1854.

³ I have not forgotten the passage (vol. i.) in which I spoke of the exceeding willingness of every one serving under Lord Raglan to give effect to his wishes; but that passage purports only to speak of things as they were whilst the army was in Bulgaria.

Raglan to confine the operations of his artillery to a distant cannonade with guns of long range.

apprehended that for the time, and until the moment for assault should be ripe, our army must confine itself to such an operation as would enable the Engineers to place in battery some guns of long range.¹

It seems probable, and even natural, that the course thus taken by our Infantry Generals of Division may have so contravened and so vexed Sir John Burgoyne on the 8th Oct. after this decision of the Divisional Generals.

been 'very sanguine of success at first,' yet now, on the day which followed the council, he astonished Lord Raglan by announcing that 'he saw insuperable difficulties 'in carrying on his Engineer works within breaching distance under the heavy fire which could be brought to bear 'upon them, and that the English must make up their minds 'to consider their position as principally one of bombardment, and as contributing to divert the enemy from the attack on the left'—the attack where the French were to act.²

This opinion of Sir John Burgoyne's was a surprise upon Lord Raglan; but he now imparted to General Canrobert the change of prospect occasioned by Burgoyne's last opinion.

This opinion of his chief Engineer came upon Lord Raglan so suddenly that, until he had actually heard it from Burgoyne's lips in the conclusive form above stated, he had no reason for imagining that it would become his duty to prepare the French Commander for any shortcomings in the way of siege work on the part of the English; but he now at once imparted to Canrobert the change that had just taken place in the prospects of the English, so far as concerned the use of their siege-guns. The French General did not seem to be surprised by this announcement, for he had previously learned, it would seem, that the ground in front of the English furnished no materials for intrenching. Lord Raglan did not fail to assure

¹ Lord Raglan seems to ascribe to the decision of his Divisional Generals the necessity of thus confining the operations of the English army; for immediately after stating the opinion they gave him he writes, 'It was "therefore" resolved to confine ourselves,' etc.—*Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, 8th October, 1854.*

² *Private letter, Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, 8th October, 1854.* It must not be understood that the word 'bombardment,' when used by Lord Raglan and others who wrote at that time, meant only what in strictness it signified—that is, mere vertical fire. The expression was used at the time as signifying a cannonade directed against a fortress and its defenses; but an endeavor has since been made to restore to the word its original significance.

General Canrobert that he should be ready to join him in any attack that might be determined upon, and to assist him in every way.

In pursuance of their plan of attempting something against the shipping and the other defenses by their long-range guns, the English, in the nights of the 7th and the 8th of October, began the formation of two half-sunken batteries upon spots very distant from the enemy's line of works;¹ but meant to be armed with those guns of the 'Lancaster' sort which might reach with their fire the ships at the head of the creeks, and the Malakoff, then called the White Tower. Those long-range Lancaster batteries, though intended, of course, to be auxiliary to the main purpose, stood apart in other respects from the general plan of siege labor in which the Allies were engaging.

The French had before them was favorable to the plan of 'drawing closer the investment;' and, in their camp, the proposal to that effect did not meet with the hindrance which it had encountered when Lord Raglan submitted the measure to his Infantry Generals of Division.

The same day as that on which the English Generals of Division had delivered their opinions, but not till after sunset, nine French battalions, commanded by General Lourmel, were pushed forward and established in a sheltered position, beneath the commanding crest—the crest of Mount Rodolph—where the French meant to plant their batteries.

It was on the night of the 9th of October that the French were to break ground. Advancing from the ground where Lourmel had established himself, their Engineers, with a large body of men told off for the work, were to fasten at once upon the crest of Mount Rodolph; and this they proposed to do by throwing up a gabionade a few yards in advance of the ground they had selected as the site of their intended batteries. By this gabionade (to be thrown up as effectually as might be in one night) they intended to provide a fitting screen or cover for the subsequent operation of sinking the trenches in which their batteries were to be placed.

The night was clear, but there blew a fresh wind from the north-east, which prevented the garrison from hearing the sound of the pickaxe; and relays of working-parties, num-

¹ About 2800 yards from the nearest of the enemy's works.

being altogether 1600, were enabled to toil all the night without being molested, so that, when morning dawned, they had thrown up a work some 1100 yards in length, and at a distance of about 1000 yards from the Central Bastion.¹ Men imagined that the spectacle of what they had been suffered to achieve without hindrance must needs become a painful one to the enemy as soon as he should discover it. They little imagined—what yet we shall by and by see—they little imagined the feeling with which, on the morning of the 10th of October, the garrison would learn that their foe had indeed broken ground, and begun upon that kind of strife which is waged with pickaxe and spade.

From this time, the French pushed on their works with great spirit; and, as marking the singular difference that there is between the ways of a French and the ways of an English commander, it seems worth while to repeat the order which was issued at this time by Forey. He gave orders for 'zeal,' and 'contempt of danger.' 'It is necessary,' said he, in his general order, 'that every one, by his zeal, by his contempt of danger, should aim at attaining as promptly as possible the glorious end which we propose to ourselves.'

And of the warlike virtues thus invoked there was no de-
fault. The enemy often busied himself with sal-
lies at night, and the cannonades with which he
assailed his besiegers and their works rarely ceased
for any long time, and were sometimes of exceeding power.
It is recorded that one day—the 14th of October—and in the
space of a single hour, there were hurled against the works
of the French no less than 800 cannon-shots; with a result
which included a good deal of harm to the parapets, but
killing only two men and wounding three.² The next day,
for a time, a fire of the same kind was again opened;
but notwithstanding all the hindrances offered,
the French works on Mount Rodolph grew fast toward com-
pletion, and were soon connected with one another, as also
with the ground in their rear, by fitting lines of intrenchment.

Whilst the French, in most places, had beneath them a fair enough depth of such earth as will yield to the pickaxe and spade, the ground in front of the English was almost bare

¹ 1030 yards.

² Niel, p. 53; and Todleben, p. 300, who gives the number of shots at 960. The object of these cannonades of the 14th and 15th of October was to test the working of the Russian batteries, and prepare by actual experiment for the day of conflict.—*Todleben*, p. 299.

The difficulties encountered by the English.

The plan with which the English were obliged to content themselves.

rock—rock covered but thinly, where covered at all, with soil a few inches deep. Partly from that cause, partly from the configuration of the ground, and partly from the failure of the above stated proposal for drawing the investment more close, our Engineers were prevented from fastening, as the French had been able to do, upon ground at all near to the fortress. The most that the English at this time could do was to endeavor to establish their siege-guns upon the Woronzoff Height and the Green Hill, at distances of from 1300 to 1400 yards from the place; and this they proposed to do by seizing at night-time the best ground that could be chosen for the purpose on each of the two ridges, and there constructing the batteries with which they intended to prepare the way for assault.

Accordingly, on the nights of the 10th and the 11th of October, the English succeeded in opening the trenches which they had designed to construct on Green Hill as well as on the Woronzoff Height; and it soon appeared that the fire they had means of preparing was likely to be much more effective than they had ventured to hope that it could be when first they prepared to break ground.

By the evening of the 16th of October the English had established their batteries, and stood ready, as did also the French, to open fire on the following morning.

The English were to be held ready to storm the Redan as soon as the French operations should be ripe for a like effort against the Flagstaff Bastion.

War by this time had set its desolating mark upon the ridges and the slopes of the Chersonese. When first the Allies seized the ground, there was to be seen here and there a farm-house, a windmill, a cluster of cottages. But amongst the many wants of the Allies the want of timber was one; and the English more especially were put to great straits in this respect, because the platforms sent out with their siege-trains were of a new and ingenious structure, which, though promising to serve its end admirably when tried upon a perfect level at Woolwich, turned out to be altogether unfitted for the rocky and necessarily uneven ground where our batteries had to be placed. So, all at once, it appeared that platforms of the old-fashioned sort must be framed; and, to meet the emergency, most of the few build-

The appearance of desolation created at this time by the necessity of stripping the buildings of their roofs.

ings which stood on the Chersonese were quickly stripped of their roofs. It was only necessity which drove Lord Raglan to this measure, for he well knew of course that, in many ways, the roofed buildings found on the Chersonese could not but be of great value to his army. Another house standing within reach of a sally which the enemy undertook for the purpose, was by him set on fire, and burned down. Marked thus, with the ruins of men's homes standing up here and there on the sky-line, the hills began to look ghastly.

CHAPTER XV.

ALTHOUGH the Generals of the Allied armies trusted that, by the process already described, it was feasible to break into the place against even the most steady resistance, they yet were not without hope that the power of their artillery, when felt in the town of Sebastopol, and along the lines of defense, might beget such confusion and panic as would be likely to paralyze the defense, and ease the task of assaulting. Pursuing that thought, they desired that, in order still farther to perturb the mind of the enemy, and distract it from quarters where the strife would be vital, the fleets should take part in the enterprise by attempting some kind of attack.

It will presently be seen that, to obtain this concurrence of the navy, a good deal of urgency was used; and it is well to understand the grounds of that resistance—whether actual, or only anticipated—which had to be overcome by so strong an exertion of will.¹

The warlike thousands who manned the Allied fleets had long been yearning for the hour of battle with impassioned vehemence; but the mental state of such combatants as have only to fight under orders is not at all similar to that of a commander who must answer to his Government, to his country, and to himself, for the wisdom of what he undertakes; and it would seem that, at this conjuncture, the mind of an Admiral intrusted with power to grant or withhold the aid of the English navy must have labored with thoughts of this kind: 'Any good opportunity for taking part in the attack upon

Desire that the fleets should take part in the attack upon Sebastopol.

The difficulty of indicating a way in which it would be prudent for the

¹ In a private letter to Lord Raglan, 20th October, 1854, Dundas says plainly that he consented to the operation undertaken by the fleets 'with reluctance.'

fleets to take
part in the at-
tack.

'Sebastopol would be singularly welcome ; for the eagerness of our people on board has grown to a height almost dangerous to the maintenance of authority ;' and as the landsmen are confident in their hope of carrying the place, we have every motive for sharing in the achievement, if only we can do so with credit. Perhaps our best mode of effecting a diversion in favor of the army would have been to choose the moment appointed for the assault, and then make a feint of landing toward the north, at the same time cannonading the batteries on the north shore with the fire of twenty steamers. Such an operation would have been likely to make the enemy withdraw troops from the scene of the real conflict.² But a diversion of that kind is not, it seems, what the Generals desire. They wish that the attack by the fleets should be one more closely in unison with that to be delivered by the land forces. Let us see, then, what the fleets can do in the way of direct attack upon Sebastopol.

'We determined, some time ago, that in the face of this barrier of sunken ships, and of the forts, north and south, which arm the jaws of the roadstead, we would not attempt to break in. Is that decision to be reconsidered ?

'No ? Then it follows that, in the way of direct attack upon Sebastopol, we can do nothing more than cannonade the sea-forts. Well, but with what result can we hope to engage our wooden ships against casemated forts of stone, the work of a quarter of a century ? Amongst those who have weighed the question of what ships can do against masonry, some perhaps still imagine that, with water enough to admit of close quarters, a fleet having no other charge than to batter down a stone fortress, or else be sunk in the attempt, might possibly come off victorious. But whether that be so or not we need hardly consider, for the soundings do not offer us any such opportunity, and from our Governments we have no such mission. We have it in charge to defend the existence of the land forces by maintaining the dominion of the sea. With such a task weighing upon him, no naval commander would be warranted in crippling his fleet for the sake of attempting mere mischief against the sea-forts at a range of 800 yards.

'If only for the sake of the land forces, and the whole pur-

¹ This was the case.

² This was Dundas's opinion.—*Letter of his to Lord Raglan, 25th October, 1854.* The reader of Todleben's work will probably incline to believe that Dundas's mind pointed in the right direction.

‘pose of the invasion, our squadrons must be always kept in a condition to maintain their ascendant at sea. It is thought by some that this ascendant has been placed beyond the reach of all challenge by the sacrifice the Russians have made. True, the enemy has been dealing with some parts of his Sebastopol fleet in a way which seemed to show that he no longer meant it for sea; and, indeed, when we saw how he had sunk a number of his ships across the mouth of the roadstead, we not only said, “There ends the naval campaign!” but even ventured at once to give up to the land service a large proportion of our strength in seamen and marines as well as in guns and materials; yet, for all that, there is still one way—a way disastrous for us—in which it would be possible for our squadrons to bring about a renewal—or rather, one may say, a commencement—of the naval campaign. Only let us suffer our fleets to be disabled by a ruinous encounter with the forts, and then the Sebastopol fleet—for, after all, it is only a portion of it which has been sunk—will be able at last to come out and find us for once in a state ill-fitted for a naval encounter.

‘Certainly we shall not choose to prepare such a disaster for our fleets. Neither we nor any successor of ours will ever engage the batteries in a way that might be ventured by a commander who is able to risk, and risk frankly, the actual destruction of his squadron in an attack upon stone forts; and if we are persuaded to assail these sea-forts at all, we shall not engage in the business with that desperate purpose of running all hazards which alone could open out to us any even faint prospect of success. We know, in effect, beforehand, that our attack of the sea-forts would be followed by no result which could be worthily called a victory for the naval forces. We know more. We know that, after a while, mere exhaustion of shot will bring our bombardment to a stop; and yet, if we thus desist and sheer off without having first achieved the ruin or surrender of the forts which we attack, our failure will be signal—will, in short, be a kind of defeat. Supposing that we give our aid in the attack of Sebastopol, the part we take will be this: For the purpose of effecting a diversion in favor of the land forces, we shall attack the forts in half earnest, yet at some cost of life and limb and naval strength. If that were all, we

¹ Dundas soon had a successor. No living man, I imagine, could desire more passionately than Lyons did to bring the power of the Navy to bear upon the great enterprise, but from the moment when he attained the command of the fleet until the close of the war he never struck a blow at Sebastopol.

‘might willingly do as we are asked; but also—and there lies the precious sacrifice—we shall be willfully encountering a discomfiture. Can this be agreed to by one whose duty it is to maintain unimpaired the renown of the navy?’

The French Admiral was under the orders of General Canrobert; and although Lord Raglan had no actual authority over the English fleet, he could speak to its Admiral in the form of request, and that, too, with no little cogency. By character and temperament, no man then living, I think, could have been less inclined than Lord Raglan to press with advice or exhortation upon a colleague of the sister service holding equal command with himself; and the terms of his intercourse with Admiral Dundas were not of such a kind as to lessen his reluctance; but he felt all the weight of that charge to capture Sebastopol, which was given, as he expressed it, by the united voice of the Queen, the Government, and the ‘country;’ and besides, he already perceived that an army nailed fast to the Chersonese by the strength of an unperformed vow, must soon be brought into trouble by time and the lapse of the seasons. Therefore it was that, with a degree of urgency to which he but seldom resorted, he resolved to press upon Admiral Dundas the importance of supporting the efforts of the land forces by the active co-operation of the fleet.

It would have been well if the communication needed for this purpose had been oral; and indeed it must be acknowledged that, at this conjuncture, the feelings which prevented a cordial and personal intercourse between Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas did harm to the public service. The differences existing between them had been closed, it is true, in a measure, by the reconciliation effected in the previous month, and thenceforth the written correspondence of the two chiefs with each other was conducted in the way that is usual with men who are personally acquainted: but still Dundas never used to come to Head-quarters; and Lord Raglan, as might be supposed, did not quit his duties on shore to go on board the flag-ship. From this separation, so far as I know, no evil had hitherto resulted, for Lyons, as the commander of the in-shore squadron, was ever at hand—ever burning with zeal to bring to the aid of the land forces the resources of the fleet; but now that the duty of landing troops and supplies, and tending the march of the armies, was to be followed by that

The French Admiral was under the orders of General Canrobert.

Lord Raglan's probable reluctance to press advice on Dundas.

His sense of the duty which weighed upon him.

The want of personal intercourse between Lord Raglan and Dundas.

of determining whether the fleets should take part with the land forces in one great attack upon Sebastopol, much advantage would have been likely to result from a close and free intercourse between Lord Raglan and Dundas. Indeed no one, I think, well acquainted with the qualities of the two commanders, would easily believe that, after conversing freely upon such a question, they would have been likely to come to any other than a sound conclusion.

This, however, was not to be; and I can not think that

The absence of Dundas at this time from the English Headquarters was not effectually supplied by Lyons.

the absence of Dundas from the English Headquarters was effectually supplied by Lyons. Nay, it rather will be inferred that the counsels of Lyons, at this time, were conducing to the course which Lord Raglan took, and to the naval operation which resulted.

Rather, it will be inferred that the counsels of Lyons were conducing to the course Lord Raglan took.

The time I now speak of is the second week in the month of October. Lyons then, with the 'Agamemnon,' was on duty at Balaclava. As might be expected, he was much with Lord Raglan, and the intercourse between the two was most

cordial. By his exceeding zeal for the cause, Lyons had wrought himself into a high state of vehemence; and he had not yet cleared his mind (as he did a day or two afterward) by comparing his idea of what the navy could do against Sebastopol, with that entertained in the fleet. Now, considering the cordial terms on which Lord Raglan was associated with Lyons, and the course which duty and common sense would naturally enjoin, it may be regarded as certain that the appeal which Lord Raglan was about to address to Dundas must have been made after free consultation with Lyons. It is not less certain that, if Lyons at this time had gained that greater clearness of view which he derived on the following Monday from his intercourse with the ships' captains, his counsels would have been of much greater worth to Lord Raglan; and in that case also, it may, I think, be inferred that Lord Raglan's appeal to Dundas would

Lord Raglan's letter to Dundas sent 14th, dated 13th, of October.

either have been withheld altogether, or else would have been made in terms less cogent, and leaving more room for the free deliberation of the naval commander.¹ Be that as it may, Lord Rag-

¹ See *post*, extract from letter of Lyons to Lord Raglan of the 16th of October. I think it plain from the tenor of that letter that, until Lyons, after being recalled to the fleet, had brought his mind into contact with those of the ships' captains, he had not perceived the most objectionable feature of the proposed naval attack. From the time when he thus cor-

lan's appeal was in writing, and the letter which conveyed it ran thus:—

‘BEFORE SEVASTOPOL, 13th October, 1854.

‘MY DEAR ADMIRAL DUNDAS,—This letter will be delivered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Steele. I have requested him to wait upon you with it, and if you will be so good as to allow him to impress upon you the great importance I attach to the active co-operation of the combined fleets, upon the day on which the French and English armies open their fire, and commence their attack upon Sevastopol.

‘That day is fast approaching, and both General Canrobert and myself feel that, if the enemy's attention can be occupied on the sea front as well as upon that of the land, there will be a much greater chance of making a serious impression upon their works of defense, and of throwing the garrison into confusion. If the first efforts of a combined attack by sea and land should be great, the most advantageous consequences may be anticipated from it; and I know no way so likely to insure success as the combined efforts of the Allied naval and military forces. The royal navy has already done so much for the army, that the latter has no claim upon its farther exertions perhaps; but then it must be recollected that the former aspires to share in the renown which those of the sister service hope to gain in bringing the present enterprise to a happy conclusion, and their presence would go far to make all feel that victory would be nearly a matter of certainty. I can hardly find terms to express my sense of the aid afforded to me by Sir Edmund Lyons since he came into Balaclava; but now that most of what we chiefly required has been landed, and active measures have been taken to put the place in a state of defense, I should do an injustice to him if I were to urge the farther detention of the “Agamemnon” in the harbor, and particularly when I see that there is a chance of that noble ship distinguishing itself under his able guidance. I entertain no doubt that it is his ambition that it should be so employed. Our position here is at least an extraordinary one. We are in the middle of October. The fine weather which we have been so fortunate as to enjoy, with one single day's exception, since we appeared on the south side of Sevastopol, can hardly be expected to last much longer, and large reinforcements are moving from the northward to the assistance of Prince Mentschikoff. Time, therefore, is most precious, and we have not much left to capture the place which we have been called upon by the united voice of the Queen, the Government, and the country, to take possession of, and which our recent success on the Alma will have led all to believe could and would be accomplished. Not to disappoint these universal expectations, the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and military service are necessary, and none, I am sure, will be withheld.

‘Excuse my pressing these considerations upon your attention.

(Signed)

‘RAGLAN.

‘His Excellency Vice-Admiral DUNDAS, C.B.’

The feeling which prevailed at this time in the English fleet. It must be acknowledged that the feeling which prevailed in the English fleet at this time was not at all such as to support Dundas in any resistance to Lord Raglan's appeal. From the very souls of those thousands of warlike men, all bent upon

rected his view. I do not see that his opinion of the plan, in a naval point of view, differed from that of Dundas.

hopes of a fight long given and long deferred, there had been generated a force too mighty, and, if so one may say, too spiritual, in its nature, to be altogether controllable by mere authority. To resist it, a commander would need all the support that could be given him by an officer serving next under him. Lyons was the second in command. He, however, by this time, had certainly placed himself in a state of determined antagonism to his chief. Devoting his energies, with all that fiery zeal of which we have spoken, to the business of the invasion, he seems to have lost his power of appreciating the less stirring duties which devolved upon Dundas; and (apparently) by contrasting his own ceaseless activity with the seeming quietude of the Vice-Admiral, he wrought himself into a state of mind and feeling which was hardly compatible with loyalty toward his chief. Lyons himself, I think, would not have said that he was loyal to Dundas; but rather would have insisted that, because of the lukewarmness and obstructive tendency which he imputed to his chief, disloyalty had become a duty; and, indeed, at the time we speak of, this spirit of resistance to the naval Commander-in-Chief had won a strange sanction from home.¹

The letters which reached London from the fleet and from the camp, were so charged with accounts of the supposed torpor or willful obstructiveness of Dundas, and of the devoted energy of Lyons, that they failed not to work a deep impression upon the mind of the Duke of Newcastle; and the result was that, upon his sole and undivided responsibility, he ventured to give his conditional warrant to a measure of singular boldness. Conceiving that to thwart or obstruct the zeal of Sir Edmund Lyons was to involve the expedition in imminent danger, yet fearing, apparently, that his design, if communicated to the Cabinet, would be baffled by the scruples of more timid men, the Duke went the length of intimating—and this without the knowledge of his colleagues—that he would support Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, if Sir Edmund, in concert with Lord Raglan, should take upon himself to act independently of his chief. In other words, the Duke carried his burning eagerness for the public service to the extent of inviting Lyons to enter upon

The feeling and attitude of Lyons toward Dundas.

The sanction which this spirit of resistance obtained from the Secretary of State.

¹ The sanction here spoken of was contained in a letter from the Secretary of State (see the next note), which had been dispatched on the 9th of October, though it had not yet reached its destination.

a course of mutinous resistance to the will of Dundas.¹ By those means, such as they are, which enable me to come to a judgment, I am brought to believe that, in suffering himself to take this attitude toward his chief, Lyons was at once honest and wrong;² but, be that as it may, he made no secret of his opinions nor yet of his feelings; and the known antagonism in which he stood toward Dundas, gave a head to the warlike impatience which stirred every ship in the squadrons.

In this condition of things it would have been hard for the
The exceeding difficulty of resisting Lord Raglan's appeal. firmest of men to withstand a request such as that which had come from the English Head-quarters. Dundas at once yielded; and the officer who had brought to the flag-ship Lord Raglan's appeal, carried back the consent of the Admiral. Dundas's short answer ran thus:—

Dundas's consent.

“BRITANNIA,” OFF SEVASTOPOL, 14th October, 1854.

‘MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,—Colonel Steele has just arrived with your

¹ It was in a letter to Lord Raglan, of the 9th of October, 1854, that the Duke gave this bold, nay, as he himself would be the first to say, this lawless undertaking. Without ever disguising for a moment the lawlessness of the proceeding, the Duke often spoke of it to me as one of the acts of his life to which he looked back with pride and satisfaction. I have not at present before me the letter of the 9th of October, for it seems to have been handed by Lord Raglan to Sir E. Lyons, and the Duke's copy of it (which Mr. Gladstone, his executor, at no small cost of trouble to himself, has most kindly endeavored to find) will not perhaps come to light in time for publication in this volume. I however have before me a written statement by the Duke of the purport of the letter (given in the Appendix), and also Lord Raglan's reply to it. As may well be supposed, Lord Raglan, ‘educated in the strictest school of discipline,’ was startled at the idea of his ‘suggesting, to a second in command, to set aside the authority of his ‘Commander-in-Chief’ (see the MS. Memorandum by Mr. Loch in the Appendix); and his reply to the Duke is as follows:—

‘BEFORE SEVASTOPOL, October 28, 1854.

‘*Confidential.*

‘MY DEAR DUKE OF NEWCASTLE,—I thought it best to communicate your letter, marked ‘*confidential*, of the 9th inst, to Sir E. Lyons, who has since had letters from Sir James Graham of a subsequent date, in which he does not refer to what you tell me, but appears to wish that, if possible, all *scandal* should be avoided.

‘I am quite satisfied that this is in the highest degree desirable, and I do not think any thing can occur to render it necessary to take any such extreme step as you authorize the adoption of.

‘It is, however, very gratifying to me, and I make no doubt it is equally so to Sir E. Lyons, that you should place such confidence in us.’

Those who knew Lord Raglan's accustomed way of expressing himself will perhaps detect a characteristic archness in his manner of saying that Sir James Graham—the most cautious of men—had sent letters to Lyons containing no reference to the subject of the Duke's secret instruction.

² The voluminous correspondence of both the Admirals with Lord Raglan, forms a part of the ground on which I rest my conclusion.

‘lordship’s letter of yesterday’s date, and you may depend on my using every exertion with my French colleagues to aid in your object.

‘Sir E. Lyons I have recalled from his present post, where his services have been so valuable, and I have no doubt, in his magnificent screw-ship, he will be of the greatest use here.

‘I will consult with Admiral Hamelin as to our joint operations, and will thank your lordship to let me know the time when you intend to attack.

‘I do not wish to detain Colonel Steele, and therefore leave it to him to explain what has passed between us.

‘Yours faithfully,

‘JNO. D. DUNDAS.’

In a conference held the next day on board the ‘Mogador,’

15th Oct. Naval conference on board the ‘Mogador.’

First resolution of the conference.

Opinion of the English ship captains in regard to the stage of the conflict in which the navy should commence its attack.

Lyons concurs in their opinion, and, on the 16th, perceives the vice of the plan.

the Allied Admirals resolved that, in order to support the attack of Sebastopol by the Allied armies, all the ships of their squadrons should execute, at the same time, a general attack upon the sea-forts of the place, and the ships lying moored in its harbor.¹ The captains of the English ships judged that the co-operation of the fleets should be simultaneous—not with the preliminary bombardment, but rather—with the intended assault,² and Lyons soon afterward agreed with them, declaring that he could not see what advantage was to be ‘gained by firing, and then

‘retiring, without the means of renewing the attack from day to day;’ and that such an operation could ‘hardly fail to encourage the enemy,’ because he would think—and truly, too—that the

fleets of great naval States, which desisted from an attack which they had deliberately commenced, must be desisting from a want of power to go on.³ If the land forces should carry Sebastopol—and they were confident, at the time, that they would do so—it might be more or less gratifying to the lovers of the sister service to feel that the navy, though unable to do more, had, at all events, borne a part in the preparatory cannonade; but that humble share in a great triumph was not what the ship captains wanted. They de-

¹ First resolution contained in the paper headed, ‘Résolutions prises par les Amiraux des trois escadres Alliées au sujet de l’attaque de Sevastopol.’ This paper, dated the 15th of October, and signed by Dundas, Hamelin, Ahmet Pasha, Bruat, Lyons, Charner, and Bouet Willaumez, was received by Lord Raglan on the 16th.

² Writing from the fleet, Lyons says that this was ‘the strong and universal opinion amongst the captains here’ (private letter to Lord Raglan, 16th October, 1854). I have no reason for supposing that the French or the Turkish captains differed from the English; but it is not within my knowledge that they expressed an opinion on the question. ³ Ibid.

The view entertained by the English ship captains in regard to the part proposed to be taken by the navy.

The decision of the Admirals in conference.

Their second resolution.

sired that the part the squadrons were to take should be one of such a kind as to be powerfully conducive to the great end; and it was all but evident that, if the fire of the ships on the sea-forts was to be simultaneous with the land cannonade, it must not only lead to failure, but failure of such a kind as to wear in its public aspect the character of a naval discomfiture. But the Admirals sitting in conference judged that they might appropriately leave it to the men of the armies to say in what stage of the impending conflict they would best like to have the help which the navy could give them;¹ and accordingly, after intimating that their ammunition was limited to 70 rounds for each gun,² they submitted it to the Generals on shore to determine whether this, their supply of projectiles, should be all expended at the time of the land cannonade or at the time of the assault, or whether it should be divided into two, so as for one half of it to be used at the time of the land cannonade and the other half at the time of the assault.³

The Generals chose the last of the proffered alternatives.

Decision of the Generals upon the choice offered them by the Admirals.

Indulging, as we saw, a fond hope that the united power of the artillery might engender confusion in the place, they judged that the hour which they had fixed for commencing the land cannonade—that is, half-past six in the morning—would be also the most fitting time for the ships to open their fire.⁴

Joint letter of Canrobert and Lord Raglan to the Admirals.

In the joint letter which conveyed this decision, the Generals applauded 'the great resolve' to which the Admirals had come, and ventured an opinion that, by the common action of the fleets and the armies conjoined, 'moral and material effects' would be produced which must 'insure the success of the attack upon Sebastopol.'

The plan of the naval attack as originally conceived.

They also intimated that the attack would begin at half-past six in the morning, and ended by announcing that an entire cessation of the fire from the trench-

¹ Lyons was present at the conference; but, unfortunately, his perception of that true view of the question which the ship captains presented to his mind was subsequent to the meeting of the naval conference, in which the Admirals determined to leave the question to the decision of the Generals.

² That is, 140 rounds for each gun meant to be used; the intention being that each ship should deliver fire from one only of her two broadsides.

³ Second resolution, *ubi ante*.

⁴ Written communication from General Canrobert and Lord Raglan—date, the 16th October.

es was to be taken as a signal that the moment for the assault had come.¹

Regarded separately, and apart from any advantage which
To the navy, regarded separately, the plan promised nothing but failure. a naval diversion might confer upon the land forces, the Allied fleet, when thus invoked, had no clear prospect thrown open to it except a prospect of failure. Lyons came to see this, we know, before the day of the action;² and Dundas, more calm than his second in command, had perceived, from the first, that the operation was a 'false' one.³ The chiefs thought thus ill of the plan even before those sudden changes enforced by the French of which we shall afterward hear; and the evil was, not that the Admirals judged wrongly, but that their judgment was overborne by paramount forces. All, landsmen as well as sailors, desired that the part to be taken by the navy should be one of glory; and Lord Raglan, whose heart ever warmed with gratitude and admiration when he spoke of the seamen, was especially anxious that they should have their full share in what he believed to be the approaching triumph; but with this desire in common, there was still, as might be expected, a variety in the tendencies of the several minds which were brought to bear upon the naval counsels.

The longing of the seamen for a naval engagement had been so effectually baffled by obdurate stone forts and the shoal newly formed of sunken ships, that a real attack upon Sebastopol and its sheltered fleet was deemed to be out of their power; but the frustrated ardor of officers and men (growing fast, as some thought, to a grave discontent), and the probable eagerness of the people at home to see their fleets striking a blow, made it easy for the Generals to ask, and to ask with imperative cogency, that the fleets should undertake a diversion in favor of the land forces; and thus it resulted that the Admirals, though seeing aright, were moved in the wrong direction. Without being led astray by any ill-founded intelligence, without being caught by a

¹ The letter, 16th October, 1854, was signed by Lord Raglan as well as by Canrobert, but it was drawn up by the French; and I imagine that, if there had been time for mere literary changes, Lord Raglan would have liked to exclude the part about 'great resolve,' 'moral effects,' and certainty of success. The arrangement which the French expanded into the form of the joint letter was come to by Canrobert and Lord Raglan in the presence of General Rose and Colonel Trochu, and was recorded by a memorandum now lying before me in the handwriting of Colonel Trochu.

² See his letter of the 16th October to Lord Raglan, quoted *ante*.

³ Letter from Dundas to Lord Raglan, 20th October, 1854.

fallacy, without being met and confounded by the darkness which shrouds the future, they still were so beset by circumstances that, knowingly and with open eyes, they prepared for themselves a discomfiture.

The Generals commanding the French and English armies found themselves invested—the one by express commission, and the other by circumstance—with an all but complete power to enforce the concurrence of the fleets in their meditated undertaking, and having that power they thought fit to use it. Lord Raglan's appeal to the navy was one of such irresistible urgency that virtually, as I think, he would have made himself answerable in an equal degree with Canrobert for summoning the fleets to take part in the attack, if it were not for this all-important difference—namely, that Canrobert, in ordering the French fleet to attack, was following apparently his own judgment, without accepting much light from the mind of the Admiral serving under him; whilst Lord Raglan, on the other hand, when he made his appeal to Dundas, was writing, so to speak, with Rear-Admiral Lyons at his side,—was writing, in short, with all the sanction which could be given by the opinion of a naval commander deeply trusted by the Government at home.¹

It must also be remembered that if Lord Raglan thus ventured to invoke the aid of the navy, he, at all events, did nothing to render its action abortive. He took no part with General Canrobert nor with Admiral Hamelin in causing those changes which we shall by and by hear of as defacing the original plan.

CHAPTER XVI.

IN that room by the 'Number Four' Battery on the north of the roadstead where Prince Mentschikoff met his vicegerent, we heard the Prince flatly announcing that he would not engage his field army in the conflict which awaited the garrison; we also heard Korniloff answer, that without the field army Sebastopol must surely fall; and, finally, we heard the Prince say he would summon a council of war.

There, the conference ended; and during the hours which followed, the fate of the 'jewel,' the 'treasure'—for so men

¹ Lyons, as we saw, was at Balaclava in the most friendly and constant communication with Lord Raglan.

For some hours the fate of Sebastopol was in suspense.

The indefensible character of Prince Mentschikoff's continued endeavors to withhold from the garrison the aid of his field army.

called their loved fortress — was hanging upon the chance that a wrong-headed, obstinate man might be driven, for once, from his purpose. That purpose, however, was of a sort to be almost revolting; for what it involved was — not the surrender of a beleagured fortress to superior forces, but — the abandonment to the enemy of many thousands of sailors and landsmen who, having stood fast to their guns when the army marched out in the night-time, were still defending the place with intent to hold out to extremity. And, Prince Mentschikoff's communications with the interior of Russia being now in perfect security, the reason which had excused him when retreating out of Sebastopol could no longer hold good as a warrant for standing aloof from the conflict.

Upon the theory, I suppose, that the State must ever be ready for the defense of its honor and its interests, but especially for the defense of its territory, tens of thousands of the youth of All the Russias had been every year torn from their homes at a cruel cost of life and happiness. Well, one of those very conjunctures which was to be provided for by the infliction of all these sufferings upon millions and millions of men had now at last come. A great Russian fortress more precious than many a kingdom, was assailed by the foreign invader. Brave sailors, with a handful of landsmen, were laboring to defend it; and already, as we know, to cover the town, there had been formed an intrenched position four miles in length. Without a reinforcement of several thousands of infantry to hold that intrenched position, the case of the garrison was hopeless. With it, the place might be formidably defended. That was the exigency. All ready to meet it, if only the Commander would give his assent, Prince Mentschikoff's army was lying on the north of the roadstead in actual sight of the garrison — nay, almost within hailing distance. Yet when he came into conference, Prince Mentschikoff had still thought it possible for him to deny the garrison all aid from his field army; and his promise to summon a council of war gave little or no room for thinking that perhaps his judgment might bend. It rather tended to show that he meant to have his will ratified.¹

The probable intention with which Mentschikoff undertook to summon a council of war.

But the defeat he had sustained in battle, and also, per-

¹ It will be remembered that a council of war was the very instrument by which Prince Mentschikoff enforced his foregone and foreknown determination to sink the ships.

Circumstances which were making it more and more hard for him to maintain his resolve.

haps, his long absence from the scene of the impending conflict, must have been lessening the ascendant of the Russian Commander, and making it more and more hard for him, not only to persist in maintaining what to most men must seem an outrageous resolve, but to do this in defiance of the hero who had been raised to a great height of power by the devotion of the garrison, and all the people around him.

And Korniloff now took a step which seemed to provide that, in case of Sebastopol's falling for want of aid from the army, the truth should be visibly extant. He framed and signed a remonstrance against the plan of continuing to withhold the entire field army from the defense of Sebastopol. The paper was to be handed in to the promised council of war; but Korniloff apparently intended that, whether he was destined to survive, or to perish along with the fortress, his words should go to the Czar.¹

The fact that this protest was coming may have got to the knowledge of the Russian Commander, and tended to govern his decision; but the paper itself never reached him, for whilst it still lay in the desk of the writer, Prince Mentschikoff gave way.² Without calling a council of war, he suddenly caused it to be known that some twelve battalions should at once be moved into Sebastopol, and suffered to take part with the garrison in the defense of the place.

The next day, to the joy of Sebastopol, these troops, with two other battalions besides, were brought over from the north of the roadstead; and from time to time afterward, yet farther bodies of infantry detached from Prince Mentschikoff's army were sent to strengthen the garrison.

Still, so late as the 5th of October, the forces defending the quarter of the Malakoff Tower were judged to be deficient in numerical strength; and as though

Without calling the council of war, Mentschikoff suddenly gave way, and announced that twelve battalions should at once be moved into Sebastopol.

Reinforcements of infantry brought in to succor the garrison.

¹ This remonstrance is signed by Korniloff, and dated 'Sebastopol, 19th September [*i. e.*, 1st October], 1854.' It contains so authentic a statement of the straits to which the garrison was reduced in the last days of September, that I have caused it to be inserted in the Appendix.

² Korniloff's remonstrance was found among his papers after his death, with this note by Korniloff on the margin: 'This was to be submitted to the council which did not assemble. Three regiments of Kiriakoff were given without this paper—1854.' And in his journal he says, 'The Prince did not assemble a council, but gave us three regiments of the 17th Division.'

gem for wringing still farther succors from Prince Mentschikoff.

by way of a sailor's contrivance for bringing the landsmen to his purpose, Admiral Istomin, with the full concurrence of Korniloff, imagined the idea of a 'sham fight,' which was to take place on the part of the ground thus judged to be wanting in strength. The proposed manœuvres were executed, and in a way which seemed to prove that a powerful assault on the Malakoff could not be resisted with the force then available for the purpose. Prince Mentschikoff yielded to this practical form of argument; and a yet farther reinforcement, amounting to some 3000 men, was at once detached from the army, and sent to take part with the garrison in defending the Karabel faubourg.¹

Its success.

By the 6th of October the sailors had with them, to help the defense, more than 25,000 men belonging to the army;² and, taken together, these soldiery and the battalions of sailors doing duty on shore amounted to near 38,000.³

Strength of the garrison on the 6th Oct.

This enumeration does not include the troops, amounting to some 2600, which I have called the 'stationed marines,' nor yet, of course, the 12,000 dockyard and other laborers.⁴ Those men, however, were Government servants, amenable to military discipline; and the approaching conflict was of such a kind—a conflict much dependent upon the speedy construction and the speedy repair of earthworks and batteries—that the value of their services must have been hardly less than that of an equal number of soldiers. Upon the whole, it can scarcely be wrong to say, that the numbers now engaged in defending the land front of Sebastopol, were at least equal to any which the Allies, at this time, could have prudently brought to attack it. In the course of the ten days which followed this 6th of October, the garrison was yet farther reinforced.

Restoration of the seamen to their old sys-

All this accession of strength made it practicable to give back to the sailors the system of organization which divided them into what were called 'crews' instead of battalions;¹ and at about the same time

¹ Viz., the Boutir regiment, four battalions, with a strength, according to the muster-roll of the 24th September (6th October), of 3430 men.

² Viz., including the men of the 'train,' 25,765.

³ 37,958. See note in the Appendix.

⁴ Nor the gunners on duty at the sea-forts. They had nothing to do with the land defenses.

⁵ It must not be understood that the force (consisting in general of about 1000 men) which the Russians called a 'crew,' was the crew of any particular ship. The word imported only an arbitrarily divided portion of the

tem of organization.

the lines of defense, extending, as we know, to a length of four miles, were divided into four sections.'

Division of the lines of defense into four sections.

Increased hopefulness of the endeavor to defend Sebastopol.

With these forces posted in an intrenched position, with, moreover, a great command of labor, and an all but unbounded command of material resources, the undertaking to defend Sebastopol was no longer one which could be justly called desperate. It is true that a careful and scientific calculation of the strength which was likely to be available for the defense of given points in the hour of the

expected assault, might still have obliged the garrison to deem their prospect gloomy; for General de Todleben reckons that, after all the reinforcements which the defenders of Sebastopol had now at last wrung from Prince Mentschikoff, the Allies might have brought mighty bodies of men to two points—say, for instance, to the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan—without encountering at either, from first to last, more than from 4000 to 5500 men;² but if this was the conclusion which a man might attain by reckoning over the combatants, and timing the march of battalions hurried up to the point of conflict from their ground on the Theatre Square, it did not embitter the sense of relief with which the garrison found itself emerging from a state of defenselessness to one of comparative strength. No longer was Korniloff forced to act the hard part of one who makes other men joyous and trustful, whilst he himself is despondent. In his secret heart now, no less than before all the world, he was able to say (after speaking of the reinforcements obtained, and the free communication there was between Sebastopol and the field army): 'Notwithstanding the number of our enemies who have surrounded Sebastopol on the south side of the bay, we have no fear of not repelling them, unless God forsakes us; and, in that case, his holy will be done! It is

body of seamen belonging to the fleet; but the organization which distributed the men into 'crews' was one to which they had long been accustomed, and they were glad to return to it—glad to be once more under their accustomed 'colors.'

¹ Sir John Burgoyne supposed the flanks of the intrenched position to be nearly unassailable; but the distribution of the troops occupying these four sections seems to show that the chiefs in Sebastopol did not at all share his view. The two sections which comprised the 'front for attack' were occupied by only one-half of the number which guarded the flanks of the position.—*Todleben*, p. 272.

² *Todleben*, p. 278. The General reckons at 40,000 the force with which the Allies could have afforded to assault; but I may here say that his way of dealing with numbers has not led him to an accurate apprehension of the relative strength of the Allies and the Russians.

‘the duty of mortals to bend before it in humility, as it is always just. We continue to work at our fortifications.’

Then ended the time during which, from mere want of battalions, the garrison had been lying at the mercy of the Allies.²

Close of the period during which the place had been lying at the mercy of the Allies.

Also Prince Mentschikoff's field army, now largely reinforced and awaiting fresh accessions, showed signs of resuming the campaign.

By this time, moreover, Prince Mentschikoff's field army began to show signs of an intention to intervene once more in the campaign. Largely reinforced already, and expecting from time to time fresh accessions of strength, the Prince no longer stood aloof from the war by ensconcing his field army in the country of the Katcha and the Belbec, but undertook to set bounds to the dominion of the Allies in the valley of the Tchernaya. He occupied Tchorgoun, a village very near to the

river, and sent a force on so far south, upon the extreme right of the English, as to challenge their right of forage in the grassy vale of Baidar.

But the soundest foundation of hope to the people defending Sebastopol was the likelihood of finding it happen that, instead of assaulting, the Allies might resort to siege operations; and the trust that so it might be, gathered more and more strength from the time which passed over without an attack. Other signs gave a like indication. Still,

But after all the main hope was, that the Allies, before they assaulted, would resort to siege operations.

every man yearned to be blessedly certain of that which—by comparison with the alternative of an assault—he all but regarded as his deliverance; and the Lancaster batteries, which sprang up in the nights of the 7th and the 8th of October, did not help to relieve the anxiety of the garrison; for those works were so distant that, as seen from the lines at Sebastopol, they appeared to be meant for defense.

But at length came the morning of the 10th of October.

Morning of 10th Oct. Discovery of the fact that the French had broken ground.

If a stranger then alighting by enchantment in the Theatre Square had hastened to ask why it was that people on all sides were shaking hands and embracing with raptures common to all, he would hardly have slaked his curiosity by learning that

¹ Private Journal, under date of 24th September, *i. e.*, 6th October.

² The Allies reached their ground on the south of Sebastopol on the 26th and 27th of September, and the first succors which the Prince gave the garrison were the fourteen battalions which he sent into Sebastopol on the 1st of October. From that day until the 6th of October there were poured in farther succors, which amounted, with the fourteen battalions, to 25,000 men.

all this delight was the welcome which Sebastopol gave to a prospect of being besieged. Already we know that, on the night before, the wind blew so fresh from the town to the lines of the French as to hinder the garrison from hearing the sound of the pickaxe; but when morning dawned it disclosed the mark of a seam, stretching on with many a bend, along the crest of Mount Rodolph. This was the work which the French had thrown up in the night. Then quickly Sebastopol learned that the Allies had made their election, and were really undertaking a siege. It was with un-

The joy this occasioned in Sebastopol.

speakable joy that the garrison and the inhabitants received the glad tidings; for the step the Allies had taken was to Sebastopol a respite from assault—a respite of at least several days; and in the mean time, though great things had already been done in the way of preparing defenses, much more might yet be achieved. ‘If only,’ so Todleben writes—‘if only men chance to know what siege warfare is, they can imagine the joyful impression which we must have experienced at the sight of those works. . . . Every one in Sebastopol rejoiced at this happy event. People congratulated each other upon it; for each man saw in it a guarantee of success, and the hope that the town would be saved.’

The appearance on the two following mornings of the English works.

On the two following mornings the sight of the works thrown up in the night by the English confirmed the glad inference which had been drawn from the discovery of the gabionade on Mount Rodolph, and proved that the whole Allied army was content to resort to siege labors.

Light in which the chiefs at Sebastopol regarded the determination of the Allies.

If the joy of the many was that of men all at once freed from the stress of a desperate conjuncture, the chiefs who perceived the full import of the change had a rarer and finer delight. They saw their foe clearly foregoing the kind of conflict in which, from the power of his victorious armies, he was likely to have the ascendant, and undertaking, instead, a species of strife in which they well knew they could match

Todleben's idea of the way in which the threatened attack was to be met.

him. Thought is swift; and from the moment when Todleben, on the morning of the 10th of October, descried the brown line then appearing along the crest of Mount Rodolph, it cost him brief time to infer the whole plan of the enemy, and determine, too, how he would meet it. His accounts of what he designed and what he did are long, and elaborate, but I gather that the pith of his deliberations was of this

kind : ' Our labors are rewarded ! Our attitude of resistance ' has induced the Allies to break ground ! This work which ' the French have thrown up must be meant to give cover to ' a system of batteries containing some forty guns. In other ' words, the Allies—though without being able to invest the ' place—are really beginning a siege. For such an under- ' taking they needs must have workmen and gunners, spades, ' pickaxes, gabions, heavy guns, gun - carriages, platforms, ' great store of fit ammunition. But of all such people and ' all such things we can command more than they—more ' workmen, more gunners, more tools, more and heavier guns, ' more platforms, more powder, more—twenty times more— ' shot and shell. The species of conflict in which, as it hap- ' pens, we thus enjoy an ascendant is the very one which, ' thanks be to Heaven ! the enemy has advised himself to try. ' By dint of our greater strength in what concerns trench- ' work and ordnance, we will crush and extinguish his bat- ' teries. Mount Rodolph shall be the example. The whole ' line of guns which the French mean to plant on its crest ' shall be under a dominant fire.'

To execute this plan of aggressive defense, Todleben not
The measures he adopts. only caused several portions of the existing para-
 pets to be pierced for additional guns bearing well
 on the works of the French, but planted at once five new
 batteries, all formed with the same special aim. One of
 these, thrown up on a site more than two hundred yards in
 advance of the nearest bastion, and searching with an enfilade
 fire the right flank of the trench on Mount Rodolph,
 gave General Bizot a sample of the enterprise, the skill, and,
 if so one may speak, the agility with which his unknown
 counter-actor could wage a warfare of earthworks. At the
 same time, Colonel de Todleben so ranged or so altered the
 armaments of the Flagstaff, the Central, and the Land Quar-
 antine, that, from every one of those bastions, the works of the
 French might be made to undergo heavy fire.

When the English works grew into sight on the mornings
 of the 11th and the 12th of October, Colonel de Todleben
 prepared to encounter them by increasing the power of his
 ordnance along the Redan and the Malakoff, as well as by
 prolonging a battery already established in rear of the Flag-
 staff Bastion ; but his measures against the English were in-
 sufficient. The positions of their Attacks did not give him
 the kind of opportunity which he saw on the crest of Mount
 Rodolph ; and, apparently, he underrated the harm that
 might be done to his defenses by guns thirteen hundred

yards off. At all events, he could not or did not provide means for overwhelming Burgoyne's threatened batteries by a mightier power of ordnance.

In order to secure full advantage from the aid that can be given by sharpshooters and musketry-men in a conflict of the kind now impending, care was taken to provide for them rifle-pits and other apt means of shelter.

But if, as we now must have seen, the resistance which Todleben planned was mainly of that active sort which consists in assailing the assailant, he did not at all, for that reason, neglect the use of expedients more strictly defensive in kind. Thus, as soon as he could see that the bending line of the enemy's works was threatening any of his batteries with an enfilade fire, he hastened, at great cost of labor, to give them the shelter of 'traverses.' In general, he used, at this time, to throw up only one traverse to stand between two pairs of guns.

And now there came fit occasions for striving to restore to

The long respite which the Russians had been suffered to enjoy in the enemy's presence gave them excellent means of recovering their morale.

the troops the moral strength lost on the Alma. When, either from recent defeat, or from any other more permanent cause, an army is wanting in that self-confidence, and that sense of relative strength which are principal sources of warlike ascendancy, it is a great advantage to be posted in close proximity to the enemy, if only it so happens that (for political or warlike reasons) his forces may be expected to abstain for a time from any decisive attack. In such circumstances, the soldiery whose self-confidence has been brought low can be encouraged to undertake petty enterprises against the enemy's outposts; and, since these attempts aim at very little, and commonly take effect by way of surprise, they often end in a way which can be represented as successful. Thus, for instance, a few men who have well formed their plan, and well watched their moment for surprising a picket at night, will be likely enough, if not to bring in a prisoner, at all events to capture some trophy—a flask, perhaps, or a haversack, a kettle, a greatcoat, or a blanket; and even if they have no such token of their prowess to show, they at least can bring in a report of what they may have been able to see within the enemy's lines. The fame of these little ventures soon spreads and expands in an army (which only, of course, hears one side of each story), and if they are followed, as they probably will be, by a few more enterprises of a like kind, but on a somewhat larger scale, a change most astonishing to those who

are unacquainted with such things is speedily produced. A soldiery which but lately was cowed by disaster, and unfit for an immediate encounter in the open field, may be so easily exalted in spirit by a little of this sort of training, that after a while it will come to hold itself equal—nay, soon, perhaps, more than equal—to the troops it has lately been dreading.¹

This opportunity of regaining their self-confidence was one of the many advantages which delay conferred on the Russians, and they availed themselves of it with great skill and sagacity. One of the sorties they undertook was a good deal above the rank of what I called ‘petty ventures;’ for it seems that the enterprise which ended in the well-known result of burning down the Rodolph farm-house, and destroying the wall of the homestead, was effected by one battalion of seamen, with some sappers, a handful of Cossacks, and a couple of guns, in the teeth of two French battalions and a squadron of horse;² but, commonly, the enterprises of the garrison were of the humbler kind already indicated. The use that could be made of these trivial acts was perceived. Admiral Istomin formally submitted to Korniloff, that it was a right policy to exaggerate the valor of these little enterprises in order to raise the confidence and enthusiasm of the garrison. ‘It is necessary,’ he writes, to ‘bring the defenders of Sebastopol into a kind of excited state of bravery; and this can only be done by valuing their actions perhaps even higher than they deserve, and by giving them recompenses in the same measure.’³

And upon this view Korniloff was full willing to act; for, almost on the eve of the long-expected attack, he issued a

¹ The materials before me show at length and in much detail the whole process of this moral recovery from the disheartening effects of the blow received on the Alma.

² The distance of the farm from the Russian lines of defense was about two-thirds of a mile, and the time three o’clock in the afternoon of the 5th of October.—*Niel*, ‘*Siège de Sebastopol*,’ p. 50. As General Niel has not mentioned the fact that any French troops were present when the Russians came out and burned the house, it may be well to give the authority on which the statement rests. Korniloff records that he himself both ordered and witnessed the exploit. In his *Private Journal* he says, ‘Our brave fellows ‘drove away two battalions of Frenchmen and a squadron of their cavalry, ‘destroyed the wall, and burned the house. There could be no exaggeration as to what was done, because *the feat was achieved in our sight*.’

³ Letter of Admiral Istomin to Admiral Korniloff, 3rd (i.e., 15th) of October.

general order, in which, after telling the garrison that from the first they 'had shown a decided readiness to die but not 'to surrender the town intrusted to them by their beloved 'Czar and all Orthodox Russia;' and after speaking to them of the fortifications which, by the unflinching energy of all, both officers and men, had been made to grow out of the earth, he went on to commemorate six trifling ventures of the kind I have described, and ended by saying, 'Such continual exploits have evidently discouraged the enemy, and 'probably shame alone restrains him from flight.'¹

All this while, and with ceaseless energy, Todleben had been pressing on the defenses; and it seems to have turned out that the respite of twenty days with which the Allies had been indulging Sebastopol, was just of the length that the garrison needed for bringing the works commenced since the 26th of September to a state of all but completion.²

In that interval great wonders had been wrought. Besides all that had been done to develop the might of artillery, due care, as we saw, had been given to those other numberless works which were requisite for the defense of the place; and if that be premised, it would be possible to convey some idea of the proportion in which the whole system of the defenses gained strength during those twenty days by showing the increase of power which was given within that time to the armament of the Sebastopol batteries. On the 26th of September, the land defenses on the south side of the place were armed with 172 pieces of ordnance, which, if each gun were once fired, could discharge missiles weighing altogether some 3000 pounds. The twenty days passed, and by the end of that time the guns in battery along the same lines of defense were in number 341, with calibres for throwing, in one salvo, about 8000 pounds' weight of shot.³

Thus, then, it can be said that in almost all the ingredients of warlike strength the defenders of Sebastopol had gained, and gained largely, since the day

Great progress of the works.
The time needed for completing them corresponded almost exactly with the respite granted by the Allies.

¹ General order of Korniloff, 3rd (15th) October. It is curious and instructive to see that, in an appeal thus framed for the purpose of exalting the spirits of the garrison, Korniloff, who so well knew his way to the heart of the soldier and the sailor, avoided all mention of the more considerable successes achieved (such, for instance, as that at the Rodolph farm-house), and confined himself strictly to anecdotes tending to show the boldness of individuals.

² Todleben, p. 301.

³ Ibid. p. 313 *et seq.*

particulars in which, during the interval, the defenders of Sebastopol had been gaining strength.

when the invader surprised them by his daring flank march. They had been largely reinforced. They had recovered much of their self-confidence. They were now in free communication not only with the interior of Russia, but also with a relieving army already on the flank of the invader and preparing to manœuvre against him. Their fortress was at length well covered by an intrenched position which, although four miles in extent, had yet been made strong at all points. Above all, they were assured that in the particular kind of strife to which they had the happiness to find themselves challenged—the strife that is waged by meeting earthworks and batteries with other earthworks and other batteries—they had, and must have for a long time to come, vastly more means of putting forth strength than those who undertook to besiege them.

If inquirers shall ask how it was that, in the very presence of a victorious invader, the weakness and the all but despair of the garrison could thus be changed into strength and confidence, it will first, indeed, be acknowledged that these people were brave, patriotic, firm men, raised up to a lofty enthusiasm by the inspiring soul of Korniloff, and guided in all they did by the genius of the great ‘volunteer ;’ but still to any such questions one part of the answer is this:—The Allies gave them time.¹

On the evening of the 16th Oct. the garrison knew that the bombardment was to begin on the morrow.

On the evening of the 16th of October, no spy nor deserter, it seems, had brought the news into Sebastopol; but by surer indications the garrison knew that the time of preparation must be almost touching its end, and that a great cannonade of their works was ordained to begin on the morrow.

CHAPTER XVII.

I.

If it be acknowledged that the forces now charged with the land defense of Sebastopol outnumbered the troops which besieged it;² that, in command of

¹ They so gave time, as we saw, against the desire of Lord Raglan, and in spite of the counsels of Lyons and Cathcart.

² *i.e.*, Forey's siege corps, and the English troops camped on the Cher-

the prospects of the garrison. labor and material resources, the garrison had an enormous ascendancy; that they were strongly intrenched; that they had in their rear a harbor and a roadstead not only made good against hostile intrusion by sea, but assuring them aid close at home from the broadsides of their own men-of-war; and, finally, if it be granted that the relieving army now gathered under Prince Mentschikoff had a greater numerical strength than the forces which covered the siege, men may ask how it came to be believed, by both the French and the English, that the chances of war on the morrow would be brought to incline to their cause.

The Allies trusted much to the power of their ordnance as well as to the quality of their troops; and, apart from the baneful delays which their plan of attack had involved, it was not an ill-devised measure. The Allies, we saw, hoped to be able to get down the fire of the place to an extent which would enable their assaulting columns to gain the Redan and the Flagstaff Bastion, without, up to that time, undergoing an overwhelming loss from artillery; and they trusted that, when once they had thus pierced the enemy's line, their troops would so overmaster any soldiery that could be gathered to meet them in rear of the assaulted ramparts, as to be able to cut into two the whole structure of the Russian defenses. This last hope was even, perhaps, better founded than the Allies at the time understood it to be; for we now know that, notwithstanding the large reinforcements then lately brought into Sebastopol, the extent and conformation of the ground which the garrison had to defend put it almost out of their power to be prepared at each point against the apprehended assaults with what they judged competent forces.

It was with batteries of 126 pieces, including 18 heavy mortars, that the Allies hoped to get down the fire of the enemy's defenses; and of these, 53 were French,¹ and 73 English.² Of the English guns, 29 were manned by our seamen, the rest by our Royal Artillery.³ The battery which the French had

The batteries with which the Allies were to undertake this cannonade.

sonese. It will be remembered that Bosquet's corps (having with it Canrobert's Turkish battalions), and also the forces engaged in defending the town and plain of Balaclava, were not in the number of the troops which carried on the siege. For the strength of the contending forces at this time see the Appendix.

¹ Niel, 'Journal des Operations du Génie,' p. 60. Anger gives the number of guns as 49, but I follow Niel.

² 'Journal of the English Engineers,' p. 31.

³ Ibid. See details of armament in Appendix.

[illegible][illegible]

constructed by the sea-shore (near the site of an old Genoese fort), and also the two English Lancaster batteries, may be regarded as standing, in some measure, apart from the general plan of attack; and all the rest of the siege ordnance with which the Allies thus proposed to conquer the enemy's fire were distributed into three systems. One of these was the system or string of batteries erected by the French on the crest of Mount Rodolph, and armed with 49 pieces. Another was the bending line of English batteries on Green Hill, with an armament of 41 pieces, which our people called the 'Left,' or 'Chapman's Attack.' The third, called the 'Right,' or 'Gordon's Attack,' was on the Woronzoff Height, and its two-faced array of batteries mounted 26 pieces.

Without counting the batteries of the 'Jagoudil'—a ship lying moored across the head of the Man-of-war Harbor¹—or any other of the guns still on deck which could be more or less brought into use, the Russians, we saw, had in battery for the land defense of Sebastopol on its south side 341 pieces of artillery; but of these, there stood opposed to the batteries established by the Allies only 118 pieces, including five heavy mortars.² Amongst the rest of the 118 pieces there were some guns of great calibre; but upon the whole, a salvo from the 126 battering-pieces now prepared for the siege was a good deal more weighty than one from the 118 pieces with which the Russians meant to engage them.³

It therefore appears that, as regards the weight of ordnance brought into actual service for the artillery conflict of the 17th of October, the garrison was inferior to its assailants; but it must be understood that, irrespectively of the 118 pieces thus awaiting an encounter with the battering-guns of the besiegers, the Allies, if proceeding to assault, might have to incur whilst advancing not only the shell and the shot of ships' guns trained and pointed beforehand from the waters below, but also the fire of as many as 160 guns established in land batteries which swept the approaches of the place; and that, even after traversing the approaches thus guarded, and coming at last to close quarters, the still surviving assailants might be encountered in front

The pieces which the Russians had in battery and bearing upon the batteries of the besiegers.

Irrespectively of these 118 pieces there were (without counting guns on board ship) 160 guns which swept the approaches, and 63 guns besides which could take the besiegers in front or in flank upon their coming to close quarters.

¹ The 'Jagoudil' was an 84-gun ship which lay at the very head of the Man-of-war Creek with her larboard broadside toward the besiegers.

² Todleben, p. 344.

³ 12 per cent. greater, according to Todleben, *ibid.*

or in flank by the blasts of yet 63 more pieces of cannon delivering grape-shot and canister.¹

It must also be borne in mind that, potentially, the ordnance arm of the Russians had a much greater ascendancy than is indicated by giving the number and calibre of their guns already in battery. To an extent which, for a long time to come, must enable them to outdo their assailants in artillery conflict, the garrison could not only command endless supplies of guns and ammunition, but (because of their strength in workmen as well as in material) could ceaselessly repair and re-arm, or shift or improve their batteries, and augment them in numbers and power.

In distributing his batteries along the lines of defense, Colonel Todleben had not apportioned them ratably to the strength of the respective systems of 'Attack' which they were destined to encounter. Whilst he ventured to meet the 71 guns and mortars of the English with so few as 54 pieces of ordnance, and those too, upon the whole, of a lighter calibre, he made ready to answer the 53 guns and mortars which the French had in battery with a fire of 64 pieces.²

At intervals throughout the night, the Russians, as it was their custom to do, fired some shots with the purpose of disturbing the working-parties of the besiegers, but they elicited no reply.

Notwithstanding that the intervention of the Allied navy had been suddenly postponed to a later hour, the moment appointed for the opening of the land cannonade remained unaltered. At half-past six in the morning of the 17th of October, three shells were to be discharged from one of the French batteries, and then forth-

¹ Guns opposed to the batteries of the Allies.....	118
Guns sweeping the approaches.....	160
Guns for taking the besiegers when at close quarters in front or flank	63

Total (being the numbers given *ante*)..... 341

² The calibres of the French and Russian guns being upon an average about equal, the superiority of the Russian armament was measured by the difference in the number of the pieces—*i. e.*, by the difference between 64 and 53. Still, in the real conflict between the French and the Russians—*i. e.*, the conflict between the batteries on Mount Rodolph and their opponents—the difference in the number of pieces was only 3. It was by the position of his batteries rather than by mere weight of metal that Todleben there prepared to take the ascendancy.

with the Allies were to open fire along the whole line of their works.

The signal had not yet been given, when the breaking gray of the morning enabled the Russians to see that the Allies, in the night-time, had cut their embrasures, and that seams of earth hitherto blank had all at once put on the look—significant of man and his purpose—that is given by guns seen in battery. Here and there, as this change was descried, a Russian battery opened fire. More followed. Some French guns began to make answer. There was more and more light. A body of French tirailleurs with a support pushed forward toward the enemy's lines. Sebastopol beat to arms. The three appointed signal shells sprang out from the lines on Mount Rodolph. In a minute, some English guns opened; and presently, along their whole line of batteries, and along all the enemy's works, from the Central to the Flagstaff Bastion, and thence across to the Redan, and thence on again to the Malakoff, there pealed a sustained cannonade. Then, and quickly again, and from time to time, this sustained cannonade was out-thundered by salvos of a kind sounding strange to the land-service people. No ships were in action; but at the first roar of the mightier outburst, the seamen who heard it grew radiant. They knew by what manner of men such a salvo as that was delivered.

Whether serving the guns of the English, or forming part of the garrison, the sailors engaged in this conflict had brought with them many of their familiar usages; and the Russian sailors especially, who were fighting at the land defenses to the number of several thousands, clung fast, it seems, to their customs. Their naval system had been in a great measure copied—copied even, perhaps, with servility—from that of the English; and thus it resulted that, in each of the main fastnesses which constituted the line of defense, there was much of the warlike practice, and even, indeed, of the lesser routine, which obtains on board English vessels. The 'bastion' stood for the ship. The parapets were bulwarks; the embrasures were port-holes. Every piece the men had to serve they tended and fondled and cursed in their natural, seamanlike way; and that too with the more affection when they knew it for one of their own familiar ship's guns. As in our naval service, so also with the Russian seamen, the drum used to

The dawn of
the 17th Oct.

Opening of the
fire.

Cannonading
in salvos.

The cause of
this firing in
salvos.

The seamen
who manned
the guns.

beat to quarters; but to other of their duties the men, though on shore, were still called by the boatswain's whistle. They were piped to their meals; they were piped to their 'grog.' Night, for them, was a period divided into 'watches;' and far from going by clock, they measured and marked lapse of time just as though they were still on board ship; so that when, for example, it was noon, they reported it always 'eight 'bells,' and as soon as they had the due sanction, were ready to make it 'eight.' But, so well had these Russians been taught, that they could not be got to stop short in their old English lesson at the point their Commanders desired. To the exceeding vexation of Todleben, they could not at all be persuaded to train and point every gun with a separate attention to the object for which he designed it. Knowing well what nation it was that manned the works on Mount Rodolph, the men at the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions were too strongly bent on the end, aim, and purpose of what they had learned from the English, to be able to forego all the rapture of 'giving the Frenchman a broadside.' And, that being done to begin with, their rooted faith was that, with no greater pauses of time than were of absolute need for sponging and loading and firing, one broadside should follow another.¹

To be serving the guns; to be swiftly repairing the havoc from time to time wrought in the parapets (and especially in the revetments of the embrasures) by the enemy's round-shot and shell; to be quenching the fires which were constantly seizing upon gabions, fascines, and timber; to be replacing guns; to be tending or removing in litters the men newly wounded; and to be toiling thus, hour by hour, in the midst of a dim pile of smoke, with a mind always equal to an instant encounter with death,—this was alike the duty of the French, of the English, and of the Russians, who worked the power of artillery in the

¹ There was a part of the height overlooking Sebastopol from the neighborhood of the 'Maison d'eau' which served as a very good post for observation; but the three men who witnessed from that point the opening of this great cannonade were disturbed in their appreciation of its grandeur by an incident strangely incongruous. From the direction of Sebastopol three setters came ranging up the hill-side, but making small progress, for at every salvo they dropped. At the thunder of the nations, as though it were the report of their master's 'double-barrel,' the well-bred and well-broken beasts took care to 'down-charge.' I never knew whence the dogs came, nor whither they went.

For some time this conflict of ordnance was maintained with unflinching spirit by the French, the English, and the Russians.

The frail state of the Russian earthworks.

conflicting batteries; and, until there occurred that disaster to the French of which we shall presently speak, the duty was performed with unflinching persistency by besieged and besiegers alike.

The works which covered the Russian batteries had been constructed in haste, with dry, gritty earth laboriously brought to the spot; and, no rain having come in the interval to bind the loose heaps into solid structures, they formed of course sorry ramparts. The embrasures, too, were weak. Some of them, for want of fascines and hurdles, had been revetted with bags of earth, with planks, or with clay. There were other embrasures which had not been revetted at all. Of the revetments formed with clay, some were brought down in fragments by the mere blast of the guns firing out from between them; and those that had been made of earth-sacks and planks very often took fire and fell. There was need of heroic stubbornness to be able to cling to the determination of sacrificing numbers of lives with the object of restoring defenses so easily brought to ruin; but the garrison had been taught that it was of great moment to them to have their embrasures in the best state that might be possible, and at whatever cost of life to those who were charged with the toil, they repaired them again and again.

But the Russians—and that every minute—had to hold themselves in readiness for a yet harder trial. Expecting an assault, they ever kept steadfastly in sight that last appeal to ‘mitrail’ which their great Engineer had designed; and often, very often they imagined that the appointed moment had come. From the irrepressible tendency of the seamen to deliver their fire in broadsides, it resulted—for no breath of wind was stirring—that the men, by these rapid discharges, piled up above and around them huge, steadfast, opaque banks of smoke, which so narrowed the field of every man’s sight that he hardly could see the outline of a comrade’s figure at a distance of two or three paces.

Now a dim bank of smoke, admitting distorted and deadened rays, yet confining within straitened limits the scope of a man’s real vision—this, we know, is a lens which gives infinite favor to the creatures of an imagination already excited by battle. The gray, floating wreaths, though their movement can scarce be descried, are all the while slowly changing in place, as well as in form; and from that cause, or that cause in part, it seems to result that, when once the thick cloud

The imaginary columns of attack with which the Russians were combating.

which obscures a man's vision has been peopled and armed by his fancy, the shapes which appear before him do not long continue at rest. They grow larger; they move; and the unreal creature of the brain which at first seemed like infantry halted is presently a column advancing. With the Russians—a firm, robust people—the imagination, though straying beyond the bounds of reality, was still guided in part by sound knowledge; for the images men saw in the smoke were the images of what might well be. As in a quarter of the field at the Alma (where the onset of the English horse might fairly enough have been looked for), the mist had seemed to reveal a host of cavalry charging, so now when, as people believed, the Allies would storm the defenses, men easily fancied they saw—that they saw indeed many times over—the enemy's columns of infantry coming on to deliver the assault. The quality of the Russian soldier being what I have said, these pictures of his imagination did not drive him at all into panic, but still they much governed his actions. Again, and again, those who manned guns so planted as to be of no service except against assailing infantry, worked as hard at their loading and firing as though the assault had begun, and many a blast of mitrail was sent tearing through phantom battalions.

So long as the conflict should be one between covered bat-
 teries on one side and covered batteries on the
 other, there could not well be any approach to
 equality in point of losses between the besiegers
 and the besieged; for the Russians were not only
 forced to keep manned the 223 guns which they
 had prepared against the expected assaults, but
 also to have close at hand near the gorges of
 their bastions the bodies of infantry with which
 they designed to meet the same contingencies; and, both the
 gunners and the foot soldiery being imperfectly sheltered
 against the batteries of the Allies, it could not but result
 that the troops thus kept in expectation would be, many of
 them, killed or wounded; whilst the besiegers, on the other
 hand, could keep out of fire the troops with which they
 meant to assault till the moment for their onset should
 come.

Conditions under which the cannonade would necessarily take place so far as concerned the respective losses of the Allies and the Russians.

Though Prince Mentschikoff had come from the country of the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, and although he indeed crossed the road-

The forces defending Sebas-

topol were still under the command of Admiral Korniloff. stead on the morning of this cannonade, and visited a part of the lines in the Karabel faubourg, he did not long stay, as we shall see, amid the scenes of the artillery conflict which raged on the south of Sebastopol; and the virtual control of the whole force of soldiers and sailors engaged in defending the place still remained in the hands of the seaman whom the popular voice had raised up to be chief and commander of all.

If Korniloff had been in command of a military garrison so organized, and so highly instructed in all their duties, as to warrant him in relying upon their exact performance of orders, he would probably have thought it his duty to remain, for the most part, at the central and commanding spot which he had chosen as his dwelling: for there, he would have been most readily found; there, better than at the ramparts, he would have been able to understand the general state of the conflict; there, with the greatest dispatch, he might have pushed forward his reserves to the endangered post; there, most quickly, he would have been able to learn where his presence was needed. But the forces defending Sebastopol were not of such a kind as to warrant Korniloff in taking this strictly military view of the position in which events had placed him. On the contrary—and that he knew—it was the collapse of the military structure which had put upon him this great charge; and a true instinct told him, that as the hope of defending Sebastopol against a determined attack had had little to rest on at first save that spirit of enthusiastic devotion with which he had inspired his people, both seamen and soldiers; so, although the defense of the place was no longer a task of such utterly overwhelming difficulty as to need being faced in a spirit of romantic desperation, it still must depend for success upon his power of exalting and sustaining men's minds. Therefore, overruling the numberless advisers who strove to move him from his decision, he judged it his duty to be visiting the lines of defense, to be sharing in the risks of the day with the gunners who stood at the ramparts, and, in short, to cause himself to be seen at all the chief posts of danger.

Men belonging to Korniloff's Staff have commemorated the acts and the words of their hero, in this the last day of his life, with an almost pious exactness; and, although it be plain that, amongst our people at home, the uneventful ride of a Russian Admiral from bastion to bastion will never evoke that kind of inter-

The movements of Korniloff.

est which it wrought in the minds of his own fellow-countrymen, I yet imagine that some portion of the material derived from those loving records may help to give true impressions of the nature of the business which engaged the chiefs in Sebastopol on the day of the first cannonade, and may even, in an incidental and passing way, afford better insight into the condition of things within the fortress than could well be imparted by formal words of siege narrative saying when, where, and how the men were struck down and replaced, when and where a gun was dismounted, or an embrasure spoiled and restored.

The instant he heard the opening of the cannonade, Korniloff hastened to spring into his saddle; and then—at so eager a pace that his Staff could hardly keep up with him—he galloped off to the Flagstaff Bastion. By the time that he had gained the esplanade by the left face of the bastion, the firing had grown to its full height and power. Already the smoke of the salvos in which the sailors delighted had enwrapped the whole field of sight in a thick steadfast cloud. Seen through it, the sun in the east was a dull red and lustreless orb. Yet, by the darts of fire which, from moment to moment, were piercing the cloud, Korniloff and the officers with him could make out where the enemy's guns were in battery, or where their own were replying. In their rear, too, they saw through the smoke a third belt of fire; for behind the gorge of the bastion, the skilled contriver of the defenses had planted two batteries, which threw their shells over the heads of the men engaged at the ramparts in front.

It was hot at this time in the Flagstaff Bastion; for the batteries of the French on Mount Rodolph—unstricken, as yet, with the havoc which awaited them—were exerting their full might; but also—and this was more formidable by reason of the greater calibre of the guns—the left face of the bastion was battered, and, at the same time, its right face enfiladed, by the fire from Chapman's Attack.

Korniloff conversed with the gunners, and to some of them he gave directions in regard to the pointing of the guns; but it does not appear that he brought himself to put a check upon his seamen by preventing them from firing in broad-sides. He passed from gun to gun along the whole bastion, and then went along the winding boulevard line to that new work adjoining the Péres-sip, which, because of its sudden growth, men called the 'Mushroom' Battery. Whether it was that the minds of

His presence at
the Flagstaff
Bastion.

His ride along
the boulevard
toward the Pé-
ressip.

men were so kindled as to be capable of giving new color and form to what their sight conveyed to them, or that Korniloff's look and bearing were really in some degree altered by the opening of the long-promised conflict, it is certain that the language of those who rode with him along the line of the boulevard gives a kind of support to that old superstition of the Scots which assured the believing world that approaching death was foreshown by a sign, and that when his end drew near the doomed man was clothed with a preternatural brightness. 'Calm and stern,' says one of the Staff who rode with Korniloff—'calm and stern was the expression of his face, yet a slight smile played on his lips. His eyes—those wonderful, intelligent, and piercing eyes—shone brighter than was their wont. His cheeks were flushed. He carried his head loftily. His thin and slightly bent form had become erect. He seemed to grow in size.'

Korniloff returned the same way back to the right wing of the Flagstaff Bastion; and, after speaking with Vice-Admiral Novolsilsky, he remounted his horse and descended into the ravine, going on through that part of the defenses which connected the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions. The road lay along a steep slope, and the blaze from the French batteries was so constant, and their fire so heavy, that for a moment the affrighted chargers of Korniloff and his Staff refused to confront the storm; but Korniloff soon conquered the will of his horse; and when he had done so he said, with a smile, 'I can not bear to be disobeyed.' In the valley he passed near the Taroutine battalion, and the soldiers were overheard saying, 'This is indeed a brave fellow.'

Gaining at length the Central Bastion, Korniloff there found Admiral Nachimoff toiling hard at his duty, and seeming to be as much at home in the batteries as though he were on board his own ship. Nachimoff's appearance at this time might be regarded, perhaps, as somewhat characteristic of that tendency to self-immolation which we have attributed to him; for, as though he would be decked out for sacrifice, he distinguished himself from others by choosing to wear his full uniform, with all the heavy splendor of an admiral's epaulets; and already, from a slight wound then lately received, the blood was coursing down his face.

His presence at
the Central
Bastion.

¹ Admiral Likhatcheff, one of Korniloff's Staff, quoted in the 'Matériaux pour servir.'

While conversing with Nachimoff, Korniloff mounted the banquette at the projecting angle of the bastion, and there for some time the two Admirals stood; for they were trying to ascertain the effect of the Russian fire upon the enemy's batteries. Driving in from moment to moment, the round shots so struck the parapet and its defenders as to cover the Admirals and the officers at their side with the pelting of loose, gritty earth, and even sometimes to sprinkle them with the blood of men wounded. Shells also were bursting on all sides, and slaughtering the people at the batteries.

Seeing the danger to which Korniloff exposed himself, Captain Ilynsky approached the Admiral, and entreated him to leave the bastion. By that time Korniloff had descended from the banquette, and was looking to see how the men at the batteries were pointing their guns. Ilynsky tried to carry his purpose by saying to Korniloff that his presence at the bastion denoted want of trust in his subordinates; and added that he would so take care to fulfill his duty as to render unnecessary the presence of the Admiral. Korniloff answered, 'And if you are to do your duty, why do you wish 'to prevent me from doing mine? My duty is to see all.'

Korniloff's continued survey, and his return to his quarters.

Korniloff visited the battery at the gorge of the Central Bastion, and then went on to the work which we call the Land Quarantine. Seeing that

the men were suffering from thirst, he gave orders for hauling up casks of water to the batteries. Then, needing food, he rode home to his quarters. Before he yet

His letter and message to his wife.

broke his fast, Korniloff found time to finish a letter which he had been writing to his wife. This, along with a watch which he regarded as a kind

of heirloom, Korniloff intrusted to the courier who was about to be dispatched to Nicolayeff. 'Pray,' said he, 'give this 'watch to my wife—it must belong to my eldest son;' and then, in words half playful, but susceptible of an interpretation which would give them a mournful significance, he went on to say, 'I am afraid that here it will get broken.'

It was soon after this that Baron Krüdener came in with messages from Admiral Istomin, the officer in command at the Malakoff. Istomin's words purported to convey an assurance that all was going on well at the Tower; but the words were accompanied by an entreaty. The entreaty was, that Korniloff would not needlessly imperil a life so precious as his by coming up to the Malakoff Hill. He persisted in his determination to go thither; but a little delay was obtained by inducing him to

He persists in his determination to go up to the Malakoff Hill;

but before descending so ascends the house-top in order to gather a general impression of the cannonade.

ascend to the terrace on the house-top in order to form a more general and extended idea of the scope and power of the cannonade than he had yet been able to gather. It would seem that he was painfully impressed by what he saw; for, after first giving some practical directions for in-

sureing an unfailing supply of ammunition to all the batteries, he once more disclosed in private that want of hopefulness which we have already remarked upon as forming an anomalous characteristic in one who could kindle and sustain

His despondency.

the heroism of other men. 'I fear,' he said, 'that no means will suffice against such a cannonade.'

It may be said that, at the time, there was some ground, not, indeed, for so great a despondency as that which weighed upon Korniloff, but, at all events, for grave forebodings. The artillery conflict then

The state of the conflict at this time.

raging between the French and the Russians had hitherto seemed so equal as to disappoint the reckoning of the great Russian Engineer; for Todleben's idea of overwhelming the batteries on Mount Rodolph by a mightier and more embracing array of ordnance-power had been baffled, as yet, by the prowess of the French artillerymen, and also, it would seem, by the obstinacy with which the Russian seamen still clung to their favorite notion of constantly firing in broadsides. The fronting walls of the cazern at the gorge of the Central, and the one at the gorge of the Land Quarantine Bastions, were in some places destroyed, in others, grievously injured; and the parapet of that last cazern being also destroyed, the five guns ranged behind it were soon reduced to silence. Also, the lower part of the town wall was a good deal damaged, and in some places broken through, by the French shot. Moreover, there were some of the Russian batteries opposed to the French in which a large proportion of the gunners originally serving the guns had already been killed or wounded, and replaced by fresh combatants.

But if the strife of great guns between the French and the Russians was thus for a while almost equal, it was otherwise with the conflict of artillery-power going on in the Karabel faubourg; for there, the besiegers were obtaining the ascendant. With all his skill and all the resources at his command, Todleben, as we saw, had failed to provide sufficing means to counteract the two English Attacks. Before the first hour of the cannonade had passed, it began to appear that our batteries were proving to be of greater power than those opposed to them. This superiority resulted in

part from the greater calibre of the English guns, but in part also from the skill with which they had been planted on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Already a good deal of havoc had been wrought in the Redan, as well as in the fronting walls of the cazern near it. Some of the guns on the summit of the Malakoff Tower had been dismounted, and the rest were now silent; for the English shot had not only ruined the parapet, but had flung its stone fragments upon the gunners with an effect so destructive as to compel an abandonment of all farther attempt to work the two or three guns still remaining in battery. For the rest of the day it was no longer from the tower itself, but only from some guns covered by the glacis and its flanking entrenchments, that the famous position of the Malakoff still asserted its power.

And although at the Russian batteries the men were still firm, yet elsewhere, it would seem, there was need of that exaltation of spirit which Korniloff knew how to create by his presence among the combatants. Indeed, one of the very officers who strove to dissuade him from hazarding his life at the ramparts has acknowledged that the forces composing the garrison were in a state to require encouragement.¹ Whilst the seamen, with such work in hand as was more than enough for the utmost of human energy, still persisted and stood to their guns, the bodies of infantry drawn up in rear of the bastions to meet the expected assault had been subjected to a different, nay, almost an opposite, kind of trial.

State and temper of the troops posted near the gorges of the bastions.

Symptoms of a commencing panic.

They had had to remain still and passive under a fire of heavy artillery—for the most part a ricochet fire—which, for some time, had been more or less working havoc in their ranks. There were symptoms of a commencing panic. Some combatants of the inferior sort—including, it seems, a body of convicts—began to move off in disorder from the comparatively unimportant positions in which they had been placed; and although the troops posted by the gorges of the assailed bastions did not thus give way, their firmness was plainly undergoing too heavy a trial. The chief judged it necessary to reduce to a very small number the force of infantry thus detained under fire, and to endeavor to compensate for the effect of the change by providing that at several chosen points there

Measures adopted in consequence.

¹ Captain Gendre. The Captain says: 'We all knew what influence his [Korniloff's] appearance exercised over the soldiers in these last days, and he found it indispensable to animate the men, who were not accustomed to the heavy naval shot. I did not dare to speak more.'

should be posted an aid-de-camp, having orderlies and horses in readiness, who was to hurry up reinforcements of infantry to any point threatened with immediate assault.

Upon the whole, therefore, it must be acknowledged that there was some approach to a fulfillment of the hope which the Allies had suffered themselves to entertain when they looked to a panic in Sebastopol as the not unlikely result of their mere cannonade; and it would not be traveling beyond the range of things probable to imagine that, if the Allied navies at this time, and in accordance with the original plan, had been thundering at the mouth of the roadstead, the failing heart of those combatants who were less resolute than the rest might have led to confusion and flight. But whatever may be imagined in regard to the probable effect of putting that farther stress upon the composure of the garrison at a time when the land cannonade was most disturbing its courage, the Russians were secured from any such super-added trial of their fortitude by Admiral Hamelin's determination to postpone the naval attack;¹ and the moment was now close at hand when the evil, nay, the danger, that there is in the grievous discouragement of troops would be shifted away from Sebastopol by the turning fortune of war, and made all at once to pass over into the midst of the French batteries.

As matched against the opposing Works, that string of French batteries on the crest of Mount Rodolph had so narrow, so protruding a front, that it has been likened to a solitary and isolated bastion depending its strength from a centre against the concave of an arc; whilst the long, bending line of great guns with which Todleben sought to embrace it threw back a converging fire; and although the great Engineer had been baffled for a time by the eagerness or the obstinacy of the sailors who manned his batteries, the higher skill of his dispositions was already beginning to give him the mastery, when the gradual and rightful solution of the problem he so longed to work out was all at once intercepted by what, in a sense, may be called an accident. The earth shook. A volume of flame sprang up from the ground. There was a roll of sound, not harsh nor deafening, yet such as to out-thunder great guns;

The effect that might possibly have been produced at this time by a naval attack.

The skillfulness of Todleben's dispositions was beginning to tell;

when a great explosion occurred in one of the French batteries.

¹ See *post*, p. 278.

and from the spot whence the flame had issued there was reared up on high a black, steadfast column of smoke. A shell from one of the Russian batteries had blown up a French magazine. The explosion, although so great a one as to be seen and heard from afar by the English as well as the French, was less widely apparent to the Russians, who were wrapped in a dense cloud of smoke. Some indeed of the garrison perceived what had happened, and they greeted the sight with exulting 'Hurrahs!' but it was only by slow and imperfect process that even the chiefs in Sebastopol attained to learn much of the truth; and down to the last, it would seem, they regarded the explosion as merely an incident of siege-warfare, when, in truth, it almost had proportions great enough to decide the campaign.

By this explosion no utterly ruinous harm was done to the works or the armament of the battery in which the disaster occurred, and the number of men whom it stretched on the ground killed or wounded is confined by French records to fifty; but for those who had to witness the scene of the havoc, whilst yet the disaster was new, it may well have been appalling to see half a hundred of human beings, who had all been alive and busy the instant before, now changed by one blast of fire into mere blackened corpses or maimed and helpless sufferers.

Therefore mere horror may have partly conduced to what followed; and the sensitive, anxious, humane disposition of General Canrobert laid him painfully open to the impressions which such a calamity was but too well fitted to create;

but French troops know so much about war, and are so prone to the use of the intellect as a means of divining results, that, in general, their feelings, whether of ardor or of despondency, are more or less founded upon reasoning, if not upon reason. Even if the French gunners had not discovered the error before, they would have been swift to infer the faultiness of General Bizot's dispositions when they saw that their batteries could be raked; and upon learning from this signal misfortune that a great magazine of gunpowder had been ineffectually sheltered from the enemy's fire, they would be likely to carry yet farther their distrust of the men in authority.

But whatever was the immediate cause of the feeling, it is certain that the moral prostration occasioned by the blowing up of the magazine was out of all proportion to the mere physical harm which it had wrought. The service of the battery in which the disaster had occurred was at once dis-

Physical effects
of the explosion.

Its effect upon
the spirit of
the French
troops.

organized. Its fire ceased; and, the Russians then bending their care to the batteries which remained unextinguished, there occurred, before long, a second explosion in the French lines. This last mishap—the explosion of an ammunition-caisson—was not in itself of much moment; but coming soon after the great explosion, it naturally increased the discouragement prevailing in the French batteries; and General Canrobert—tortured, apparently, by grief and by doubt—left it to the officer commanding his artillery to determine and say whether the fire of the French batteries should, or not, be suspended. The decision was exactly the one which might have been expected from the tenor of such an appeal; and at half-past ten o'clock in the morning, the Attack from Mount Rodolph was silenced.¹

Not long after the silencing of the French batteries, General Rose brought a message from General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, and not only intimated that the silence of the French batteries would continue for the rest of the day, but said that the misfortune had produced great discouragement. After an interval General Rose again came to Lord Raglan with another message from Canrobert, and this his second report was even more gloomy than the first.²

¹ After mentioning the last explosion, Niel, the official narrator, says:—*‘Ce nouvel accident determine la cessation du feu vers dix heures et demie.’*—*Siège de Sebastopol,* p. 62.

² General Rose was English Commissioner accredited to the French Head-quarters. It happens that Lord Strathnairn (formerly General Rose) does not remember the purport of the messages which he delivered, and I am therefore obliged to appeal—I do so very reluctantly—to my own memory. My impression, however, of what passed in my presence and hearing is this: General Rose came twice. On the first occasion he came to say that the body of combustibles which had exploded was not a French magazine, but something which the Russians had found means to hurl into the French trenches; and he added that the French were a good deal discouraged, at the same time intimating, if I rightly remember, that their fire would not be resumed that day. Upon his second visit—I am still speaking only from memory—General Rose said he had been requested by General Canrobert to apologize for having sent the first message—the fact being (as all, of course, knew) that the exploded combustibles were munitions of war contained in one of the French magazines. General Rose, it seems, must have added that the effect of the explosion would be to prevent the French from reopening their fire even on the morrow; for I find that my note is as follows: ‘General Rose rode up, and told me that the French would not be able to go on again until “the day after to-morrow!”’ My impression is that after imparting the bad tidings to Lord Raglan, Rose intimated in a general way the determination of Canrobert to hold himself in readiness for assaulting. He did not, however, convey any proposal to that effect.

The nature and scope of the disaster in the French lines was not so understood at the time by any of the chiefs in Sebastopol as to lead them to follow up their advantage. If, on seeing the magnitude of the first explosion, the Russians had at once assailed the batteries on Mount Rodolph with so bold a sortie as the one they undertook some six hours later, they would have tested the power of the French infantry to hold good in a time of depression.

No enterprise against Mount Rodolph was attempted at the time by the Russians.

After 10.30 A.M. the English were engaged alone with the enemy.

From half-past ten in the morning, and thenceforth to the end of the day—nay, indeed, for a yet greater time—it was only by the English batteries that the attack upon Sebastopol was maintained.

I have spoken of Korniloff—acting always under the counsels of Colonel de Todleben—as the real commander of all the forces besieged in Sebastopol; but Prince Menschikoff still held a supreme authority in the Crimea over army and navy alike; and during a part of the morning he was personally present in the place. After visiting the batteries in the Karabel faubourg, the Prince came back into the main town, rode up the Telegraph Hill, and stopping at Korniloff's door, requested the Admiral, then still at his house, to come out and join him. The Admiral accordingly mounted his horse, and accompanied Menschikoff as far as the Catherine landing-place, for thither the Prince was going with the intention of quitting Sébastopol, and crossing over to the north of the roadstead.

Prince Menschikoff.

His presence for a time in Sebastopol.

It seems that the Prince was departing in a condition of mind far from hopeful;¹ but Korniloff, who, only some minutes before, had let fall some words indicative of his own despondency, was now, they say, able to cheer the spirit of his commander. He made his report to the chief of the sound condition of things along that part of the line which he had already visited; but also the Admiral was now able to impart tidings, which went to show that, for the moment at all events, the balance of the artillery conflict was

His conversation with Korniloff whilst riding down to the landing-place in order to depart from Sebastopol.

¹ My authority (Admiral Korniloff's aid-de-camp) does not say this in direct terms, but I consider that he does so impliedly by the language in which he shows that the Prince was reassured by Korniloff.

inclining against the French; for although Korniloff had not yet apparently heard of the great explosion in the French lines, he already knew something of the consequences resulting from the disaster, and was able to assure his chief that the fire from Mount Rodolph had slackened. That it had quite ceased he could not yet say; for the time when the two chiefs thus rode to the Catherine landing-place was about ten o'clock, and a little anterior to the moment when the French gave up their attack.

I have heard no account of the reasons by which Prince Mentschikoff may have thought himself compelled to depart from the beleagured town, and to depart, too, at such a time. It is true that, in moving to the region on the north of the roadstead, Prince Mentschikoff would be rejoining his field army; but since that was a force secure itself from attack, and not then about to be used by him as a means of striking any instant blow at the besiegers, the necessity for his personal presence in the country toward which he was going is not at once made apparent by showing that he there had an army. It may be that, entertaining faint hopes of a successful resistance on the South Side, he judged it a duty to bend all his energies to the defense of the Severnaya; and, indeed, if he really held fast to the theory by which his former withdrawal from Sebastopol was justified, that persuasion alone, however perverse it may seem, would still go far to account for the step which he thought fit to take.¹

Be this as it may, what we know is, that the town of Sebastopol, with the Man-of-war Harbor, the fleet, and the arsenal, being now once more in a crisis of its fate, Prince Mentschikoff again withdrew from it. He got into a boat at the Catherine landing-place, and crossed over to the north of the roadstead.

After receiving a farewell—the last farewell—from his chief, Korniloff rode along the Catherine Street to the Theatre Square, and thence, after dispatching three of his Staff, with special orders for the relief of the wounded, and the supply of ammunition, he returned once more to the Flagstaff Bastion.² Captain Gendre at that

¹ The theory spoken of, *ante*, p. 168, which maintained that Sebastopol was of smaller account than the rest of the Crimea—that the kernel was of less worth than the shell.

² One of the three officers whom Korniloff dispatched on these errands

time was the only officer with him. At every step the Admiral was met by litters bearing away the wounded and dead, and great as was the number thus carried away, very many still lay where they fell. It was only by great and increased exertions that the Flagstaff Bastion could at length be cleared of the dead and the wounded.

It would seem that at this time Korniloff first heard of the great explosion which had occurred in the French lines full an hour before; but there is no indication of his having even then got to know the magnitude of the disaster, and he failed to infer the discouragement of his foe from the slackening of the fire on Mount Rodolph.

In the bastion, Korniloff and his companion were joined by the officer acting under General Möller, as Chief of the Staff; and the three, after mounting by the barracks to the top of the hill, and inspecting the two shell-batteries, there manned by the crew of the 'Jason,' descended by the alley of the upper boulevard, and returned to the Theatre Square. On the way, Korniloff indicated the arrangements which were to be made for repelling any assault against the Flagstaff Bastion; and from the unquestioned authority with which he seems to have given his instructions to the Chief of the Staff, it is made evident that the Admiral's virtual command of the land forces in Sebastopol, no less than of the seamen, was still unimpaired.¹

At the gates of the boulevard Captain Gendre tried to dissuade Korniloff from undertaking his intended visit to the Karabel faubourg; and he based this attempt on the ground that the Admiral was already acquainted with the condition of things in that part of the lines: but Korniloff answered, 'What will the soldiers say of me if they do not see me to-day?'

Korniloff now descended the road leading down to the head of the Man-of-war Harbor; and at the Péressip, he

was his aid-de-camp, Shestakoff, who, up to that time, had not quitted his chief for a moment.

¹ I have thought it worth while to make this remark, lest it should be supposed that the appointment of another officer as Chief of the (army) Staff, had abridged Korniloff's power. At the time of his acquiring a kind of dictatorship by acclamation, Korniloff himself, as we saw (*ante*, chap. x. p. 148), was made Chief of the (army) Staff, in order that his authority over the land forces might be undisputed; and Mentschikoff did not disapprove the arrangement, but he afterward varied it by appointing as Chief of the (army) Staff an officer of the land service much devoted to Korniloff, and quite understanding (apparently) that he was virtually under the Admiral's orders.

The meeting of was met by Todleben then returning from the Kar-
 Korniloff and abel faubourg. During some minutes, and for the
 Todleben at last time, the two great defenders of Sebastopol—
 the PéreSSIP. I called them the soul and the mind of the undertaking—took
 counsel together. Todleben by this time had completed his
 inspection of the defenses along the whole of the front as-
 sailed by the Allies; and although he had found the Redan
 reduced to a critical state by the fire of the English, he was
 able to report the success of the exertions since made to re-
 pair the harm done. His visit to the Karabel faubourg hav-
 ing been thus recent, it might seem that there was the less
 reason for Korniloff's going thither; but the Admiral had
 resolved, as we know, that in every part of the lines assailed
 the men should see their chief.

Accordingly, he parted from Todleben, and riding on to
 the eastern or Karabel slope of the ravine, he as-
 cended it, as he had often before done in these
 lines of defense cended it, as he had often before done in these
 in the Karabel latter days of his life, by the steps cut out in the
 faubourg. rock. He was quickly in the Redan; and he
 His presence in found that the work, though undergoing a cross-
 the Redan. fire of great weight and power from the English batteries,
 was now, as Todleben had intimated, in a good condition for
 State of things maintaining the defense. All the guns in the
 there. works were firing; and the number of killed and
 wounded was not yet very great, because the breastworks
 covered the men at the guns, and the infantry reserves had
 been so stationed as to be little exposed to fire; but the bar-
 racks near the gorge of the work were already a mere heap
 of ruins, and all the space in rear of the Redan was plowed
 up by English shells.

Several of the chief officers in command at the Redan ac-
 companied Korniloff in his inspection of the work. Not
 deeming it needful for their beloved chief to be thus survey-
 ing the lines under the heavy fire of the English batteries,
 they affectionately expressed the pain with which they saw
 him exposing his life to so great a danger; but they could
 not move him from his purpose. When they learned that he
 was going to the Malakoff Hill, they prayed that
 at least he would take the route by the hospital
 suburb; for they said it was impossible for a man
 to pass on horseback along the line of the trenches without
 being struck down. Korniloff smiled, and said, 'You can
 never run away from a shot.'

Accompanied by Captain Gendre, his aid-de-camp, and fol-
 lowed by a single Cossack, Korniloff now descended the hill

along the line of the trenches, near the garden of Colonel Prokophieff. There the cover was not so high as even to shelter the horses; but the Admiral rode quietly on under a heavy fire, and commented as he went on the plans of the Allied army. In this part of his ride, the aid-de-camp wondered to find that the round-shot, humming loud through the air, and plowing the earth on all sides, yet always left space for three horsemen to pass on unhurt in the storm; and he got to imagine at last that Fate and a 'happy star' had made sacred the life of his chief.

After changing the position of the 'Moscow' battalions, by moving them to a ground where they would be sheltered from the enemy's fire, Korniloff passed the dock-bridge and began to ascend the western slope of the Malakoff. When he came near the seamen on duty in that part of the field, they greeted him with loud cheers; but Korniloff forbade them. He pointed to the crest of Mount Rodolph, where all was now hushed, and said to his people, 'When the English 'batteries are as silent as the French yonder, then, and not 'till then, we will cheer.'

Korniloff ascended the Malakoff Hill from the side of the Karabel suburb, and gained the right flank of the intrenchment which covered the front of the tower. He quitted his saddle and began to go through the batteries on foot. The fire was very heavy. When Korniloff reached the tower, he found that its guns had been silenced and deserted; but Admiral Istomin still answered the English by a well-sustained fire from the earthworks which covered and flanked the stone building. It occurred to Korniloff that the ground floor of the tower would be suitable for an ambulance or field-hospital, and he gave directions accordingly. After this, he was going to mount the upper floor of the tower, but Admiral Istomin dissuaded him from doing so, saying that no one would be found on the top. Korniloff remained for some time at the foot of the tower. His aid-de-camp begged him to return home; and in answer he pointed to the ground where the Boutir and Borodino regiments were stationed, saying, 'We will just go to those 'battalions, and after that we will go home by the hospital 'road.' He still loitered for a few minutes longer, but at length—it was then half-past eleven o'clock—he said, 'Now 'let us go.' He moved toward the spot under shelter of the breastwork where the horses were awaiting him; but he had

The wound he there received.

scarcely yet taken four steps when the uppermost part of his left thigh was shattered by a round-

shot. Gendre raised the head of the wounded chief, and the other officers near coming up and lifting him in their arms, they together laid their Admiral under the shelter of the breastwork, between two of the guns. For a moment, Korniloff was able to speak, and he so used his waning power of utterance as to say, 'Defend Sebastopol!' He then became senseless.

Korniloff was carried to one of the nearest ambulances; and having, when there, recovered full consciousness, he took the sacrament of his Church. He knew that he was to be taken to the hospital, and perceiving that men shrank from the duty of lifting him for fear of the pain they must give, he undertook the task himself, and, by a singular effort, contrived to throw his mangled body upon the litter which awaited him. He was carried to the hospital. There, at intervals, he underwent pangs so cruel as to wring from him more than once a shriek of agony; but at a moment when he was free from sharp pain, he laid both hands upon the head of the Chief of the Staff who stood at his side, and said, 'Tell every body how pleasant it is to die when the conscience 'is quiet.' He sent tender words to his wife and to his children; and from time to time he prayed thus: 'O God! bless 'Russia and the Emperor. Save Sébastopol and the fleet!' After taking an anodyne potion he was tranquil, and seemed to be dozing; but upon an officer coming in with a story that 'the English batteries had been almost silenced, and 'that only two of their guns were still firing,' Korniloff seems to have become aware that the new arrival had brought with it tidings which interested the by-standers, for he roused himself to ask 'Who was there?' and as soon as he was told of

His death. the English guns being silenced, he collected his last strength and cried out, 'Hurrah! hurrah!' He then became insensible. After a few minutes he ceased to breathe.¹

Thus Korniloff died. In an earlier page I have spoken of his valiant, devoted nature; and, indeed, he had a soul of such quality that men who abhor truthless praise might yet dare to call it heroic. There, it would seem, lay the main source of his power; for although

The heroic
quality of his
nature.

¹ Narrative by the Chief of the Staff, who was present. The narrative is given in the 'Matériaux pour servir.' The story which the officer had brought in of the English batteries being nearly silenced was founded apparently upon the circumstance of there having occurred a short lull in the firing—a lull resulting from a momentary failure of the ammunition lying in immediate readiness.

he well proved himself to be an able administrator, very careful for the weal of his people, there is no safe ground for inferring that he had all those varied gifts which go to make a great commander; and it must always, of course, be remembered that the wisdom and the vigor of his thousand measures for the defense of Sebastopol were owing in no small degree to the guidance of another man's mind.

In a sense, it might be agreed that, so far as concerns the fame of the man, there was almost enough of duration in those twenty-six days of illustrious life which Heaven vouchsafed to Korniloff; for in part, as we know, the evading army had already come back to its task; and short as was the period of the Admiral's dictatorship, he at least had outlived that dark hour when the peril besetting Sebastopol created the need of a hero. I imagine it probable that, if the Admiral had not been slain, his authority, though wielded so nobly, would have been soon curtailed.¹ It could hardly have long survived the cessation of those supreme dangers to which its existence was owing.

If the defense of Sebastopol was now so far provided for as to be no longer dependent upon the enthusiasm of the garrison and the romantic devotion of Korniloff, still on this day, when the assault of the place seemed impending, there was needed at least a commander whom all would obey with trustful loyalty; and after Korniloff's death no one succeeded to the power he had been wielding. True, Prince Mentschikoff was the Commander of all the forces in the Crimea, both military and naval; but, besides that the Prince had proved himself wanting in ability for the conduct of a battle, he was absent from the beleagured town, and not, it seems, willing for the day to come back to the scene of the conflict. Admiral Nachimoff succeeded to the naval command which Korniloff had exercised, but that control of the land forces which had been given, as it were, by universal acclamation to the Admiral now lying dead, relapsed into the hands of General Möller. The command of the forces thus became split into two; and although there was nothing in this circumstance which made it impracticable to go on with the work of the engineers and the gunners along the

Question whether a longer span of life would have been likely to add to the brilliancy of his fame.

After Korniloff's death, the control of the forces defending Sebastopol no longer remained centered in one man.

The embarrassment likely to result from divided command in the event of an assault.

¹ Notwithstanding what I have said (*ante*, p. 271, note), I still think that the mere fact of superseding Korniloff as Chief of the military Staff denoted an intention of gradually abridging his authority.

lines of defense, it was evidently to be apprehended that the want of a single and trusted commander might come to be grievously felt if the Allies should deliver their assault in the course of this same afternoon.

An effort, it seems, was made to conceal the death of the Admiral, and there were some at least of the garrison who did not learn what had happened till almost the close of the day. Upon coming to know the truth, the sailors, and the soldiery too, grieved bitterly for the loss of their trusted chief and dictator, who had caused men to stand to their guns when the fleet and the army alike seemed to abdicate all warlike purpose. And along with this grief for the loss of a trusted leader, there was the sorrow of the humble thousands, both seamen and soldiers, who had come to know how much of their welfare was owing to the skillful administration and the watchful care of their beloved Admiral. From time to time there had been posted up numbers of general orders, in which Korniloff gave directions tending to relieve the sufferings of the men, and in many ways add to their comfort. These announcements remained on the walls long after the death of the chief whose name stood in print at the foot of them; and, the benefits conferred by his care being still retained and enjoyed, the grateful men, as they passed, used to look up and point to the words, and bless the memory of their hero, saying often, in that gentle and poetic spirit which is characteristic of the Muscovite people, 'Our Admiral still watches over us!'

II.

Meanwhile, the fleets of the Allies, though they had not yet come into action, were standing in toward the roads of Sébastopol.

The captains of the English ships were apparently right when they counseled that their fire should be withheld until the moment of the intended assault, but their opinion had not been adopted by the Generals; and, it having been once determined that a naval attack should be undertaken for the avowed purpose of adding to the moral effect which the land cannonade might produce, there was reason enough for determining that it should begin at the same time — that is, at half-past six in the

Endeavor to conceal for a time the fact of Korniloff's death.

The grief of the sailors and of the soldiery.

The feelings with which his memory was regarded.

If the naval attack was meant to add to the moral effect of the land cannonade, it was important that it should begin at the same time.

Accordingly, it was so determined.

morning. Accordingly, it was so agreed by Lord Raglan and Canrobert.¹

Already Lyons had written to Lord Raglan, 'We shall hear each other at half-past six in the morning, and I am not without hopes of our seeing each other in the course of the day in Sebastopol;' and at half-past ten at night Dundas was announcing to Lord Raglan by letter that he had completed his arrangements for the morrow. But at that hour the subversive announcement, which soon afterward reached the 'Britannia,' had yet to come; and in a postscript to the very note which stated that his dispositions had been made, Dundas was obliged to add, 'Since writing the above, I have had a communication from Admiral Hamelin, and find he does not intend commencing his fire before ten or eleven o'clock, as his shot would not last long, and, if expended early, the enemy might² that he was beaten off. I mention this to explain to your Lordship why the fleets do not begin their fire early in the day.' Dundas acceded to the reason which Hamelin adduced, and consented to the proposed change of time.³

Just before midnight on the 16th, the time for the attack was postponed at the instance of the French Admiral.

It had been determined apparently that the attack of the forts should be executed by ships which, keeping always in movement, would deliver their fire in succession,⁴ and having

¹ On the 16th, the eve of the engagement, Colonel Trochu's memorandum of the agreement to which Canrobert and Lord Raglan had come upon this point is express: 'Le feu commencera demain 17 Octobre vers 6 heures $\frac{1}{2}$ du matin au signal donné par trois bombes parties des ouvrages Français. La marine est invitée à se conformer à cette disposition.' Lord Raglan, in his own handwriting, has indorsed the memorandum with these words: 'Put by. This paper was drawn up by Colonel Trochu in my room, on the 16th of October, in my presence, and that of General Rose and General Canrobert.'

² In the original note, now lying before me, there is an omission of the word which the writer must have meant to insert after 'might.' The letter is printed in the Journal of the Royal Engineers, and the hiatus is there supplied, I see, by the word 'think.'

³ In a note written that night to Lyons, Dundas, after mentioning Hamelin's postponement of the hour, and his reason for it, adds, 'I think the reason a fair one, and I mean to act upon it.' Lyons, on the contrary, says, writing to Lord Raglan, 'I confess that I can not understand their [the French] leaving the decision to you, and then acting at variance with that decision' (P.S. written after midnight on the eve of the engagement).

⁴ I say 'apparently,' because, though there are good grounds for believing the above statement to be accurate, I do not observe any mention of this superseded plan in the strictly authentic documents which are the foundation of what comes next in the text.

given way to the French in regard to the time for beginning, Dundas perhaps suffered himself to hope that thenceforth he would be left free to execute his part of the joint naval enterprise without undergoing fresh guidance.

But at seven o'clock in the morning of the 17th, Admiral Hamelin, to the astonishment of Dundas, came on board the 'Britannia,' and announced a new plan of attack. To say that he 'proposed' it to Dundas for his consideration would be to mislead.

By the means which will be presently shown, he forced it upon the English Admiral. It would seem, however, that Admiral Hamelin spoke in the name of his commanding officer, General Canrobert, and not as an Admiral propounding any scheme of his own; for, personally, Admiral Hamelin is believed to have been ever loyal in his relations with Dundas;¹ and he was not a man who would willingly have outraged his English colleague by undertaking to put him under compulsion.

Nor, indeed, is it likely that Canrobert himself would have been inclined to enter upon any such line of action at a time when his judgment was holding its full sway;² for besides that he was of a friendly, generous nature, and had learned something by this time of the worth of the English on shore, he knew that at sea they were not without some renown; and he hardly could have believed, in any calm moment, that it was right for him to refuse them a free voice in the counsels which were to govern the operations of the Allied navy, including, of course, their own fleet; but he had been so constituted that, when called upon as a commander to form important resolves, his mind became the prey to a distressing kind of anxiety, which unfitted him (as he soon came to learn) for the wielding of an army in the field; and if now he broke loose from the plain obligations of the Alliance by peremptorily imposing upon the English navy—and that upon pain of finding all joint action suspended—the last and the feeblest of the notions which successively tormented his fancy, it is certain enough that he was far from intending discourtesy, and that he had no other object than that of

¹ Dundas well knew, I believe, that Hamelin, when he had to make communications of this unwarrantable sort, was acting under the peremptory orders of his commanding officer, General Canrobert; and I believe the English Admiral's friends will bear me out when I say that he always spoke warmly of Hamelin's loyal disposition toward him.

² The loyal and friendly way in which Canrobert (when not tormented by anxiety) could conduct his relations with the English is shown, I think, *ante*, p. 90.

pressing, with an almost hysteric force, for the adoption of a measure which his doubting and agonized mind had suddenly represented to him as the one that was the best for the common cause.

By this new plan it was laid down, that instead of an operation effected by ships kept in motion, the two The particulars of the new plan of attack. fleets, whilst engaging the forts, should be anchored in line; that the array of the French fleet should begin at Chersonese Bay, proceeding thence in a north-north-easterly direction to a point opposite the centre of the harbor; and that from thence, but in a line taking a north-easterly direction, the English fleet should be ranged. By examining this plan with the aid of a chart, and assuming that the French line would commence at that part of the bay which the 'Charlemagne' actually took, it results that the French fleet was to be at distances of from 1600 to 2000 yards from the Quarantine Sea-fort (the nearest of the forts which it proposed to assail), and that the English fleet would have to engage Fort Constantine at ranges equally long.

Such was the plan which the last deliberations of the The plan insisted upon by the French as an ultimatum. French had brought them to adopt; and scarce credible though it may seem, Admiral Hamelin caused Dundas to understand that the French were determined to have this line or none.

There was no time for an appeal to the good sense or The dilemma in which Dundas was placed. good feeling of General Canrobert, and the dilemma in which Dundas now found himself placed was complete. Either he must come to such a breach with his tormentors as might endanger the delicate structure of the Alliance, and at all events prevent the united action of the two fleets, or else he must consent to draw up his ships at preposterous ranges, and engage alongside of the French in what (if it should not involve a painful and useless sacrifice) must be almost a mock battle. It was an addition to his troubles that he could not much speak the language of the nation which thus put him under compulsion. And this was the 'command in the Mediterranean,' that pleasant marine retirement which a good, faithful Whig had been earning by toil at the Board in Whitehall, by toil in the lobbies of the House of Commons, by long and enduring patience on the cushions of the Treasury Bench! The times were no more when he could have what men call 'quiet life;' and of the only two paths which lay open to him, each was so beset with evil that, upon the whole, as it seemed to him, the least pernicious thing he could do was to consent to range with the

French in their planned line of battle, and deliver a vain cannonade. True, he was so bitterly reluctant to adopt a measure which he saw must be mortifying and hurtful to the self-respect of our navy, that he withheld his assent till Hamelin—in the very act, it seems, of leaving the ship—had declared outright that, since he could not have the English fleet with him, he must act alone;¹ but when that last pang of the torture had been inflicted, Dundas yielded. He did not deceive himself. Though his volition was pliant under any hard stress of this sort, his judgment, it would seem, remained always unwarped; and he had not the solace of imagining that perhaps, after all, the measures forced upon him might turn out to be good ones. He has caused it to be formally and officially recorded that he gave his consent to the new plan because he saw that the French were determined to have this line or none.²

Dundas's reluctant acceptance of the new plan.

His declared reason for accepting it.

It was thus that, by means of a sudden and peremptory change adopted and enforced as an ultimatum on the very morning of an intended attack, the lever of the precious Alliance could be used and applied without mercy to an admiral commanding our fleet.

The effect of the course thus taken by Canrobert.

The midnight and the new morning changes thus forced upon Dundas obliged him, of course, to confer anew with Lyons, as well as with the captains of his ships; and he summoned them on board the 'Britannia.' There, at nine o'clock, they assembled. Dundas explained what had been required of him. I gather that with one mind, if not with one voice, the assembled captains condemned the new plan; and one of them put a question to the Admiral which tended to lay bare its weakness. Thereupon, Dundas rang a bell, and sent

9 A.M. 17th Oct. Dundas's conference with his ships' captains.

By them the French plan was unani-

¹ I have some reason for believing that Admiral Bouet de Willaumez, who was present, would corroborate this last statement.

² '6.45 A.M.—The siege-batteries and Russian forts opened fire. 7 A.M.—Admiral Hamelin came on board, and proposed a new line of attack—viz., 'the French N.N.E. from Chersonese Bay to the centre of the harbor, and 'the English from thence N.E. This was agreed to, as the French seemed 'determined to have that line or none.'—*Admiral's Journal*, entry under date of 17th October, 1854. When Dundas uses the words 'or none,' I understand him to mean *none in concert with him*. What Hamelin, I believe, threatened was—not to abstain from all naval action, but—to act independently.

mously condemned, but reluctantly assented to.

for the chart; but the captains did not come to precise conclusions as to the ranges at which the ships taking part in the array would have to act.¹ They apparently judged that the service would be one of greater danger to the ships than it proved to be; but, in regard to the hopelessness of the intended attack, they did not deceive themselves. However, they deferred to authority.

It must be acknowledged that the English were good, easy allies. As on the morning of the landing they had made haste to accept the change, and to mend the confusion which the French had created by altering the place of the buoy,² so now our ships' captains gave proof that even under such a trial as this—and it was nothing less than that of having to play out before Europe a play which each saw to be a sorry one—they could keep themselves free from the guilt of that which the churches call 'schism.'

The English Admiral had to form, with the French, a line of ships riding at anchor, which was to stretch in unbroken array across the approaches of the roadstead; and although it is true that to a portion of Admiral Hamelin's fleet this design seemed to offer a fair opportunity of ruining the work which we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, yet so far as concerned the rest of the French, and the whole of the English Navy, the proposed operation was calculated, as it seemed, to be in some degree hazardous, and at the same time thoroughly impotent. Under such conditions, the task imposed on our seamen was sacrificial rather than warlike; and apparently it was in the spirit of devotion to a forlorn duty that Dundas chose the place in which to put his own flag-ship; for when, in the course of this conference, an officer, whose opinion was weighty, pointed out that the ship which should be on the extreme right of the English line must of necessity be sunk in one hour, Dundas quietly answered that that post was the one he had reserved for the 'Britannia.'² That por-

The readiness with which the English yielded to constraints of this kind put upon them by their Allies.

The nature of the service which Dundas imposed upon himself when he submitted to the change of plan which had been forced upon him.

The place he chose for the 'Britannia.'

¹ They had not, of course, before them all the requisite data for coming to such conclusions, unless they knew the exact *part* of Chersonese Bay at which the French line of battle was to commence, and upon that, apparently, they were imperfectly informed.

² See vol. i. chap. xxxix.

² General Brereton, p. 26. Upon the supposition that the French line would commence at the eastern part of the Chersonese Bay, the centre of the whole array would be brought very near to the mouth of the roadstead;

The main division.

Arrangement separating a portion of the English fleet from the main division.

The in-shore squadron.

The English steamships which were to be kept under way.

tion of the English fleet which was to anchor in the array enforced upon Dundas, and prolong the French line of battle, will be called the 'main division.'

In the course of the discussion, it was determined (as we shall afterward see more particularly) that some portion at least of the fleet should be exempted from the necessity of taking part with the French in their vain line of battle; and as the ships thus excepted were dispatched on a separate service, which brought them to closer quarters with the forts, they will be called the 'in-shore squadron.'

The ships of both the main division and the detached squadron were to be at anchor while delivering their attack; but Dundas had, besides, four steam-frigates, the 'Sampson,' the 'Tribune,' the 'Terrible,' and the 'Sphinx;' a steam-sloop called the 'Spitfire,' and a steam-gunboat called the 'Lynx.' These steamers were left free to move as might be advisable, without casting anchor; but the 'Sphinx,' having a freight of ammunition on board, was ordered to keep out of range. In his instructions to the captain of the 'Tribune,' the duty of helping disabled ships was the one upon which Dundas most carefully insisted.

The three great sea-forts which were so placed as to be able to engage the fleets.

From the time when, on the eve of the war, Captain Drummond, of the 'Retribution,' had come back from Sebastopol with the result of the survey which he then found means to effect, the state of its sea and harbor defenses had been very well known to the Allies.¹ The main object of these works were,—to prevent an enemy's ships from entering the

and in that case, there was good reason for believing that, if the fleets should be ranged at any moderate distance from Sebastopol, the enemy's batteries would cross their fire with destructive effect upon any ship occupying the central post reserved for the 'Britannia.' With regard to General Brereton, it may be right to say that he was the guest of Admiral Dundas on board the 'Britannia,' was in the entire confidence of the Vice-Admiral, and with him in fact all day.

¹ It was in January, 1854, I think, that Captain Drummond, upon some specious pretext, took leave to enter the roadstead of Sebastopol. Whilst he lay in the roadstead, at some little distance from the inner or Man-of-war Harbor, the number of guns bearing on the 'Retribution' was no less than 350. I imagine that any one acquainted (from Russian sources) with the sea-forts of Sebastopol, and examining Captain Drummond's report, as well as the plan which accompanies it, would be struck with the exceeding accuracy of the survey which the 'Retribution' effected.

roadstead; to destroy them very speedily if they should ever succeed in doing so; and, failing even that, to sink them in any endeavor to approach or to penetrate the Man-of-war Harbor. So large a proportion of the defensive works had been designed for these purposes, that (not counting those two small works, the Wasp Tower and the Telegraph Battery, of which we shall hear by and by) three only of all the water-side forts were so placed as to be able to take part in an engagement with ships keeping clear of the entrance. These three forts were Fort Constantine, Fort Alexander, and the Quarantine Sea-fort.

Fort Constantine on the north, and Fort Alexander on the south, of the entrance, were, both of them, works of prime importance, not only from their size, strength, and power, but also because it was evident, from the position of these two great fastnesses, that the capture or destruction of either would be an event that might govern the fate of Sebastopol.

Like the rest of the great stone forts which defended the coast and harbor, Fort Constantine and the casemated portion of Fort Alexander were built of a very strong limestone called the 'stone of the steppes.'¹ The average height above the level of the sea of the guns ranged in all these great sea-forts was, for the casemated tiers, about 26 feet, and for the open-air batteries on the top, from 30 to 40 feet.² The fronting stone walls of these two forts were from 5½ to 6 feet thick; and the vault-roofs which protected the storeys below from the effects of vertical fire had a thickness, including all their fillings and the layer of earth on the top, of from 6 to 12 feet.³

Fort Constantine had an armament of 97 pieces, disposed in the manner which will be indicated in a later page.

Fort Alexander mounted, in all, 56 guns, of which 27 were in casemates.⁴ Of these 56 guns there were 51 which, in the course of the engagement (though only at long range) could be brought to bear upon the French or the English ships.⁵

The third and last of the three great works which were so placed as to be liable to become engaged with the fleets was the Quarantine Sea-fort. Amidst all the haze that there was in the mind which

The one definite purpose involved in the French plan.

¹ Todleben, p. 93.

² Ibid. p. 334.

³ Ibid. p. 93.

⁴ Ibid. p. 96.

⁵ Ibid. p. 333.

planned for the navy this attack of the 17th of October, there stood out one lesser object which was aimed at with a clearly-defined intent. That object was the destruction of the Quarantine Sea-fort. The work stood detached at some distance west of Sebastopol. It had been constructed so early as the year 1818. Whilst the great casemate fastnesses of Constantine and Alexander were the chief of the forts, north and south, which lay couched to expect an intruder and forbid his approach to the roadstead, the batteries of the Quarantine Sea-fort were so placed as to be competent to help with great means toward the same end; but, standing on a double-tongued promontory, with a command over the water in many directions, the fort also secured to its holders their control of the Quarantine Bay—a dominion of high importance to the land defense of Sebastopol.

The fort was at the water's edge, and so formed that it threw out a salient upon each of the two tongues of land which it occupied; and, the two salients being connected by a curtain fronting toward the sea, and having retours toward the gorge, a newly-constructed redan, which now closed the whole work on the side of the country, gave it the character of a completed redoubt of small profile.¹ Unlike the great castles at the mouth of the roadstead, this Quarantine Sea-fort had no casemated tier; so that the 58 guns with which it stood armed were all in open-air batteries, and fired from over the parapet.² There were 48 of its pieces that could be brought to bear on the Allied fleets, and of those, as many as 33 could be used against the French.³

It is true that the conquest of the fort would not, like the conquest of Fort Constantine or Fort Alexander, be an event carrying bodily with it the fate of Sebastopol; but, in the event of the place holding out for a time, the dominion of the Quarantine Bay could not but be of great value to the Allies. Above all, the undertaking seemed to be not merely feasible, but easy; for with a replying power of only 33 pieces, the 58 guns of the Russians—all standing in open-air batteries—were to be under the starboard broadsides of the whole of the French line of battle, and the depth of the water was such that the ships,

Determination
of the French
to attack it.

¹ Todleben, p. 95.

² Ibid. p. 334.

³ Ibid. pp. 332, 333. The Quarantine Sea-fort is the one which the Russians call 'Number Ten.' The details of the armament of the three forts spoken of in this section will be found in the Appendix.

if so men should choose, could be brought to close quarters with the Fort.

In an earlier page we saw that a main ground for pressing the Admirals to undertake an attack with their ships was the hope of its increasing the confusion and terror that might be inflicted upon the garrison by the opening of the fire from the trenches; and that, accordingly, the onslaught of the fleets had been ordained to begin simultaneously with the land cannonade, at half-past six in the morning; but we afterward had to be told that the hour of the naval attack was postponed, at the instance of Admiral Hamelin. We have since been learning that at half-past ten the land batteries of the French were silenced. After that, there was no room for hoping that the garrison just relieved from the pressure of the batteries on Mount Rodolph would be thrown into a state of dismay by a distant cannonade from the ships. But the arrangements for the naval attack had been made. They were not countermanded; and the result was a coincidence both perverse and exact. At half-past ten in the morning, the project of a naval attack ceased to offer its promised advantage. At half-past ten in the morning, the movement of the squadrons began.

The bulk of the Allied fleet had been lying in the roads off the Katcha, and in the column of ships thence advancing the French had the foremost place, being followed by Admiral Dundas with that part of the English fleet which we call the 'main division.'¹ Some of the ships had on board them their own steam-power.² The rest were


The order of advance from the roads off the Katcha.

The steam power of the Allies.

¹ This order in the advance seems to have resulted from the arrangement which placed the French on the right hand—*i. e.*, on the southern side—of the intended array at the time of the landing. The French fleet off the Katcha being already to the southward of the English, and having to move in a southerly direction, was naturally in advance from the first.

² Amongst the French ships destined to exert the strength of their fire, there were three—the 'Napoleon,' the 'Jean Bart,' and the 'Charlemagne'—which had, each of them, her own steam-power on board her. The English had no such ships in their 'main division;' for their 'Agamemnon' (as also their 'Sanspareil') formed part of the 'in-shore squadron;' and although, as we saw, they had besides, 4 steam-frigates, a steam-sloop, and a steam-gunboat, those six vessels were not destined to anchor and form a part of the Allied line designed by the French.

Of 17th Oct. 1854, with the sea-forts of Sebastopol, showing the array of the French Fleet.



Mode of applying it to the sailing-ships.

moved by steam-vessels—towing in the ordinary way, but—lashed alongside them; for the intention was, that upon coming within range, each sailing-ship should, on one side, protect with her bulk the steam-vessel lashed alongside her, and, on the other, should present an armed broadside to some of the enemy's batteries. With the exception of the 'London,' the ships having steamers attached to them were to fight with their starboard broadsides.

Fire opened by the Russian forts.

At one o'clock in the afternoon, Admiral Hamelin's fleet was closing upon its destined anchorage off the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead; and when, somewhat later, he was in process of forming line, the Russian forts opened fire upon such of his ships as already had come under range. Then instantly Dundas gave the signal to his in-shore squadron of which we shall afterward hear. Pending the completion of their array, the French

The calm silence of the French ships.

ships vouchsafed no reply to the Forts; and their silence during those teeming moments was more expressive of power than the roar of six hundred great guns when firing at too long a range.

The array and position of the French fleet.

Consisting (along with two Turkish vessels of war) of not less than thirteen fighting ships, with the steam-power needed for moving it, this French fleet at length came to anchor, and then lay ranged in a line which began with the 'Charlemagne,' near the mouth of the Chersonese Bay, and extended thence more than a mile;¹ but the part of the bay where this line commenced was so far toward the west that the Admiral's flag-ship (which took her place near the centre) was some 1600 yards distant from the Quarantine Sea-fort, whilst the ship at each extremity of the array was 1800 yards or more from the nearest of the enemy's works.²

High tone and quality of officers and men in the French navy.

Their presumed dislike of false heroics.

Surmise as to the cause which may have led to the adoption of Admiral

Knowing the high quality of the French navy, I am led to imagine that the signal which preceded the engagement must have been chosen in expectation of a really great battle, or else had been fashioned beforehand, and enforced upon the reluctant Admiral by some paramount authority. If conjecture in regard to the authorship could be safely indulged, it would point to the ruler of France. But whether Admiral Hamelin was acting of his own free-will or by compulsion, his words, it

¹ For the names of the ships, see the plan.

² See the accompanying plan. The exact direction of the French line was, as we saw, to be N.N.E.

Hamelin's signal to his fleet.

historic grandeur, if followed by a corresponding achievement. He ran up for his signal,—‘*La France vous regarde!*’

The words of the signal.

It was about half-past one when the French fleet opened fire from more than 600 guns.¹ The fire was directed (at ranges of from 1800 to 3700 yards) against Fort Alexander, against the town, and also against the ships in the roadstead; but the main object of the attack—at ranges already shown—was the Quarantine Sea-fort.

Opening of fire by the French fleet with more than 600 guns.

The range of their fire.

As soon as the French opened fire, Dundas ordered the ‘*Terrible*,’ the ‘*Tribune*,’ and the ‘*Sampson*’ to engage the enemy.²

Dundas orders three of the steam-frigates kept under way to engage the enemy.

The number of guns with which the Russian forts were able to answer the French fleet.

The Quarantine Sea-fort was able to answer Admiral Hamelin with a fire of 33 guns, whilst his ships were also under a fire of 17 pieces, discharged from Fort Alexander at a range of some 2000 yards, and of 23 pieces, in the rounded part of Fort Constantine, which could be worked against a part of his fleet, though at a range of more than 3000 yards. Altogether, there were 73 guns in the Forts which replied to the 600 guns discharged from the starboard broadsides of the French fleet.³

During several hours, the cannonade directed against the Quarantine Sea-fort was continued by Admiral Hamelin; and, the work not being casemated, there seemed to be fair ground for trusting that its batteries must be overwhelmed and brought to ruin by the vast weight of metal with which the French fleet was assailing them. It happened that an immensely large proportion of the missiles thus hurled by the French fleet shot a little to the east of the work for which they were destined, and swept the empty space between the fort and the town in so thick and so ceaseless a storm that, until to-

Engagement of the French fleet with the Quarantine Sea-fort.

¹ Number of guns on board the fighting ships of the Franco-Turkish line, not including the ‘*Shérif*.’..... 1412
Deduct one-half, *i. e.*, the guns on the port side..... 706

Guns on the starboard, or fighting broadsides..... 706

I, however, speak of ‘six hundred’ as approximately representing the number of guns, because I have an impression that there were two 80-gun ships and one 90-gun ship which were not called upon to deliver fire.

² The order was by signal.—*Log of the ‘Britannia.’*

³ Todleben, p. 332.

ward the close of the day, the Russians judged it hardly possible for a man to pass unscathed; and, all communication being thus cut off for a period of several hours, there was anxiety in Sebastopol for the fate of the Quarantine Sea-fort. This anxiety increased, nay, almost changed into grief, when it was observed that the work had all at once ceased firing; but at length a volunteer, Lieutenant Troitsky, undertook to endeavor to make his way to the fort. He succeeded, and was soon able to come back and astonish his hearers by informing them, to their great joy, not only that the fort was safe, but that it had suffered no material loss or injury, and had only ceased firing because the French ships were judged to lie at too great a distance to allow of their guns being answered by any effective fire.

Of the 58 guns arming the fort, three only were dismounted, and seven had their carriages injured. Of the garrison—both infantry and artillerymen—which defended it, 8 were killed, 22 wounded, and 5 bruised.

We saw that the other work upon which, though at a yet greater range, the French fleet directed a portion of its fire was Fort Alexander. It is hardly imaginable that, in any way, however remote, the distant broadsides expended in such a direction could have been deemed conducive to the fall of Sebastopol; but they were a reply to the 17 guns brought to bear from that quarter; and, great as the range was, it admitted of some shots taking effect in the upper or open-air batteries of the fort. In this fort (Fort Alexander) 3 guns were dismounted, 3 gun-carriages injured, 3 men killed, 17 wounded, and 5 bruised.¹

These results the French fleet achieved; but whilst sustaining, as it did, heavy damage, and losing in killed and wounded 200 men, it had an opportunity of proving the skill, the coolness, the resource with which conflagrations and havoc of all kinds can be dealt with in battle by seamen. It displayed too that exalted kind of courage which, without being heated by the rapture of strife at close quarters, can yet make men steadfast in fight whilst their comrades from time to time are falling, some mangled, some slain, by an enemy ensconced behind ramparts.²

If the French seamen were exposed, and fruitlessly ex-

¹ Todleben, p. 334.

² The loss of the French fleet alone (without including the Turks acting with them) seems to have been 203.

The long range at which the French attempted to act was apparently the cause of their failure. posed, to a trial of this kind, it was apparently because they endeavored to operate against land fortifications at a range which, for such a purpose, was fatally long. It would seem that they must have been acting under some misconception of the distance at which a fleet undertaking to assail land defenses can most advantageously operate; for, so far as concerns depth of water, there was nothing to hinder the ships from coming to close quarters with the fort.

The works which the in-shore squadron undertook to engage were three:—
 The works which were to be assailed by the in-shore squadron.
 The Wasp.

At a bend of the coast north-east of Cape Constantine there stood that small fastness which the English surnamed the 'Wasp.' Overhanging the shore, at an elevation of 130 feet above the level of the sea, the work was so well covered round by its glacis, that, much as it made itself felt, the Allies, at the beginning of the war, hardly knew the form of its structure. They have since learned that it was a small square tower 27 feet high, with a diameter of 50 feet, and surrounded by a ditch. Besides a piece placed for the defense of its draw-bridge, it mounted on its summit 8 guns, being one at the centre of each of the four sides, and one at each of the four angles.¹ Of those 8 guns there were 5 that could be brought to bear upon shipping in the waters beneath.²

The Telegraph Battery was an earthwork on the cliff, which gave it an elevation of 100 feet above the level of the water. It was armed with 5 guns, all having command toward the sea.³

The great casemated fastness called Fort Constantine stood at the water's edge, and along with Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort contributed largely to the cross fire which defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. As we have already seen, it was a work built of stone, with a front wall of from

¹ Todleben, p. 118. The 'Wasp' was called by the Russians the Volkoff Tower. There was no sufficient room on the tower to work so many guns; and, according to some Russian statements, it was mainly with one gun that the tower from the beginning to the end of the war kept alive the attention of our seamen.

² Ibid. p. 333.

³ Ibid. p. 117. This was the work which the Russians called the Kartacheffsky Battery.

five and a half to six feet thick, and vaulted roofing from six to twelve feet thick. The work had the form of a horse-shoe, so placed upon a narrow spit of land that its right face was toward the sea, whilst its left looked up to the east, along the Sebastopol roadstead; and the rounded part of the work, which joined the right face to the left, defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. The fort contained two storeys of casemates, and had besides, on its summit, a tier of open-air batteries. At its gorge, the work was closed by a strong cazern with a crenelled wall for muskets, and casemates on the storey above for 11 guns. Altogether, the fort mounted 97 guns, of which more than 60 were in casemates, and 27 in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. Of these 97 guns there were 43, according to General de Todleben, that could be brought to bear upon some portion or other of the Allied fleet—that is to say, 23 (at a very long range) upon the French fleet, 18 upon the main division of the English fleet, and 2 only in the direction of a vessel approaching from the north along the five-fathom edge of the shoal.¹

But Nature had done a good deal to defend Fort Constantine from the guns of an enemy's shipping, for the spit on which the work stood was prolonged toward the sea by a shoal of such form and size, that it forced line-of-battle ships attempting an attack from the west to stand off to a distance of eleven or twelve hundred yards. Toward the north-west, however, there was a bend in the form of the shoal of which we shall presently speak.

The Allies had discovered the weak point which tended to mar the defensive powers of Fort Constantine; and with a view, if possible, to take advantage of the defect, it became important to know the boundary of the shoal with a greater exactness than that attained by the Admiralty charts. The exigency was no sooner felt than men came forward to meet it. On the night before the action, Mr. Mainprise the master of the 'Britannia,' Mr. Noddall the master of the 'London,' and Mr. Forbes the master of the 'Sampson,' volunteered to go in under cover of darkness and endeavor to take soundings. And this they did. Approaching the shore in boats with muffled oars, they boldly penetrated within the line of the enemy's look-out

The weak angle of the fort.

The shoal which protected Fort Constantine.

Soundings taken the night before the action.

¹ According to Todleben, those two guns were in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. It must be stated, however, that the actual experience of our in-shore squadron does not perfectly accord with Todleben's impressions. For the exact armament of Fort Constantine, see Appendix.

boats; and although they were repeatedly hailed by the enemy, they yet, by their skill and coolness, succeeded in achieving their purpose.

The result of this night's survey proved to be one of high interest to those who desired an attack on Fort Constantine. It turned out that, from a point opposite the Wasp Tower, and distant from it some six hundred yards, the five-fathom line ran parallel with the coast till it came to a spot within eight hundred yards of Fort Constantine;¹ but then, with a sudden bend, this five-fathom line passed trending away to the west and south-west, running parallel in that last direction with the seaward batteries of the fort, and at a distance from them of eleven or twelve hundred yards. From this configuration of the shoal it resulted that, although a line-of-battle ship attempting to attack from the west could not come at all near to Fort Constantine, she still would find water enough at that sudden bend just now mentioned, where the edge of the shoal was within eight hundred yards of the fort.

The form of the shoal north-west of Fort Constantine.
Point at which a ship of the line could approach to within 800 yards of the fort.

What made this formation of the shoal the more interesting was, the now apparent fact that the point where a great ship could float within eight hundred yards of the fort, was on that very line of impunity, or comparative impunity, where a vessel might act against the fort—nay, might rake it obliquely from its gorge to its eastern face—without incurring a fire from any great number of guns.

Before parting with Lyons on the morning of the action, Dundas (who had hitherto limited his designs to a mere prolongation of the French line) was moved to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered;² and having, as we saw, two powerful ships which were propelled by their own steam-power, and could therefore be wielded with an ease and exactness unattainable by any towed vessel, he at once perceived these to be the two ships which could best be charged with the duty of feeling their way to the edge of the shoal, and thence engaging Fort Constantine. Accordingly, he resolved to

Dundas's determination to detach some ships to the edge of the shoal off Fort Constantine.

¹ The five-fathom line sufficiently represents the boundary which kept off line-of-battle ships; and there was no question of attacking with gunboats or other small vessels.

² He was so moved, as I understand, by Lyons. I imagine that the merit of discovering the 'weak or 'dead angle' of the fort belonged in great part to the French, and that Lyons, in inviting attention to this subject, was in some degree conveying their suggestion.

dispatch Sir Edmund Lyons upon this service with the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Sanspareil.' The 'Agamemnon,' as before, carried the flag of Lyons, and Dacres commanded the 'Sanspareil.' Subsequently the 'London,' commanded by Captain Eden, was added to the force thus placed under Lyons.² At a later hour, the 'Albion' and the 'Arethusa' were detached from the main division, with orders to attack the Wasp, and the Telegraph Battery; and although these two ships at first had not been placed under Lyons, yet, as they acted in proximity to the ships which he commanded, and indeed were sent off from the main division before it got into action, they came to be included with the 'Agamemnon,' the 'Sanspareil,' and the 'London,' as a part of the force which we have called the in-shore squadron.³

Essential difference between the lot assigned to the main division and the lot assigned to the in-shore squadron.

In the nature of the lot which was assigned to the main division, and of that which fell to the share of the detached or in-shore squadron, there was this all-governing difference: The main division had a place assigned to it beforehand by the force of the lever which subjected our Admiral to the direction of the French; whilst, so far as concerns the ships in the in-shore squadron, Dundas was left free to place them in those positions which he judged to be the best for the purposes of attack.

At half-past twelve, the 'Agamemnon,' the 'Sanspareil,'

¹ 'Agamemnon,' 91 guns; 'Sanspareil,' 67. The current belief at the time was, that Lyons's attack on Fort Constantine was an act of his own free-will, not deriving at all from the authority of his chief; but that was an error. Lyons, I believe, conveyed to his chief the suggestion spoken of in the last note; but Dundas having seen the merit of it, and having also now learned the exact form of the shoal, was able to define the places which the 'Agamemnon' and 'Sanspareil' were to take, and this he says that he did at the morning's conference. In a private note to Sir James Graham, Dundas, after adverting to a statement which seemed to give sanction to the current belief above-mentioned, says: 'The position taken by every ship during the action was as defined by me in my conference with the captains previously; but during the action I was desirous of strengthening the position of the "Agamemnon," "Sanspareil," and "London," and I sent,' etc.—*27th November, 1854.*

² 'London,' 90 guns. It was at the earnest instance of Captain Eden himself that Lyons sought and obtained from Dundas permission to take the 'London.'

³ 'Albion,' 90 guns; 'Arethusa,' 50. In the authentic record of the fleet called the Admiral's 'Journal,' these ships are treated as being formally as well as substantially under the orders of Lyons; but since it happened that they moved at first with the bulk of the fleet, and had their towing steamers on the port side, it was very generally believed that they formed part of the main division.

Advance of the
in-shore squad-
ron.

and the 'London,' moved slowly on toward the south; but if Lyons and Dacres and Eden were now at last standing in for the long-studied forts

of Sebastopol, they needed some patience, or else some half-mutinous resolve, to sustain them under the weight of the distressing instructions which Dundas, on the eve of the action, had issued to some of his captains.¹ Until the very words shall come to light, it may be surmised that Dundas

The paper of
instructions is-
sued by Dun-
das on the eve
of the action.

was misconstrued; but by this paper the English Admiral was really understood to ordain that each captain to whom he addressed it must keep his ship out of danger. Yet the men to whom Dundas addressed these instructions were told by him that the object of the attack was 'the destruction of the enemy's batteries.' They were to seek a great victory, but only by a path of safety. So far as concerned the captains of ships in the main division of the fleet, the cramping force of this paper might not be intolerable; for their duty was to be one of a fixed kind, leaving only slight room for the exercise of discretion; but to men commanding ships in the in-shore squadron these orders might be much more embarrassing. I do not understand that at the conference any remonstrance was made by the captains who had received this paper; but some of them determined from the first to treat the instructions as null.

Supposing that the instructions had really the import ascribed to them, it would be quite just to say, in condemnation of Dundas, that either he should have refused to attack at all, or else should have given due power to his captains; but we have seen how far out of his reach the first alternative was; and in regard to the second, it may be well to remember that few people having authority are so constituted as to be able to carry out with great vigor the measures which they wholly condemn. In general, when men are forced to do what they disapprove, they render a sort of homage to the opinion they have been forced to desert, by doing as little as may be in the opposite direction. As our statesmen at home had sought rest for the soles of their feet in that shadowy land which they thought must lie somewhere between peace and war,² so, apparently, Dundas in his

¹ It was understood to have been a circular addressed to all the captains; but I have reason to doubt whether all received copies, for there are some who have no recollection of the circumstance. I have not myself seen a copy. One captain assures me that, purposely and in anger, he destroyed his copy before the action.

² After the disaster of Sinope. See vol. i. chap. xix.

pain had tried to find some middle term between doing and not doing—between the evil of undertaking a determined yet hopeless attack, and the all but impossible alternative of not attacking at all. Disapproving altogether the idea of assailing the forts with ships, he seems to have inferred that in proportion as he could attenuate the attack by confining it within cautious limits, he would be lessening its evil effect.

But whatever was the origin of the instructions, they were scattered to the winds when the naval engagement began. The men of the in-shore squadron had just been aroused by the opening of the fire against the French fleet,¹ when there flew out a signal from the 'Britannia.'² As they gazed at the fast-shifting flags, Lyons, Dacres, and Eden may have, all of them, expected with pain more warning, more caution, more hampering orders from the Commander-in-Chief; but perhaps Dundas now remembered his chilling instructions, and perceived that they were unfit for the guidance of a squadron standing in for the forts, or again it may be that his Scots blood at last had got heated, as the Scots blood commonly does when the din of fighting begins. At all events, his signal bore no such import as to make it unwelcome to even the most ardent of captains. The signal was this:—'Proceed and attack batteries.'

Already the 'Agamemnon' had cleared, or was clearing, for action; and upon the appearance of the signal her speed was increased.³ Presently, that she might take her place in the van, the 'Agamemnon' had to pass the 'Sanspareil.' There was friendship between Lyons and Dacres, and the people of the 'Agamemnon,' too, were united to those of the 'Sanspareil' by the bonds of a long-standing affection. Therefore, whilst the two ships were abreast, the crew of each welcomed the other, and welcomed, with the same roar of cheers, the long-desired fight then beginning.

When the ships passed under the guns of the cliff batteries, some shots were exchanged, but at first with little effect. The main purpose of the fire from the ships whilst thus moving along the coast was to raise up around them a shroud of smoke, which might more or less baffle the gunners at the Wasp and the Telegraph Battery.

¹ At 1.5, according to the log of the 'Agamemnon.'

² This was at 1.7, according to the log of the 'Agamemnon.'

³ To 40 revolutions.

Accelerated
advance of the
'Agamemnon.'

Her inter-
change of
cheers with
the 'Sanspa-
'reil.'

Fire delivered
and received
by the ships in
passing under
the guns of the
cliff batteries.

A bold offer had just now been made, which was destined to exert a great influence upon the tenor of the approaching combat. Mr. Edward Charles Ball, acting master, who had the command of a little steam-tender called the 'Circassia,' proposed to be allowed to move on with his small craft ahead of the 'Agamemnon,' in order to feel the way for the great ship by taking soundings for her, and leading her on as close to the shoal as prudence would allow. Lyons felt the value of such an offer, but thought it fair to warn Mr. Ball that his vessel would probably be sunk, telling him, however, at the same time, that, to meet that contingency, and to pick up the commander and his crew, the 'Agamemnon's' boats should be kept ready and manned. Mr. Ball did not hesitate an instant. Upon the suggestion of Lyons, he placed his little vessel upon the off-shore side of the 'Agamemnon,' and, as soon as the preconcerted signal was given, moved forward ahead of the great ship, and proceeded to find a path for her. In his first attempt to sound, the lead-line was struck out of the leadsman's hands by a shot; but this only caused Ball to search for another sounding-line; and although his small craft received nine shot in her hull, and his leadsman got wounded, he did not remit his task till he had guided the 'Agamemnon' to the very verge of the point to which she could move without grounding.¹

Whilst the 'Agamemnon' was slowly creeping on to the spot thus found for her, she received her first shot; and a few moments afterward she was hulled, and much harmed in her rigging, by shot coming from several quarters. At five minutes before two she let go her stream anchor by the stern in five fathoms and a half of water, and presently she dropped her small bower-anchor under foot in five fathoms. Then, by so moving the ship as to bring the stream-cable to her starboard quarter, her port broadside was laid on Fort Constantine with all the advantage that the position allowed. She opened her fire. The centre of the fort then bore nearly south-east of the ship, and at a distance from her of 800 yards.²

In such a position as this, after all his impatience for action, Lyons well might see room for contentment. He was so placed as to be assailing Fort Constantine almost in reverse, with power to rake its

¹ Lyons to Dundas, Dispatch, 18th October, 1854.

² The exact bearing of the fort was S.E. $\frac{1}{2}$ S.

NAVAL ENGAGEMENT
OF 17th Oct., 1854, with the sea-forts
of Sebastopol. The In-shore Squadron
proceeding to take up its position.



top batteries at a range of but 800 yards; and, although he was within 750 yards of the Telegraph Battery, within 1200 yards of the Wasp, and also under the fire of some thirteen guns which (at very long range) could be brought to bear upon him from the opposite side of the roadstead, yet, as concerns Fort Constantine itself, he had so happily struck upon its weak point as to be secure from most of its batteries. General de Todleben, indeed, has erred in supposing that there were only two guns, and those on the top platform of the fort, which could be brought to bear upon the 'Agamemnon;' for it is certain that she received shot and shell from some few, at least, if not more, of the guns in the casemated tiers; but it is not the less true that the ship took Fort Constantine at a great advantage, and that, so far as concerned the fire from that work, she enjoyed a comparative impunity.

Dacres, in the 'Sanspareil,' came up close astern of the 'Agamemnon;' and laying his port broadside toward the shore, opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 900 yards. For the purpose of the attack, the position of the 'Sanspareil' (if only she should be able to hold it) was regarded as admirable; but the ship was much more exposed than the 'Agamemnon' to the fire of guns on the cliff, more especially those of the Telegraph Battery.

Eden, in the 'London,' came up in the wake of the 'Sanspareil.' Anchoring close astern of her, he laid his port broadside toward the shore, and opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 1500 yards. So large a proportion of his crew was engaged in the land operations that, with only the numbers remaining on board his own ship, he could hardly have brought into play more than one-third part of her batteries; but having reinforced himself by taking a body of men from the 'Niger' (his towing steamship) to work his upper-deck guns, he was able to put forth the whole strength of his port broadside. He was, however, exposed to a destructive fire from the guns on the cliff; for he lay right under the Telegraph Battery, at a distance from it of less than seven hundred yards. The simple truth is that, by the destructive power of the cliff batteries on the

Position taken up by the 'Sanspareil.'

By the 'London.'

Causes which narrowed the region of the comparative impunity enjoyed by the 'Agamemnon.'

one hand, and the form of the shoal on the other, the region of comparative impunity was so narrowed as to offer no more than one berth to a great ship of war, and that berth was the one which the fortunate 'Agamemnon' had taken.

At this time, the steam-ships kept under way were all, it seems, hovering upon the off-shore side of the detached squadron. Some of them tried their range at Fort Constantine; and, almost at the time when the 'Agamemnon' opened her fire, a shell, which was believed to have been thrown from Carnegie's steam-frigate, the 'Tribune,' caused a great explosion of ammunition amongst the batteries at the top of the Fort.¹ This disaster alone must have done much to breed confusion; but it was mainly by the fire of the three great ships—the 'Agamemnon,' the 'Sanspareil,' and the 'London'—that the result was obtained. The upper-tier batteries of Fort Constantine were brought to ruin. Of the 27 guns there planted, 22 were speedily silenced; and the gunners found themselves so overwhelmed with shot and splinters of stone that, chiefly it seems by that last stress, they were driven to go down and take refuge in the casemates below.² Though no statement to such an effect has been made in Russian narratives, there is some ground for inferring that the gunners thus driven from the top of the Work must have carried down with them to the lower batteries a consternation approaching to panic; for during a space of ten minutes the whole fort was silent.³

But with that extermination of the top batteries, and with that ten minutes of silence, the power of the ships over the fort may be said to have ended; for in the lower or casemated tiers, though ten of the embrasures were more or less damaged at the cheeks, and though four out of five of the shot-heating furnaces were destroyed, the stone wall of the fort held good, and the guns all remained untouched.⁴ So decisive was the line which defined the power of the assailing ships over Fort Constantine, that what they could inflict upon the open-air batteries proved to be sheer ruin, and what they could do against the casemates turned out to be almost nothing.

At about half-past two, the 'Arethusa' towed by the 'Triton,' and the 'Albion' towed by the 'Firebrand,' came

¹ Brereton, p. 33, confirmed by inquiry from Admiral Carnegie. The shell from his ship, the 'Tribune,' was thrown at a range of 1600 yards. The 'Lynx,' also, at this time was firing on Fort Constantine.—*Admiral's Journal*. As to the effect of the explosion, see Todleben, p. 336.

² Todleben, p. 336.

³ Brereton, p. 33.

⁴ Todleben, *ubi ante*.

The 'Arethusa' and 'Albion,' coming into line with the rest of the detached squadron as sail the cliff batteries.

in from the south-west. They soon afterward took up positions astern of the 'London,' and opened upon the cliff defenses, the 'Arethusa' being then about 700 yards from the Telegraph Battery, and the 'Albion,' as her Commander reckoned it, within 600 yards of the Wasp.

The line now formed by the ships of the in-shore squadron.

When this had been done, the whole number of those ships which I have spoken of as composing the in-shore squadron, were ranging in a single line which ran nearly parallel with the shore, and at distances from it of from 600 to 800 yards.

Meanwhile the main division had been coming into line; and indeed the 'Queen,' which was the leading ship, had moved on, and had even anchored so far toward the south as to be in the array of the French fleet; but the 'Britannia' was in her designed position at the extreme right of the English line; and although, at a quarter before three o'clock, there were still some of the vessels following her which had not yet come to an anchor, they were, all of them, very near to their assigned places; and it may be said that about this time the array of the main division had attained so much of perfection as it was destined to achieve.

Besides the 'Britannia,' 120, the flag-ship (which was towed by the 'Furious'), there were appropriated to this dismal service the 'Queen,' 116 (towed by the 'Vesuvius'), the 'Trafalgar,' 120 (towed by the 'Retribution'), the 'Vengeance,' 84 (towed by the 'High-flyer'), the 'Bellerophon,' 78 (towed by the 'Cyclops'), and the 'Rodney,' 90 (towed by the 'Spiteful'). These ships, all destined to be anchored in a continuous file, and in prolongation of the French line of battle, formed the right of the English fleet, and main division. The several steamers which propelled them were lashed to each sailing-ship on her port side, it being intended that the ships in this main division of the fleet should pour their fire from the starboard broadsides. During the progress of the main division from the roads off the Katcha, the propelling steamers (being already lashed on in the way described) were, by consequence, on the landward

¹ She had the 'Henri IV.' on her bow.—*Log of the 'Queen.'*

side of the vessels propelled; but, before taking up her assigned position in front of the entrance to the Sebastopol roadstead, each ship was to make a sweep round, and present toward the forts her starboard, or fighting broadside. Even in the dead calm that there was on that day, the moving of great ships by means of steamers lashed to their sides turned out to be a slow process;¹ and it was not until half-past two o'clock that the 'Britannia' and the vessels which followed her began to range in line of battle, and successively to open their fire.² At this time, then, the French fleet and Dundas's main division were for the most part in their places, and if they had ranged in perfectly straight lines they would have formed an obtuse angle, at the point where the French left was touched by the English right.³ There being, however, a slight bend in both the French and the English lines, the two formed together a great arc or crescent, which inclosed the approach to Sebastopol, with a span nearly two miles in length; but at a distance of more than 2000 yards from the entrance of the roadstead, and at a distance, also, of from 1600 to 1800 yards from the nearest of the enemy's forts.

The combined array formed by the French fleet and the main division of the English.

Position of the in-shore squadron in reference to that of the main division.

Of the steamships kept under way.

On the left front of this array, and placed, as it were, in echelon to it, at distances of only from 600 to 800 yards from the nearest of the batteries which they assailed, there were the ships which constituted the in-shore squadron of the English fleet. The four frigates, the sloop, and the gunboat which remained under way moved, hovering, as we have already seen, near the ships of the in-shore squadron, and either supported by their fire the attack on Fort Constantine and the cliff defenses, or else from time to time rendered such services as their facility of movement enabled them to afford.⁴

¹ There was great difficulty in steering ships propelled in this manner; and even the single process of getting the ship's head into the right direction after weighing anchor proved to be a tedious one.

² It was at half-past two o'clock that the 'Britannia' herself cast anchor (log of 'Britannia'); but the 'Queen' was in advance, and had anchored, some minutes before, amongst the French ships. The 'Trafalgar,' the 'Vengeance,' the 'Bellerophon,' and the 'Rodney' were close following, and preparing to range in prolongation of the line.

³ The French line being N. N. E., and the English N. E.

⁴ The 'Tribune,' the 'Terrible,' and the 'Sampson' were the three steam-frigates which had specially been ordered to engage by signal from the 'Britannia.'—*Log of 'Britannia.'* But I do not except the 'Sphinx' from the statement in the text; for it seems that, though ordered to keep out of range, she occasionally fired.—*Admiral's Journal.*

Great as was the amount of naval strength thus spread out to sight by the Allied fleets, it can hardly, I think, be acknowledged that their battle array wore an aspect portentous of conquest. Whilst their power was a power impending, and not least during that mid-day time when, in the majesty of their unexerted might, they were gliding down, ship after ship, to take their assigned positions, both the imagination of the unskilled people of Sebastopol, and the fairly-drawn inferences of minds informed on such things, were conducing to a rational dread of what might be achieved against a port, town, and arsenal by forces which ruled the high seas; for none, at that time, knew where they could point to a limit which bounded the power of great navies over places in range of their guns. 'There was something solemn;' says Todleben, 'in those minutes of expectation; all bending their anxious attention to the manœuvres of the enemy's fleet, but at the same time full of firmness, prepared to undergo a maritime bombardment terrible, unknown till then in the annals of war.'¹ But no sooner had the fleets taken up their array than the spell seemed to break. The practiced seaman, who saw, through the barrier of smoke, how the line of fire from the French ships began at more than a mile from the nearest of the enemy's works, and then went away N.N.E. as though avoiding Sebastopol, would soon be able to say: 'This is not so much as a threat, still less an attack in great earnest.'

The English Admiral did not forget the place which he had chosen to reserve for his flag-ship when told that any vessel must needs be sunk in one hour if she should be posted in the centre of the Allied line of battle. It was exactly there that, in fulfilment of his words, Dundas now placed the 'Britannia.'

It will presently be seen that of the vessels which followed the 'Britannia' when she was thus brought into line by the English Admiral, three were afterward moved farther in, to take part in the closer engagement which Lyons had begun with Fort Constantine; but such of the ships as continued to act with the main division delivered, and continued to deliver, their fire all the rest of the day at ranges of from 1600 to some 1800 yards from

¹ Todleben, p. 326.

the nearest forts. With what effect can scarcely be known ; for Fort Constantine, the work they chiefly attacked, was engaged at the time with other English ships at comparatively short ranges ; and it would be hard to say that there was any part of the havoc and loss sustained by the Fort which may not have come from its closer assailants.

These ships, it appears, were answered by 18 guns in Fort Constantine, and were also under a fire at long range from 36 pieces in Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort.¹

In a contest between ships and forts, long range gives immunity to the forts, but not to the ships. The 'Britannia' was set on fire by a red-hot shot, which buried itself in some of the hammocks. She received 42 shots in her hull ; and she suffered great damage in her masts, yards, shrouds, and rigging. Lieutenant Vaughan and eight of the 'Britannia's' men, besides six of the men of the 'Furious,' her towing steam-ship, were wounded. The main-mast of the 'Retribution,' the steam-ship which towed the 'Trafalgar,' was struck by a shot, and went by the board. Thereupon, the 'Trafalgar' was ordered to haul out.

We have before seen that not only the French fleet, but also those English steam-ships which were kept under way, and likewise the in-shore squadron acting with Lyons, had successively begun to take part ; so that now, when, for the most part, Dundas's main division had also come into line, it might be said that nearly the whole of the Allied fleet was at length engaged with the Forts ; and although each ship was firing from one only of its broadsides, it is declared that the cannonade which now pealed from the whole Allied line was the heaviest that had ever been delivered from shipboard.²

The fire was delivered from more than 1100 pieces of heavy artillery,³ whilst, to meet this great cannonade, the Russians could only bring to bear on the fleets 152 guns ; and of those there were as many as 105 that were in open-air batteries firing over the par-

2.45. Almost the whole of the Allied fleet was now engaged.

The great cannonade now delivered by the Allied line of battle.

¹ Todleben.

² 'From the experience of fifty years, I can assert that so powerful a cannonade as that of the 17th inst. has never taken place on the ocean.'—*Admiral Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 17th October, 1854.*

³ 1119 guns, as I make it (621 of the French fleet and 498 of the English), fired from the line of battle, without counting the guns of the steam-ships kept under way. Todleben gives a greater number, but he includes the guns of some French ships which were not in action.

The fire that could be opposed to it.

Counterbalancing effect of hard masonry.

Comparative harmlessness of the cannonade delivered by the ships.

No farther results obtained from the continuance of the fire from the fleets.

Dundas, having once yielded to Canrobert and Hamelin, could not now do otherwise than make his fleet conform to the position taken up by the French.

apet, so that there were only 47 casemated guns to meet all the broadsides of the Allied fleets.¹

But with all these elements of superiority on one side, the strength of hard masonry on the other did more than redress the balance; and if this was the heaviest sea cannonade that, up to that time, had been known, it was also, in proportion to its greatness, the most harmless one ever delivered.

The continuance of the fire from these 1100 guns added nothing to the advantages already obtained by the Allied fleets.²

Such a result could not but be mortifying; and some may judge that, in yielding to the dictation which caused this impuissant display, Dundas was so abandoning his freedom of action as to be guilty of making an extravagant sacrifice to the exigencies of the French alliance; but, at all events, it is only by argument in that direction that the fitness of the position taken up by the English Admiral and the ships which followed him can be rightfully challenged; for when once Dundas had submitted to act upon the plan which the French forced upon him that morning, he had nothing to do but to place one of his ships near the 'Jupiter' or the 'Napoleon,' and thence prolong the array in a north-easterly direction.

And, after all, it was only in part that the strength of the

And, after all, a part only of the main division was long kept in the more distant line of battle.

main division ran to waste in this impuissant array; for out of the six fighting ships which constituted that part of our fleet at the opening of its fire, no less than three, as we shall by and by find, were sooner or later sent off to reinforce the detached squadron; and a fourth—the 'Trafalgar'

—as we saw, was ordered to haul off; so that only two English ships (with their propelling steamers) remained ultimately employed in the task of prolonging the French line of battle.

When we left the in-shore squadron, it had just been reinforced by the 'Arethusa' and the 'Albion.' These ships had stood in with orders to attack the cliff

Continuation of the engage-

¹ Todleben, pp. 334, 335.

² For the results which had been obtained by the French fleet and the English fleet respectively, see *ante*, p. 289, and p. 299.

ment under-
taken by the
in-shore squad-
ron.

English ships
engaged with
the Telegraph
Battery and
the Wasp
Tower.

batteries; and, accordingly, they advanced to the very edge of the shoal which ran parallel with the beach, overlooked by the Wasp and the Telegraph, the 'Albion,' as we saw, casting anchor at a distance of only 600 yards from the Wasp. They were aided in their attack by a fire (at much longer ranges) from the 'Sampson,' the 'Tribune,' and the 'Terrible;' nor, indeed, can it be said that there were any of the ships near the coast on the north of Sebastopol which were strangers to this conflict with the cliff batteries; for although the 'London,' as we saw, had come on in the wake of the 'Sanspareil,' and opened fire on Fort Constantine, she suffered much more from the little Telegraph Battery than from all the power of the great casemate castle. Indeed the same, or almost the same, might be said of the 'Sanspareil,' and even of the 'Agamemnon.' More or less grievously the whole of the in-shore squadron was suffering under the fire of only a few pieces of artillery well placed on the cliff; and, indeed, it might be said—for, compared with its next neighbor battery, the Wasp did but little harm—that the five guns of the Telegraph earthwork sufficed to produce this result.

The power of
the cliff guns
against the
English ships
became appar-
ent at once.

The contest of
the 'Arethusa'
with the cliff
guns.

It soon proved that this contest between cliff batteries and ships was one of a kind altogether unequal. Without the means of repressing her assailants by any effective fire, the 'Arethusa,' a fifty-gun frigate, was rudely struck. Four shells took effect on board her; and she was set fire to, both on her main and her lower decks. Seven of her planks started. She was in danger of sinking; and there needed the coolness and the skill of the successive commanding officers and the crew of the 'Triton,' as well as of Captain Symonds and the crew of the 'Arethusa' herself, to get the ship out of action. According to the official list, she lost 4 men killed and 14 wounded; but there was one whose name did not appear in the return because he concealed his wound. This was Lieutenant Bowden.²

¹ The 'Triton' was under the command of Lieutenant Lloyd. 'When he was severely wounded, Mr. George Arguimban, second master in charge of the "Triton," took command, and did his duty admirably. Both these officers displayed the utmost coolness and intrepidity.'—*Captain Symonds (who commanded the 'Arethusa') to Admiral Dundas, dispatch, 18th October, 1854.*

² 'His zeal keeping him to his work and hiding his hurt. I can not speak too much in his praise. His exertions all day, and cool courage, call for my warmest praise.'—*Captain Symonds to Admiral Dundas, private letter, 21st October, 1854.*

With the 'Albion,' a 90-gun ship, it fared yet worse. She had been ordered to engage the Wasp, and, accordingly, she was placed within 600 yards of the work; but not being molested by it, and finding herself hotly attacked by the Telegraph Battery, she engaged her assailant. Her fire was altogether in vain. Without being able to harm the battery, she was soon struck by numbers of shells. Of these, some struck the ship near her water-line, and some of them, bursting on the orlop deck, set fire to the ship in several places.

In her masts, in her rigging, and in the part of her hull near the water-line, the ship suffered havoc, and the fires which had laid hold upon her having rendered it necessary to close the magazine, her broadside was by consequence silenced. Altogether, she was in such a plight as to make it the duty of Commander Rogers, who was in charge of her,¹ to haul out; and accordingly she slipped her cable; but the missiles hurled from the cliff had shot away the lashings which joined the 'Firebrand' to her side, and, for a time, the two ships became unmanageable.² Whilst the 'Firebrand' labored and labored to move out the 'Albion,' the two ships were not only under the ceaseless fire of the cliff batteries, but at one time were raked by them; and as they could not enshroud themselves in smoke, they stood out a fair target for the enemy's gunners. Moreover, they were so close upon the edge of the shoal, that any effort of the steam-ship which might cause the 'Albion' to turn or to move, even slightly, in the wrong direction, would suffice to ground her. All this while, nearly half of the 'Albion's' crew were mustered at 'fire-quarters,' to get down the three conflagrations which threatened the powder-magazine. The men worked as steadily as at an inspection. More for pride's sake than with any notion of effective reply to the cliff batteries, one gun was from time to time fired.³

She signal which was flying from the masthead of the 'Albion' imported that she was in danger; and the practiced eyes of seamen who gazed from the neighboring ships conveyed to them an exact perception of her predicament. They understood the problem; and watching to see how


¹ Rogers commanded in the ship, in the absence of Captain Lushington, who commanded the naval brigade acting ashore.

² The 'Firebrand,' the 'Albion's' towing steam-ship, was commanded by Captain Stewart.

³ Commander Rogers to Admiral Dundas, 17th October, 1854.

{ Sampson.
Tribune.
Terrible.
Splend.
Lynx.

Positions to be occupied by the Queen towed by the Vesuvius, the Belle-Rodney and the Bellespheron towed respectively by the Spitfire and the Cyclops.



NAVAL ENGAGEMENT

Of 17th Oct. 1854, with the efforts of Sebastopol. The array of the Allied Navies at a quarter before 3 o'clock P.M.

Stewart would solve it, they soon became willing admirers of the skill with which he applied the power of the 'Fire-brand' to the object of getting out the disabled ship. The success with which Commander Rogers and Captain Stewart and the crews of both the 'Albion' and the 'Firebrand' encountered these dangers and troubles was not, of course, likely to be greeted with that kind of welcome at home which is given to tidings of victory; but, perhaps, as a sound proof of firmness and seamanlike skill, it was of a fully equal value.

When this hard-smitten ship 'Albion,' with signal flying that she was on fire, was at length moved away out of range, she had lost 10 killed and 71 wounded. Lieutenant Chase was one of the killed; and amongst the wounded there were the master, the surgeon, and the paymaster. On board the 'Firebrand,' too, there were five men wounded; and amongst these was Captain Stewart himself.

Both the 'Arethusa' and the 'Albion' had to be sent to Constantinople to refit; and indeed they were in such plight, that the chance of their proving able to reach the Bosphorus was judged to be dependent upon weather.²

And those few guns on the cliff which thus beat off and disabled the 'Arethusa' and the 'Albion' were, all this while, inflicting great havoc upon the 'London' by the cliff guns. From the moment when the 'London' cast anchor, she was under a telling fire from the Telegraph Battery, but at first, though many shots struck, there were also some which missed. After a while, men gazing at the battery from the deck of the 'London' saw an officer, quadrant in hand, exerting himself to obtain with mathematic exactness the proper angle of fire. After that, there was no imperfection in the aim of the Russian gunners; and as soon as the 'Arethusa' and 'Albion' had been disabled and beaten off, the fire from the cliff, which before had been divided in its objects, became concentrated with powerful effect upon the three remaining ships. Of these the 'London' was the one which lay closest under the guns of the Telegraph Battery.

So, against that battery as his real antagonist Captain Eden exerted the whole power of his port broadside; but after a while he was able to assure himself of that which we now know with certainty—

¹ Described by Commander Rogers (*ubi supra*) as a 'very valuable and intelligent officer.'

² Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 18th October, 1854.

namely, that his ship, whilst sustaining a good deal of havoc, and losing men killed and wounded, was absolutely powerless against the battery.¹ As soon as he had ascertained himself of this, he determined to shift the position of his ship, and with that intention sheered out.² Afterward he again stood in, and, from a new position, assailed Fort Constantine as well as his old foe at the Telegraph; but it resulted from his movement that, during the interval which elapsed before he stood in for the second time, the number of ships which still occupied the line taken up by the in-shore squadron was reduced to two.

The 'London' lost 4 men killed and 18 wounded. Amongst those last was Lieutenant Stephens. Having received an ugly wound in the head, he quickly got it bandaged, and went on with his duty as though nothing had happened to him. When recommended by Captain Eden to go below, he excused himself by setting up a theory that because his wound was quite warm it needed for the time no attention. Afterward, he got wounded in the knee; but by the help of that same theory of his, and also another bandage, he so dealt with the second casualty as to be able to go on with his duty.

The 'Sanspareil' was the northernmost of the only two ships under Lyons now remaining in line; and the fire from the cliff, which had been doing great harm from the first, was now very heavy upon her. Galled, just as Eden had been, by the sense of not being able to do any thing against the Telegraph Battery, Captain Dacres determined to shift the position of his ship. He got up his anchor, and tried so to place his ship as to be able to lay a broadside upon the cliff batteries in a way more effective than before.³ Still remaining near the 'Agamemnon,' the 'Sanspareil,' for an hour and a half, was kept in her place by steam-power;⁴ but at the end of that time there sprang up a

¹ As to the absolute immunity enjoyed by this battery, see *post*, p. 317.

² The soundness of Captain Eden's conclusion is now proved by General Todleben, who states, as will be presently seen, that the Telegraph Battery suffered nothing at all from the ships.

³ It was imagined—see the log of the 'Agamemnon'—that during the period of probably some ten minutes which it took to effect this movement, the 'Sanspareil' lost a number of men; but it seems that this idea was a mistaken one. Only one shot struck the ship at the time, and that was the one which, striking a table and driving it with violence against Captain Dacres, knocked him down and stunned him.

⁴ One hour and thirty-five minutes, according to the log of the 'Sanspareil.'

light breath of wind, which caused her to forge ahead; and, the bow of the ship coming into such a position that her foremost guns failed to bear clear of the 'Agamemnon,' Dacres wore his ship round. Receiving at nearly this time an order from Lyons 'to close in and support,' he returned to his old station under the stern of the 'Agamemnon,' and again let go his stream anchor.

The position of the 'Sanspareil,' from the first, had been such as to subject her to heavy loss, and mainly, it would seem, from those small cliff batteries which had operated so destructively against the 'Arethusa,' the 'Albion,' and the 'London.' As on board the other ships, so now on board the 'Sanspareil' there sprang up the question whether the works which inflicted this havoc were suffering at all from the ships' guns. The captains of the guns declared to Captain Dacres that their fire was taking no effect against the coast batteries; and the accuracy of their observation was definitively confirmed by Hastings Anderson, the gunnery lieutenant, who went up the mizzen rigging of the ship and saw that her fire was in vain.

But although it soon became plain that the 'Sanspareil' could add nothing to what had been achieved in the first few minutes of the conflict, and that she was powerless against her assailants, Dacres seems to have considered that as the fire his ship was sustaining must be visible to those who were on board the 'Agamemnon,' he ought not to sheer off until his ship should be either disabled or ordered to move out of range by a signal from Lyons; but, whatever might have been the principle on which he acted, it was not without grievous sacrifice that the ship kept the place she did during

Her losses. a period of three hours. She lost 11 men killed—of whom one was Mr. Madden, midshipman—and 59 wounded, including Lieutenant W. H. Anderson, Lieutenant James Bull, and Mr. Parkinson, second master.

For a while, the Rear-Admiral's flag-ship had been enjoying a comparative impunity; for after the ruin of the batteries on the top of Fort Constantine, the guns in the casemates, though not so absolutely powerless against the 'Agamemnon' as General de Todleben believed, were still of but moderate efficiency, and the much more formidable power of the little cliff batteries was in a great measure absorbed for a time by the other vessels of the in-shore squadron. But in proportion as the rest of the squadron got to be discomfited, the 'Agamemnon' suffered more and

Comparative
impunity en-
joyed for a time
by the 'Aga-
'memnon.'

Change in this
respect which
subsequently
occurred.

more ; and when the ‘Arethusa,’ when the ‘Albion,’ when the ‘London’ had all of them hauled out, one after the other, and when also the ‘Sanspareil’ had moved away from her original position, the ‘Agamemnon’ began to undergo a heavier cannonade than before. She was set on fire by a shell.

Whether it was that Lyons still entertained a hope of re-
 Persistence of Lyons. ducing Fort Constantine, or that he was governed by the instinctive reluctance of a brave man to abandon a strife once begun, he could not yet bring himself to haul off; but he became somewhat anxious.¹ He sought to obtain reinforcement. He signaled to the ‘London’ to take station astern of him, and to the ‘Bellerophon’ (which did not form part of his squadron) he made an appeal for support. Knowing that his signal might be interrupted by smoke, he dispatched his flag-lieutenant in one of the ‘Agamemnon’s’ boats, with directions to board the ‘Bellerophon,’ and personally convey the appeal to Lord George Paulet, her captain. Lord George was asked to close in and support the ‘Agamemnon.’ Lieutenant Coles, the flag-lieutenant thus dispatched, was to board the ‘Sanspareil,’ and deliver to Dacres an order to the same purport.² At the same time, Lyons sent up for general signal that favorite ‘Number thirteen,’ which says to the captains who see it, ‘Close the enemy, and engage for ‘mutual support!’

These appeals were all abundantly answered. The ‘London’ stood in, and again engaged her old foe on
 The effect of his measures. the Telegraph Height. The ‘Sanspareil’ resumed her place astern of the ‘Agamemnon.’ Lord George Paulet, upon receiving the message, stood in at once with the ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘I have seldom,’ wrote Lyons—‘I have seldom ‘had my mind more relieved than when I saw the “Bellerophon” coming down to our succor, and my gallant flag-lieutenant and his boat’s crew emerging from the smoke on ‘their return.’ From ships not specially invoked there also came help. The ‘Queen’ stood in to support the ‘Agamemnon;’ and Dundas having already dispatched the ‘Rodney’ upon the same errand, she

¹ See the passage of Lyons’s dispatch, quoted in the text, ‘I have seldom had my mind more relieved,’ etc., *post*.

² This is the order to that effect before mentioned to have been received on board the ‘Sanspareil.’

pealed to by Lyons. came down at full speed. The steamers kept under way still hovered as before, at some distance, upon the starboard quarter of the 'Agamemnon.'

Thus, then, with the exception of the two disabled ships and the three'—the 'Britannia,' the 'Trafalgar,' and the 'Vengeance'—which still aligned with the French, the whole English fleet was crowding in to support the 'Agamemnon.' True, the form of the shoal, as we already know, was not such as to afford an anchoring-ground from which numbers of ships could effectively engage Fort Constantine; and, against the cliff batteries, it had only been too well proved that ships were powerless; but the signals and the messages of Lyons, and the position of the 'Agamemnon,' admired from afar, had engendered with some a belief that great results might yet be achieved by supporting her attack on Fort Constantine;² whilst others were led to apprehend that the ship was in danger, and needed to be helped.

It was under the impulse of that last idea that Lord George Paulet, coming down in the 'Bellerophon,' seemed to take up the fight. For the purpose of relieving the 'Agamemnon,' he opened a violent cannonade against the Telegraph Battery. He soon brought down havoc upon his own ship. Her wheel was destroyed; and she was set on fire by a shell, but Lord George continued to stand in, and at length moored his ship on the starboard quarter of the 'Agamemnon.' As the 'Bellerophon' swung to her anchor she offered an occasion to the enemy; and, the enemy promptly seizing it, she was swept by a raking fire. Her launch was struck by a shot and sunk; she again took fire; she was in a condition to be in need of help. Help was brought by the 'Spitfire;' and at last, with a signal flying which told that she was on fire, the ship was towed out of action. She lost 4 men killed and 15 wounded; amongst the last was Mr. M. Foster, a midshipman, whose skull was fractured.

The 'Queen,' as we saw (Captain Mitchell), was hastening to take her part in the fighting of the detached The 'Queen.' squadron; and Lyons, when he saw her stand in, and begin to engage, made her welcome, by signal, with the greeting of 'Well done, "Queen!"' but already the new-comer had come under the power of the Wasp, or the Telegraph Battery; and signaling for answer, the "'Queen" is on fire!' she passed away toward the north.

¹ Reduced, as we saw, to two, when the 'Trafalgar' was disabled.

² See note, *post*, p. 313, mentioning Captain Jones's counsel.

Before this time, and whilst preparing to take her place in the line of the main division, the 'Rodney' had been boarded by Captain Jones, the Commander of the 'Sampson,' who, passing from ship to ship in his gig, brought an order from Dundas—an order suggested to the Admiral by Captain Jones himself—which directed the 'Rodney' to go in and support the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Sanspareil.' Captain Graham, who commanded the 'Rodney,' made haste to obey the command, and his ship was at once moved forward in the direction of Lyons's flag-ship with all the speed that could be given her by her satellite steamer the 'Spiteful.' In about fifteen minutes from the time when Graham received the order, his ship was already close in near the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Sanspareil.' She fired from time to time, when her guns bore clear of her neighbors, and—moving stern foremost—proceeded to back on toward the southward in search of a good fighting berth.

The only part of the position which appeared to be at all advantageous for the attack of Fort Constantine was so narrowed by the form of the shoal, that the places already occupied by the 'Agamemnon' and the 'Sanspareil' left hardly the room that was needed for another line-of-battle ship.²

As the 'Rodney,' stern foremost, moved slowly to the southward in search of a berth, the lead was kept constantly going, and the water was found to be shoaling. Mr. Craigie, the master, could not believe it safe to be going on toward the edge of the shoal in less than seven fathoms.³ His belief was that, both for the object of fighting the ship and that of keeping her clear of the shoal, the space between the 'Sanspareil' and the 'Agamemnon' was the only one which offered a good berth.

Captain Graham, however, rejected the plan of trying to thrust in between two other ships at the risk of fouling them; and presently, overruling the master, he resolved to go to the southward of the 'Agamemnon.' In that direction, accordingly, his ship continued to move; and whilst she was passing the 'Agamemnon,' Lyons signaled, 'Well done, "Rodney!"'

¹ In the dispatch highly laudatory of Captain Jones, which reports his passage in his boat from ship to ship under fire, the Captain is stated to have suggested to Dundas, that 'If a line-of-battle ship were sent to a position near the "Agamemnon," great execution might be done.'—*Admiral Stopford (Captain of the Fleet) to Dundas, 19th October, 1854.*

² See the plan

³ The ship, I think, drew $24\frac{1}{2}$ feet—i. e., four fathoms and a half a foot.

It was not till her starboard bow had just passed the starboard bow of the 'Agamemnon' that the 'Rodney' let go an anchor. She then came to, with her starboard bow anchor in six fathoms and a half. The bows of the two ships were then abreast, but divided the one from the other by a distance of some thirty or forty yards. To bring the jib-boom of the 'Rodney' out of reach of the 'Agamemnon's' jib-boom, the 'Rodney,' by a back-turn of her steamer's engine, was so made to veer that—still moving, of course, stern foremost—she glided on to the southward, where the edge of the shoal was awaiting her.

All this while, the soundings were being taken incessantly, not only from the 'Rodney' herself, but also from the stern of the 'Spiteful;' and, by the orders of Kynaston (the officer in command of the 'Spiteful'), the result of each cast of the lead that he caused to be made from his vessel was so chalked up on a board as to be easily visible from the deck of the 'Rodney.' This board, when the anchor went down, gave 'six fathoms and a half;' but whilst the ship was yet veering, the board showed 'four and a half;' and in the next instant the 'Rodney' stant the heel of the 'Rodney' was cast upon the shoal with a force which threw over the four men at the wheel.

With her heel—and only her heel—hanging thus on the shoal, the 'Rodney,' although held fast, was held fast, as it were, to a pivot—to a pivot on which she could swing. Her bow swung to starboard; and, the distance to which she had veered not sufficing to keep the ships clear, her jib-boom fouled the jib-boom of the 'Agamemnon,' and so caused the bow of the flag-ship to move some few feet toward the shore. The people of the 'Agamemnon' had sought to avoid this contact by hauling astern on their stream cable; but when the movement of each ship had ceased, the jib-guys of the two were still touching.

Notwithstanding her mishap, the 'Rodney' now lay bravely placed for the task of engaging Fort Constantine; and to that her men bent their exertions; for all that they did at this time, as a consequence of their being aground, was to heave taut the cable by which they had anchored.

During the progress of the movement which had brought the one ship past the other, each starboard gun of the 'Rodney,' as it came to bear clear of the 'Agamemnon,' had, at once, opened fire on the fort; and now that the batteries of the 'Rodney' were no longer, in any part, masked, she pour-

The position of the 'Rodney.' Her engagement with Fort Constantine.

ed upon Fort Constantine the fire of her whole starboard broadside at a range of 800 yards, whilst she answered the more distant batteries on the south of the roadstead with the four guns she had at her stern on the main and the lower deck.¹

Whilst thus engaging Fort Constantine the 'Rodney' found no such 'dead angle' as to be in the enjoyment of any perfect immunity from the power of its casemated batteries; but it is certain that—from causes still somewhat obscure—the fire which the fort directed against this ship was not only ill directed—being always a good deal too high—but also intermittent, and in short, one may say, somewhat languid. The 'Rodney' was also exposed to a raking though distant fire from Fort Alexander and other batteries on the south of the roadstead. The fire from these was not ill directed; but, considering the numbers of shot hurled into the ship from that quarter, the harm they did was strangely small. Like all the other ships which took part with Lyons, the 'Rodney' was more or less under the fire of those cliff batteries which had done so much service to the Russians; but she did not receive from them a harm bearing near proportion to that which they had inflicted upon other ships. Indeed it may be said generally of every ship constituting the in-shore squadron or acting in company with it, that the nearer she lay to Fort Constantine, the greater was the impunity she enjoyed.

So large a part of the 'Rodney's' crew were on shore taking part in the land cannonade, that Captain Graham did not engage with his upper-deck guns; but the ship had a very good crew, and the fire which she long maintained from her main and lower decks was carefully directed. Her firing was not in broadsides.

It seems that the ship's company were not in the least decomposed by the circumstance of being aground under the guns of Sebastopol.

But whilst the 'Rodney,' hard at work with her starboard batteries, was thus lying fast on the shoal in a berth which contented her crew, Lyons at length determined to haul off. The 'Agamemnon' ceased

Lyons in the
'Agamemnon'
now hauled off.

¹ Two of these were 68-pounders; and, notwithstanding the length of range, it is probable that their fire may have told somewhat upon the open-air batteries of Fort Alexander.

firing.¹ Slipping her port, or small bower cable, and cutting away her stream cable, she backed astern till she got to be clear of the shoal, and afterward moved ahead, delivering a farewell fire as she passed at the cliff batteries, and then going out of range.²

She had lost 4 killed and 25 wounded. Amongst the wounded were Lieutenant S. Gausson and Duke D. Yonge, naval cadet.

Her losses.

The 'Sanspareil' followed the 'Agamemnon,' and the 'London,' too, went out of action.

The 'Sanspareil' and 'London' also hauled off.

Summary of what had been effected by Lyons with his in-shore squadron.

These, then, were the operations which Lyons conducted. With the aid of the shell from Carnegie's steam-frigate the 'Tribune,' his squadron had effected, within the first few minutes of its anchoring, all the good that it was destined to achieve; for by that time the batteries on the top of Fort Constantine had been ruined; and during the period of nearly three hours which followed, the efforts of the ships were of no avail, except to afford one more proof of the reluctance of our seamen to accept discomfiture. At any range allowed to large ships by the extent of the shoal, the casemates of Fort Constantine were found to be an armor of proof against the guns of those days.

¹ At 5.10, according to the log of the 'Agamemnon.'

² An officer, whom I judge to be highly competent to speak of the probable motive which brought the late Lord Lyons to take these steps, gives the following explanation of the reason for the 'Agamemnon's' hauling off when she did, and slipping her cable: 'The "Agamemnon" did not go out from under Fort Constantine until she had been there four hours [three hours, according to the "Agamemnon's" log]; it was then getting late, and became evident we could do nothing more [that is, the in-shore ships] whilst unsupported by the rest of the Allied fleets, who were too far off to make any impression on the forts. [In contradiction of that last statement see *ante*, p. 312.]

'The reason we slipped was, that the "Rodney" had anchored over our anchor, and we could not pick it up whilst she was there; and as we were in her way of coming out, it was advisable for us to move first. The "Rodney" took up her position well; and Captain Graham's conduct was much appreciated by Lord Lyons.'

The officer who thus accounts for the loss of *one* of the 'Agamemnon's' anchors does not speak (in terms) of the reason for sacrificing also the stream anchor. For the determination of the question whether the 'Rodney' anchored over the anchor of the 'Agamemnon,' the existing materials are probably sufficient. 1st, the 'Agamemnon's' anchor—her port bow anchor—was dropped in 5 fathoms; 2ndly, she slipped her cable at its first shackle, *i.e.*, 12½ fathoms.—See her log. 3rdly, it will be remembered that after the 'Rodney' had veered, her jib-guys were touching the jib-guys of the 'Agamemnon;' and from that part the distance between the bows of the two ships may be computed.

If the casemated batteries at the water's edge proved all but safe against shot, they did not, on the other hand, exert much power; and unless a third species of force had been ready to take part in the combat, neither the ships nor the sea-forts would have been very much altered in their relative strength by the effect of a three hours' fight. But the interposition of the two little works on the cliff, or perhaps indeed one may say of the Telegraph Battery alone, wrought so great a havoc in the ships which came under their guns, as to give to the coast defences a decisive ascendant over their naval assailants; and this result the cliff batteries were enabled to achieve without being subjected in return to any grave loss or injury. In the *Wasp* 22 men were wounded and a gun-carriage overturned, but that Telegraph Battery which wrought so great a havoc in our ships sustained no harm at all in either men or material.

It could hardly have been intended that the '*Sanspareil*,' the '*London*,' the '*Arethusa*,' and the '*Albion*' should remain under a fire like that to which they were exposed, without being able to answer it effectively; and perhaps the comparative impunity conferred upon Lyons's flag-ship by the splendid position she occupied, was in part the cause of this mischief; for an Admiral directing his squadron from on board the '*Agamemnon*,' would not know the extent of the havoc going on in the rest of his ships, and might easily fail to perceive that they were powerless against the cliff batteries.

The '*Rodney*' (with her satellite steamer the '*Spiteful*') was now the only ship remaining in action; and the men who stood working the guns on her main and lower decks were not slow to learn that the '*Agamemnon*,' with the rest of the force under Lyons, had sheered off; but although they, it seems, growled a little in their half surly, half humorous way, when they found themselves left on the shoal by the departing squadron, their anger, if anger it can be called, was rather of a kind to increase than to impair their efficiency. They steadily maintained their fire; and at the time I speak of, this duty was not interrupted by any endeavor to get the ship off.

All the power that Fort Constantine as well as the cliff batteries had been hitherto exerting against numbers of ves-

Concentration of fire upon the 'Rodney.' sels could now be concentrated upon the 'Rodney,' with her satellite steamer the 'Spiteful;' and besides, for some time, the grounded ship sustained a raking though distant fire from the batteries on the south of the roadstead; but, after a while, the chief of those last forts ceased firing, and the midshipmen of the ship indulged their minds with a theory that the guns at the stern of the 'Rodney,' and especially the 68-pounders, had humbled and silenced Fort Alexander.

Its effect. The ship herself suffered a good deal, especially in her rigging, and she was set fire to, both in her orlop deck and in her foremast under the foreyard; but her crew enjoyed a singular impunity. One cause of this was that scantiness of the numbers remaining on board, which determined Captain Graham to abstain from fighting his upper deck; but it is also certain that the fire from Fort Constantine was slack and ill directed. As we saw, the open-air batteries of the fort had been long before silenced; and in regard to the guns in the casemates, it is imagined that the smoke may have been so blinding as to hinder the gunners from giving due effect to their ordnance. At all events, they fired ill, and with little constancy. Oftentimes the men of the 'Rodney' were heard to declare—and in gruff tones which sounded like anger—that the Russians in Fort Constantine were not standing to their guns.¹ Though the 'Rodney' was comparatively distant from the cliff batteries, it is believed that she suffered more from their fire than she did from the guns of Fort Constantine.

Indeed, one of the theories which seeks to account for the impunity of the 'Rodney,' is based upon the supposition that some of those who were directing the fire of Fort Constantine perceived the ship to be aground, and regarded her almost as their own. This idea receives some support from the fact, that the moment the 'Spiteful' moved ahead, so as to disclose herself to the gunners in Fort Constantine, she experienced full proof that they did not intend to grant her the least measure of that indulgence which they gave to the 90-gun ship.

For some time, the French ships had been hauling off, when Dundas at length sent up his signal to cease firing and

¹ General de Todleben having stated, as we saw, that the 'Agamemnon' was so placed at the dead angle of Fort Constantine as not to be liable to be touched by any of the guns in the casemates, gives no other explanation of the causes which rendered the fort so harmless.

The French,
and afterward
the English,
fleet hauled off.

come out of range.¹ Except the 'Rodney' still fighting on the shoal, with her satellite steamer at her side, the whole Allied fleet hauled off.

The 'Rodney'
still aground
on the shoal.

Though in order to get off the 'Rodney' there was wanted some more steam-power, Captain Graham so hated the idea of asking even that kind of aid, that he refused to make the appeal; and it was only after breaking a cable, and failing to move his ship by the sole power of the 'Spiteful,' that he at length brought himself to

Measures taken
for getting the
'Rodney' off.

run up a signal for help. At once the appeal was answered; for Lieutenant Luce, in command of the gunboat 'Lynx,' quickly came in to give help.

It was determined to endeavor to get the ship off by the united power of the two steamers, both acting from ahead of the 'Rodney.' The 'Spiteful' was to tow with the stream cable, and the 'Lynx' with the towing hawser.

It may be that the 'Spiteful' moved somewhat too fast before she got a strain on the cable, for the result was that the stream cable snapped.

The fire with which the Russian batteries had been assailing the 'Spiteful' then increased in power, cutting her masts and rigging, and hulling her several times.

Captain Graham now resorted to another plan. The 'Spiteful' was lashed alongside, and the anchor hove up to the bow; whilst the 'Lynx' exerted her power by steaming ahead; and, some of the 'Rodney's' guns having been run forward in order to lighten her abaft, she at length was dragged off the shoal.

In the course of the endeavors thus crowned at length with success, a heavy fire had been directed, though directed in vain, upon those of the 'Rodney's' boats which were employed in the task of getting cables on board the towing steamers.²

The Russians, still intent on harming the 'Spiteful,' sent against her a shower of rockets, which wounded Commander Kynaston, and Baillie, one of his midshipmen.³

Fire directed
against the
'Spiteful.'

¹ At 5.30.—*Log of 'Britannia.'* According to the same record, the French ships began to haul off at 5.10.

² In these operations, good service was rendered by Mr. Craigie the master, and Mr. Hancorne the assistant-master. Mr. (now Captain) Craigie, a most able and thoroughly trustworthy officer, was warmly thanked by Captain Graham.

³ I hear that Commander Kynaston's death, though it occurred long after the engagement, was caused by the wound then received.

The deliberation with which the people of the 'Rodney' encountered their predicament was maintained to the last. They did not slip their cable, but righteously got up their anchor. Almost at the same minute they ceased firing, closed their ports, and extinguished all lights. Then, at half-past six in the evening, the 'Rodney' hauled off.

She had lain aground under the guns of Fort Constantine during a period of more than two hours and a quarter:¹ and although, as we have seen, it did not so happen that her men were exposed to the trial which is put upon seamen when their decks become scenes of carnage, there was enough in her predicament to put to a proof the warlike composure and firmness still upholding the name of the 'Rodney.' Nor less will it be gathered from what I have recounted, that, along with the captain, officers, and men of the 'Rodney,' those also of the 'Spiteful' and the 'Lynx' were deserving of the praise they received.²

Both the 'Rodney' and the 'Spiteful' sustained a good deal of damage from shot and shell; but strange as it may seem, the 'Rodney' had no men killed, and only two or three wounded.³ With her satellite steamer it did not fare so well. Out of the small crew which serves to man a six-gun steam-sloop the 'Spiteful' lost two killed and nine wounded.

¹ According to her log, she dropped her anchor at 4.8, and weighed at 6.30.

² The court of inquiry which investigated the circumstances under which the 'Rodney' ran ashore, found that the mishap resulted unavoidably from Captain Graham's gallant determination to take up the position he did in support of the 'Agamemnon;' and that the greatest credit was due to Captain Graham and the officers and ship's company of the 'Rodney,' as also to Commander Kynaston and Lieutenant Luce, and the officers and men of the 'Spiteful' and the 'Lynx,' for their gallant and indefatigable exertions in towing the 'Rodney' off whilst exposed to heavy fire from the enemy. This finding was approved by the Admiralty, and the approval was communicated by Sir E. Lyons, then in command, in a notification dated the 23rd of February, 1855. A day or two after the action, Sir Edmund Lyons addressed to Captain Graham a letter of thanks for the support the 'Rodney' had brought him, and he added, I believe, some words tending to explain why he had left the 'Rodney' when he did. All hands were called aft to hear the praises of the Rear-Admiral, and a part of the letter was read on the quarter-deck. I have no copy of the letter before me, but if memory could be trusted, it would appear that Sir Edmund did not take the same ground as the officer cited in the note to p. 316.

³ The official list gives only two wounded; but it seems that there were one or two wounded men whose names did not get into the return.

Thus ended—thus vainly ended—the naval attack on Sebastopol. Except as regards that part of it which unsuccessfully aimed at subduing the Quarantine Sea-fort, the attempt did not spring from any more direct warlike purpose than that of effecting a diversion in favor of the land forces.¹ Of course, this could not be said if the design of attacking Fort Constantine had been based upon grounds which were—even apparently—good. But it was not so: it was not the belief of those days that good walls of stone, with a thickness of five or six feet, would give way under broadsides from ships at a range of 800 yards; or that the number of shots which skill or chance might send through the embrasures could be looked to as means of reducing a great casemate fort long prepared for the day of attack, and defended by brave, steadfast men. People rather founded their dream upon the hope of there occurring in the fort some mighty explosion; and, indeed, it was natural enough that the English should have remained more impressed by the event which once gave them the fortress of Acre, than by that faithful voice which (entreating men not to take guidance from what was a sheer gift of fortune) strove to make them beware of sending ships to capture stone forts.² And, again, there were people so constituted as to be able to believe that walls built by Russian contractors, though faced with a semblance of stone, would turn out to be formed, in the main, of some rotten and costless material, very soft to the touch. Any attempt which should seek to open a way for the fulfillment of hopes like these would, of course, be empirical, but would not, for that reason only, be necessarily unwise. On the contrary, the genius and the enterprise of the seamen, whether English or French, gave a naval commander some right to trust that, although he might enter upon an attack without being able at first to pursue a well-defined purpose,

¹ Dundas wrote to Lord Raglan: 'All this'—a plan for a diversion on the side of the Belbec, which the Admiral had been speaking of—'would be to act in a true position. The action of the 17th was a false one, and which I decline to repeat. It is one that I accepted with reluctance, and with which, as a naval commander, I am dissatisfied.'—*Private letter, 20th October, 1854.*

² It was in 1840 that our ships attacked the fortress of Acre; and, there occurring an explosion which sent to destruction great numbers of men, the Egyptians abandoned the place. In his place in the House of Lords the Duke of Wellington spoke with warm praise of what the navy had achieved upon the coast of Syria, but with a great earnestness he added the warning above referred to.

he yet, having freedom of action, might so use the chances of combat as to be borne onward to victory by the inspirations that come in great moments.

But, unhappily for the Allies, their vast naval strength was so used that, instead of being free to seize upon occasion, and to act in that spirit of enterprise which might compensate for the want of fixed purpose, the ships of the whole French fleet and of our Admiral's 'main division' had to ride at anchor in a formal line of battle, at once so grand and so impotent that there needed the fighting there was by the ships in the English left wing to save the whole business of the engagement from being deemed solemnly frivolous. If the zeal of the united navies was perforce to be used against Sebastopol in such a way as to go to the verge of what might be possible, the best direction to give to that sort of hardy empiricism would have been, perhaps, an attempt to break a way into the roadstead. At the worst, a venture of that kind, if made at a well-concerted moment, would have been an effective diversion in favor of the land forces. And, again, it is imaginable that the original plan of attack adopted by the council of admirals might have won for them some semblance of successes more or less specious, or might even have enabled them—for their ships would have been moving incessantly—to feel and make good their way to some more or less signal achievement. Their original plan would at least have secured for them the advantage of a less solemn failure

Failure of the attack as an attempt to reduce any of the forts, or to effect a diversion.

than the one which they actually incurred. As it was, the ships spent their strength upon forts of stone and coast batteries, not only without reducing any one of them, but even without dismounting a single gun, except amongst those which were in open-air batteries and fired from over the parapet.¹

History is crowded with instances in which the forces of two allied states are reduced to impuissance by the sheer perverseness of one, or the clashing pretensions of both; but even amongst such examples this naval attack seems egregious; for, so far as concerns the main division of our fleet, the English were coerced into a plan of attack which no one of their captains approved, and found themselves disposed, with the French, in such a meek order of battle that, as long as

Perverseness of the coercion applied by the French to Admiral Dundas.

¹ Todleben, p. 336.

the great array lasted, they were offering themselves to the striker, without being able to strike.

But, independently of the general idea which fashioned this order of battle, there resulted from the perverseness of the arrangement which excluded the English ships from the south or deep-water side, the stiffness attendant upon the Alliance so strange a waste of opportunity that it deserves to be marked and remembered. Whatever doubts the sanguine English might entertain of the power of stone forts to resist the broadsides of their ships, they, at all events, were sure that to act with effect in such strife they must come to close quarters.¹ The French, on the other hand, believed that a long range—a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards—was the one at which their fleet could best act.² Well, corresponding, as it were, with this difference of opinion, there was a difference between the shoals on the north and the shoals on the south of the harbor; for whilst on the north there was a shoal which kept off line-of-battle ships to distances of from 800 to 1200 yards from Fort Constantine, the forts on the south, and especially the Quarantine Sea-fort, could be attacked by ships at close range.³ Therefore, Nature herself had ordained the respective positions of the French and the English fleet, so that those who desired close quarters might go where close quarters could be had—that is, to the south; and those who preferred to act at a range of 1600 yards would be content with the north of the roadstead, where the approaches, though shut against close fighters by the extent of the shoal, were every where open to those who liked ranges of 1600 yards or upward. The reverse of this, as we know, is what happened. For no other reason, it seems, than that they were already on the right, that is, on the south of our fleet, the French took a place where, with the opportunity of closing the forts to within extremely short ranges, they chose to stand off at a distance of nearly a mile, thus excluding their allies from the deep water most nearly approaching the forts without making use of it themselves; and meanwhile, the English, who entertained the belief that ships should engage forts at close quarters if they engaged them

¹ The English gave good proof of this by the way in which they pressed and crowded to the very edge of the shoal in order to get as near as was possible.

² The French gave conclusive proof of this by attacking forts at ranges of 1600 yards and upward, when, if they had liked, they might have chosen ranges of from 150 to 400 yards.

³ See the plans,

at all, had to crowd round a shoal which barely suffered more than one of their ships to come within 800 yards of the principal fort they attacked, condemning all the rest to longer ranges upon pain of running aground.

Regarded as an attempt to effect a diversion in favor of the land forces, the naval attack, as we saw, lost all the little worth it had had when Admiral Hamelin thought fit to change the time for beginning it. The gunners on duty at the sea-forts were a distinct force long ago organized for that special service;¹ and I know of no ground for supposing that any one man engaged at the land defenses was either withdrawn from his post or otherwise disturbed in his task by the stress of the sea cannonade.

In proportion to the immense artillery-power which the two fleets exerted, the loss they inflicted upon the enemy was small. Under the fire of 1100 ships' guns, and these so diligently served that from two ships alone there were hurled between 6000 and 7000 shot, no more than 138 of the Russians were either killed, wounded, or bruised.²

The Allies suffered more. Besides the two English ships which were so crippled that they had to be sent back to Constantinople to be refitted, there were many that sustained great damage. The 'Ville de Paris,' the French Admiral's flag-ship, received fifty shots in her hull; and a shell bursting under the poop made such havoc in that part of the ship that nine of the officers of Hamelin's Staff there standing near their chief were either killed or wounded. Indeed, the Admiral himself, and Rear-Admiral Bouet-Willaumez, the Chief of his Staff, were the only two of the group who remained unstricken.³ In killed and wounded (without including the Turks, whose losses remained unrecorded) the Allies lost 520 men; 203 French, and 317 English.

But it was not only in men and material that the Allied fleets were losers; they lost some part of that incorporeal strength which, conferred though it be by mere human opinion, may yet be to fleets and armies a main source of warlike ascendancy. Before the 17th of October, that haughty dominion of the seas which the Allies had been able to assert contrasted so painfully in the minds of the

Small comparative loss inflicted upon the Russians.

Damage to ships, and loss of men sustained by the Allies.

Loss of the moral strength which the Allies had derived from the undefined ascendancy till then enjoyed by their fleets.

¹ *Ante*, p. 106.

² Todleben, p. 336.

³ Relation du Contre-Amiral Bouet-Willaumez, inserted in Bazancourt, p. 332.

Russians with the posture of their own Black Sea squadrons, all sunk as they were or imprisoned, that it oppressed them with a sense of vast power—with a sense of vast power, which, though it might not be immeasurable, had, down to that time, been unmeasured; and there were signs of a spirit in Prince Mentschikoff's troops which made it seem probable that in moments of discouragement the acknowledged ascendant of the Allies at sea might be used as a pretext and excuse for shortcomings and dereliction of duty on the part of the Russian land forces. But by that which they did, and by that

The pretension of the Allied fleets to assail Sebastopol thenceforth came to be regarded as withdrawn.

The boundary of the dominion exerted by the forts on the side of the sea became extended.

which they refrained from doing, on the 17th of October, the Admirals who were wielding this hitherto undefined and therefore most dreaded power, gave a public acknowledgment of the limits which bound them in approaching the forts of Sebastopol. From that day, their supposed pretension to be, some day or other, the assailants of the place was visibly a pretension withdrawn; and the seaward approaches of the roadstead became added to the range of unchallenged dominion thenceforth enjoyed by the fortress.

This security of the fortress from any fresh naval attack

After the action, the security of Sebastopol from naval attack was so well established, that although Lyons succeeded to Dundas, and long retained the command of the fleet, he did not again attack the place.

was indeed so firmly established by the engagement of the 17th of October, that it afterward received a practical recognition from the one man of all the world whose mind would most violently struggle against any such conclusion. Until he was recalled from Balaclava to the fleet a few days before the action, Lyons—evidently differing from Dundas—had believed that the navy might take a great part in the reduction of Sebastopol; but even before the action, his views, as we saw, were much cleared by hearing what was said to

him by the English captains of ships; and after the 17th of October, his opinion upon the question of attacking Sebastopol became apparently the same as that of Dundas; for although it was his fate to become before long the successor of the Vice-Admiral, and to hold the command of the fleet until the close of the siege, yet, during the whole of that time, he acted exactly as Dundas had desired to act from the first, and abstained from attacking Sebastopol.

Whence came all the errors which brought about this ostentatious misuse of naval power we have well enough seen. So far as I have learned, there is no reason for believing that the judgment of Admiral Hamelin was ever astray, or that (except under the stringent orders of the General who was his commanding officer) he would ever have outraged the English by depriving them of a voice in the control of their own fleet. Indeed the contrary is almost manifest, for Dundas ever spoke with warmth of the loyalty which marked the character of the French Admiral; and this, of course, he could not and would not have done if he had looked upon Hamelin as a free agent.

Dundas had the merit of disapproving, one after another, the false steps proposed to the navy; but then, unhappily, there remains the fact that he took those steps nevertheless. He must have deemed that the soundness of his judgment upon these questions was in a great measure proved when he saw his example close followed by a successor who had been the foremost of his naval critics; and, in that respect, his vindication has since been completed by the Russian accounts of the war; but the misfortune was that, not having the natural ascendant, not yet that authority resulting from former exploits which might otherwise have hindered the insistants from approaching him with their urgency, he also wanted the stubbornness that was needed for withstanding the stress when it came. True, he was Scotsman enough to be tenacious of his mere opinions—those, indeed, he seemed never to change—but his will, overtempered perhaps by the action of politics upon the mind of a subordinated member of the Government, was too pliant to enable him to maintain himself steadfast against the violent and sudden assaults that were made upon his freedom of action.

Under the first of the two hard trials to which his firmness was subjected, he found himself compelled to leave undischarged one of the gravest of the duties which attach upon a commander in war-time. The duty I speak of as thus attaching upon a commander is that of protecting the force he commands from the impatience of the Government at home, from the impatience of the people, from the pressure of colleagues and Allies, but, above all, from its own healthy eagerness for action, and continuing so to protect it until his own judgment tells him that the moment for striking has come. It is for this amongst other reasons that a command-

Admiral Hamelin, being under the orders of General Canrobert, was not responsible.

Degree in which blame could justly attach upon Admiral Dundas.

er with a warlike reputation already established is of so much more worth than another of equal ability who is wanting in that condition. The adviser who comes forward in difficult conjunctures to lay it down that 'something must be done' is as dangerous in the business of war as in any other public concerns. Nor let it be thought that this extension of Lord Melbourne's precept to warlike counsels would tend to exclude bold resolves. History is replete with proof that the boldest captains have ever been those who, far from striking at random, and with half-formed notions of what they might do, have always had clear conceptions of their objects, and of the way in which they meant to succeed. No sane commander could well be more venturesome than Cochrane, but he was a man who could forecast his way to the havoc he was preparing with a clearness of mental vision which might almost be called Satanic.

The pressure to which the English Admiral was subjected might have been resisted by a man who had gained a great naval victory. It could not be resisted by one who had acceded to command by paths of peace and pleasantness; and Dundas had so much modesty and clearness of perception that he never confounded his nominal with his real authority. On public grounds, and apart from selfish desires, he used to lament that he was without the kind of ascendant which is earned by warlike achievements. Those who were the most anxious to support their chief in the maintenance of his own opinion were obliged to acknowledge, when they knew how the stress was applied, that no freedom of choice remained to him. One of our ship's captains,¹ perceiving, as he thought, that his chief was wrongfully obstructed in following the guidance of his own judgment, took upon himself in the intimacy of private friendship to deprecate undue concession in naval affairs to the opinions of other men. Thereupon Dundas laid his hand on the shoulder of the officer who so counseled, took him aside, placed a paper in his hand, and, requesting him first to read it and afterward give his opinion, renewed the occupation in which he had been before engaged. The letter was that appeal which had been made to Dundas on the 14th of October.² When the officer had read through the paper, he returned it to his chief, and at once decisively said, 'Sir, this leaves you no option.'

¹ Captain (now Admiral) Carnegie, the commander of the 'Tribune.'

² See *ante*, p. 234.

Where freedom of choice was thus wanting, blame could not be justly imputed.

But as regards the dilemma in which Dundas was placed by Hamelin's visit on the morning of the engagement, a different opinion must be formed. It was, no, doubt, plain that a want of concerted action on the part of the two allied fleets might have an ill aspect politically, and, in that way, become pernicious; but Dundas seems to have thought that, because the avoidance of such a result was indeed a great object, he therefore must act as though it were of all things the greatest. There he erred. Other than any blessing of such proportions as that, there was one which had descended to the England of that day from the England of greater times. The renown of our navy was a treasure unspeakably precious. By our whole people, and, above all, by an English admiral, it deserved to be guarded with jealous care; for, if it be certain that the very life of England depends upon the strength of her navy, it is also true that the strength of her navy is in some sort dependent upon its sense of power; and again, that that sense of power must always depend in part upon the sacred tradition which hands down a vague estimate of the things our navy has done and the things it has failed to do. At the time I am speaking of, it was less than ever right that, for mere policy's sake, the warlike renown of our navy should be made to suffer. France watched, with the knowledge that, in matter of naval ascendant, our loss must needs be her gain. But also there were reasons of another kind for taking full care that the momentous duty of upholding our naval renown should not be made second to any ephemeral policy.

The expedient of eliciting all sorts of labor ashore from the generous devotion of the sailor had been carried, if not to the verge of what is tolerable, at least to the limit of what prudence could sanction; for, after all, the main covenant of the man-of-war's man is a covenant to fight, not a pledge to attend fighting men: and, it being of especially high moment that the labors thus obtained from our seamen should not be followed by measures calculated to injure the warlike renown of the service, it was unfortunate that the Admiral should have to set his fleet to the business of effecting a mere diversion for the land forces, when he knew all the time that, however advantageous his intervention might prove to the besieging armies, yet, so far as concerned our navy, the end to which he found himself driving was a sure and foreseen discomfiture—nay, a discomfiture foreseen with

such clearness that the approach of night was deliberately looked to beforehand as a plausible pretext for hauling off.¹ Up to the point of determining that, in some form or other, a naval attack was to be made, Dundas, as we saw, acted almost under compulsion, and was therefore deserving of pardon; but to carry yet farther the sacrifice of our naval renown, to let our fleet fall under the control of an anxious French landsman, who insisted upon condemning it to take part in an exhibition which our captains all saw to be vain and humiliating, and to make such concession with no other object than that of guarding against the misfortune of there appearing to be a divergence between the resolves of the French and the English Admirals—this, surely, in a choice of two evils, was a palpable choice of the greater one. It is true that the French had exerted their pressure by coming at the last moment, and causing Dundas to understand that they would have their own line, or none; but the very circumstance of being subjected to such a process as that might well have inclined our Admiral to disclose his honest anger, and exert that austere kind of firmness which is commonly thought to be of great efficacy as a means of resistance to threats. So, at least, it would seem, Lord Raglan had hitherto thought; for, flexible as he had been in from time to time yielding to the proposals of the French, he had not yet suffered them to gain their way by threatening to resort to sole action; and upon the only two occasions where they ventured on any such method, he had brought them back to propriety by a wholesome and effective severity, which was better fitted to preserve real harmony in the Allied camp than a series of extorted concessions.²

And, after all, though (as viewed by men at that time) the political consequences of a schism between the Admirals might have worn a somewhat grave aspect, there, at least, is sure ground for saying that no naval inconvenience could have resulted to the English from the execution of the French threat. Supposing the French fleet to have acted alone and apart, or not to have acted at all, the English fleet would have been set free, with full power to engage in any enterprise which its commander, with the advice of his captains, might think fit to advise; and whatever that

¹ That, as we saw, was Admiral Hamelin's suggestion. See the postscript to Dundas's midnight letter, *ante*, p. 277; and acceded to by Dundas, third foot-note, *ante*, p. 277.

² For the two instances of well-timed severity referred to in the text, see vol. i. chaps. xxix. and xxxvii.

enterprise might have been, it could scarcely have failed to acquire the merit of being less impotent than the formal, remote line of battle which Admiral Hamelin proposed.

But although Dundas erred when he so far submitted to dictation as to engage to anchor his ships and prolong the French line of battle in the way prescribed to him by Hamelin, it must yet be remembered that the English Admiral did not employ his whole fleet in this distressing and frivolous duty. On the contrary, he not only devoted a choice portion of his force to the attack on Fort Constantine and the neighboring coast defenses, but supported the squadron thus detached by the fire of nearly all the steam-ships which he kept under way, and soon reinforced it so powerfully from out of his main division that, besides the 'Britannia,' which carried his flag, he at last had but two fighting ships—to exhibit, as though for form's sake—in dreary line with the French.¹ Indeed, the array in which Dundas consented to align with the French approached so near, after all, to a mere solemnity, that, happily, scarce one seaman's life was made forfeit to this painful exigency;² and whilst the ships composing the in-shore squadron, or engaging in support of it, lost nearly 300 in killed and wounded, the sacrifices incurred by those of our ships which remained in the Anglo-French line were only 21 men wounded.

I have not concealed my impression that the untoward measure of involving the navy in a combat against the stone forts of Sebastopol was in part brought about by the exceeding zeal of Lyons, by his tardiness in attaining to an accurate view of the question, and especially by the attitude of antagonism in which he stood toward his chief;³ but if Lyons in this respect erred, it was given him at least to have a foremost place in the action. The position in which he placed his superb 'Agamemnon' verged so close upon the utmost limit of what was possible, that she

¹ After 4 o'clock, he had actually only one ship besides the 'Britannia' thus employed in prolonging the French line of battle, for by that time the 'Trafalgar' (for the reason stated *ante*, p. 303) had hauled off.

² It is probable that the fact would warrant me in saying 'not one,' instead of 'scarce one;' but I have qualified the phrase, because I do not know as a certainty that the 'Queen' or the 'Bellerophon' may not have had a seaman killed before moving off to the support of the detached squadron.

³ With regard to that, and also with regard to the time when Lyons first perceived the objectionable features of the measure, see *ante*, chap. xv., and especially his letter of the 16th of October there quoted.

only had under her keel two feet and a half of water;¹ and his place at but 800 yards from the gorge and right flank of

The praises
showered upon
him at the time.
Fort Constantine won for him, at the time, the enthusiastic admiration of the French, and the approval of the English navy.² 'General Canrobert and the officers of the French army'—it was so that Lord Raglan wrote—'were loud and unanimous in their expression of admiration at the position in which Sir Edmund Lyons placed the "Agamemnon" and the ships that were with him';³ but the opinion of the French navy upon such a question had, of course, a yet higher value. 'The position of the "Agamemnon,"' they said, 'was superb, and that of the "Sanspareil" not less admirable. Both ships were capitally placed. It was really magnificent.'⁴ That last epithet, large as it was, Lord Raglan made bold to adopt; for he expressly applied it to the mode in which the 'Agamemnon' was laid 'alongside of Fort Constantine';⁵ and he ventured to declare it 'probable that if the whole of our fleet had got as close in, the fort would have been destroyed.'⁶

I conceived it fitting that these opinions should be quoted; and especially I desired to record the generous enthusiasm with which the French generally, and, above all, their naval men, were able to speak of an action performed by their ancient rivals; but because I repeat this language of praise I am not therefore venturing to submit it for unqualified adoption by others. The dearth that there was of great naval

¹ And her jib-guys were in contact with those of a ship (the 'Rodney') which was actually aground.

² I speak of the approval of the English navy without qualifying the words; because, though Dundas (who was much dissatisfied with the naval engagement, and angered perhaps against those who had forced it on) may have been dry and even silent on the subject, I have no reason for thinking that he failed to appreciate the position which Lyons took up; but it may be right for me to say that Lyons writes thus: 'Nor can any thing be more gratifying than the congratulations I receive from all the captains, and indeed from the whole fleet, with one exception.'—*Private letter to Lord Raglan, 19th (wrongly dated 20th) October, 1854.*

³ The 'Sanspareil' and the 'London.'—*Lord Raglan to Dundas, private letter, 19th October, 1854.*

⁴ 'Hamelin and Bruet said to Greville yesterday: "La position de "l'Agamemnon" était superbe, et celle du "Sanspareil" [Captain Dacres] "pas moins admirable. Tous les deux étaient supérieurement bien placés; "c'était superbe."'—*Sir E. Lyons to Lord Raglan, private letter, 19th (misdated 20th) October, 1854.*

⁵ Private letter from Lord Raglan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 21st October, 1854.

⁶ The extent to which the casemates had held good against the fire was not known at the time to the Allies.

exploits on that 17th of October made it certain that the merit of the operation undertaken by the 'Agamemnon' and the ships which followed her flag would be brought into strong light by contrast; and although I imagine that our seamen will be unwilling to lower their standard of naval excellence, by accepting the highest of praises for any thing less than great deeds, yet, when it is seen that by venturing his 'Agamemnon' upon the very edge of the shoal, Lyons fetched such a place off the gorge of Fort Constantine as enabled him to rake and crush its top batteries from end to end, there need be no scruple in saying that the berth he found for his ship was one boldly and happily chosen.

And even now, without unduly lowering the standard of naval excellence, it can be said that the position in which Lyons placed the 'Agamemnon' was one boldly and happily chosen.

It could not but be that the attack of great coast defenses by two mighty fleets would tend to throw light upon that branch of science which, relating as it does to the efficacy of the implements and appliances made use of in fighting, may be called 'mechanics of war';¹ and although I myself need not venture to draw conclusions, yet, in order that others may the more incline to do so, it seems well to state over again, and in categoric form, five results evolved by the conflict:—

The five results which, in that point of view, seem worthy of mark.

1. At ranges of from 1600 to 1800 yards, a whole French fleet failed to make any useful impression upon a fort at the water's edge, though its guns were all ranged in open-air batteries and firing from over the parapet.

2. An earthen battery mounting only five guns, but placed on the cliff at an elevation of 100 feet, inflicted grievous losses and injury on four powerful English ships of war, and actually disabled two of them, without itself having a gun dismounted, and without losing even one man.

3. At ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, and with the aid of steam-frigates throwing shells at a range of 1600 yards,

¹ Plagiarized from the title of a book on a very different subject, namely, that of legislation—the book by which Mr. Arthur Symonds delivered his patient country from the oppression of the wordy, diffuse, obscure Acts of Parliament which loaded the statute-book in the times before his attack. Treating language as the machinery by which the Legislature seeks to enforce its will, he called his book the 'Mechanics of Law-making.'

three English ships in ten minutes brought to ruin and cleared of their gunners the whole of the open-air batteries (containing 27 guns) which were on the top of a great stone fort at the water's edge.

4. The whole Allied fleet, operating in one part of it at a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards, and in another part of it at ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, failed to make any useful impression upon casemated batteries protected by a good stone wall from five to six feet thick.

5. Under the guns of a great fort by the water's edge, which, although it had lost the use of its topmost pieces of artillery, still had all its casemates entire, and the batteries within them uninjured, a great English ship, at a distance of only 800 yards, lay at anchor and fighting for hours without sustaining any ruinous harm.¹

III.

Whilst the fleets plied their thunder in vain, and the still
Continuance of the bombardment carried on by the English batteries. silent guns on Mount Rodolph confessed the ill
 plight of the French, there yet was one part of the
 field where the cause of the Allies seemed to prosper. This was in the English batteries. There,
 from break of day to that critical afternoon-time which we
 are now approaching, our cannoneers—sailors and landmen
Its effect. —had been well fulfilling their part. Not only
 had they sustained with advantage their now
 single-handed conflict with the Flagstaff Bastion and the
 'Garden Batteries'—works which for the first three or four
 hours of the bombardment had been under fire from Mount
 Rodolph as well as from Chapman's Attack—but they were
 fast achieving almost all that could have been hoped from
 their efforts against that part of the enemy's lines—his lines
 in the Karabel faubourg—which they more especially under-
 took to assail. The batteries in both Gordon's and Chap-
 man's Attacks were so placed, and were armed with guns of
 a calibre which compensated so aptly for the length of the
 range, that, after some nine hours of firing, they had estab-
 lished a clear ascendant over the enemy's ordnance. In-


¹ Of course, the value of the experience thus acquired by the 'Agamemnon' must depend upon a question still somewhat obscure, *i. e.*, the number of guns in the casemates of Fort Constantine which could really be brought to bear upon her. The impunity of the 'Rodney' would be even more instructive than the experience of the 'Agamemnon,' if it were not for the surmise referred to, *ante*, p. 318.

deed, the ascendant obtained was decisive enough to give ground for believing that Todleben, in his exceeding eagerness to overwhelm the French works on Mount Rodolph, had devoted too little of his care to those blank-looking mounds on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Heights, which, at distances of 1300 or 1400 yards, marked the seat of the English Attacks.

But after the opening of the fire, the great Engineer had been quick to learn that the English batteries were operating with destructive power against a vital part of the Russian defenses; and he seems to have felt to the quick (though seeing it all the time with a genuine, scientific approval) the telling effect of Attacks so disposed that, both as respected the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan, the same guns which battered in front the left face of the work could also enfilade the right face.¹

Though with somewhat less advantage, in that respect, than the French, the English were still upon heights which commanded the Russian defenses, and looked over into their rear. From this cause, as well as from the effect, in some places, of shot bounding in by ricochet, our siege-guns, from the first, had begun to work a great havoc in those parts of the Russian batteries which lay toward the gorges of their bastions, as well as amongst the bodies of troops which were posted hard by to await the expected assault. But this was not all; for, little by little, the whole front of the assailed defenses in the Karabel faubourg began to give way under

¹ This diagram—it is only a diagram and not a plan—may help to elucidate the text :—



the power of the English artillery. Even from the Allied lines it was easy to see that, independently of the effect produced by explosions, the shell or the round-shot alighting upon a parapet which was no more, after all, than a heap of loose particles without coherence, wrought changes in its bulk and its form, whirling up into the air at every blow a dark column of dust and small earth. Before the day was half spent, the frail ramparts most battered by our artillery had degenerated into shapeless mounds; and after the first nine hours of the cannonade there was more than one spot where they seemed to be nearly effaced.

In the midst of the earthworks thus almost dissolving into dust under blows of round-shot and shell, the stone-built tower of the Malakoff remained yet upstanding; but the work had undergone a fire so powerful that it no longer carried an effective armament. Of its few guns—all ranged, as we know, in open-air battery, at the top of the work—some had been, not merely dismounted, but even hurled over the parapet; and there was one—the English remember it—which had been so tilted round by the blow of a shot as to be made to stand up on end, a staring sample of havoc which people could see from afar. But also the stone parapet of the tower was so shattered, and its splinters flew so destructively, that, without incurring an unwarrantable sacrifice, the men at the top of the work could no longer be kept to their guns. They were withdrawn. There still poured a well-sustained fire from the guns on the glacis of the work, but the tower itself was now silent.

It was at the Redan, however, as we have seen, that the English siege-guns were to drive a pathway for our columns of assault by first getting down the power of the Russian artillery. To assail the defenses at this chosen part of them, a large proportion of the guns which armed Gordon's works had been made to cross their fire with that issuing from some of the batteries in Chapman's Attack; and thus it resulted that each face of the Redan was both battered in front and enfiladed.¹ Meanwhile, also, other projectiles of great weight discharged from the English batteries, and taking effect by ricochet, so swept the space between the Marine Hospital and the Dock-yard ravine as to make all going and coming in that direction a service of exceeding danger.

We saw that so early as that hour of the forenoon when

See again the diagram appended to the foregoing note.

Todleben surveyed the Redan, its defenses had fallen into a critical state. Even then several pieces had been dismounted, and numbers of the embrasures blocked up with ruins. True, we also learned that the zeal of the Russian engineers and seamen was supporting them in their ceaseless effort to encounter the work of destruction with the work of repair, and giving them heart to toil thus under a fire of great power. But hours and hours elapsed. The cannonade did not relent; and, despite all that man could do, the power of the English ordnance so continued to tell upon the Redan as to be gradually annulling its batteries. By about three o'clock in the afternoon, one-third of the pieces which armed the work had been dismounted; and even where guns were yet in battery, the cheeks of the embrasures lay in ruins. The loss in men had been heavy. Twice over, the gunners of several pieces had had to be replaced by fresh hands. Of 75 men sent to the Redan from on board one of the ships, so many as 50 were killed or wounded. And against the artillery which was inflicting these losses upon them the Russians could do but little; for their batteries were here overmatched by the more commanding position and the greater weight and numbers of the guns which assailed them from the Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Yet under stress of the decisive and increasing ascendant thus established against them by the English, the gunners in the Redan stood firm. They had been exalted, it seems, into so high a state of devotion by the example of their chiefs, Captain Ergominischeff, Captain Leslie, and Captain Katchinsky, that, however appalling the slaughter, the men yet remaining alive and unstricken worked on and worked on at the defense with a courage which did not droop. They strove hard to do what was needed for maintaining a fire in spite of all the havoc that had been wrought in the batteries; and, to that end, they kept on banking up the embrasures which were continually falling to pieces. The officers did not hesitate to give the example of this kind of devotion. They mounted the parapets, and toiled at the repairs of the embrasures with their own hands.

But even by all these efforts the English artillery was not to be prevented from overmastering the Redan;¹ and soon after three o'clock in the afternoon there occurred a disaster which completed the ruin of the work. A shell blew up the powder-magazine established

Great explosion in the Redan.

¹ 'These efforts were impotent to prevent the English artillery from getting the dominion of ours.'—*Todleben*.

in the salient. When the smoke lifted, it disclosed a dire spectacle of ruin. What a man could see of the world where transformed by the explosion, bore scarce any likeness to what he had been looking upon the minute before. At the fore part of the work the parapet had been heaved over into the ditch, and so filled it in. The ground was laden with fragments of platforms, with guns dismounted, with gun-carriages overthrown and shattered. On all sides there were the blackened bodies of men scathed by fire, and it was afterward known that more than 100 men had been thus killed. There were many of the dead—and among them the brave Captain Leslie—whose bodies could never be recognized. The calmest of the survivors who gazed on this scene of havoc might well enough judge that the last hour of their cherished Sebastopol must indeed be come; for not only could they see that the ruthless energy of their own war munitions had laid open the road for a conqueror, but also, through the roar of the artillery, they heard the ‘hurrah’ of the English; and the cheering was taken for proof that the besiegers had comprehended the gift which the fortune of war had brought them, and were coming to lay hands on their prize.

The cheering died out; but narrators have said that, notwithstanding the thunder of the artillery war still waging elsewhere between Sebastopol and its assailants both by sea and by land, the failure of sound issuing from the Redan added strangely to the sense of desolation which the sight of its ruins occasioned. From a work where, for hours, great batteries had been pealing, where words of command and the shouts of men toiling under fire had been all day resounding, there was nothing now to be heard except the discharge, at long intervals, of a single cannon, and the groans and entreaties of wounded men, who lay praying, and praying for water.

There were Russians so steadfast in their obedience to sense of warlike duty that, in the face of the ruin which surrounded them, they made an attempt to get some guns in a condition for service; but what resulted was, that out of the 22 pieces which had armed the work, 2 only remained in battery, and these were manned by but 5 gunners.¹

Nor was it only by the number of men killed or disabled, and the all but total ruin of both the work and its batteries, that the Redan was brought into danger. A significant in-

¹ Todleben.

Retreat of the Russian infantry posted near the Redan. dication of despair yet remains to be given. The troops which had been kept near the gorge of the Redan in order to meet an assault, now all at once fell back for shelter toward the Marine Hospital, and dropped down behind the scarp of the rock overhanging the Man-of-war Harbor. 'Thenceforth,' says Todleben—and the time he speaks of is that which close followed the great explosion—'thenceforth there disappeared all possibility of re-
 Defenseless condition of the Redan. 'plying to the English artillery. The defense in that part of the lines was completely paralyzed;
 Expectation by the Russians of an immediate assault. 'and in the Karabelnaya men expected to see the enemy avail himself of the advantage he had gained, and at once advance to the assault.'

And, indeed, it might well be imagined that the time was at hand when (after one final salvo which would build up a wall of dim smoke to cover the front of the assailants) the gunners in the English batteries might now at last take their rest, and deliver over the site of what had been the Redan to assaulting columns of infantry. From first to last I have been careful to keep under a full light the tissue of evil consequences that resulted from neglecting the element of time, and consenting to give the enemy his respite of twenty days; but although Sir John Burgoyne gave counsel which tended to this capital error, the soundness of his conclusions in other respects may fairly, perhaps, be subjected to a separate criticism; and when once the field of scrutiny is thus narrowed, it becomes right to say that, so far as concerned the English part of the siege, the state to which the Redan had been brought on the afternoon of this 17th of October was a singularly exact fulfillment of Burgoyne's design. For, although, as auxiliary and collateral measures, our chief engineer had undertaken the battering of the Flagstaff Bastion, and the battering of the Malakoff as well as of other defenses, yet the main purpose of what Burgoyne had planned to achieve by force of siege-guns was to drive such a chasm of havoc into the enemy's line of defense on the ridge where stood the Redan as would open, through ruins of earthworks and silenced batteries, a not impracticable roadway for the English columns of assault. This being what Burgoyne had undertaken to do, it resulted that—with some aid from that gift of fortune which wrought the explosion of the Russian magazine—he was able to fulfill his en-

The state of the Redan was a fulfillment of Sir John Burgoyne's design.

gement. At a few minutes after three o'clock in the afternoon, the Redan lay before him in that very state to which he had sought to reduce it.

But we have to remember that the plan which aimed at breaking in by the Karabel faubourg was a part only of the whole design, and that whenever the English should be assaulting the Redan, the French were to be assaulting the Flagstaff Bastion. According to the understanding between the French and the English Head-quarters, the one assault was not to be going on without the other; and it seems to have been—not so much stated in terms, but—rather taken for granted that the silencing, for the day, of the batteries on Mount Rodolph carried with it a corresponding postponement of any attempt by the French to assault the Flagstaff Bastion. Indeed it was evident that, independently of the physical obstacle still interposed by the unsilenced batteries of the Flagstaff Bastion, the moral discouragement which had been inflicted upon the French by the disastrous explosion of their magazine could not but be an ill preparative for the task of storming Sebastopol.

In this way, once more, the tender exigencies of the bond which united two mighty States forbade them the full use of their strength. A tacit compact required that their armies should act together in any great operation; and it chancing at this time, from the mere fortune of war, that the English were in a condition to assault and the French not, it resulted, as a natural consequence, that the temporary impotence of the one Power carried with it the abstention of both. What benumbed the Allies was the Alliance.

It must not be supposed that the disappointment of Lord Raglan's hopes came upon him at this late hour. The silence of the French batteries on Mount Rodolph prepared him of course for ill tidings; and the first message which had been delivered to him from General Canrobert disclosed no small part of the unwelcome truth.¹ As soon as General Rose had spoken, the horizon of the besiegers was all at once overcast; and, indeed, his words on that day may be regarded as marking the time when that which had seemed at the English Head-quarters to be a near prospect of the storming and capture of Sebastopol, dissolved into hopes faint and vague. Certainly in the mind of Lord Raglan this quick

The effect of General Rose's disclosure upon the prospects of the Allies as contemplated by Lord Raglan.

¹ For the purport of General Rose's communications, see *ante*, p. 268.

change was wrought. Before the explosion in the French lines, he had been apparently confident that Sebastopol would be carried;¹ and his anticipation was that, in the course of the evening, he and Canrobert would be able to make their arrangements for the assault.² After hearing General Rose's account of the discouragement suffered by the French, and of the time that would be needed for the resumption of their cannonade, he at once perceived that the siege was likely to become a protracted undertaking.³

The Russians were strangely slow in their endeavors to draw a conclusion from the silence of the French batteries; but in the course of the afternoon they began to surmise that the assailants thus paralyzed might have altogether abandoned their trenches; and in order to learn the truth, a small reconnoitering force, consisting of sailors under Lieutenant Hiliban, was dispatched at about four o'clock to the crest of Mount Rodolph. The force pushed boldly forward to within a hundred yards of the trenches, and was then driven back. From the insight obtained by this reconnoitering force, Se-

Reconnaissance sent by the Russians to Mount Rodolph.

¹ I found this statement partly though not entirely upon the tenor of Lord Raglan's communications to the naval authorities.

² Speaking to me during the progress of the cannonade, and I think at about one o'clock P.M., Lord Raglan said that, but for the disasters which had befallen the French, he believed 'he should have been able to come to 'an arrangement with Canrobert that evening;' and (by the way in which those words bore upon the immediately preceding part of the conversation) I knew that the 'arrangement' to which Lord Raglan had looked forward was an arrangement for the assault of Sebastopol. I do not, however, undertake to say whether he meant an arrangement for an assault that evening, or an arrangement that evening for an assault on the morrow. Originally, no doubt, the first day of the cannonade was looked to as the day for assaulting; and the detailed instructions issued to the troops were so framed as to be in accordance with that supposition; but some of those instructions were canceled on the eve of the 17th; and the change was such as to displace the inference which might have been drawn from the paper in its original state.

³ Lord Raglan, at the time, spoke to me in a way which disclosed his clear perception of the unfavorable change which had come over the prospects of the Allies. Lest it should be thought that a mere traveler was guilty of intrusion in remaining with Lord Raglan at a time and place when any needless addition to the group might tend to draw fire upon the Headquarters Staff, I may be suffered to mention that I had chosen for myself another post of observation. Lord Raglan, however, finding where I was, kindly sent to request that I would come to the spot at which he had stationed himself. From him at the time a request was of course a command.

bastopol learned that the batteries on Mount Rodolph, though silenced, were still amply guarded.

On the part of the English, the firing was continued till the evening without adding signal results to those already obtained. At dusk, the cannonade ceased.

Conclusion of
the cannonade
for the day.

In this the first day's conflict of the land batteries, more than 1100 of the Russians were killed or wounded,¹ whilst the loss of the Allies was comparatively small.² The disparity was occasioned in part by the exceedingly advantageous positions in which Burgoyne had established his Attacks, as well as by the greater calibre of the English guns;³ but a main cause of loss to the Russians was the necessity of preparing for the expected assault, by keeping large forces on ground where they could not be sheltered from fire.⁴ The works and the armaments of the Allies sustained, upon the whole, little harm.⁵

Its result, so
far as concerns
losses of men
and harm done
to works and
batteries.

It has been reckoned that the projectiles thrown on this day from the land batteries of the besiegers and the besieged were, by the French, about 4000; by the English, 4700; and by the Russians, so many as 20,000.⁶ This large expenditure of ammunition on the part of the Russians is ascribed in some measure to their sailors, who could not, we saw, be dissuaded from indulging their love of the broadside.⁷ But it also appears that no small portion of the Russian fire was elicited by those imagined columns of assault which so often in the course of the day seemed to come marching down through the smoke.⁸

Quantity of
projectiles ex-
pended.

¹ 1112.—*Totleben*, p. 345.

² Including the 50 men struck down by the first explosion on Mount Rodolph, the loss of the French in killed and wounded seems to have been only 96.—*Niel*, p. 62. Exclusive of the casualties among our sailors acting on shore, the losses of the English in killed and wounded were, it seems, 144.

³ *Totleben*, p. 344.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 345. The forces thus exposed were not only battalions of infantry, but also the grape-shot batteries to which *Totleben* looked for his favorite 'mitrail.'

⁵ The details of the damage will be found in *Niel*, p. 62, and the English 'Official Siege Journal,' p. 34. In the Appendix to that work there is an interesting paper by Sir John Burgoyne, showing that the comparative immunity of the English was owing in great measure to the efficient way in which our Engineers performed their many and difficult tasks. Their parapets proved solid, and their magazines, though often struck by shot and shell, held good in every instance. ⁶ *Totleben*, p. 345. ⁷ *Ibid.* ⁸ *Ibid.*

When the Allies suffered night to come and to pass without having stormed the defenses, it followed, in truth—though they did not yet thoroughly know the vanity of what they had done—that the cannonade, prepared at great cost of warlike resources, and, yet worse, at a ruinous cost of time, had brought them no nearer to their object than they were before opening fire. Not being followed up by an assault, the one opportunity which all their siege labor had earned for them became an opportunity lost.

That the deliberations of independent commanders tend to the rejection of vigorous resolves, we have been seeing again and again; but another of the characteristics which mark such counsels is their rigidity. Decisions formed in that way are really in the nature of diplomatic engagements, and it is only by a renewal of the diplomatic labor that they can be varied and adapted to the changeful circumstances of the hour. The swift exigencies of battle can ill be met by conferences and negotiations.

Apart from the diversity both of nation and of race which made it hard to restore the temper and spirit of one army by reporting to it the success of the other, there was a physical severance of the French and the English siege forces which tended to increase the evil; for whilst the two camps, and especially the Head-quarters camps, were divided from one another by a comparatively small space of ground very easily traversed, the advanced positions which had to be occupied by the besiegers whilst actively engaged in their task were divided by ravines of such depth as to be equivalent to long distances. Another of the ills resulting from this riven configuration of the ground was its tendency to aggravate the embarrassments created by a divided command. At moments which might require that unforeseen occasions should be instantly seized, and that the old plan of action should be rapidly accommodated to new conditions, it could not but be material that, if possible, the two Commanders should be near to one another; but they had both thought it right to establish themselves at posts announced beforehand to their respective armies, and it is plain that the interposed ravine did much to keep them asunder. The use of the electric telegraph had been learned in those days by merchants, nay even, in some measure, by Governments, and the value of moments in war had long been known to man-

kind; but the old and the new discovery had not yet been so blended in the human mind as to result in a wire from the batteries to the two Commanders, or across the Harbor ravine.

I do not, however, represent that if the two Commanders had been communicating with one another at the critical moment, they would have changed their design. During the whole of the day, and notwithstanding that their cannonade had succeeded at one point whilst failing at the other, they, each of them, apparently, continued to treat it as settled that, by way of preliminary to the operation of assaulting, the fire of both the Works which were to be stormed must first be got down.

If the whole Allied army had been one people obeying one chief, the Commander, when surveying the state to which the conflict had been brought after four o'clock by the destruction of the Redan, might not have been so ill content with the general result of the cannonade as to reject a large gift which the fortune of war had just brought him, for no better reason than that the gift was but a half of the entire result which he had sought to attain by artillery. Judging that the failure of the cannonade on his left was, upon the whole, well compensated by the success attained on his right, a general so circumstanced might have proceeded at once to assault.

But with the Allies, that force on the left which had sustained the check was an independent army, was the offspring of an independent nation, was commanded by an independent general; and there needed an almost romantic affection for the common cause to make the French act in a way that would have been only natural to them if the force on the right which then chanced to be smiled on by fortune had been part of the army to which they belonged. In such a case, the confidence and the warlike impulse engendered by disabling the Redan would have been carried by swift contagion to the men on the crest of Mount Rodolph; and the discouragement there occasioned by the explosion of the magazine would perhaps have been followed by a bold and determined resolve. As it was, the duality of the besieging force proved so perverse in its effects that, although both the armies were hampered by the misluck which happened to one of them, there was no happy converse to set against that ill result, and the hopefulness of the army which had chanced to succeed in its task could not be at all imparted to that one which happened to fail. Ex-

Embarrassment
resulting from
the quality of
the Allied ar-
mies.

perience gave little warrant to the fancy of those who had imagined that the concord of England and France would enable them to act in the field with the power of two mighty nations and the decisiveness of one. In that sense, the Alliance scarce ever joined together the two armies; it coupled, but did not unite them.

To a man of an anxious temperament there is sore temptation in the ever-ready, the ever-alluring, yet often pernicious, expedient of resorting to delay. General Canrobert apparently judged that he must wait until his troops, with spirits restored, and with batteries strengthened and multiplied, should be able to bring the Flagstaff Bastion to a state like that of the Redan; and to that course of action on the part of the French Lord Raglan simply assented, but he was not less determined to persist in his own cannonade.

It must not be supposed that General Canrobert receded in the least from any engagement he had made. The checked and twofold event of success at the Redan and failure at the Flagstaff Bastion had not been apparently contemplated in the anterior deliberations of the Allies; and it was in perfect accordance with the understanding between the two Generals that the French, when they found themselves baffled for the moment in their artillery conflict, determined to postpone their attack. The whole theory of the cannonade which the Allies had been preparing for the last twenty days was based upon the supposed importance of getting down the fire of a work before any attempt to assault it; and, the exceeding worth of the opportunity which had occurred being ill understood at the time, it was consistent and only natural on the part of the French Commander to put off his farther attack.

The question whether Sebastopol would have been probably carried by a resolute assault on this 17th of October has been determined in the affirmative by our English Engineers;¹ and their judgment has been ratified by the weighty authority of General Todleben. It must be observed, however, that

Decision of the question whether Sebastopol could have been advantageously assaulted at the Redan;

¹ The 'Official Journal of the English Engineers'—a work strongly bearing the impress of Sir John Burgoyne's mind—contains this passage: 'Could an assault have been attempted this evening, it is believed that it would have been successful. But as the French expected to re-establish their batteries by the following morning, it was decided to delay the assault on the British side until the French were ready to undertake the operation against the works of the Flagstaff Bastion.'—P. 34. As to the numerical strength of the opposing forces, see paper in the Appendix.

by the English
Engineers;
by General de
Totleben.

General de Todleben's argument omits the consideration of what might be effected against the assailants by the fire from the Russian ships.

Plainly also, that imaginary road to the conquest of Sebastopol which the great Engineer of the Russians can now so surely point out to his former opponents might not have been easily found by the assaulting columns; and, in the absence of a panic involving the collapse of all steadfast resistance, it seems likely that the besiegers in storming the place would have had to undergo heavy slaughter. Therefore the opportunity which presented itself to the Allies on this day was not one so unspeakably precious as those which, thrice over, occurred in the last ten days of September. Still, the predicament into which the invaders had thrust themselves was of such a kind that they would have been blessed indeed if they could now have found means to capture Sebastopol even at the cost of cruel losses; and since it happened that

At all events,
the omission of
the Allies to
push home
their advantage
was a lost occasion.

they had opened a chasm in the enemy's line of defense, their omission to push home the advantage must here take its place, and be numbered. It constitutes the fourth of the lost occasions which these volumes have to record.

In succumbing for a time to the defenders of Sebastopol, and resolving to postpone his next attack to some future day, General Canrobert, it is plain, acted loyally, and without an idea of the extent to which he was sacrificing the common cause. By the conjuncture which had suddenly placed the resources of a whole fleet and arsenal at the disposal of transcendent genius there had been generated so vast a power of rapidly constructing, restoring, and re-arming defensive works, that the like of it had never before been known in the world; and it is scarcely wonderful that, even with all the quickness and sagacity of his nation, a French commander should have been slow to perceive the whole truth. He apparently formed no conception of the huge quantity of new work, and restoration, and re-armament that might be effected by the garrison and people of Sebastopol in the course of an autumn night, and suffered himself to imagine that the besieger's work of destruction might recommence on the morrow at the point where it was to leave off that same evening. If he had not indulged this illusion, General Canrobert would have seen that, to give farther respite to Sebastopol when the favoring chances of war had torn open its line of defense, was to spurn a gift of rare worth, such as Fortune—too often rebuffed—might hardly again deign to proffer.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE morning of the 18th of October disclosed the superior

The great resources of the enemy as disclosed on the morning of the 18th by the appearance of the work which had been effected in the night.

Continued suspension of the French cannonade during the 18th of October.

The English cannonade, 18th of October.

strength of the enemy in that very species of contest to which he had been imprudently challenged. In the night-time, as now was apparent, he had so used his great resources as to be ready once more for the strife, with parapets restored and re-armed.

The French, it was known (with the hope of being able to act the more effectively afterward), had determined to abstain one day more from a renewal of their fire; but the English cannonade was to proceed.

Accordingly, though with a more careful economy of ammunition than had been hitherto observed, the English fire was resumed, and steadily maintained all the day.

The Redan and the Barrack Battery were brought to a state of ruin, which made it impracticable for the enemy to repair and re-arm his works under the fire of the English guns. The position of the Left Attack proved so commanding that the guns there established searched the interior of the enemy's batteries with a terrible power, and obliged him to determine that he must double the number of his traverses. In killed and wounded the Russians this day lost 543 men.

Pending the French preparations, the destruction brought about in the Redan and the neighboring battery was not regarded as furnishing an opportunity for the storming of the Karabel faubourg; and, since plainly it might now be expected that the havoc wrought in the day-time would be repaired by the enemy in the course of the night, the success of this second cannonade did not serve to rekindle the hopes with which the first morning had opened.

Amongst those who fell on this day was Colonel Hood of the Grenadier Guards. Whilst in command of a covering party in the trenches he was struck in the side by a round-shot, and died almost immediately. He had not lived in vain. We marked him on the day of the Alma, and saw how he led his battalion.¹

¹ Lord Raglan wrote of Colonel Hood as an excellent officer, and one

There occurred on this day one of these incidents of war which show how instantaneous in heroic natures is the process of both the thought and the resolve from which brave actions spring. The horses which were drawing an ammunition-wagon for the 'Diamond' Battery having refused to face the fire, some volunteers went to the wagon to clear it, and they succeeded in bringing in their loads; but before the powder could be stowed away in the magazine, a shell came into the midst of it whilst the volunteers were still gathered close to the heap. A voice cried out, 'The fuse is burning!' Then instantly, and, as the narrator says, 'with one spring,' Captain Peel darted upon the live shell, and threw it over the parapet. The shell burst about four yards from his hands without hurting any one.¹

At about ten o'clock, Lord Raglan was summoned from the front by intelligence which seemed to announce that at last, after an interval of a month, a Russian army once more had ventured to appear in the field. The enemy could be plainly seen marching in some force along a ridge over Tchorgoun; and the movement was even of such a kind as to have in it something of menace. Lord Raglan, followed by his Staff, rode at once to the eastern edge of the Chersonese, and stationed himself at a point from which he saw spread out before him not only the whole plain of Balaclava, but the slopes of the highlands beyond it.

After a scrutiny of more than an hour, it at length became evident that, for the time, nothing was about to be attempted against our flank and rear; but still there remained the fact that the enemy in some force was once more operating in the field. Liprandi, in truth, by this time had been intrusted by Prince Mentschikoff with the command of a detachment of all arms, then in course

Feat of Captain
Peel's.

A Russian
force of all
arms descried
in the direction
of Tchorgoun.

Liprandi's com-
mand of the de-
tachment of
Tchorgoun.

'deeply lamented.'—*Letter to Secretary of State, October 23, 1854.* An officer of the Grenadier Guards writes thus of his honored chief: 'He was looking out of an embrasure when a round-shot caught him in the side. He died almost immediately—died as a soldier, as did his father before him. 'He is a very great loss to us.' The officer who wrote thus—Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar—was himself wounded on the following day; and I see that Lord Raglan in communicating the incident adds: 'His Serene Highness, however, insisted upon remaining in the trenches until the detachment to which he was attached was relieved at the usual hour.'—*Ibid.*

¹ Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, 23rd October, 1854. On the 18th there fell, in the sailors' batteries, Lieutenant Greathead. He was one of the splendid body of officers belonging to the 'Britannia,' our flagship

of assembling at Tchorgoun, and was poisoning his wings, as it were, for the swoop which he afterward made.

Although the enemy, as we know, had been long before sending patrols into the neighborhood of Tchorgoun, it was a new thing for Lord Raglan to have within sight a force of all arms really seeming to threaten Balaclava. Close following upon that dark change of prospect in regard to the siege which had been opened to him by the silencing of the French batteries, there was added now to his cares the visible presence of hostile troops preparing to act on his flank.

Nor were these troubles all. Without merit or fault of mine, it happened to me, the same day, to be made the means of casting upon Lord Raglan's mind the shadow of approaching calamity. Mr. Cattley was a gentleman of much good sense and intelligence, who acted as interpreter at the English Head-quarters.¹ On the 18th of October he came to me in my tent, and spoke to this effect: 'I see now that this siege is likely to last a long time, and what I fear is, that if Sebastopol should not fall in the interval of autumn time yet remaining, there may be an idea of wintering here. But does Lord Raglan know what a winter here is likely to be? The army would have to encounter bleak winds, heavy rains, sleet, snow, bitter cold. But cold like the cold in England is not the worst of what may come. Once in some few years it happens that there comes a fortnight or so of Russian cold.² When I speak of "Russian cold," I mean cold of such a degree that if a man touches metal with an uncovered hand the skin adheres. I am not a strong man, and I feel certain that a winter here under canvas would kill me. With that belief I have naturally determined not to pass a winter here.³ Upon that, my mind is made up, so it is not on my own account that I am concerned: it is about the army that I am anxious. The army ought not to winter here. You are in the habit of seeing Lord Raglan. Somebody ought to speak to him. I do not like to speak to him myself.'

¹ His *nom de guerre* was 'Calvert'; there being reasons which at the time made it desirable that his real name should not become known to the enemy. He had been the English Consul at one of the ports—at Kertch, if I rightly remember.

² Cruel as was the first winter endured by the Allied armies on the Chersonese, the apprehended contingency of a fortnight of 'Russian cold' did not occur.

³ Mr. Cattley, notwithstanding this, was induced to remain at Head-quarters, and was not killed by the winter. He died, I think, at Head-quarters, in the summer of the following year.

It was obvious, of course, that the statement would be most appropriately made direct to Lord Raglan by Mr. Cattley himself, and I do not consider that his reasons for not taking the step personally were well founded; but, upon the whole, I judged that it would be wrong for me to disregard this appeal; and having an opportunity the same day of conversing alone with Lord Raglan, I repeated to him the purport of what the interpreter had said. Lord Raglan's reception of the statement was such as to assure me that he had seized the full import of Mr. Cattley's warning.

Then, at all events, if not before, the grievousness of the calamity which awaited his army, if, indeed, it should be brought to such straits as to have to winter on the Chersonese, was very present to the mind of Lord Raglan. He called upon Mr. Cattley for a report in writing upon the climate of the Crimea; and, having obtained it, proceeded to write thus (in private) to the Secretary of State: 'We have been fortunate in having very fine weather, and Mr. Cattley encourages us to hope that this may last till nearly the middle of next month. Then we must be prepared either for wet or extreme cold, and in neither case could our troops remain under canvas, even with great and constant fires, and the country hardly produces wood enough to cook the men's food. I inclose a memorandum on the climate of the Crimea which Mr. Cattley drew at my request two days ago. It shows what precautions the inhabitants and the Russian troops are obliged to take during the severe months of the winter for the preservation of their lives.' In the memorandum thus forwarded by Lord Raglan to the Home Government, Mr. Cattley, after describing the winter of 1843 in the neighborhood of Sebastopol, went on to say: 'In such weather, no human creature can possibly resist the cold during the night unless in a good house properly warmed, and in the day-time unless warmly dressed.'

The letter with which Lord Raglan accompanied the memorandum contained this impressive statement: 'Before concluding, I may be permitted to say a word with regard to this army. It requires, and should not be denied, repose. Although the marches have not been many, fatigue has pressed heavily upon the troops. The very act of finding

¹ This memorandum is given verbatim in the Appendix.

‘water and of getting wood has been a daily unceasing exertion, and the climate has told upon them; and independently of cholera, sickness has prevailed to a great extent since the third week in July. Cholera, alas! is still lingering in the army.’

Upon the supposition that the Allied armies should remain so engaged with the enemy as to be forced by sheer stress of war to winter on the Chersonese, those words of Lord Raglan’s, notwithstanding all their calmness and moderation, had still a terrible import. They foreshadowed the evil that was to come.

It was on the 23rd of October that the Commander of the Forces thus wrote to the Secretary of State. Weeks and weeks after that, when the autumn had passed, and the streets of London once more were gloomy, and cold, and wet, it occurred to some news-dealers there that they would enter upon a course of prophecy. Encountering in their own persons the discomforts of inclement weather, and coupling this experience with the fact that Crim Tartary was many degrees north of the equator, they made bold to foretell that there might be wintry weather on the Chersonese, and began—some months after the time—a series of strenuous warnings. It seems well to remember that the General who was to be roused to thoughts of winter by reading exhortations at Christmas, had himself been awakening our Government so early as the month of October.

CHAPTER XIX.

I.

ON the day the Allies opened fire, there was witnessed by Lord Raglan and the Head-Quarters Staff a half-ludicrous, yet still provoking coincidence, which abruptly compelled men to see how the Mind of our nation at home was clashing with Fact on the Chersonese: and although, for the moment, I avoided the inconvenience of breaking in upon a narrative then dealing with siege operations, the occurrence has served to remind me that war, after all, is the business of nations, not merely of their armies or their navies; that already accounts of the first battle of the campaign had traveled to Paris, to

Coincidence
tending to re-
call attention
to the capitals
of the belliger-
ent States.

¹ Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle (private letter), October 23, 1854.

London, to St. Petersburg; and that the nature of the reception accorded to such tidings as these may be almost as worthy of mark as the ruined front of the Malakoff, or the explosion of a French magazine.

During almost the whole of the week which ended the month of September, expectation in England had been kept upon the rack; and so keen was the desire of our people to know the result of the almost romantic adventure to which they had committed their army, that, to an extraordinary degree, this great public care excluded, they say, other subjects from the minds of our statesmen. 'Every sort of business,' writes one of them—'every sort of business has given way to this anxiety.'¹ Already apprised of the landing, people inferred that a battle had been fought—nay, were even enabled to conjecture that the conflict must have taken place on the heights of the Alma, and probably on Wednesday the 20th of September.² Still, from that promised Wednesday more than a week had passed, and as yet the eagerness of the public mind remained baffled by space.

But on the morning of Saturday, the 30th of September, London heard that the Greek houses at Vienna had already received tidings of a disaster sustained by the Russian army; and before evening, there came in Lord Stratford's telegraphic dispatch announcing the victory of the Alma. This was published in a supplement to the Gazette; and, according to the usage which obtained in former wars, the authentic words were read out to the audience at one of the theatres. The next day, Sunday, Lord Raglan's telegraphed account of the battle reached the War Office, and was forthwith published in an Extraordinary Gazette.

Almost along with the authentic accounts of the battle, rumors came from the south-east of Europe, which assured the people of London that already the end had come, and that the stronghold of the Czar was in the hands of the Allies. Men listened and listened for the booming of the guns which would confirm these last happy tidings, and announce the fall of Sebastopol.

Next day, the eager citizens were subjected to a disappointment which, trying as it was to their temper, still had its humorous aspect, and supplied them with what they much

¹ To Lord Raglan, 24th September, 1854.

² As to the source to which the public owed this singularly happy computation, see *post*, p. 357.

loved—a jest against the public authorities. At six o'clock on Monday morning, the keen people of London were roused from their domestic state, by what, as they trusted, might now, indeed, prove to be an authoritative announcement of the fall of Sebastopol; for the Park guns were firing, and were answered by the guns of the Tower. Called forth by the joyful sounds, numbers hastened to the Parks, as well as to other public places, and there stood gathered in groups. Even after several hours of vain expectancy they still continued to linger, each seeking to learn what any other might be able to tell; for they were slow to believe that the discharges of the guns at St. James's, and the answering thunders from the Tower, could really be void of all import. They believed that fresh tidings had come.

The firing of the Park and Tower guns on the morning of the 2nd Oct. The expectations thus raised.

They were mistaken. The firing in the Park and the Tower was only a matter of official punctilio, or rather, perhaps, an expression of official indignation, springing out of that busy sloth, that impassioned preference of form to substance, which was about to be somewhat harshly treated in the days then approaching by the name of 'Routine' or 'Red Tape.' The departments of the Queen's Government were accustomed to correspond formally the one with the other, much as though they were the governments of so many foreign states, living sometimes together in amity, at other times waging war; and it resulted, from sacred treaty stipulations long subsisting between two rival departments, that upon receiving a dispatch such as that which had come from Lord Raglan, the War Office should hasten to impart it to the Horse Guards. This, however, it seems, some clerk at the War Office long neglected to do; and his oversight inflicted upon the counter-clerk of the Horse Guards the agony of seeing the dispatch in the Sunday Gazette before his own department had any official cognizance of it. When at length the dispatch was imparted, the injured counter-clerk at the Horse Guards saw his opportunity—an opportunity of conveying a dignified reproof to his War Office adversary, and calling on all London to witness that a grievous neglect had occurred. So the thunder of the Park guns acknowledged—not indeed the arrival in England of any fresh tidings from the seat of war, but—the transmission of a now stale dispatch from one side of Whitehall to the other.

As concerning the reception by England of the victory won on the Alma, I may so far anticipate as to say, that when

Recognition on the part of the state authorities of the service rendered by Lord Raglan and the army on the day of the Alma

Lord Burghersh came home with the authentic account of the battle which the Commander of the Forces had written, there were accorded to Lord Raglan and his army warm and gracious words of approval from the Queen, enthusiastic praises from the Secretary of State, and, at a later time, the thanks of both Houses of Parliament.

‘On one subject alone,’ the Duke of Newcastle wrote,—‘on one subject alone you are silent—your own distinguished service.’¹ To this, however, others have borne witness, and ‘Her Majesty is profoundly sensible that, if her army has shown itself worthy of its ancient renown, its commander has proved himself able to uphold it, and has fulfilled the prediction written forty years ago by him under whom he learned the Art of War, and whose loss we still mourn, that he would “become an honor to his country.”’² I hope ‘you will assure your officers that the country is as grateful and enthusiastic in their admiration of the valor of the army as it was when victories were announced in your younger experience of war. As for yourself, I must again congratulate you upon all you have individually done. Your fame is now established in history. God grant you may live many years to enjoy the reputation you have won!’³

But the nation? To record ‘the demeanor of a free and impetuous people in time of war’—this, I see, was a part of the work which I, almost in words, undertook;⁴ so that, if I am to pursue my design, the moment has now come for showing with what measure of equanimity England was able to hear that the first battle of the campaign had resulted

in victory, and how her people comported themselves when there were showered upon them, first the rumors, and then the assurances, which announced a yet greater event. But from instances, even though numerous, of what private citizens may have said or done under the trials of composure to which happy tidings exposed them, it would have been hard to infer the mind of a great nation; and the task must have lain altogether beyond the reach of my industry, if it were not that that active news-dealing Company of which I heretofore spoke had so well conduct-

Means of ascertaining the demeanor of the English people when tried by the arrival of happy tidings from the seat of war.

Materials supplied by the

¹ Lord Raglan’s dispatch omitted all account of the part which he had personally taken, including even that advance of his to the knoll which did so much to govern the result; and it is to that omission that the Duke alludes.

² Dispatch to Lord Raglan, 10th October, 1854.

³ Private letter to Lord Raglan, 9th October, 1854.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 26.

Company
which printed
the *Times*.

ed its business at the time of the war as to be able to supply me with a register—a register kept up day by day—of English Opinion and Feeling.

It may be said that I do a wrong to the quiet and self-possessed millions of the English people by imputing to them, even inferentially, a concurrence in language which some will call wild and unsober ; but I answer that those tranquil millions are not, after all, the components who help, in loud times, to make up a nation's Opinion. In a nation, as in a crowd, more composure and wisdom may be found perhaps amongst those who stand silent than amongst those who shout ; but people who thus remain silent do not help much to constitute

The peculiar
value of these
materials.

either the temper of a crowd, or what men call 'the mind of a nation,' when regarded as a political force. If the motive energy of a nation is the subject in question, we have nothing to do with the 'still deeps,' however pellucid, nor yet with the clear, sparkling rills. Our business is with the torrent, because, although it be turbid, it still, for the moment, has volume and weight—because, in short, it is power ; and what I say is, that of the voices of those who, in time of joy, anger, or trouble, are accustomed to make themselves heard, this Company really gave, on the whole, so faithful an echo as to enable us to deduce from its language some idea, however imperfect, of the reception which England bestowed on the tidings brought in from the East. At all events, we may see how our country, in the hour of her triumph, was made to appear to the foreigner who judged her from the words of the *Times*.

So, if I now turn from siege labors to speak of mere words in a newspaper, I am not therefore going astray. Interruptions of this kind are within the design of the book, and from time to time will recur. If I am warranted in inferring the mind of the nation from an old yellow piece of a newspaper, it is because the writings of the Company (like the prices of the public funds) were governed, at the time of the war, by a principle strictly commercial. There is the more reason for making this plain because afterward the administration of the Company underwent a great change ; and those who are so young as to have acceded to acquaintance with politics within the last ten years can form no conception from what they now daily see of that puissant *Times* Company which flourished, nay reigned, in the world at the epoch of the Invasion.

In later years, we all know, the Directory of the Journal, growing weary it seems of the homely English People, has dallied with princes and rulers, nay, has even acknowledged

the attractiveness of mere human society, making serious endeavors apparently to fashion and adapt the public spirit of the nation to what in commerce is called the 'West End;' but it was not till after the war that the once mysterious and apparently impersonal Company thus graciously descended to Earth, and put on the mortal coil. Down to the period of the expedition against Sebastopol, the Directory of the *Times*, on the whole, had resisted temptations of State, and, undazzled by the glitter of the world, had remained always true to those widows and other proprietors who not only desired, as we saw, that politics should be turned into 'income,' but even took care that the speculation should be carried on in the way that had become traditional, by collecting, sorting, condensing, and finally selling Opinion.¹ Differing, therefore, in this respect from associations which made use of print with a view to advance given doctrines, or given sets of opinions, the *Times* Company gave a signal example of what might be done in the world by a steady, industrious firm carrying on the business of patriotism upon a principle sufficiently flexible. Not embarrassing its chaplain with questions of righteousness or wholesome policy, it simply took care to find out what counsels would be welcome, delivered those counsels accordingly, supported them by appeals to public virtue, and divided the profits half-yearly. The more the dominion of this commercial principle was complete, the greater, of course, is the historical value which attaches to an old file of the journal when consulted as a register kept up day by day of a nation's fleeting desires.

But the Company which printed the *Times* did more than write annals, did more than keep a mere journal. It was an actor upon the scene; and whether for good or whether for evil, it surely played a big part. The main difficulty under which it labored was that of being only a human institution; but if it at all felt the hindrance of not having divine attributes, it remedied or masked the defect by employing as writers bold men who virtually asserted the contrary. In the best, and the most sterling English that money could buy, those skilled, highly-disciplined wordsmen so wrote, day by day, that the power whence sprang any sheet of the *Times* was made to seem like something impersonal; and, as far as 'constant reader' could make out, the Paper was always in the right. Now, to be strictly impersonal, and therefore not liable to affections, or sickness, or death; to be always in the

¹ The arrangements under which this curious trade was carried on are given with some detail in vol. i. chap. xxxi.

right, and therefore not subject to repentance or even regret; to know the past, to grasp the present, to see the future, and, besides having such godlike powers, to be as free from all diffidence and bashfulness as the Apollo Belvedere;—this, of course, was to be more than mortal. The part, too, it must be owned, was well played; and, after all, in the determination to be one with the nation, however the nation might err, there was what, in a sense, might be almost called public spirit. We may have to be smiling sometimes when we see what our rustics call ‘Londoners’ engaged day by day in the task of superintending a war; but then also we shall come to the period when, in an hour of gloom, the great journal proved equal to its true function, giving strengthened form and expression to the manful resolve of the people. Attaining in the year of the Sebastopol expedition to the highest point of authority which it was destined to reach, the Company really earned for itself, at that anxious time, an interesting, though peculiar place in history.

But again. Upon searching for the origin of the invasion, as distinguished from the origin of the war, we observed that the just cause of resentment which at one time united against Russia all the other great Powers of Europe had altogether ceased to operate at the time when the armada of the Western States set sail for the Crimea; and that although with the French Emperor the animating principle continued to be what it had been before—that is, a very rational desire to establish his throne by a war in alliance with Queen Victoria—yet, on the part of the English, the governing motive was a love of adventure, taking definite form at last in an impassioned and almost romantic longing for the capture of Sebastopol. After examining the curious machinery by which this motive power was laid hold of and turned to account by a company dealing in news, we soon got to see how it was that the desire of the nation and the demand of the journal became almost interchangeable phrases; and, finally, we learned that, whether called ‘Public Opinion,’ or distinguished more simply by the familiar name of the Newspaper, this power was the one which not only prevented the war from expiring when the real cause of quarrel had ceased, but also enjoined the campaign, and sent our troops to Crim Tartary. We listened to the worshipful Company when delivering its final instructions in the name of our country; we saw what was done toward obeying them by a faithful army and navy; and now, if it were only for symmetry’s sake, we must stop to observe the reception which England, through the same repre-

sentative, was pleased to accord to the news of what her servants had done.

Well advised, and making good use of each atom of the earlier accounts, the Company had sagaciously reckoned and declared beforehand, not only that a battle would probably be fought on the heights of the Alma, but that the 20th of September was likely to be the day.¹ As the journal had forecast the event, so it befell; and it was with legitimate pride, no less than with the natural and healthy exultation of Englishmen in time of great joy, that the journal, on the 2nd of October, was enabled to burst upon its readers with the really authentic tidings which it fairly called 'great and glorious.' But if the Battle of the Alma was the best authenticated, it was not the greatest of the events which the managers of the paper were coming fast to believe in. Already—though as yet without answering for the truth of the statement—they suffered a column to be surmounted with tall letters spelling out 'The Fall of Sebastopol;' and on the following morning the re-appearance of the same momentous heading was supported by assuring words from the conductors of the paper. Still, although, as matter of inference, they thus stated their conviction in regard to the course which events must have taken, they hardly yet gave their full warranty to the reported capture of the place; and their language up to this time was so free from extravagance, that if the then temper of England be inferred from the tone of her great journal, she passed over the 3rd of October without having lost her composure.

But hour by hour, and minute by minute, the tidings, authentic and fabulous, had been more and more stirring the heart of the nation. It was becoming harder and harder for mortal journalist to remain calm. By the morning of the 4th of October this longing of all England had so carried with it the men who sought to speak in her name, that those who were employed by the great News Company in the function of dividing truth from fable could no longer work aright. The heading which blazoned abroad 'The 'Fall of Sebastopol,' was supported this time by the title, 'Decisive Intelligence;' and at length, without stint or reserve, without caution or modest restraint, the glorification was sounded.

¹ This is one of the best instances of the power of human forecast that I have become acquainted with.

‘The latest dispatches received from our correspondents at Vienna and Paris remove all doubt as to the triumph of the Allied armies, and the reality of the most splendid achievement of modern warfare—an exploit alike unequalled in magnitude, in rapidity, and in its results. It may now be confidently stated that the forts of Sebastopol fell successively before the combined forces of the assailants; that at least half the Russian fleet perished; that the flags of the Allies were waving on the Church of St. Vladimir; and that, on the 26th at latest, Prince Mentschikoff surrendered the place.’ The battles are over, and the victory is won. There is no longer any doubt that the legions of the Czar have been sought and encountered on their own territory by the soldiers of France and England; that they have been totally routed; that they have been driven in headlong flight, and with a dreadful carnage, to the very walls of their stronghold; and that Sebastopol itself—that symbol and citadel of Russian power, with its mighty fleets, its enormous arsenals, and its redoubtable garrison—has become the prey of the conquerors at the end of a ten days’ campaign. Never, since the days of Napoleon—we may almost say since the days of Cæsar—has an exploit of arms been attended with such entire or such instantaneous success. The arrival, the sight, and the conquest, form parts of one and the same event. The final triumph followed close on the first disembarkation; and all the anticipated incidents of an arduous campaign, marches, battles, sieges, and stormings, have been crowded into a single impulse of onslaught and victory.”²

Already the Czar was pictured as one who must abandon his capital, contenting himself with the forlorn safety that is to be found in the vastness of Central Russia; and the country between Moscow and the confines of Asia was pointed out as the possible abode of his fallen greatness. ‘We are told,’ the great news-dealers said,—‘we are told, indeed, that the Emperor has still the resources of an inaccessible territory, and an indomitable will, and that he may retire behind his steppes to preserve, somewhere between Moscow and Kasan, the palladium of his dynasty.’ But even in the far, dismal land thus appointed him for his refuge, Nicholas was to be pursued by the exulting scorn of the news-dealers. Speaking of the Czar as betaking himself to his imagined refuge in the country between Moscow and Kasan, the Com-

¹ *Times*, 4th Oct., 1854.

² *Times*, 5th Oct., 1854.

pany went on and exclaimed: 'But is that the part of a great European power, to abandon frontiers he can not defend, and to pride himself on a gloomy endurance of even, when his own weapons are turned against him?' If the challenging taunt thus addressed to the Czar was a fair expression of the state of English mind on the 4th of October, it must be acknowledged that the tone of our country on that happy day was rather pugilistic than warlike.

In a spirit of exultation which seemed—till the following day—exactly the same as just pride, the conductors of the great newspaper went on to contrast their own swift, daring, and decisive strategy with that of the mere soldiers and sailors who had troubled their brains by foreseeing all kinds of hindrances:—

'We were reminded by veteran speakers that we knew nothing of war, that such enterprises as we had undertaken were not the work of a campaign, that our enemy was mighty, the scene of action distant, and the uncertainties of fortune innumerable.'¹ Where were now the objectors? When a general sends home an account of a victory, he is wont to begin or conclude his narrative by ascribing the result, after all, to divine favor; and if to the men of the newspaper (acting always in the name of the public) there belonged all the honor of designing and forcing on the enterprise, it could still be acknowledged with a proud humility, that the glory of executing their conception was not to be claimed by them, nor indeed by other mortal. Awe-stricken by the grandeur of their own 'Decisive Intelligence'—intelligence afterward traced to the flowery speech of a Tartar—they hastened to exclaim: 'The awful rapidity, the overwhelming force, the retributive effects, of this visitation, seem to arm it with the terrors of a divine judgment.'²

It could not but be that writing of this kind would be followed by the operation of 'drawing a moral.' If the Newspaper spoke aright, the 'moral' the country drew was one which painfully concerned our Admiral in the Baltic. Before the false news from the Euxine had undergone contradiction, Sir Charles Napier was warned. Hard spurred by the example of those who—as said the great journal—had torn their way into Sebastopol, he was bidden to think how his fame would stand, in case he left Cronstadt untaken: 'The glorious success which has attended our armies in the

¹ *Times*, 4th Oct., 1854.

² *Times*, 5th Oct., 1854.

³ *Times*, 4th Oct., 1854.

‘Black Sea is not likely, we suspect, to improve the feeling with which the public appear to regard the operations in the Baltic. . . . After having been triumphant in the Black Sea, we are not likely to be content with merely holding our own in the Baltic. The public will now look for something more effectually conducive to the ultimate objects of the war.’

But above all, England vowed, or was made by her sponsor to vow, that she would be steadfast in her gratitude; and, since it was specially declared that so much of the public gratitude as the Paper thus promised to our commanders was on account of that portion of their achievements which had been officially authenticated,¹ it followed that, even if the ‘capture of Sebastopol’ should prove to be fabulous, the vow would lose none of its force.

‘And now,’ thus spoke the great journal—‘and now what should be done at home? Now that our soldiers and sea-men have performed their parts so gloriously, what duty remains for us? The duty of providing consolation for the sufferers, rewards for the survivors, and honors for all. . . . We have vows to perform. We prayed for success, and success has been given us—given us in measure full, complete, and glorious, beyond hope or prophecy. . . . We have as much right to pride ourselves upon the conduct of our commanders as on the courage of our troops; and indeed the success of this glorious expedition depended in an unusual degree upon skillful combination and judicious tactics. . . . We are now called upon to recognize the achievements of valor and generalship combined. Sure are we that the gratitude of the country will not prove below the occasion.’

These vows were made on the 4th and 5th of October. It wanted some few weeks of the time when the humor of this generous yet hasty and impetuous English people might be deemed to have so changed, that—after the sale of the sheets thus spread over with praise and thanksgivings—the Company would come back to the market with wares of a different kind.

The error of believing that Sebastopol had fallen was one which deserved easy pardon; for numbers of those who had the best means of knowing the truth were equally misled;² and even the false step which the Company made in lending its own au-

The venial character of the mistake as to the ‘Fall of Sebastopol.’

¹ *Times*, October 5, 1854, p. 6, 4th col. l. 108-114.

² The *Morning Chronicle* (with possibly some other papers) was wary enough to escape the delusion.

thority to the news, found a parallel in the similar announcement which was made by the French Emperor to troops assembled at Boulogne; but the theory which seeks to assign the cause of the mistake is interesting, and especially relevant to one of the points I am touching.

The force which men called 'Opinion' had of late made such conquests in England that city-bred people were growing to have confused, exaggerated notions in regard to the scope of its power; but, more perhaps than all others, those who had to do with the public prints stood exposed to this form of error. If sometimes they perceived how the frontiers of an ancient kingdom, or the granite of an enemy's fortress stood fast against this new moral force, they did not so take in the truth as to be able to act on their knowledge. Great things had been done in their time by this power; but Public Opinion in England, when dealing with the news from the East, went and ran itself madly against a question of fact—against a question whether given events had occurred some eight days before, and three thousand miles off in Crim Tartary. If the Company could not see truth, it was the longing of the public which blinded them. 'Probably,' they wrote—'probably the intense anxiety of the world to witness, and, if possible, to accelerate, the discomfiture of the power of Russia, caused 'this intelligence'—the intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol '—to be more greedily received than it deserved to be.'¹ There indeed had been frailty, and error was born; but according to this interesting confession, the deceiver was—who could have thought it?—the deceiver was that hoary saint long worshiped as Public Opinion.

If it could be believed that England was faithfully rendered by the Company which engaged to portray her, we have now seen with what demeanor she met the tidings of victory. It used to be said by people on the Continent who had opportunities of watching the demeanor of men of various nations when tried by the vicissitudes of the gaming-table, that the Englishman, as a rule, could be superbly calm whilst suffering ruinous losses, but that, when Fortune favored him, he was apt to be wanting in dignity and self-restraint; and supposing that the foible thus imputed to our countrymen had been brought into violent operation by all this news from the East, it will be acknowledged that the

The light in which England was made to appear to those foreign nations which judged her from the words of the Newspaper.

¹ *Times*, 6th Oct., 1854.

language of the journal gave an only too truly accurate reflection of the Public demeanor.

We saw, however, that it was a principle of the Company to avoid the error of being wiser than the people; and it is possible that, from an excess of attention to this rule, they may have slid for a moment into the opposite danger, and thus overrun by a little the bursting joy of the nation. Unless we can believe that for once the Company was a too frantic exponent of the national mind, and that England was caricatured by those who spoke in her name, we shall have to acknowledge that the joy of the people, and, still more, their haste to trample upon a foe supposed to be fallen, was wanting in soberness and dignity—nay, wanting even in prudence; for if one nation is in the humor to insult over another on account of a rumored misfortune, it ought at the least to make sure, before beginning the insults, that the misfortune has really occurred.

All this while, I have been delaying my account of the vexatious coincidence which was referred to at the opening of the chapter.

The coincidence which took place on the 17th of October.

We saw that, although there were afterward and from time to time brief revivals of hope, yet the moment at which a previously well-founded expectation of speedily taking Sebastopol came all at once to an end was the one when General Rose came down to Lord Raglan, and announced, on the part of the French, the full consequences of the disaster sustained in their batteries. The change wrought by a single shell proved so decisive, that whereas Lord Raglan, the moment before the explosion, had entertained what he believed to be a very good prospect of taking Sebastopol on the following day, he saw, when he had heard General Rose's announcement, that the capture of the place must thenceforth be regarded as an event that was indefinitely postponed. Well, exactly in that bitter hour, the mail which had come in from England was brought from the Head-quarters camp to the ground in front of the 3rd Division, where Lord Raglan with his Staff was established. Men opened their letters and newspapers, and in an instant there lay outspread upon the ground the capital letters of the *Times* announcing the 'Fall of Sebastopol.' The real discomfiture and the fabulous triumph were brought into ugly contrast. In the midst of the disappointment they were suffering, and the maledictions they failed not to utter, some felt, I think, a grim pleasure in the stumble the *Times* had made; and they hardly, perhaps, observed that remarks

to this effect were in one sense a homage to the Company. If the journal had not had a high character for the general accuracy of its intelligence in such matters, no great surprise or exultation could well have been roused by the occurrence of a single mistake.

Lord Raglan was pained; and in private he expressed his feeling to the Secretary of State: 'I can not but deplore the ready credence which has been given by the public in England to the announcement in the newspapers of the capture of Sebastopol; and, indeed, it is an injustice to our troops to view the accomplishment of the enterprise as an easy operation; and with the full determination to do every thing to insure success, I must still regard it as one of extreme difficulty, and of no great certainty.'

The arrival of the mail with a newspaper 'Fall of Sebastopol,' was rendered, of course, the more jarring by the accident of its having come upon Lord Raglan in the very hour when his hope of quickly taking the place had been suddenly chilled; but the example is only one out of numbers all tending to show how easy it was for the news-dealer to bring England and her army to cross purposes by trying to follow too closely a war some three thousand miles distant.

II.

Having possibly imagined that the venturesome design of attacking the Czar in the Crimea would be sooner or later arrested by the counsels of their own officers, or else by the prudence of Lord Raglan, the authorities of the French War Office were apparently slow to accept full belief in the enterprise, and feel sure that the contemplated invasion would actually occur;² but so soon as they knew that a landing had been really effected, they made haste to gather and send out the men and the means which might enable them to reinforce and sustain the invading army. They judged it needful to establish a great place of arms on the Bosphorus, which might serve as a reservoir of strength wherewith to feed the war.

The tidings of the Alma were received, it would seem, by the French people with a joy not transgressing the bounds of soberness; but to the Emperor, by

¹ Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 18th Oct., 1854.

² The inferences leading to this conclusion are very strong, but the matter is not of such importance as to warrant discussion.

tidings of the Alma, and the rumored fall of Sebastopol. reason of the evident effect they might have upon his tenure of power, they were of deeper moment. Being absent from Paris, he was in some measure cut off from the advice of the wary officials who might have helped him to test the accounts with all the severity needed; and from this cause it probably was that he fell into the error of announcing the capture of Sebastopol to the troops in the camp of Boulogne.

The official functionaries in Paris were more guarded, and the columns of the *Moniteur* gave no warranty of the report that the enemy's stronghold had fallen. This abstinence was owing perhaps to the strictness of the rules by which an official state journal must be bound. Without any such safeguard, however, the conductors of the *Journal des Debats* had also the merit of seeing that the reports which narrated the capture of Sebastopol were not so surely trustworthy as to enforce or warrant belief.

Some days later, an error was committed which seemed for a time to be seriously endangering the Anglo-French Alliance. When Marshal St. Arnaud's dispatches came in, the French Emperor (as his Minister afterward explained) was so exceedingly eager to impart to France without delay accounts narrating the success of the expedition, that, without suppression or alteration, he rashly ordered the immediate publication of the documents, as also of a plan and a drawing of the Battle of the Alma, which had been sent home by Admiral Hamelin.

The plan was the one sketched by the French the day before the battle to illustrate the project submitted by Marshal St. Arnaud to Lord Raglan.¹ The drawing purported to be a rough view of the battle as seen from the ships; and, however defective the work may have been in other respects, the artist was hardly to be blamed for not introducing the English, because they were fighting their battle at a distance of several miles from him. Still, in its bearing upon the maintenance of the Alliance, it was an ugly circumstance that, under the official sanction of the *Moniteur*, there should appear a representation of the Battle of the Alma with the English army left out.

But the principal danger to the Alliance was the one brought about by publishing Marshal St. Arnaud's dispatch to the Emperor.² From a fair construc-

¹ A facsimile of this is given in vol. i. p. 458.

² This was the only dispatch from the French Head-quarters which seems

Arnaud's dispatch when subjected to a fair construction.

tion of this it would probably be gathered that the victory on the Alma was substantially the Marshal's own achievement; that he had raised himself into the position of a French generalissimo, having under his virtual control an English contingent; that this English contingent, by reason of its slowness, had been giving him a good deal of trouble; and that the part which the English ultimately found means to take in the battle was rather a brilliant reparation for past shortcomings than a fight having real importance, or tending to decide the result. But beyond that, in disparagement of the English, St. Arnaud, as I think, never meant to go; and my impression is that, as far as was compatible with the overruling intention of making the victory his own, he wished and intended to do full justice to the English army. The narratives of the Mar-

Construction practically put upon them by the Parisian press. The participation of the English ignored.

shal were not, however, so construed by the conductors of the Parisian press. Partly from his dispatches, but partly also from the sketch (to which, by sending it to the *Moniteur*, the Emperor had given the semblance of official authenticity), the conductors of the Paris newspapers thought themselves warranted, it seems, in treating the victory on the Alma as simply a French achievement, and almost ignoring the presence of either an English general or an English army.¹

The English residents in Paris are a numerous and not unimportant portion of our people. With them, as was natural, the outburst of indignation began. They knew that their fellow-countrymen, with an army not far from being equal in numbers to that of the French, had fought a bloody battle, incurring heavy losses, but carrying all the ground in their front; and now, when it seemed that the two great nations might enjoy in common the glory they had gained, the one that was the best skilled in the art of appropriating laurels moved forward with a quiet dignity which was as like as could be to a real sense of ownership, and quietly took the whole. This indignation,

Indignation of the English residents in Paris.

to have excited any very general attention either in Paris or London; and in the trouble to which it gave rise, I do not observe that the really official and comparatively accurate dispatch—the one addressed to the Minister of War—was ever referred to as tending to mitigate or explain away the statements which Marshal St. Arnaud addressed to the Emperor.

¹ This, as evidenced by the dispatches before me, was the impression which English diplomacy gathered from the French newspapers at the time. I have not read the newspapers myself.

or 'disgust,' as our diplomatists at the time described it, was entertained by men who sincerely believed that each army, the French as well as the English, had really played a great part—by men who desired nothing more than that their fellow-countrymen should have a share of the glory which they believed to have been well earned by the whole of an Anglo-French army.

But there was one man in Paris who knew more than these indignant complainers. Partly from having had the advantage of seeing General Rose's dispatches, partly from conversation held with Lord Burghersh whilst passing through Paris, but in a great measure also, it must be surmised, from the circumstance of his having a natural faculty for educing the truth out of various materials, Lord Cowley had come to understand the Battle of the Alma.¹

Lord Cowley's knowledge respecting the Battle of the Alma.

The Alliance apprehended to be endangered.

To one who had found means to possess himself of this knowledge, the spectacle of the new Empire thus adding 'the Alma' to its list of victories exclusively French, must have been specially enraging; but diplomatists have to govern their tempers, and Lord Cowley would possibly have remained silent, if it were not that he perceived the Anglo-French Alliance to be in danger. Before many hours, the indignation of the English in Paris would reach London, would spread over England, would within the next fortnight get out to the Crimea, create fierce animosity there, and end by making it impossible for the

¹ Years elapsed before it could be said that any considerable number of people had attained to the comprehensive knowledge of the battle which Lord Cowley acquired in the first few days of October. Lord Raglan's admirable dispatch did not help toward this comprehensive as distinguished from particular knowledge, because it carefully avoided any thing like an account of the whole Battle of the Alma, and was strictly confined to a narrative of what the English—other than himself—had done. Moreover, by omitting to record the part that he himself had taken, he left a chasm in his narrative for which, by the by, he was gracefully chided by the Secretary of State. In the way of any one desiring to understand the battle, the Russian outpost at the village of Ulukul Akles was the confusing circumstance. It led people to imagine that Prince Mentschikoff's position extended to the verge of the sea-cliff; and until people learned that there was a mile or so of unoccupied ground between the Russian left and the sea, it was difficult for them to make even a good beginning of any endeavor to obtain a comprehensive idea of the battle. Lord Raglan was so struck with the accuracy of Lord Cowley's insight into the nature of the battle, that he spoke of the paper which disclosed our Ambassador's impression as 'perfect,' and even said, 'You must have written it by inspiration.'

Government of a free country to maintain with the new Empire those cordial and intimate relations which were needed, of course, in a war where the two nations fought side by side.

This being the condition of things, and delay being obviously dangerous, Lord Cowley, without waiting for authority from home, took upon himself to wait upon the Emperor's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, though maintaining a cordial and friendly tone, to remonstrate in serious, and even, one may say, indignant, language against the course which the French Government had taken in publishing dispatches offensive to England and her army.

At this interview, our Ambassador began his remonstrance by reading to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the following passage from Marshal St. Arnaud's dispatch to the Emperor: 'I had desired the English to prolong themselves on their left in order to menace the right of the Russians at the time when I should be giving them occupation at their centre; but their troops [the troops of the English] did not get into line till half-past ten. They bravely made up for this delay.'

When he had read the passage, Lord Cowley expressed his regret that it should have been published with the sanction of the French Government. He said there were two facts implied by the paragraph in question: 1st, that the Marshal had the direction of the movements of Her Majesty's

¹ I thus translate the words, 'J'avais engagé les Anglais à se prolonger sur leur gauche pour menacer en même temps la droite des Russes pendant que je les occuperais au centre, mais leurs troupes ne sont arrivées en ligne qu'à dix heures et demie. Elles ont bravement réparé ce retard.' If the word 'desired' (as here used) is not a sufficing equivalent for 'engagé,' I know of no better one. This sentence of Marshal St. Arnaud's, and the troubles which followed, will probably be cited where French is carefully taught as affording an instance of diplomatic remonstrance, and the temper of mighty States, with (potentially) the fate of a great alliance and of Europe all hanging upon the niceties of the verb 'engager.' By the adepts, including our Ambassador at the Tuileries, the phrase, it would seem, was regarded as implying that the Marshal had the direction of the movements of Her Majesty's forces; and I gather that the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs—having, perhaps, the fear of the French Academy before his eyes—was unable to deny that this must be indeed the effect of the sentence, for he made no attempt to defend St. Arnaud, by trying to deduct any thing from the subtle and recognized energy of the verb 'engager.' The word seems to import something less than an *order*, but it is more cogent than a *request*; and Lord Cowley perhaps judged rightly the effect of the sentence when (without asserting that it imported an actual direction) he said that Marshal St. Arnaud expressed himself in a way implying that he had a right or power to direct the movements of the English troops.

forces ; and, 2ndly, that the fortunes of the day were to a certain extent compromised by the delay which was said to have occurred in the advance of the British troops. He said that, from the use of the word 'reparer,' he could not but gather that a fault was alleged to have been committed.

He urged that, though it was impossible to prevent the French commanders from writing what they pleased, it was clearly the province of the French Government to take care that nothing offensive to their Allies was published by their authority.

After going into some details on the subject of the embarkation and the Battle of the Alma, Lord Cowley thought it well to let the French Government see that he at least knew something as to the respective parts taken in the action by the two armies. He said plainly that the English had had to bear the brunt of the action, the Russian main position having been in front of the English, whilst General Bosquet had nothing to confront but some difficult ground.¹

After warning M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the serious consequences which might ensue unless more care should be taken in future, Lord Cowley entreated the Minister to speak to the Emperor, as well as to his colleagues in the war and naval departments, and prevent a recurrence of such publications.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys received this communication in the most courteous manner. He frankly enough confessed and regretted the error that had been committed, and acknowledged the necessity of taking better care for the future. He added—and he said he could give this assurance with truth—that the conduct of the Queen's troops in the battle had been the admiration of the whole French army. He said he was certain the Marshal had not intended to convey the shadow even of a reproof.

Lord Cowley said he thought that for the future—he evidently intended no sarcasm—the reports published in so delicate a matter as the participation of two armies in one great enterprise, should be confined as much as possible to facts.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys throughout this interview was most courteous, and promised, as we saw, to do all that Lord Cowley asked him ; but it was evident that the fair words of a minister would not suffice to

Notwithstanding the courteous assurances of M.

¹ The 'nothing' of the Ambassador is substantially accurate, but must not be taken in a sense *absolutely* literal, because, as we know, Bosquet interchanged some shots with the outposts at Ulukul Akles, and was afterward engaged by the artillery of the force which he had 'turned.'

Drouyn de Lhuys, the Alliance was in jeopardy.

allay the indignation which had been provoked, and for some hours the Alliance was in jeopardy. The danger was not one which sprang from any evil design on the part of the French Emperor—the rupture of the Alliance at that time would apparently have been ruinous to him—but simply from his pardonable eagerness and want of composure in a time of trying excitement.

Circumstance which all at once allayed the indignation of the English.

Yet on this occasion—as indeed happened many times afterward—it was the fate of the Emperor to be shielded by fortune from the perilous consequences of his mistake. At the very time when the indignation of diplomatists and of the English in Paris was upon the point of extending over England,

Tidings of Marshal St. Arnaud's death.

and putting the Alliance in the gravest peril, there came tidings of almost the only imaginable event (except, perhaps, a fresh battle or the capture of Sebastopol) which would have been calculated to hush the storm. France and England

Its effect.

learned that Marshal St. Arnaud was dead. The intelligence acted upon the wrath of the English with immediate and decisive effect. Although their complaint was, in form, against the French

Government for publishing papers which our statesmen regarded as 'offensive,' yet, practically, any Englishman who might otherwise have been founding his expressed indignation upon the contents of the Marshal's dispatches, was silenced as soon as he knew that the hand of the writer was cold.

Circumstances tending to prevent the death of St. Arnaud being regretted by the French Government.

St. Arnaud's private letters, and those also of other French officers, opened at the post-office.

During several months Marshal St. Arnaud had been subjected to a kind of inspection which our countrymen in general would judge to be cruel and unfair. He had vanity, he had a perilous fondness for the use of his pen, and he trusted the French post-office. It resulted that his foibles were laid bare to the world without mercy. The private letters which he had addressed in all confidence to personal friends and relatives were opened and copied before they reached their destinations; and as the letters of his enemies in the French camp,

were subjected to the same process, any minister or other public man who had these transcripts before him, was furnished with just those materials which were the best fitted to produce an ill impression of the man to whom the French army had been trusted. All those little accounts of himself and his actions which were likely to be read with delight and even approval by the close friends and

Ill effect of this upon the

military reputation of the Marshal.

relatives to whom the letters had been addressed, were exposed to the scornful eyes of strangers, and enemies, but also to the criticism of cold-blooded men sincerely desiring to make out, as a mere matter of business, whether the French army in the East was in the hands of a capable chief; and, the reputation of the Marshal being subjected to a trial of this severe kind, there is no room for wondering that it should have become more and more difficult to sustain him against the current of Opinion. If the death of the Marshal was a relief to the French Government, it was not the less, for that reason, a subject of international condolence. Our Government condoled; and if

The condolence of the English Government.

they had desired to show that their words were not without warrant, they might have said, as we know, that by Lord Raglan himself—and who else of our countrymen could be so competent to speak?—the loss had been deeply regretted.¹

From the arrangements of the French post-office, there resulted at least one advantage to the cause of truth. In communications to their friends and relatives, which they meant to be private, French officers testified their admiration of the English soldiery in action; and, along with the other contents of the letters, these statements were disclosed. They conveyed what was evidently at that time the genuine feeling of the French army. So far as I have learned, no men in all France were so free from the tendency to undue boastfulness and depreciation of others as the men composing her army in the field.

High opinion of the English army found to be expressed in the intercepted letters of French officers.

The French Emperor had hardly been extricated by fortune from the consequences which were resulting from his rash publication of the 'offensive' dispatch, when he all at once stumbled again, and, without apparently having had the least notion of the construction which would be put upon his words, roused the indignation of the English Government. Having to address a letter of condolence to the widow of Marshal St. Arnaud, he thought fit to make this communication a vehicle for imputing to some persons unnamed an endeavor to obstruct the expedition against Sebastopol by their timid counsels. Now, as France knew nothing of the

The Emperor's imprudent letter to Madame St. Arnaud.

Its immediate consequence.

¹ *Ante*, p. 95. Lord Raglan's expression of regret was contained in a private letter, and could not, therefore, be regarded as merely formal. It is true, however, that Lord Raglan at that time had not seen the dispatch which our authorities regarded as 'offensive.'

paper which I have called the ‘unsigned remonstrance,’ and as it might well be judged highly improbable—though it afterward turned out to be the fact—that the French Emperor, in a letter of condolence to a gentlewoman, should have meant to assail his own officers in the form of innuendo, there seemed to be little room for doubting that the English must have been the delinquents to whom he ascribed timid counsels.

Our Government took fire at the supposed charge, and an indignant remonstrance was addressed to the Government of the Emperor. This time, however, the cure for the mischief was easily found. The Emperor consented to insert in the *Moniteur* a distinct assurance, declaring that the allusion had no reference to the English. This accordingly was done, and in very plain terms: ‘The following words of the letter of the Emperor to the Marechale de St. Arnaud, viz., “resisting timid counsels,” have been made the subject of false interpretations. The only object of the words was to make specially conspicuous the energy of Marshal de St. Arnaud in opposing the very natural differences of opinion which, on the eve of so grave a resolution, were manifested in the counsels of the French army and fleet.’² This declaration, of course, put an immediate end to the misunderstanding between the two Governments which the Emperor’s words had occasioned.

It was apparently surmised at the time that the Emperor’s disclaimer of all intention to allude to the English was a sacrifice of truth to policy; but a full knowledge of what had occurred on the 8th of September strongly tends to dispel that idea. It seems plain that the French officers who submitted for consideration the unsigned remonstrance of the 8th of September were the men to whom the Emperor alluded. The remonstrants were officers of great weight and authority, who put forward what may be called orthodox military considerations—considerations of such a kind as would have been probably approved by the French War Office, though opposed to the personal wishes of the Emperor. For that reason alone the Emperor might naturally have been willing to level a blow at them; but another and yet more cogent motive was apparently conducing to his somewhat infelicitous taunt. After the victory of the Alma, and the successful es-

Question as to the real meaning of the Emperor’s allusion.

¹ *Ante*, vol. i. p. 402.

² *Moniteur* announcement, dated Paris, 1e 30 Octobre.

tablishment of the Allied armies in the invaded country, he might well seek to make it appear that he had sanctioned and promoted the enterprise.

The Emperor at this time had not, perhaps, learned all that passed on the 8th of September and the days which followed. If he had known the entire truth, and had been willing to disclose it, he would have said that Marshal St. Arnaud was so grievously ill at the time as to be physically incapable of himself reconsidering the question of the invasion at the instance of the remonstrants—that in these circumstances he placed the decision in the hands of the English Commander—and that Lord Raglan, then eluding discussion, and gliding, as it were, into action, found means to overrule the remonstrance without even attempting to refute it, and drew forward the whole Armada, whether French or English or Turkish, to the rendezvous off Cape Tarkan.¹

III.

Prince Mentschikoff wrote no dispatch recounting the disaster he had undergone on the Alma,² but he sent an aid-de-camp to St. Petersburg.

No dispatch recounting the Battle of the Alma from Prince Mentschikoff.

The Czar's state of expectancy.

For several days toward the close of the month of September, the Czar had been growing more and more impatient for tidings. His impatience, it seems, was rather the longing for the good news he expected than the result of evil foreboding. It is said that he looked upon what he deemed to be the unwarlike rashness of the invasion with a feeling akin to pity; and assuring himself that the Allies would soon be his prisoners, he ordered, they say, that in that event the captive armies of the West, but more especially the English, should be treated with kindness.

At length the moment came when it was announced to the Czar that an aid-de-camp fresh from the Crimea was in the ante-room.³ He was instantly brought into the Czar's presence. By brief word or eager gesture he was ordered to speak. He spoke—'Sire, 'your army has covered itself with glory, but—' Then in-

His reception of the tidings of the Alma.

¹ See chap. xxxvii., vol. i.

² An official narrative of the battle was afterward prepared at the Russian Head-quarters; but was in the form of a journal. The aid-de-camp dispatched to St. Petersburg carried, it is believed, no word of writing from the Prince.

³ This aid-de-camp, I have heard, was Major Gregg.

stantly the Czar knew that the tale to be told was one of disaster. With violent imprecations he drove the aid-de-camp from his presence. The aid-de-camp, however, understood that he was liable to be again called in; and after a time—a quarter of an hour I think I have heard—he was once more in the Czar's presence. The Czar was changed in look. He seemed to be more composed than he had been, but was pale. When the aid-de-camp approached, the Czar thrust forward his hand as though to snatch at something, and imperatively cried, 'The dispatch!' The aid-de-camp answered, 'Sire, I bring no dispatch.' 'No dispatch?' the Czar asked, his fury beginning to rekindle as he spoke. 'Sire, 'Prince Mentschikoff was much hurried, and—' 'Hurried!' interrupted the Czar; 'What! what do you mean? Do you 'mean to say he was running?' Again his fury became uncontrollable; and it seems that it was some time before he was able to hear the cruel sound of the truth. When at length the Czar came to know what had befallen his army, he gave way to sheer despair; for he deemed Sebastopol lost, and had no longer any belief that the Chersonese was still a field on which he might use his energies.

I have said that this man, gathering into his own person all the power, all the will, all the cares of the empire, was verily and indeed that which he had dared to call himself when he said that he was 'the State.' I have said, too, that because the religion and the national passions of his obedient millions were his religion and his passions, therefore, in his superb and stately form vast Russia was truly incarnate. But never was this incarnation more manifest than in the time of the nation's trouble. Because a disaster had come upon Russia, her Czar was first raging, then prostrate. He obeyed the instinct which brings a man in his grief to sink down and lie parallel with the earth, and to seek to be hidden from all eyes. He took to his bed. Knowing the danger of approaching him, every body was scared from the door of the chamber. By the side of the low pallet-bed that he lay on there was a pitcher of barley-water, or some such liquid, and of that, it is supposed, from time to time he drank; but, except the nourishment thus obtained, it is believed that for many days he took no food.

This period of blank despair was indeed so prolonged that, when other and better tidings were beginning to come in from the Crimea, the Czar, it is said, still lay in the same condition.

¹ 'Est ce qu'il courrait?'

People feared to approach him so long as there was nothing to set against the thought of the defeat on the Alma; but when the more hopeful accounts came in, some thought they might approach him once more. Going to his bedside, they told him of these new tidings, and spoke of it as possible, if not even likely, that Sebastopol might still be saved. But the Czar would put no faith now in any words of hope. Nay, he raged, as they say, against those who sought to comfort him, saying: 'You are the men, you are the very men, who brought me to this—who brought me into this war by talking to me of the power of the English "peace party."' 'Yes; you are the men, the very men, who persuaded me that the English would trade and not fight. Leave me! leave me!'

CHAPTER XX.

AFTER the failure of the 17th of October, the Allies had determined to undertake a new plan of attack. Change of plan on the part of the Allies. The French were now to proceed against the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches. The English, it was known, with difficult ground in their front, and having but scant means of carrying on extensive siege works, would be able to do but little toward attaining the Redan by regular approaches; but it was agreed that, whenever the French should be ready for the assault of the Flagstaff Bastion, the English, at one point or other, should also storm the defenses. In the night of the 17th of October, the French so prolonged their first parallel as to disclose their new plan of proceeding against the Flagstaff Bastion.

It was determined, however, that, pending the time which would be occupied in proceeding by regular approaches, the cannonade should go on; and it was in pursuance of that part of the design that the English, on the 18th of October, had maintained the fire of their batteries. Determination to proceed by regular approaches, but at the same time to go on with the cannonade.

Since the silencing of their fire on the 17th of October, the French had been not only repairing the havoc made in their works, but establishing new, powerful batteries; and as it was known that, on the morning of the 19th, they would be in a condition to re-open their fire with largely increased means, the hour of trial was looked forward to with great interest by the Allies. Indeed it may be said that, notwithstanding the adoption and continual Cannonade of the 19th Oct.

prosecution of the plan for carrying forward regular approaches, there was a revival of the hope which had animated the Allies at the opening of the first cannonade. Men trusted that, under the more powerful fire which the French were now about to direct against it, the Flagstaff Bastion might be brought to such a condition as to warrant an assault; and, the English being ready at any time to storm the Redan, there was a prospect that, after all, the more summary of the two methods might be successful. In that aspect, the cannonade of the 19th of October would be a repetition of the attack which the Allies had commenced just two days before, though about to be attempted, this time, with more numerous and more powerful batteries.

But the preparations of the French were under the eyes of Colonel de Todleben; and he assured himself that, so long as they might continue to assail him from a narrow front of fire, he would be able to keep his ascendant, by meeting their increase of armament with an increase yet greater than theirs.

And Todleben got the dominion. Two of the French batteries were visited by the calamity of explosions; a third was silenced by fire at about ten o'clock in the morning; and at three in the afternoon there was no longer any French battery which continued the strife.

The English fire was maintained with great energy the whole of the day, and directed, for the most part, against the Redan.

At evening the cannonade ceased. No material injury had been done to the works of defense; but in killed and wounded this day the Russians lost 516 men.

Every day from this time until the evening of the 25th of October the fire of the Allies was continued, but every day also it was encountered by Todleben with a ceaseless energy. His defense of the place would be weakly, nay, almost wrongly, described by calling it 'obstinate;' for, united to all the gifts which the defender of a beleagured fortress should possess, he had a rare flexibility of mind, which enabled him to bend his vast powers to every changing phase of the conflict. Far from offering to the foe a resistance of the kind which the English call 'dogged,' he was enterprising, disturbing, aggressive. If there could be little rest for a garrison living within the range of such energies, there was now even less on Mount Rodolph, where the French, with their magazines too often exploding, and their batteries too often enfiladed by new works thrown up for the purpose, were undergoing a trial

The six successive days of cannonade which followed the 19th Oct.

of such a kind as might tend to make them distrustful of their own engineers. They hardly at the time understood the true root of the evils which beset them, but that which really stood in their path was warlike genius.

Under the direction of this great volunteer, the Russians, though suffering carnage, could steadfastly hold their ground. By fighting their batteries in the day-time with unsparing valor, and achieving at night immense labors, they were able to present to the besiegers every morning a line of defense which was not only strong and unbroken, but even augmented in strength; and they also found means to provide themselves, as the struggle continued, with a more and more efficient protection against the missiles of war. The comparative immunity enjoyed by the garrison after the 19th of October they owed mainly to the traverses and other defensive works which were growing up round them each night, but in part also to the skill which they were acquiring from practice in the art of desecring and eluding the heavier missiles of war. On the 18th, as we saw (when only the English were firing), the Russians in killed and wounded lost no less than 543 men; but although, during the six days which followed the 19th of October, a cannonade equally vigorous was maintained by both the French and the English, yet during that period the average daily loss of the Russians in killed and wounded was reduced to 254. The whole loss in killed and wounded which the Russians sustained from the siege down to the evening of the 25th of October was officially stated to be 3834.

But whilst Todleben thus met all the exigencies of the daily cannonade, he devoted yet more of his skill and energy to the object of counteracting what he now perceived to be the main design of the Allies. From the moment when, on the morning of the 18th of October, he saw how the French on Mount Rodolph had newly opened the ground along a distance of four or five hundred yards, he assured himself that they had determined to assail the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches. As an engineer, he entirely approved their decision; for there were many circumstances which concurred to make the Flagstaff Bastion a weak point in the line of defense; but so much the more for that reason he labored to frustrate the assailants. By means of a change effected in the organization of the night outposts, he found it possible to inflict much heavier losses than before upon the French working-parties, and, indeed, to car-

Measures for counteracting the French in their plan of proceeding against the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches.

ry the interruption to such a length as to render the progress of the approaches exceedingly slow; but also he constructed fresh batteries for the purpose of counteracting the new design of the French in all its successive stages, so ordering his measures that the nearer they might draw their approaches the more he would be enabled to ply them with fire; and adhering to his favorite principle, he never ceased to take care that, whenever the moment might come for assaulting the work, any troops employed in the enterprise should be under a storm of mitrail.

CHAPTER XXI.

BEFORE entering upon the narrative of a battle in which the English division of horse took a principal part, it seems right to speak of the selections that were made by our governing authorities when they undertook to name the general officers who were to be intrusted with cavalry commands in the army dispatched to the East. If a minister were unhappily forced to cast his eyes over a crowd of officers who had none of them rendered war service, and to try to draw out from among them the three or four gifted men who could best be intrusted to act in the field as generals of cavalry, it would be senseless to blame him for failing in so hard a task; but when it so happens that within recent years the State has carried on war, there surely is one test of fitness which has such paramount value, that the neglect to apply it can hardly be deserving of pardon, or even, we would say, of indulgence: Has the officer whose name is submitted done recent service in the field? Has his service been brilliant? Has he shown his prowess in action as a cavalry officer? Has he in any rank, however humble, taken part in cavalry fights? Is he of the age for a cavalry man? Is he either under thirty-five, or else a man so fresh come from the performance of cavalry feats that the question of age may be waived? If the minister finds that all these questions must be answered in the negative by a portion of the candidates, whilst others can answer affirmatively, it would surely appear to follow that he has already effected some progress toward a selection of the right names, because he can thenceforth confine his investigation to the merits of those officers who have served in

The task of selecting generals of cavalry for service in the field.

The great test of fitness which is applicable where a State has carried on war within recent years.

the field, and eliminate those who have not. To our own countrymen, more especially, the principle might be expected to recommend itself, because it so happened that, notwithstanding the long duration of the peace which had been existing between the great Powers of Europe, England had a superb list of cavalry officers in the early prime of life who had done brilliant service in the field.

Well, elimination proceeded—a choice was made; but it was with an actually inverting effect that these operations took place. Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that, in nominating general officers for cavalry commands in the East, the names of the men who had done service in the field were all set aside, and that from the peace-service residue exclusively the appointments in question were made.

The officer intrusted with the charge of our cavalry division was Lord Lucan. To his want of experience in the field there was added the drawback of age; for he had attained to a period of life at which no man altogether unused to war service could be expected to burst into fame as a successful cavalry general; but by nature Lord Lucan was gifted with some at least of the qualities essential for high command; and his fifty-four years, after all, however surely they may have extinguished the happy impulsiveness which is needed for a wielder of the cavalry arm, can hardly be said to have impaired his efficiency in the general business of a commander. He enjoyed perfect health; he saw like a hawk; and he retained such extraordinary activity of both body and mind, that perhaps the mention of his actual age makes it really more difficult than it might otherwise be to convey an idea of the tall, lithe, slender, and young-looking officer, pursuing his task of commander with a kind of fierce, tearing energy, and expressing by a movement of feature somewhat rare amongst Englishmen the intensity with which his mind worked. At every fresh access of strenuousness, and especially at the moments preceding strenuous speech, his face all at once used to light up with a glittering, panther-like aspect, resulting from the sudden fire of the eye, and the sudden disclosure of the teeth, white, even, and clenched.

At an early period of his life, and whilst still almost a boy, he had the honor to be encouraged in his career by the Duke of Wellington, and even to receive words of counsel and

guidance from the lips of the great captain. In later years, he had had the spirit and enterprise to join the Russian army whilst engaged in military operations, thus giving himself the advantage of seeing a campaign;¹ and I can not but believe that the time thus spent was more conducing to war-like efficiency than many a diligent year employed in peace service at home. Independently of the general advantage derived from a glimpse of reality, Lord Lucan gathered from his experience of that campaign on the Danube some knowledge of a more special kind in regard to Russian troops; and there is reason for inferring that his mode of handling the English cavalry in the Crimea was in some measure influenced by the impressions of his earlier days. A quarter of a century before, he had come back from the Danube campaign with a low opinion of the Russian cavalry, but with a high respect for the infantry—more especially, it seems, for the infantry when gathered in heavy column; and he not only carried those opinions with him to the Crimea, but continued, when there, to hold them unchanged, and even, perhaps—though unconsciously—to make them the basis of his resolves.

Lord Lucan's intellectual abilities were of a very high order, and combined as they were with the extraordinary energy of which I have spoken, they might seem to constitute power. Experience, too, had shown that he could apply these qualities effectively to at least one grade of military duty, for at the time when he exercised a Lieutenant-Colonel's command his regiment was in excellent order.

No military duties in peace-time could suffice to absorb such energies as those which Lord Lucan possessed; and during a period of many years immediately preceding the Russian war, he had engaged himself in the conduct of large agricultural operations, carried on upon his own estates both in England and Ireland. With him, the improvement and culture of land had not been a mere quiet resource for dawdling away the slow hours, but a serious and engrossing business, eliciting sustained energy. In executing his designs for the improvement of his Irish estates, he pressed on, it appears, with a great strength of purpose which overthrew all interposed obstacles; and that ruthlessness perhaps was a circumstance which might be numbered amongst the reasons for giving him a command, because the innovating force

¹ In the war of 1828-9 against the Sultan, Lord Lucan was attached to the Staff of Prince Woronzoff; and I have heard that he was graciously chided by the Emperor Nicholas for too freely exposing his life.

of will which he evidenced was a quality which had at the time a special and peculiar value. At the commencement of operations in the field, it is difficult for any man who is not of an almost violent nature to prepare troops long used to peace service for the exigencies of actual war, by tearing them out of the grooves in which they have long been moving. Of course, the grave task of choosing our cavalry generals was converted, as it were, into guess-work by the determination to take them exclusively from the list of those officers who had never served their country in the field; but apart from that grave objection, and the objection founded on age, Lord Lucan was an officer from whom much might be reasonably hoped, if the soundness of his judgment could be inferred from the general force of his intellect, and if also it could be taken for granted that he would prove willing and able, after having long had his own way, to accept the yoke of military subordination in the field, and to bear it with loyalty and temper.

Lord Lucan had one quality which is of great worth to a commander, though likely to be more serviceable to a commander-in-chief than to one filling a subordinate post. He had decision, and decision apparently so complete that his mind never hankered after the rejected alternative. His convictions once formed were so strong, and his impressions of facts or supposed facts so intensely vivid, that he was capable of being positive to a degree rarely equaled. When he determined that he was right and others wrong, he did not fail also to determine that the right and the wrong were right and wrong with a vengeance. In summing up before the House of Lords an argument attempting the refutation of a dispatch sent home by Lord Raglan, he spoke in a way which was curiously characteristic. He did not dilute his assurances with the language of moderation. 'My Lords,' he said, 'I believe I have now answered every charge contained in Lord Raglan's letter. I pledged myself to refute every accusation; I said that I would not leave a word unanswered. I believe I have fully fulfilled the undertaking I gave—have not left two words together, but have torn the letter to rags and tatters.' Coming from Lord Lucan, this language was no vulgar brazenry: it represented the irrepressible strength of his real though mistaken conviction.

From the qualities observed in this general officer at the time of his appointment, it might have been difficult perhaps for a minister to infer the peculiar tendency which developed itself in the field; but what happened was—that, partly from

the exceeding vigor of his intellect, partly from a naturally combative, antagonistic temper, and partly, perhaps, from the circumstance of his having been long accustomed to rural and provincial sway, Lord Lucan in the Crimea disclosed a habit of mind which was calculated to endanger his efficiency as a subordinate commander. He suffered himself to become an inveterate critic—an inveterate critic of the orders he received from Head-quarters; and since it happened that his criticism almost always ended in his coming to a strong disapproval of his chief's directions, he of course lost that comfort of mind which is enjoyed by an officer who takes it for granted that his chief must be right, and had to be constantly executing orders with the full persuasion that they were wrongly conceived. Plainly, that was a state of mind which might grievously impair a man's powers of action in the field, not only by chilling him with the wretched sensation of disapproving what he had to do, but also by confusing him in his endeavors to put right interpretations upon the orders he received.

It was never from dullness or sloth, but rather through a misaiming cleverness, that Lord Lucan used to fall into error. With a mind almost always apparently in a confident and positive state, he brought it to bear in a way which so often proved infelicitous, that his command in the Crimea was made on the whole to appear like that of a wrong-headed man; but I imagine that this result was in no small measure produced by the circumstance of his being almost always in an attitude of oppugnancy; and there is room for believing that under other conditions, and especially if detached, and acting for the time independently, he might have evinced a much higher capacity for the business of war than he found means to show in the Crimea. There, at all events, he was not at all happily circumstanced; for besides being wholly unarmed with the authority which is conferred by former services in the field, he had so yielded to his unfortunate habit of adverse criticism as to be more often fretted than animated by the orders which came down from Head-quarters; and, on the other hand, he had under him a general officer commanding one of his brigades who was rather a busy antagonist than a zealous and devoted lieutenant.

It must be remembered, moreover, that the control of a large body of cavalry in action carries with it one peculiar source of embarrassment. If the general commanding leads a charge in person (as Murat was accustomed to do), he loses, of course, for a time his power of personally directing

the troops not included in his first line, and so abdicates during the interval one of his principal functions as a general. If, on the other hand, he clings to his power as a general, and declines to narrow his authority during several critical minutes by taking the part of a leader, he must be content to forego a large share of the glory which attaches to cavalry achievements. He may deserve and attain the high credit of seizing the happiest moments for successively launching his squadrons; but in combats of horse, the task of actually leading an attack is plainly so momentous a business that it would be difficult for any man coming new to field service to build up any lofty repute as a general of cavalry, by ordering other people to charge.

Therefore, for general as well as for special reasons, Lord Lucan's command was one of an embarrassing kind; but despite the inherent difficulties of his position—despite all the hindrances created by himself, and the hindrances created by others—he was a diligent, indefatigable commander,—always in health, always at his post, always toiling to the best of his ability, and maintaining a high, undaunted, and even buoyant spirit under trials the most depressing. He expended a prodigious industry upon his duties. It may be that he was not perfectly consequent, or that his measures were wrong or ill-timed, or, again, that he was unduly thwarted; for certainly the result seems to have been that, in proportion to the energy exerted, his mind left no great trace of its action; but if a man's power of commanding could be safely inferred from mere words, the collection which has been made of Lord Lucan's divisional orders would be a striking example of vigor applied to the management of cavalry in a time of the heaviest trials. Disliking apparently every sacrifice, however temporary, of the controlling power, he did not take upon himself to lead in person any cavalry charge; and therefore the degree in which he may have been qualified for that very peculiar kind of duty must of course be a subject of conjecture rather than proof; but his composure under heavy fire was so perfect that, even in an army where prowess evinced in that way was exceedingly general, it did not escape observation. 'Yes, 'damn him, he's brave,' was the comment pronounced on Lord Lucan by one of his most steady haters.

This is not the place for giving the general tenor of Lord Lucan's services as commander of our cavalry in the Crimea;¹

¹ The place for that will be the chapter in which I deal with the period of Lord Lucan's recall.

but I have sought to prepare for my account of the action in the plain of Balaclava, by conveying beforehand some impression of the officer who there commanded our cavalry. Some such glance was the more to be desired because Lord Lucan's abilities were evidently of a higher order than those he found means to disclose by the part he took in the battle.

It should be understood that Lord Lucan did not thrust himself into the command of our division of horse. All he had asked for was to have charge of a single infantry brigade.

The English division of horse numbered two brigades, one of which comprised the Light Cavalry, the other our Heavy Dragoons. The Light Brigade, as we know, was commanded by the Earl of Cardigan.

Lord Cardigan, when appointed to this command, was about fifty-seven years old, and had never seen war service. From his early days he had eagerly longed for the profession of arms, and although prevented by his father's objections from entering the army at the usual period of life, he afterward—that is, at about twenty-seven years of age—was made a cornet in a cavalry regiment. He pursued his profession with diligence, absenting himself much from the House of Commons (of which he was at that time a member) for the purpose of doing orderly duty as a subaltern in the 8th Hussars. Aided partly by fortune, but partly by the favor of the Duke of York and the operation of the purchase system, he rose very quickly in the service, and at the end of about seven years from the period of his entering the army, he was a lieutenant-colonel.

He had a passionate love for the service—a fair knowledge, it is believed, of so much cavalry business as is taught by practice in England—a strong sense of military duty—a burning desire for the fame which awaits heroic actions—and, finally, the gift of high courage. Lord Cardigan's valor was not at all of the wild, heedless kind, but the result of strong determination. Even from his way of riding to hounds, it was visible, they say, that the boldness he evinced was that of a resolute man with a set purpose, and not a dare-devil impulse. He bore himself firmly in both the duels he fought; and upon the occasion which opposed him to an officer against whom he was bitterly angered, he shot his foe through the body.¹ His mind, although singularly barren, and wanting in dimensions, was not without force; and he

¹ Without, I think, killing him.

had the valuable quality of persistency. He had been so constituted by nature, or so formed by the watchful care which is sometimes bestowed upon an only son, as to have a habit of attending to the desires and the interests of self with a curious exactitude. The tendency, of course, was one which he shared with nearly all living creatures; and it was only from the extraordinary proportions in which the attribute existed, and from the absence of any attempt to mask the propensity, that it formed a distinctive peculiarity. When engaged in the task of self-assertion or self-advocacy, he adhered to his subject with the most curious rigor, never going the least bit astray from it, and separating from it all that concerned the rest of creation as matter altogether irrelevant and uninteresting. Others before him may have secretly concentrated upon self an equal amount of attention; but in Lord Cardigan there was such an entire absence of guile, that exactly as he was so he showed himself to the world. Of all false pretenses contrived for the purpose of feigning an interest in others he was as innocent as a horse. Amongst his good qualities was love of order; but this with him was in such morbid excess, that it constituted a really dangerous foible, involving him from time to time in mischief. One of his quarrels was founded upon the color of a bottle; another upon the size of a tea-cup. In each case the grievance was want of uniformity. To his formulated mind the distinction between lawful and right was imperceptible. A thousand times over it might be suggested to him that he ought not to have been sleeping on board his yacht—a yacht with a French cook on board—when not only all the officers and men under him, but also his divisional chief, were cheerfully bearing the hardships and privations of camp life; but a thousand times over he would answer that he indulged himself thus with the permission of Lord Raglan; and the lawfulness of the practice being thus established, he never seemed to understand that there could remain any question of propriety, or taste, or right feeling.

With attributes of this kind, he was plainly more fitted to obey than to command. Having no personal ascendancy, and no habitual consideration for the feelings of others, he was not, of course, at all qualified to exert easy rule over English gentlemen, and his idea of the way to command was to keep on commanding. There surely was cruelty in the idea of placing human beings under the military control of an officer at once so arbitrary and so narrow; but the notion of such a man having been able to purchase for himself a

right to hold Englishmen in military subjection is, to my mind, revolting. Lord Cardigan incurred a series of quarrels, and was removed from the command of his regiment; but afterward, by the special desire of the Duke of Wellington, he was restored to active service.

There can hardly have been any well-founded expectation that Lord Cardigan would be able to go through a campaign without engaging in quarrels; and never, surely, by action or speech, did he convince the dispensers of military authority that he was a man who would be competent to meet the emergencies of war with the resources of a fruitful mind. I imagine that the first active Bishop or Doctor of Divinity whom the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards might chance to have met on horseback would probably have been much more competent than Lord Cardigan (whose mind worked always in grooves) to discover and seize the right moment for undertaking a cavalry charge. Yet without the attributes of a commander, a man may be a resolute, faithful, heroic soldier; and that surely is the kind of glory—it is glory of no mean kind—which can best be claimed for Lord Cardigan. In despite of all the faults which he had manifested to the world when appointed to the command of the Light Brigade, there still remained good grounds for trusting that, as long as he should be acting in the performance of what he might clearly understand to be his duty, he would perform it with precision, with valor, and, if need be, with unsparing devotion.

If between Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan there could be discovered any points of resemblance, these were not of such a kind as to be conducive to harmony. They were, both of them, contentious; and whether from natural gifts, or from long habits of disputation, they had both of them powers of a kind which are commonly developed in lawyers, though not certainly in lawyers of the same quality. Lord Lucan was the able, the cogent, the strenuous, the daring advocate, whose opponents (especially if they happened to be in the right) were to be not merely answered but crushed. Lord Cardigan, in his forensic aspect, was of the species which repeats a hundred times over in the same words the same version of the same facts, persistently ignores the whole strength of the adversary's argument, and which also relies a good deal upon what in the courts are called 'points' and objections.' Yet it would seem that he must have been capable of attaining to a higher level; for upon one occasion, when undertaking to defend

himself in the House of Commons, he made what the House regarded as a very good speech. Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan were both of them men possessed with exceeding self-confidence, but a self-confidence resulting from very different springs of thought. Lord Lucan's trustfulness in himself was based upon the consciousness of great ability, and upon that rare vividness of impression as well as that strength of conviction of which we were just now speaking. He was confident because he was positive. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan's assurance was not, I think, founded upon any quality which could be rightly called self-conceit, but rather upon the corollary which he drew from the fact of his having a given command. He was so extravagantly military in his notions, so orderly, so strait-minded, so given to narrow and literal interpretations, that from the mere fact of his having been intrusted with the charge of a brigade, he inferred his perfect fitness for the task. By the act of appointing him his Sovereign had declared him fit, and he took the Queen at her word. When we see him, by and by, side by side with a cavalry officer of warlike experience, at a critical moment, we shall learn to how great an absurdity a man may be brought by this army-list process of reasoning. So far did Lord Cardigan carry the inference, that once, I see—even in writing—when maintaining his view as to the extent of undisturbed authority which should be possessed by the commander of a brigade, he made bold to bracket himself, as it were, for the purpose of the discussion, with no less a man than Sir Colin Campbell, basing one of his arguments upon the tacit assumption, that because Sir Colin and he both commanded brigades, they were both of them, therefore, entitled to the same degree of latitude.

It was hardly to be expected with confidence that officers appointed to high cavalry commands without having earned them by serving their country in the field would all at once show themselves able to put sound constructions upon the orders which were to guide them in the presence of the enemy; and the personal qualities of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan were not of such a kind as to supply in this point the absence of warlike experience. With Lord Lucan the danger was, that his fertile and vigorous mind might bring him into some elaborate and subversive process of reasoning. If, for instance, we should hear him informed that he is to be supported by infantry, we must be prepared to find him convinced that the infantry is to be supported by him. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan's endeavors at construing orders

were sure to be characterized by an exceeding rigidity, which might be preposterous in one instance, in another superb. If ordered to hold a position, he might think himself planted as fast as a sentry at the gate of a palace. If ordered to advance down a valley without being told where to halt, he might proudly abstain from supplying the omission, and lead his brigade to destruction.

Lord Lucan was the brother-in-law of Lord Cardigan; but so little beloved by him that, in the eyes of cynical London, an arrangement for coupling the one man to the other seemed almost a fell stroke of humor. It might have been thought that, in a free country, the notion of carrying official perverseness to any such extreme length as this must have been nipped in the bud. It was not so. If England was free, she was also very patient of evil institutions, as well as of official misfeasance. She trusted too much to the fitful anger of Parliament, and the chances of remonstrance in print.

In justice to Lord Cardigan—because tending to account for, and in some measure palliate, the act which will be presently mentioned—it should be stated that, some short time before the embarkation, he had had to endure a bitter disappointment, under which he continued to smart during the first two weeks of the invasion. Lord Lucan was to have been left in Bulgaria, and, under that arrangement, Lord Cardigan in the Crimea would have been commander of our cavalry during several momentous days, without being liable to any interference except from Lord Raglan himself; but Lord Lucan successfully insisted upon his claim to be present with the portion of the division which was likely to come first into the presence of the enemy; and accordingly Lord Cardigan, though commanding the Light Brigade, had over him his divisional general, and was therefore in a measure annulled.

Lord Cardigan was not a man who would have consciously suffered himself to become at all insubordinate; but, whilst writhing under the torture inflicted by the annulling presence of his divisional general, he brought himself to imagine that the custom of the service set something like bounds to the overruling authority which should be exercised by a divisional general over his brigadier, and that in some matters at least—as, for instance, in the arrangements of his camp—the brigadier had a right to expect that he would be left to his own discretion.

Lord Cardigan's desire to be protected against what he regarded as the undue interference of Lord Lucan.

Accordingly, and at a period of the campaign when it might be imagined that the eternal claims of self would, for a time, be superseded by the warlike ardor of a cavalry leader, Lord Cardigan applied his mind to the object of protecting himself from the interference of his commanding officer. He drew up in writing a lengthy string of complaints on this subject, and submitted them to Lord Raglan.

Lord Cardigan's complaint in writing.

Lord Raglan judged it his duty to answer this appeal with some severity. In a paper which was addressed, it seems, to Lord Cardigan, but meant to be communicated also to Lord Lucan, the Commander of the Forces thus wrote:—

Lord Raglan's severe answer.

‘BALACLAVA, *Sept.* 28, 1854.

‘I have perused this correspondence with the deepest regret, and I am bound to express my conviction that the Earl of Cardigan would have done better if he had abstained from making the representation which he has thought fit to submit to my decision.

‘I consider him wrong in every one of the instances cited. A general of division may interfere little or much with the duties of a general of brigade, as he may think proper or see fit. His judgments may be right or wrong, but the general of brigade should bear this in mind, that the lieutenant-general is the senior officer, and that all his orders and suggestions claim obedience and attention.’

Lord Raglan, however, determined to try whether it were possible that words of entreaty from himself, addressed alike to Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, might either allay the animosity existing between them, or render it less embarrassing to the public service; and accordingly, in the same paper, he addressed to both these Generals the following appeal: ‘The Earl of Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan are nearly connected. They are both gentlemen of high honor and of elevated position in the country, independently of their military rank. They must permit me, as the Commander of the Forces, and, I may say, the friend of both, earnestly to recommend to them to communicate frankly with each other, and to come to such an understanding as that there should be no suspicion of the contempt of authority on the one side, and no apprehension of undue interference on the other.’

Lord Raglan's appeal to the good feelings of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan.

(Signed)

‘RAGLAN.’

It must not be supposed, however, that the relations be-

tween these two officers involved them in unseemly personal altercations. Lord Lucan with great wisdom and tact took care that the more unwelcome communications which he from time to time made to his brigadier should be either in writing, or else conveyed by the mouth of another; and Lord Cardigan on the other hand had a sense of propriety in such matters, and was not without power of self-restraint.

But now, why did it happen that England, having under her eyes a brilliant list of cavalry officers from whom she might make her choice, determined to exclude all those who had served in the field, and to place in the respective commands of which we have been speaking two peers between fifty and sixty years old who had neither of them rendered war-service? One answer is this: There was a divided responsibility. We heard what happened to London when the War Office and the Horse Guards—the clerk and the counter-clerk—differed; but this selection of cavalry officers was the result of agreement, or rather, one may say, of a process which goes by the name of ‘compound-
Inquiry as to the cause which rendered it possible to confine our cavalry to those generals exclusively who had not rendered service in the field. ing.’ From ancient treaties of peace between the two sides of Whitehall it resulted that the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards was the authority for advising the appointment and taking the Queen’s pleasure upon it; but that the authorities responsible to Parliament, or, in other words, the Ministry, might take upon themselves to interpose; and that if they should do so, and do so persistently, then, painful as the surrender would be, their objection should be allowed to prevail.

From this division of power there followed, of course, a corresponding alleviation of responsibility. Lord Hardinge could say that the proposed nominations had been brought to the cognizance of the Ministry, without causing them to interpose their authority as a positive bar to the proceeding. The Ministry, on the other hand, could declare—as, indeed, the Duke of Newcastle very constantly did—that they strongly disapproved the appointments, and never would have made them if they had the full power in their hands; but that, still, they did not feel it absolutely incumbent upon them to take the somewhat strong measure of interposing.

In the present condition of our State arrangements, one of the best and most graceful uses of an aristocracy is to supply the country in time of war with commanders who have attained to distinction in presence of the enemy, and yet are sufficiently youth-
The value of an aristocracy (in the absence of other sufficient arrangements) as a

means of supplying the State with military commanders having warlike experience, and being also of the right age.

ful. For a nation to build its hopes upon so narrow a basis, instead of fairly searching out from among the whole community those men who may seem the best qualified to lead its forces, this, no doubt, must be looked upon as a rude, quaint practice, which is only saved from being preposterous

by the fact that no more rational method has hitherto found acceptance; but in the mean time, the practice, as thus understood, has its value. The adventitious circumstances combine with personal merit, and lift a man into command at the age best adapted for the purpose; so that the qualities of a Wellesley, for instance, may come to be recognized at thirty instead of at sixty—a difference material to the individual, but unspeakably important to the country; and in that way (until a better method can be discovered) the legitimate ambition of powerful or wealthy families may subserve the true interests of the State. If Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan had been two nobles of the age of some thirty-three years, who had fought side by side on the banks of the Sutlej, who had inspired their commanders with a high idea of their warlike qualities, and who, by aid of these circumstances combining with their family pretensions, had attained to such military rank and distinction as to be recognized and deserving candidates for high commands, then, indeed, a country which had not yet hit upon any better mode of attaining the object would have had reason to be grateful for the existence of a system which supplied and raised into eminence, at the right time of life, men capable of wielding

The appointments rested upon no such basis.

authority in the field. Far from resting upon any such basis, these appointments deprived the country of the inestimable advantage of seeing her squadrons intrusted to men in the prime of cavalry life who had gloriously served in the field, and committed a superbly great stake to two peers of the ages of fifty-four and fifty-seven, who, so far as concerns that teaching which is imparted by responsible war-services, were now to begin their education, and begin it in the enemy's presence.

The effects that were to be anticipated from these appointments.

However, these two general officers were both of them brave men, and in that, at all events, there was a basis for hoping that, in spite of any misfortunes resulting from the appointments in question, the honor of the service would be sustained. It may be that, in professing to judge of the seed which was sown in the spring, one is governed too much by observing the harvest that was reaped in the autumn; but certainly this

double selection of generals does seem as though it were fitted—and that without much help from fortune—to involve the English Light Cavalry in some ruinous yet brilliant disaster.

There is a circumstance which tends in some measure to account for dereliction of duty on the part of those who were preparing our army for foreign service. Men who might be supposed the most competent to form an opinion, were persuaded that the force would be used as a support to negotiations, and not for actual warfare.¹

The officer appointed to the command of the Heavy Dragoons was Brigadier-General the Honorable James Scarlett. He was fifty-five years of age, and he too, like Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, had never done service in the field; but besides those soldierly qualities of which we shall be able to judge when we see him engaging the enemy, he was gifted with two quiet attributes, which enabled him to appreciate the deficiency, and do all that man could to supply it.

He had modesty as well as good sense; and knowing that experience, valuable in almost all undertakings, is especially valuable in the great business of war, he did not for a moment assume that, by the magic virtue of his mere appointment to a command, he became all at once invested with the knowledge or the practical skill which men acquire in the field; and he therefore determined, if he could, to have men at his side who knew of their own knowledge what fighting was, and had even won high distinction.

The officer whom Scarlett chose as his aid-de-camp was Lieutenant Alexander Elliot. Before the period of his entering the Royal Army Elliot had served five years in India. He was in the Gwalior campaign, and at the battle of Punniar commanded a troop of the 8th Bengal Light Cavalry. With the same regiment he went through the whole of the eventful and momentous struggle which we call the first Sutlej campaign. He commanded a squadron at the great battle of Ferozeshah; and at a time when the 62nd had been driven back and almost annihilated, he executed a desperate charge, and with his standard-bearer and five troopers pene-

¹ I do not include the Duke of Newcastle amongst those who entertained the impression, but certainly the communications made to Lord Raglan—communications extending down to the eve of his departure for Paris—compelled him almost to believe that the period of foreign service would be extremely brief.

trated into the Sikh intrenchments. In recognition of his brilliant cavalry service in that war, Lord Hardinge appointed him to a command in his body-guard, and made him honorary aid-de-camp. Being afterward constrained to leave India by the state of his health, he entered the Royal Army, and it was owing to this necessitated change that he bore no higher rank than that of lieutenant. With all the special knowledge and instincts of a brilliant cavalry officer, he had qualifications of a more general kind; and if there had been at the time of the invasion a minister so strong and so resolute as to be able to do the thing which is right, a man such as Elliot would have been eagerly laid hold of and intrusted with high cavalry command.

But this was not all that Scarlett was able to do toward arming himself with the experience of men who had done good service in war. Colonel Beatson had fought under Evans in Spain, and had afterward risen to high distinction in India. Being for the time in Europe, and yielding to the warlike impulses of his nature, he had laid aside those considerations of military rank which might have governed a lower order of mind, and consented to be attached to General Scarlett's Staff as his extra aid-de-camp. Lord Lucan, with that unhappy perversity which was so constantly marrying his cleverness, opposed himself to this last arrangement of Scarlett's, and declared, it seems, that Colonel Beatson must not be considered as having any recognized position in the army.

I have said that if General Scarlett enjoyed the immense advantage of having two such aids-de-camp as these, he owed the happy idea of thus strengthening himself to his own wisdom and modesty; but it is worth while to say that that last quality of his had a tendency to withdraw our brigade of Heavy Dragoons from its due share of public attention. Concurring with other known causes, General Scarlett's quiet unobtrusiveness did much to prevent his fellow-countrymen from acquainting themselves so fully as they might otherwise have been eager to do with the fight between his brigade and the main body of the Russian cavalry.

On the day of the battle at Balaclava it was not the destiny of General Scarlett to have to act under any great complexity of circumstances, nor to give rise to any kind of public controversy, and it will therefore be easy to see and to understand him in action without having a preliminary knowledge of the man; but in truth his achievement corresponded so closely with the noble and heroic simplicity of his

character, that the account of what he did will not fail to carry along with it a true indication of his quality. We shall see him lead his great charge.

CHAPTER XXII.

I.

THE strength and compactness of the position taken up by the Allies on the Chersonese upland was not at all shared, as we know, by the scanty detachment of infantry which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the defense of Balaclava. Stationed apart in the plain below, this small force was in such local relation to the Allied army on the Chersonese as to be lying outside, and at the foot of the natural castle from which the main body looked down.¹

Yet Balaclava was the storehouse, the arsenal, the port, whence the English drew all their supplies; and such was the anomalous character of the arrangements which Lord Raglan had been forced to adopt, that, instead of being safely ensconced in the rear of the main Allied camp, the material sources of the English strength lay inviting the enterprise of Prince Mentschikoff's field army, and in charge, so to speak, of an outpost.

It, however, seemed feasible to construct a system of field-works which would enable the troops left out in the plain below to withstand an attack for such time as to allow of the needed reinforcements coming down to their aid from the upland; and the English were quickened in their sense of the importance belonging to this part of their task, by the always increasing strength and boldness of the Russian force which had begun to show itself in the direction of Tchorgoun so early as the 7th of October.

Before hearing of the battle of the 25th of October, it is well to have an idea of the ground upon which the security of Balaclava depended, and the arrangements which had been made for its defense.

The string of houses constituting Balaclava extended along a narrow ledge between the eastern

¹ See chap. xiii. p. 214, *et seq.*

Position of
the Balaclava
town.

side of the little harbor and the western acclivities of Mount Hiblak. Except at the gorge of Kadiköi toward the north, and the narrow strait toward the south leading crookedly into the Euxine, both the town and the harbor were surrounded in all directions by steep lofty hills; and the hills toward the west being a continuation of that Chersonese upland where the main Allied armies lay camped, were within the unquestioned dominion of the invaders.

Partly from this cause, and partly from their command of the sea—including the small but deep harbor, which brought ships of the line close up to the town—the English, at Balaclava, were secure against any attack coming either from the west or the south; and again, toward the east, the ground was not only steep and commanding, but otherwise favorable for defense. Accordingly, from a part of the

The inner line
of defense.

The part of it
from the sea-
coast to the
Church of St.
Elias.

sea-cliff which is one mile east of Balaclava, and thence north and north-west to the Church of St. Elias, in the neighborhood of Kadiköi, a curve could be drawn, extending along a distance of between two and three miles, in which Nature had done so much for the defense that, by expending upon it a moderate amount of labor, and arming the works there constructed with a few naval guns of position, our Engineers were enabled to place all this portion of the inner line in a fair state of security, without diverting from the duties of the siege any very large body of men.¹ A few of the guns in position near the church were manned, it seems, by the Royal Artillery, but all the rest of them by our Marine Artillery; and the only bodies of infantry which this line of more than two miles absorbed, were the 1200 marines from our fleet, under the command of Colonel Hurdle, with two companies of the 93rd Regiment.²

Toward the north, the hills opened, and the place could be approached by the gorge of Kadiköi; but even there, at intervals there were spurs thrown out from the neighboring acclivities which offered

The part of
the inner line
of defense
which crossed

¹ The number of guns in battery along this inner line of defense was, I think, 26. The Engineers were confident in the security of the 'inner line,' and at times certainly Sir Colin Campbell shared their belief; but I gather that he was brought into an anxious state of mind by the peculiar responsibility which weighed upon him, and his language in regard to the security of the position was not always the same.

² Our Engineers put the length of the line, taken altogether, at 'about three miles.'—*Official Journal*, p. 41.

the gorge of
Kadiköi.

Sir Colin
Campbell's
force at the
gorge.

good sites for several small field-works, and by taking advantage of these, our Engineers completed their inner line of defense. The troops on which Sir Colin Campbell relied for the defense of the gorge were the main body of the 93rd Highlanders, with a battalion of Turks and a battery of field-artillery.

The other re-
sources con-
tributing to
the defense of
the inner line.

There was a frigate in the harbor, and (besides a score or two of English soldiers, having duties of some kind which brought them to Balaclava on the day of the battle) there lay in the town some eighty or a hundred English soldiers, who, although invalided, were not so prostrate as to be unable to handle a musket.

Circumstance
curiously illus-
trating the
quiet efficiency
with which the
inner line of
defense was
made good.

So great was the confidence which most of our people reposed in the strength of this inner line of defense, in the quality of all the troops which manned it, and in the prowess of the veteran soldier who commanded the garrison, that the safety of the ground thus covered cost them little or no uneasiness; and, as a not inexpressive sign of the quiet efficiency with which this part of the defense was made good, I may mention that an officer holding a very high and responsible command, and one, too, which did not at all tend to divert him from this part of the Allied position, was long able to remain unacquainted with the very existence of the inner line of defense, and to hear of it for the first time some ten years after the peace. To him in the Crimea this inner line of defense was what oxygen is to a peasant—a blessing unperceived and unheard of, on which his existence depended.

The plain of
Balaclava.


The gorge of Kadiköi opens out into a large tract of ground which, though marked in some places by strong undulations, by numberless hillocks, and even by features deserving the name of 'heights,' is yet, upon the whole, so much lower, and so much more even than the surrounding country, as to be called 'the plain of Balaclava.'

This tract of comparatively low ground is the field of the engagement, which we are accustomed to call the Battle of Balaclava, but it lies a mile north of the town.¹ It has an average length of about three miles, with a breadth of about two, and is hemmed in on almost all sides by ground of from

¹ See the map; but a glance at the diagram on the following page may aid toward an apprehension of the general features of the field.

some 300 to 1000 feet high; for, on the north of the plain, there are the Fedioukine Hills; on the east, Mount Hasfort; on the south, the Kamara Hills and Mount Hiblak; on the west, the steep buttresses of the Chersonese upland.

The distinctive feature of the basin thus formed is a low ridge of ground, which, crossing the so-called 'plain' in the direction of its length—or, in other terms, from east to west—divides it into two narrow valleys. So completely has this range of heights bridged over the plain, that it served as a natural viaduct, enabling the designer of the Woron-



zoff road to carry his trace-line across from the Kamara Hills on the east to the Chersonese uplands on the west without letting it ever descend to the general level of the ground which had to be traversed; and therefore it is that the features which constitute this ridge are distinguished as the 'Causeway Heights.'

From the foot of the Chersonese the North Valley sloped down in an eastern direction till it reached the embankment of the aqueduct, there crossed, it appears, by three bridges. A yet farther descent of only a few yards down the valley brought a rider to the left bank of the river Tchernaya, and to fords by which he might cross it. On the other side of the river, and at a distance of less than a mile, there stood the village of Tchorgoun, where Liprandi, as we know, had established his Head-quarters, and gathered his main strength. This North Valley is ground on which the memory of our countrymen has brooded. It was the scene of the Light Cavalry charge.

The South Valley is on the Balaclava side of the 'Causeway Heights.' At its eastern extremity there is a knoll between 500 and 600 feet high, which, being joined to the Kamara Hills by a neck of high ground, juts out over the valley as a promontory does over the sea, and for a feature thus conspicuous men soon found a name. They called it 'Canrobert's Hill.' At the opposite or western extremity of this valley, the road connecting Balaclava with the Chersonese passed up by the way of the 'Col.' It is with the slope of a hillside descending into this South Valley, and with the glory of Scarlett's Dragoons, that England will have to associate her memory of the one great fight between cavalry and cavalry which took place in the course of the war.

It was of so much moment to secure Balaclava from disaster, that there could not but be a desire to prevent the enemy from coming within the limits of the South Valley; and considering, on the one hand, the inconvenience of diverting troops from the siege for merely defensive purposes, and, on the other, the configuration of the ground in the plain of Balaclava, men thought that what was wanting in bayonets might possibly be eked out with the spade; and this idea was the more readily pursued because it happened that, in part from the confidence of the Sultan, and in part from the graciousness of the French Commander, Lord Raglan had obtained the services of some 3000 Turkish soldiers, who might first be employed in constructing the requisite earthworks, and then in manning

Conception of
the outer line
of defense.

them. Our Engineers saw that by throwing up a slight work on Canrobert's Hill, and a chain of little redoubts on the bosses or hillocks which mark at short intervals the range of the Causeway Heights, there might be formed an intrenched position which would enable a force of moderate strength to hold the ground against one much more numerous; and it is evident that the design would have had a great value if the position of Balaclava, when expecting an attack from 20,000 or 25,000 men, had had a small army of 10,000 or 12,000 men to defend it. But this was not the real exigency; for, on the one hand, the Allies, if they could have time to come down, were in no danger at this period of being outnumbered in the plain; and, on the other hand, there was not only no army at Balaclava of such strength as to be able to defend an intrenched position like that which might be formed on the line of the Causeway Heights, but actually no army at all, and no force of any kind that could be charged to support the men placed in the intended works, save only a division of cavalry, with a single troop of horse-artillery. Our Engineers formed an intrenched position which could only have strength upon the supposition that several thousands of the Allied infantry would have time to come down and defend it. Yet unless there should be a more than English vigilance in the plain of Balaclava, and unless, too, our Division of Cavalry should be so brilliantly wielded as to be able to check and disconcert for some hours the marches of the enemy's columns, there was no good ground for imagining that the strength of this 'outer line,' or the prowess of the brave Osmanlis who were to be placed in its earthworks, could fairly be brought into use.

It would seem, therefore, at first sight, that General de Todleben's severe criticism of the outer line of defense must have been well enough justified; but the truth is, that the scheme was never recommended by our Engineers as a really trustworthy expedient. They chose it apparently as a makeshift which might more or less baffle a hitherto unenterprising enemy; and, at least, their plan had the merit—the then truly enticing merit—of diverting no English forces from the great business of the siege; for if the outer line of defense had not been adopted, our cavalry, with its attendant troop of horse-artillery, would still have been camped in the plain.

On Canrobert's Hill there was thrown up a slight breast-work, with its salient toward the north-east; and along the whole line of the Causeway Heights there were formed as many as five other earth-

The works constituting the outer line of defense.

works, each smaller and weaker than the one on Canrobert's Hill. Of these six works some were open at the gorge, and some closed, but they used to be all called 'redoubts.'¹

The work on Canrobert's Hill was known as the Redoubt Number One, and the five other works were distinguished by successive numbers;² but the one which, in this way, received the name of Number Three was sometimes also called 'Arabtabia.'

The works were executed by Turkish labor under the direction of an English Engineer officer.³ They were of very weak profile, and a horseman, as was proved by the Cossacks, could well enough ride through and through them. Indeed, one of the works was begun, completed, and armed in a single day.

The work on Canrobert's Hill was armed with three 12-pounder iron guns, supplied by Dundas from our fleet; and the three redoubts next adjoining it—that is, the Redoubt Number Two, the Arabtabia or Redoubt Number Three, and the Redoubt Number Four—were each of them armed with two guns of the same sort and calibre.⁴ The two other works—namely, the Redoubt Number Five and the Redoubt Number Six—were unarmed on the day of the battle.

¹ Practically—I am not speaking of what might be found in books or in the impressions of formulated people—the word redoubt has two meanings. In its most confined sense it means a work which is not open at the gorge; but in the every-day language of those military men who are not professing to describe in a special and distinctive way, any kind of field-work, whether open or not at the gorge, is commonly called a 'redoubt.' Like, for instance, the word ship (which may either be used in a very general sense, or else may be taken to designate a three-masted vessel of a particular rig), the word 'redoubt' has practically two meanings, one general, the other distinctive. Lord Raglan—the most accurate of men in his language—constantly used the word 'redoubt' in its general sense, applying it indiscriminately to works which were open at the gorge as well as to those which were not.

² I adopt the nomenclature which obtained so generally as to render any other inconvenient; but I may usefully mention that some—and amongst them Lord Raglan—did not include the work on Canrobert's Hill in the numerical designation. With them the work commonly called Number Two would be Number One, and so on.

³ Lieutenant Wagman, I believe; but I hear Captain Stanton also took some part. The work completed in a single day was the 'Number Two.'

⁴ There is a difference between the various authorities which record the number and place of these guns, Lord Raglan putting them at seven, Todleben at eleven, and others at intermediate numbers. I put them, as may be seen, at nine.—'Journal of Operations.' The difference is an immaterial one.

The works were manned by Turkish troops, one battalion of these being posted on Canrobert's Hill, and a half battalion or wing in each of the Causeway redoubts.

The work on Canrobert's Hill was perilously exposed to any artillery which might be placed in battery on the neighboring ridge of Kamara; and no arrangements were made for preventing the enemy from seizing this vantage-ground, for the ridge of Kamara was itself overtopped by crests ranging higher and higher in the direction of Baidar; and it was judged that to attempt to hold more ground would be to add to the weakness of this outer line. As it was, the line of these six earthworks extended over a space of more than two miles; and Canrobert's Hill was so distant from the ground whence supporting forces might be expected to come, as to offer the enemy a license of some hours' duration for an enterprise in the plain of Balaclava upon which he might think fit to venture.¹

The only force immediately available for attempting to give any support to the Turks was the division of English cavalry, which, along with its attendant troop of horse-artillery (commanded by Captain Maude), was under the orders of Lord Lucan. This division of cavalry comprised some 1500 sabres, and was in high order. It lay camped on the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights, at a distance of not much less than two miles from Canrobert's Hill, but it kept an outlying picket at a spot near the heights of Kamara.

Such, then, was the outer line of defense; and this—only this—was the force which, except after the lapse of some hours, could be expected to come and support it.

It is strange, but still true, that for some time before the 25th of October, Sir Colin Campbell had been every day growing more and more confident in the strength of the position. There were moments, no doubt, when he spoke more distrustfully, but in his report of the 20th of October, sent up to Head-quarters, he wrote: 'I think we can hold our own

The Kamara Height, which commanded Canrobert's Hill, left in possession of the enemy.

Space over which this outer line of earthworks extended.

Distance of the farthest work from the English camp before Sebastopol.

The force immediately available for supporting the Turks.

Sir Colin Campbell's confidence in the maintenance of the position.

¹ The distance from Canrobert's Hill to the camp of the nearest English division of infantry was only about four miles going straight; but we shall see that, from the moment of first giving the alarm to that when an English division could be got down to even the more western part of the plain, some hours elapsed.

‘against any thing that may come against us in daylight. ‘I am, however, a little apprehensive about the redoubts if ‘seriously attacked during the night;’ and, in a later report, he said, ‘I fancy we are now very strong as well as secure.’

It could not but be that, when so wary and anxious a soldier as Sir Colin reported the position secure, he would more or less impart his own trustfulness to Head-quarters; and it is not to be wondered at that, when thus assured, Lord Raglan abstained from weakening his scant resources by sending down any farther detachments of infantry.

The Turkish redoubts, though capable of supplying useful aid to an army, had no such means of independent self-defense as to warrant the notion of their holding out without support; and it is evident that, in the absence of infantry, nothing short of a vigilant and brilliant use of the cavalry arm would enable the Turks to withstand a determined attack. I can not say whether Sir Colin Campbell’s sense of security was in any high degree founded upon the cavalry, or whether, for once, he went along with the herd in his estimate of what could be insured by a little upturn of the soil with a few Turks standing behind it.

A main defect in the arrangements of the Allies was the one under which it resulted that those divisions of infantry on the Chersonese which lay the nearest to the plain below were not the troops of the nation which undertook to defend Balaclava. Bosquet, with two divisions, was so posted on the edge of the Chersonese upland, that, judging from their position alone, his troops might have been naturally looked to as the first to descend into the plain for the defense of Balaclava; and, besides that General Bosquet was an ardent soldier, and a man most loyal in action, there is no reason for supposing that mere difference of nationality alone would have made the French slow to come down to the aid of Sir Colin Campbell; but the fact of the interposed force being under orders of a commander other than Lord Raglan, made a dangerous break in the chain by which the Allies held together. It was only by persuading General Canrobert to allow it, that the nearest of the battalions on the Chersonese could be made to partake in a battle upon the plain of Balaclava; and the exceeding scantiness of the infantry force which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the immediate defense of the place made it a thing of great moment that the promptest possible dispatch of reinforcements should not be left dependent upon the result of persuasions addressed

This necessarily communicated to Lord Raglan.

Uncertainty as to the sources of Campbell’s confidence.

to an independent commander, more especially where the commander whose assent thus had to be gained was a man of a hesitating and anxious temperament.

Independently of the inherent fault that there was in this outer line of defense, the collateral arrangements were far from being calculated to avert a disaster.

Inherent weakness of the outer line

One important omission was this: In all the works constituting this outer line, the Turkish soldiery were left without that strengthening help which might have been afforded them by the presence in each redoubt of one or two Englishmen accustomed to rule

Collateral arrangements which tended to increase the probability of a disaster.

Oriental; and the want was in no way supplied by sending, instead, a non-commissioned officer of artillery.¹ Then, again, since the cavalry was much looked to as an arm to ward off for some time any Russian attack, it would have been well to avoid a severance of authority by placing under one commander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or foot, or artillery, which were charged with the defense of Balaclava; for excellent as was the understanding between Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, their concord was no equivalent for the advantage which belongs to absolute unity of command.

Above all, if the plan of defense were to rest at all on our cavalry, there was cogent need of an effort to neutralize in some measure the vice of Lord Hardinge's peace-service appointments, and to make arrangements for giving more or less of initiative power in the field to men such as Morris and Elliot, who were practiced in war, and knew by their own experience what it was to lead squadrons in battle. No such effort was made.

It was against these defenses of Balaclava that Prince Mentschikoff now resolved to direct an attack. So early as the night of the 13th of the month, Colonel Rakovitch, with three battalions, four guns, and a couple of hundred Cossacks had ventured down from the Mackenzie Heights; and having been suffered at break of day on the following morning to take

Mentschikoff's purpose of assailing the defenses of Balaclava.

¹ In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an English artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a resolute man or boy, of a higher station in life, who will undertake to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted over a Turkish force by a fearless English gentleman is spoken of *ante*, vol. i. chap. xxx. Notwithstanding all that had been achieved in the defense of Silistria and on the field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means which there produced such brilliant results.

possession of the village of Tchorgoun, he there established the nucleus of a force complete in all arms, which thenceforth began to gather in the valley of the Tchernaya. On the 23rd, this force had been definitively constituted as the 'Detachment of Tchorgoun,' and placed under the command of General Liprandi. The force comprised 17 battalions of foot, 30 squadrons of horse,¹ and 64 guns. But besides the troops under the orders of Liprandi, there was a distinct force, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, and comprising some 8 battalions,² 4 squadrons of horse, and 14 guns, which had orders to co-operate with the Detachment of Tchorgoun. Altogether, therefore, the force set apart for the attack upon the defenses of Balaclava comprised 25 battalions, 34 squadrons of horse, and 78 guns. The numerical strength of the force is not to be learned with strict accuracy;³ but it seems to have amounted to about 25,000 men.⁴

For a sound appreciation of the Battle of Balaclava, it would be well to know what was the object contemplated by the assailant. His primary design was to seize the outer line of defense and the camp of the 93rd Highlanders, as well as the camp of the Turks established near Kadiköi.⁵ It is plain, however, that the enterprise of an assailant who might attain to so much as that would be strangely collapsing if he were to stay his victorious advance without doing all he could to bring ruin upon the English in the small crowded port from which they drew their supplies; and the possession of a spot from which it would have been practicable to shell Balaclava must needs have been

The forces collected for this enterprise.

The object of the contemplated attack.

¹ 20 squadrons of regular cavalry, and 10 'sotnias' (or, as I call them, 'squadrons') of Cossacks. A 'sotnia' imported about the same number of horsemen as a 'squadron.' General de Todleben is careful to make all possible 'deductions from strength,' but he acknowledges that each squadron and each sotnia had a strength in *effectives* of 100 horsemen; p. 387.

² Literally, 7 and $\frac{1}{2}$ ths.

³ Because, at the period in question, the 'morning states' of the infantry had been left uncorrected since the beginning of the month, and the 'states' of the cavalry were wanting altogether.—*Todleben*, p. 388.

⁴ On the 25th of October, 1854, the most recent 'states' of the infantry strength were those which had been furnished at the beginning of the month; and these, together with the estimated reckoning of the cavalry (of which no 'states' had been prepared), give a total of 23,425, without counting the artillerymen, who (at 30 men for each gun) would number 2340, making, altogether, 25,765; but it is right to say that General de Todleben (by making a guess at the deductions from strength which may have occurred since the beginning of the month, and by reducing the estimate of the cavalry strength) cuts down the total effective to 20,500 (pp. 388–90). In that estimate, however, he does not, I believe, include the 2340 artillerymen.

⁵ *Todleben*, pp. 384, 387, 388.

coveted. The destruction of the root which the English had taken in Balaclava may therefore, perhaps, be regarded as the real, though ulterior object of the intended attack.

The force destined for the attack upon the Turkish redoubts was divided into three columns. The left column was commanded by General Gribbé, the centre column by General Semiakine, the right column by Colonel Scudery ; and, with that last force, General Jabrokritsky's detachment was in close co-operation. Gribbé was to issue from the direction of the Baidar valley, seize the heights of Kamara, and thence take part in the attack directed against Canrobert's Hill. General Semiakine, at the same time, was to advance against Canrobert's Hill, and the Redoubt Number Two, by the road which leads from Tchorgoun to Kadiköi.

Colonel Scudery's column was to issue from the Tractir road, cross the North Valley, and advance upon the Arabtabia or Redoubt ' Number Three.'

The main body of the cavalry with its attendant batteries was to enter the North Valley, and there form in columns of attack to await Liprandi's next orders.

A battalion of the Ukraine regiment, with a company of riflemen and a battery of field-artillery, was to constitute the reserve.

Finally, General Jabrokritsky, though not under the orders of Liprandi, was to cover the intended attack, by descending from the region of Mackenzie's Farm and taking post on the Fedioukine Hills.

Notwithstanding the trust they repose in the direct intervention of Heaven, the Turks know how to eke out their faith by means sufficiently human ; and being too warlike a people to be careless of the value of foreknowledge in regard to the designs of the enemy, they see the use of a scout. The officer who had the merit of obtaining, at this time, good, decisive intelligence, was Rustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier-Gen-

24th Oct. Information of the enemy's march obtained by the Turks the day before the battle.

The way in which the information was dealt with.

eral. On the 24th of October, a spy employed by him brought back an account which disclosed Liprandi's designs for the morrow. The man announced that troops to the number of 25,000, and of all arms, were to march upon the plain of Balaclava, and he even prepared his hearers to expect an advance from the direction of Baidar. He was carefully examined by Lord Lucan, as well as by Sir Colin Campbell ; and, both Generals coming to the conclusion that this report was well worthy of attention, Lord

Bingham (his father's aid-de-camp) was sent by Lord Lucan to Head-quarters with a letter from Sir Colin Campbell conveying the intelligence. Lord Bingham delivered the letter and the tidings it conveyed to the Quartermaster-General, but did not succeed in obtaining an interview with Lord Raglan, who was then engaged with Canrobert. General Airey, it is true, interrupted the conference of the two Commanders, and showed Lord Raglan the letter; but the answer first elicited was only a message of acknowledgment sent back in the words, 'Very well!' Afterward, Lord Raglan requested that

The morning
of the 25th
Oct.

Tidings of the
impending at-
tack upon the
Turkish re-
doubts.

any new occurrence which might take place should be reported to him; but no fresh orders resulted from the information thus furnished. The truth is that only a few days before, Lord Raglan had been induced by a similar report to send down 1000 men of the 4th Division, who had to be

marched back when it proved that the enemy was not advancing.¹ He could ill afford to exhaust the time and strength of his men in these marches and countermarches, and he seems to have come to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient for him to be again dispatching reinforcements to the outer line of defense in the plain of Balaclava, unless he should learn that the enemy was actually advancing against it.

II.

In accordance with its daily custom, the English cavalry on the morning of the 25th of October had turned out an hour before daybreak; and the men were standing to their horses when Lord Lucan, already in the saddle and followed by his Staff, moved off at a walk toward Canrobert's Hill. Two of the Divisional Staff—Lord William Paulet, I think, and Major McMahon, who had now, it seems, been joined by Lord George Paget—were riding some distance in rear of their chief, and had come within about 300 paces of Canrobert's Hill, when a streak of pale light in the horizon before them began to disclose the morning. Present-

25th Oct. The
hour before
daybreak.

Advance of
Lord Lucan
and his Staff
in the direction
of Canrobert's
Hill.

Break of day.
Two flags seen
flying from
the fort on
Canrobert's
Hill.

ly, there was gray enough to show through the dusk that Canrobert's Hill was not without its standard; but soon it became almost clear, and presently afterward certain, that from the flag-staff of the work two ensigns were flying. 'Hol-

¹ This was on the 21st of October.

‘loa!’ said one, ‘there are two flags flying! What does The import of this. —‘that mean?’ ‘Why, that surely,’ said another, ‘that the enemy is advancing. Are you quite sure?’ The questioner was soon answered; for scarcely had he spoken when the fort opened fire from one of its 12-pounder guns. The Staff-officers hurried forward to overtake their chief; and Lord George Paget galloped back at speed to the cavalry camp, where (in the absence of Lord Cardigan, who had the practice of sleeping on board his yacht, and had not yet come up from Balacalva) he took upon himself to mount the Light Brigade. He had hardly done this when a messenger came in from the front with an order dispatched by Lord Lucan (then reconnoitering with Sir Colin Campbell in the direction of our advanced post) which directed the immediate advance of the cavalry.

Thus it seems that the Turks not only obtained the earliest intelligence of the impending attack, but were also the first to perceive the advance of the enemy. The elevation of Canrobart’s Hill may have aided their surveys; but, without being watchful and sagacious, they could hardly have succeeded in being beforehand with so keen a soldier as Sir Colin Campbell.

We watched the sweet slumbers of a Cabinet whilst assenting to the cogent dispatch which enforced this invasion; but now, in the midst of the campaign, and at a moment when accounts have come in which announce an attack for the morrow in the direction of the Baidar valley, we may steal before break of day to the ground where the enemy is expected, and there seek our ideal of vigilance in the outlying cavalry picket.

We shall seek in vain. The English soldier’s want of vigilance is so closely allied to some of his greatest qualities (as, for instance, to his pride, and his sullen unwillingness to be put out of his way by mere danger), that our countrymen incline to think of it with indulgence, nay, perhaps, with an unconfessed liking; but if the fault is in some measure natural and characteristic, it has been aggravated apparently by the empty ceremonies of military duty in peace-time; for to go on rehearsing men day after day, and year after year, in the art of giving and taking pretended alarms about nothing, and to carry on these rehearsals by means of formulated sentences, is to do all that

Lord George Paget, in the absence of Lord Cardigan, takes upon himself to mount the Light Brigade. Orders from Lord Lucan for the immediate advance of the cavalry

Vigilance evinced on this occasion by the Turks.

The English soldier’s want of vigilance.

perverted industry can toward preventing, instead of securing, the 'bright look-out' of the seaman.

The relation that there is between standing armies and war bears analogy to that which connects endowed churches with religion; and, in particular, the Anglican arrangements for securing the infant mind against heresy show a curious resemblance to those which are made during peace for preventing surprises in war-time. Whether aiming at the one or the other of these objects, man tries to secure it by formula. Just as through the means of set questions and answers, the anxious theologian arms children against 'false doctrine,' in the trust that, when they come to riper years, they may know how to treat his opponents, so also with him who makes rules for the governance of soldiers in peace-time, the hope, it seems, is that they may learn to be vigilant against night surprises by repeatedly saying their catechism. The common 'challenge' is brief; but, it being foreseen that he who is appointed to watch may himself require watching, the functionaries called 'visiting rounds' have been invented, whose duty it is to see that the sentries are at their posts and awake; but as this task of supervision has itself also lapsed into form, the result is, that at a military post requiring great vigilance, there goes on, all night, a reiteration of set questions and answers, which tends to avert real watchfulness by suggesting that a mere formal sign of not being absolutely asleep will sufficiently answer the purpose. Men trained to 'look out' as do sailors, are more likely to pierce to the utmost of what eye and ear can reach, than those who are repeating to one another, and repeating and repeating all night, set lessons, of which this is one: 'Halt! who goes 'there?' 'Rounds!' 'What rounds?' 'Visiting rounds!' 'Visiting rounds advance! All's well!' When these words have been reiterated by the same men a few thousand times, they are as lulling as the monotone waves that beat and still beat on the shore. The truth is, that the object of securing a really keen watchfulness is one which lies out of the true scope of mechanical arrangements. A man's wits may be easily deadened, they can hardly be sharpened, by formula.

Far from detecting the earliest signs of an advance in force, and being at once driven in, our outlying picket enjoyed its tranquillity to the last, and was only, indeed, saved from capture by the 'field officer of the day,' who learned, as he rode, what was passing, and conveyed to the men of the watch—

Our outlying picket did not detect the enemy's advance, and was only saved from capture by the

field officer of the day.

just in time to secure their escape—that warning of the enemy's approach which they themselves should have given.

Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell were together a good way in advance; and, as day broke, they saw the enemy's columns of infantry in march—saw them converging upon the easterly approaches of the Causeway Heights from the directions of Tchorgoun and Baidar. It soon became apparent that, whatever might be his ulterior design, Liprandi's first object was the seizure of the Turkish defenses, beginning with Canrobert's Hill; and Lord Lucan did not fail to dispatch an aid-de-camp to Head-quarters with intelligence of the impending attack.¹

Our cavalry was brought forward; and the guns of Maude's troop of horse-artillery were got into battery on the right of the Arabtabia or Number Three Redoubt. The Light Cavalry regiments were placed in reserve under the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights; and Lord Lucan, then acting in person with his Heavy Brigade, sought to check the advance of the enemy by demonstrations;² but—with the full approval of Sir Colin Campbell, who indeed seems to have counseled this policy—he determined to confine himself to threats. His threats failed to deter; for the Russians pursued their design like men who had yet found no hindrance; and indeed it seems probable that the firmness of purpose they soon after disclosed was in some measure occasioned by the circumstance of their having detected our cavalry leader in a determination to threaten without striking. Since the ground, in most places, was favorable for the manœuvring of horsemen, with no such ob-

structions as would prevent them from attempting flank attacks on the enemy's infantry and artillery, it may be that a cavalry officer fresh from war-service would have been able to check Liprandi, and to check him, again and again, without sustaining grave loss; but if a man can so wield a body of cavalry as to make it the means of thus arresting for a time an attack of infantry

¹ Captain Charteris was the officer sent.

² 'Lord Lucan with the Heavy Cavalry moved about, making demonstrations and threatening the enemy.'

The improbability of an officer being competent to such a task unless he is a man practiced in war.

and artillery without much committing his squadrons, he has attained 'to high art' in his calling; and to expect a peace-service general to achieve such a task, is much as though one should take a house-painter at hazard and bid him portray a Madonna. There were riding amongst our squadrons men well tried in war—men famed alike for their valor and their skill as cavalry officers; and although the perversity of our State authorities labored, as it were, to neutralize the unspeakable value of such experience by putting the men who possessed it under peace-service generals, yet if Campbell's command had included that cavalry arm which formed so large a proportion of the scanty resources, available, at first for defense, it is imaginable that he would have been able to say a few words to some such a man as Morris, which would have had the effect of checking the enemy without bringing grave loss on our squadrons.¹ Such a result would appear to be the more within reach, when it is remembered that Liprandi's advance was in three columns moving upon 'external lines' without speedy means of intercommunication, and that Gribbé's column—the one upon which the whole enterprise much depended—comprised only three battalions of infantry.²

The Russians had begun their advance at five o'clock in the morning. Without encountering the least opposition, General Gribbé, moving forward from the direction of the Baidar valley with three battalions, a squadron of horse, and ten pieces of cannon, had been suffered to take possession of the village of Kamara; and, when there, he was not only enabled to cover the advance of the assailing forces on their left flank, but also on the high ground above—ground commanding the object of attack—to establish his ten guns in battery, with the purpose of directing their fire, at close range, upon the work crowning Canrobert's Hill.³

He seizes Kamara, and establishes a battery, which opens fire at close range on the Redoubt No. 1.

¹ I refer to Captain Morris (commanding the 17th Lancers) and Lieutenant Alexander Elliot (aid-de-camp to General Scarlett) merely as the two war-service officers of cavalry then in the Crimea whose names first occur to me. They were both of them men who had earned fame in honest war.

² See, in the Appendix, Lord Lucan's view as to this.

³ This battery included, besides six light field-pieces of the No. 6 Light Battery, four guns of heavier calibre belonging to the Position Battery No. 4 (Liprandi's Dispatch, October 26, 1854). The three battalions were the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd battalions of the Dnieper regiment. The squadron was one belonging to Jeropkine's Lancers.

Nearly at the same time, Semiakine's forces having advanced from Tchorgoun gained the slopes of the ridge on the north-east and north of Canrobert's Hill. With five battalions (besides a separate body of riflemen) and ten guns, General Semiakine in person prepared to operate against the work on Canrobert's Hill;¹ whilst, on his right, General Levoutsky took up a like position with three more battalions and ten guns.² His goal was the Redoubt Number Two.

Advance of the central column under General Semiakine.

Its position on the north-east of Canrobert's Hill.

Advance of Levoutsky's force.

Its position on the left of the forces with Semiakine.

Advance of Colonel Scudery's column.

Its position on the left of Levoutsky.

Advance of the Russian cavalry, and the batteries which it escorted.

At the same time Colonel Scudery, who with the four Odessa battalions, a company of riflemen, three squadrons of Cossacks, and a field-battery, had advanced from the Traetir bridge, was now moving upon the Arabtabia.³

The main body of the cavalry under General Ryjoff, with its attendant troops of horse-artillery, was already in the North Valley, and supporting the advance of the columns.

Whilst the Russians were marching upon the heights which they now occupied, and whilst they were there establishing their thirty guns in battery, Lord Lucan, as we see, was present with a superb division of cavalry, and this upon fine ground, which, though hilly, was very free from obstructions; but except his six light pieces of horse-artillery, he was wanting in the ordnance arm, and of infantry forces he had none. Thus, then, by a somewhat rare concurrence of circumstances, there was brought about an emergency which enforced, and enforced most cogently, the decision of a question involving more or less the general usefulness of the cavalry arm.

Some are chary, it seems, of acknowledging a condition of things in which cavalry can be used for the repression of the ordnance arm. Others fully agreeing that a body of horse, with its great extent of vulnerable surface, must beware of coming, or at all events of remaining, under the fire ofartil-

¹ With four battalions of the Azoff regiment, one—viz., the 4th—of the Dnieper battalions, the 2nd company of the Rifle battalion, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4, and six pieces of the Light Battery No. 6.

² The three Ukraine battalions, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4, and six guns of the Light Battery No. 7.

³ On Redoubt 'Number Three.' The riflemen forming part of Scudery's column were of the 4th Rifle battalion, the Cossacks of the 53rd Cossack regiment, and the battery was No. 7 of the 12th brigade.

lery, are yet of opinion that cavalry, after all, is the very arm which, in many contingencies, can best be exerted against the power of ordnance. They say that artillery in march, or engaged in unlimbering, is good prey for horsemen; that artillery established in battery is assailable by horsemen at its flanks; and that, in general, where the country is at all open, a powerful and well-handled cavalry ought to be able to challenge the dominion of artillery by harassing it incessantly, by preventing it from getting into battery, and, failing that, by disquieting its batteries when formed.

The decision of Lord Lucan was much governed by a sense of the great need there would be for the aid of our cavalry if the enemy, after carrying all the outer defenses, should come on and attack Balaclava;¹ but it would also seem that his determination—a determination entirely approved, and even, I hear, originated by Sir Colin Campbell—involved a leaning to the first of the two opinions above indicated.

Be this as it may, the result was that, without being met by any hindrance on the part of our cavalry, the Russians were suffered to advance from three points of the compass and converge upon the chain of little redoubts which extended from Canrobert's Hill to the Arabtabia. The thousand or twelve hundred Turks who manned the three works thus assailed saw converging upon them some eleven thousand infantry and thirty-eight guns. Upon the heights of Kamara, which overlooked Canrobert's Hill from the east, and upon the part of the Causeway Heights which overlooked the same work from the north, the enemy placed thirty guns in battery; and he now opened fire upon the work crowning Canrobert's Hill, as also upon the

Fort Number Two. He was answered by the Turks with their five 12-pounders;² and, for a while, by our troop of horse-artillery, but apparently with little effect. Captain Maude, the officer commanding the troop, was horribly wounded by a shell which entered the body of his horse and there burst.

Maude's troop had come into action without a due following of wagons; and, before long, its ammunition was already so nearly exhausted as to leave but a small supply for even one gun.

¹ See Lord Lucan's statement in the Appendix.

² Three on Canrobert's Hill, and a couple on the Number Two Redoubt.

As soon as Lord Lucan heard this, he ordered that the troop should be withdrawn and kept out of fire until the want could be supplied.¹

It was hardly to be expected that under the fire of thirty guns, including eight pieces of heavy calibre, the three 12-pounders which formed the armament of Canrobert's


Hill would long remain undisabled. The fort became silent, and already the hapless battalion which manned it must have undergone heavy slaughter; but notwithstanding this, and although it became now apparent that the hill was to be attacked by largely outnumbering bodies of infantry, the brave Turks

were still unconquered. They moved, indeed, from the unsheltered part of the work to the side where more cover was offered; but there they stood fast and awaited the attack of the infantry.²

It was with the five battalions acting under his personal direction that General Semiakine determined to storm Canrobert's Hill. Covered by the fire of the artillery, and by two companies of riflemen,

¹ Ibid. Maude's severe wound was the reason why Lord Lucan instituted no inquiry as to the cause which led to this want of ammunition.

² This sketch may help to illustrate the attack of the eleven battalions, with thirty guns, upon the two little works, No. 1 and No. 2, which were defended by about 1000 or 1200 Turks with five guns.



Canrobert's Hill. pushed forward in skirmishing order, he advanced rapidly with three battalions of the Azoff regiment, disposed in columns of company, and so ranged in two lines of columns as that the first line was only about 100 paces in advance of the second. In a third line, General Semiakine brought up the 1st battalion of the Azoff regiment and the 4th of the Dnieper battalions, each formed in a 'column of attack.' Advancing in this order, he approached to within about 100 paces of the hill-top, and at once gave the signal for the assault. Then the two foremost lines of columns, led by Colonel Krudener, the commander of the Azoff regiment, and supported by two columns of attack, moved rapidly forward. Encountering no fire of cannon to check them, the foremost of these troops converged from their extended front upon the small object of their attack, swarmed in across the ditch, swarmed over the feeble parapet, and, standing at length within the fort, closed at once with the remnant of the single battalion there bravely awaiting the onslaught. The force which thus stormed the work, and which threw itself upon the remnant of the one Turkish battalion, consisted, as we see, of five battalions; but on the side of Kamara, the three other Dnieper battalions were so operating that Sir Colin Campbell regarded them as actual partakers in the attack; and, moreover, Levoutsky's three Ukraine battalions, though not engaged in the storming, were still so placed at the time as to be aiding the assault by their presence. Upon the whole, therefore, it may be said that, after having undergone an overwhelming cross-fire from the thirty pieces of artillery, which hurled destruction upon them at close range from commanding heights, the one battalion of Turks which defended this feeble breastwork, was now pressed by a number of battalions amounting to no less than eleven, and engaged in close conflict with five.

It commonly happens in modern warfare that the domination of one body of infantry over another is not found to depend, at the last, upon the physical strength of man, or the quality of his weapons, but rather upon faith, or, in other words, upon sense of power. In this instance, however, the assailants and the assailed were both so resolute that, for once, the actual clash of arms was not to be averted by opinion. The many flooded in upon the few, overwhelming, surrounding, destroying, yet still confronted with heroic despera-

Comparative rarity in modern warfare of bodily collision between masses of combatants.

Here, the firmness of both Russians and Turks resulted in close fighting.

The fort at length carried,

the Turks losing, in killed only, 170 men out of a single battalion.

tion, and owing all the way they could make to the sheer fighting of the men, who thus closed with their Mussulman foe, and to the weight of the numbers behind them. With much slaughter of the devoted Turks — who lost, in killed only, no less than 170 out of perhaps about five or six hundred men—the work was carried at half-past seven o'clock, with its standard and its guns; but it seems that, before moving out, the English artilleryman who had been placed in the redoubt to assist the Turks took care to spike the guns which had armed it. The color of the Azoff regiment now floated from the summit of Canrobert's Hill.

When the Turks in the three next redoubts saw how it had fared with their brethren on Canrobert's Hill, and perceived that, under the eyes of some 1500 English horse, the work was left to fall into the enemy's hands without a squadron being launched to support it by any attack on the foe, they had what to them would seem reason for thinking ill things of the Christians, and were not without warrant for judging that the English would fail to support them in any endeavor they might make to defend the remaining forts. But whether these Osmanlis reasoned, or whether they simply caught fear, as people catch plague, by contagion, they at all events loosed their hold.¹ Without waiting for a conflict with the three Ukraine battalions, then already advancing to the assault, or the four Odessa battalions, then also advancing, they at once began to make off, taking with them their quilts and the rest of their simple camp

Their flight under fire of artillery, and pursued in some places by Cossacks.

treasures. Coming west with these burthens upon them, they looked more like a tribe in a state of migration than troops engaged in retreat. In their flight they were followed for a while by the fire of the Russian artillery; and although Lord Lucan sought to cover their retreat with his cavalry, the Cossacks, at some points, pursued, and were able to spear many of the fugitives. Rustem Pasha had a horse shot under him.

The enemy not only established a portion of his forces on Canrobert's Hill, but likewise in the Number Two Redoubt, as well as in the Arabtabia or Number Three; and took possession of the seven iron 12-pounder guns with which the three works had

The enemy establishes himself on Canrobert's Hill, in the Re-

¹ In those redoubts, as in the Number One, the English artilleryman present in each is said to have spiked the guns.

doubt No. 2, and in the Arabtabia, taking possession of the seven guns there found.

He also marches into the Redoubt No. 4, and overturns its two guns; but having first done what he could to raze it, he abandons the work.

Fresh disposition of our cavalry now effected by Lord Lucan with the concurrence of Sir Colin Campbell.

been armed. He also, with the Odessa battalions, marched into the Redoubt Number Four; but instead of undertaking to hold the work, he did what he could to raze and dismantle it. He then withdrew, because he deemed the position too far in advance to allow of his undertaking to hold it.

Our cavalry now became exposed to some musketry shots which were successfully directed against it from the positions of the lost redoubts; and, as it was also apparent that our horsemen were in the line of the fire which the gunners along our inner line of defense might soon have occasion to open, Lord Lucan, in accordance with an arrangement to that effect which had been preconcerted with Sir Colin Campbell, withdrew his division to a part of the South Valley which was between the Number Four and the Number Five Redoubts.

The position he then took up was across the valley, his squadrons facing eastward. He was so placed as to be able to take in flank any enemy's force which might bend away from the valley and endeavor to pass to the south, with intent to assail Balaclava.

Such, then, was the first period of the Battle of Balaclava; and it must be acknowledged that the engagement, if it had closed at this time, would have furnished a distressing page for the military history of England. War often demands bitter sacrifices, and may sometimes force men to repress—not only their generous impulses, but—even those appeals of the conscience which a too fiery soldier might treat as the absolute dictates of honor. It may therefore well be that Lord Lucan performed a stern duty, when (with the sanction of Sir Colin Campbell) he determined that our cavalry must be patient of the attack directed against Canrobert's Hill, must endure to see English guns captured, must suffer our Allies to be slaughtered without striking a blow to defend them; and the soundness of his conclusion can hardly be determined by the casuists, but rather by those who know something of the conditions in which the power of the cavalry arm (when cavalry chances to be the only available force) can be wisely, and therefore rightly, exerted.¹

¹ The opinion of our cavalry, so far as I have been able to observe it, tends to sanction Lord Lucan's decision.

If our people in general had known the truth, they would have been guilty of unspeakable meanness when they cast off all blame from themselves, and laid it upon the Turkish soldiery—upon men who had been not only intrusted to the honor and friendship of our army, but were actually engaged at a post of danger in defending the first approaches to the English port of supply.¹

The truth is, however, that the great bulk of our army (including Lord Raglan himself) had regarded the work on Canrobert's Hill as a fastness susceptible of a protracted defense; and—strange as the statement may seem—were, for a long time, unacquainted with the nature of the conflict there sustained by the brave Turkish soldiery. Several causes contributed to obscure the truth. In the first place, the defense of the work, though carried to extremity, was still of necessity brief; for when once the men, numbered by thousands, had swarmed in over a feeble parapet on the top of an isolated hillock which was held by only some 500 or 600 men, the end, of course, could not be distant; and although there were numbers of our cavalry-men who had been so posted as to be able to see that the Turks stood their ground with desperation, and were in close bodily strife with the enemy before they gave way under his overwhelming numbers, yet to the great bulk of the spectators, whether English or French, who gazed from the steeps of the Chersonese, no such spectacle was presented. They looked from the west; and, the attack being made upon the north-eastern acclivity of Canrobert's Hill, they saw nothing of the actual clash that occurred between the brave few and the resolute many. They descried the enemy on the heights of Kamara and on the line of the Woronzoff road, but lost sight of him when from that last position he had descended into the hollow to make his final assault; and soon afterward, without having been able to make out what had passed in the interval, they saw the Turkish soldiery beginning to stream down from the gorge of the work. Then almost immediately they saw the red fezzes pouring out from the other redoubts, so that what they observed on the whole was a general flight of the Turks. They saw nothing of the fierce though short strife which

¹ Lord Lucan was never one of those who thus spoke. He could see the nature of the conflict on Canrobert's Hill, and I believe he has always spoken generously of the firmness with which the Turks awaited the onslaught of overpowering numbers. Sir Colin Campbell was also a spectator; and he says in his dispatch,—‘The Turkish troops in No. 1 persisted as long as they could, and then retired.’

ended in the slaughter of 170 out of the 500 or 600 men on Canrobert's Hill; and I believe it may be said that the loss sustained by the devoted garrison of this little field-work long remained unknown to the English. Considering that the Turkish soldiery died fighting in defense of the English lines, this may seem very strange and unnatural; but the truth is, that between the soldiers of the Prophet and the men of our Army List there was so great a gulf that it proved much more than broad enough to obstruct the transmission of military statistics. The man temporal who would ask for a 'Morning State,' with its column after column of figures, is baffled, of course, by the man spiritual, who replies, that by the blessing of the Almighty his servants are as the leaves of the forest; and soon ceases to apply for a list of 'casualties' if he only elicits an answer asserting the goodness of God and an indefinite accession of believers to the promised gardens of Paradise.¹ Certainly, Lord Raglan remained long unacquainted with the nature of the defense which the Turks had opposed to the enemy on Canrobert's Hill.² It was from ignorance of the bare facts, and not from dishonest or ungenerous motives, that our people threw blame on the Turkish soldiery.

III.

All this while, the French and the English Commanders on the Chersonese had been too distant from the scene of the attack against the Turkish redoubts to be able to sway the result; but they, each of them, proceeded to make arrangements for ulterior operations.

Upon being apprised of the impending attack, Lord Raglan had at once ridden up to that part of the ridge which

The spot on
which Lord
Raglan placed
himself upon

best overlooked the scene of the then commencing engagement;³ and as soon as his sure, rapid glance had enabled him to apprehend the proba-

¹ I find in the correspondence between the French and English Head-quarters some trace of an attempt on the part of one of the hapless Turkish commanders to have justice done to his people; but probably the remonstrant did not know how to state a fact in such way as to obtain for it any real access to the European mind, for it does not appear that he succeeded in conveying any clear idea to the mind of General Canrobert.

² This is shown very clearly by the tenor of his correspondence. Any one who ever had means of judging of Lord Raglan's nature must be able to imagine the eagerness with which, upon learning the truth, he would have hastened to redress the wrong done.

³ Lord Raglan was on the ground before the capture of Canrobert's Hill.

being apprised of the attack.

His dispositions for the succor of Balaclava, and for securing the forces on the Chersonese against a surprise.

ble scope and purport of his assailant's design, he determined to move down two out of his five infantry divisions for the defense of Balaclava. The 1st Division, under the Duke of Cambridge, and the 4th Division, under General Cathcart, were accordingly dispatched upon this service. Lord Raglan, however, was not without suspicion that the operations in the plain of Balaclava might be a feint, and that the real attack might be made from Sebastopol upon the besieging forces. He took care to make provision for such a contingency; and his oral directions for the purpose were conveyed by Captain Calthorpe, one of his aids-de-camp, to Sir Richard England, the Commander of the 3rd Division.

General Canrobert also on the ridge.

His dispositions.

General Canrobert, also, upon hearing of the attack galloped up to the ridge overlooking the Balaclava plain; and ultimately, though not all at once, the French Commander moved down to the foot of the heights both Vinoy's and Espinasse's brigades of infantry, and also the two cavalry regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, regiments comprising eight squadrons, and commanded by General d'Allonville.

Apparent difference of opinion between the French and the English Commanders.

There was, however, an evident difference between the opinion which governed the English Commander and the one entertained by Canrobert. Keenly alive, as was natural, to a danger which threatened his only seaport, and hoping, besides, I imagine, that the somewhat dimmed prospects of the siege might be cleared by a fight in the plain, Lord Raglan, at this time, had not entertained the idea of surrendering ground to the enemy, and was preparing to recover the heights. General Canrobert, on the other hand, was of course less directly concerned in keeping watch over Balaclava; and having become impressed with a belief that it was the object of the Russians to draw him down from his vantage-ground on the Chersonese, he seems to have resolved that he would baffle the enemy's supposed policy by clinging fast to the upland. Accordingly, it will be seen (if we chance to speak farther of these French infantry reinforcements), that though Vinoy's brigade pushed forward, at one time, to ground near the gorge of Kadiköi, it was afterward withdrawn from its advanced position, and ordered to rejoin the other brigade of the 1st Division close under the steepes of the Chersonese.

As a means of covering Balaclava, the position taken up by Lord Lucan near the gorge of Kadiköi is believed to

The new disposition which Lord Raglan made of our cavalry division.

His probable reasons for making the change.

The position to which Lord Raglan withdrew the cavalry.

Six at the

have been very well chosen; but the Commander-in-Chief, at this time, was indulging the expectation of something like a battle to be fought with all arms; and he apparently desired that his cavalry should not be entangled in combat until the arrival of the two divisions of foot, then already dispatched, should give Lord Lucan an opportunity of acting in co-operation with our infantry forces. He accordingly sent down an order which compelled Lord Lucan, though not without reluctance, nor even, indeed, without anger, to withdraw his horsemen to ground on the left of the Redoubt Number Six at the foot of the Chersonese upland.¹

Approaching concentration on the west of the Causeway Heights of forces with which the Allies proposed to engage Liprandi.

Isolation of Balaclava.

Position of Liprandi's infantry at this time.

thence westward by Canrobert's Hill and the Causeway Heights, till it reached a point somewhat in advance of the Arabtabia.

The Odessa regiment became the index of the enemy's

When this retrograde movement of our cavalry had been completed, the whole of the forces of all arms with which Canrobert and Lord Raglan proposed to engage Liprandi might be regarded as approaching to a state of concentration near the westernmost limits of the plain. The ground, however, upon which the Allies were thus gathering lay at distances of not less than a mile from the gorge of Kadiköi; and it not only resulted, from the last disposition of the cavalry, that the small body under Sir Colin Campbell which defended the approach to Balaclava was left for the moment uncovered, but that (by reason of the period required for the transmission of a fresh order, and for counter-marching our squadrons) this state of isolation might continue some time, in despite of all Lord Raglan could do.

On the other hand, the position of Liprandi was this: With his victorious infantry and artillery disposed near the captured redoubts, he occupied a slightly curved line, which began at Kamara, and extended thence westward by Canrobert's Hill and the Causeway Heights, till it reached a point somewhat in advance of the Arabtabia. The four Odessa battalions, posted near this Arabtabia or Number Three Redoubt, marked the limit of the venture which the Russian Commander was assigning to his infantry in the direction of the Al-

¹ Captain Wetherall was the bearer of the order, which ran thus: 'Cavalry 'to take ground to the left of second line of redoubts occupied by Turks;' and the Captain, at Lord Lucan's request, waited to see the order executed in the way which he judged to be accordant with Lord Raglan's meaning.

changing resolves.

lied camps. Indeed we shall see that this Odessa regiment, for the rest of the day, was a faithful and sensitive index of the enemy's intent, mounting guard over the site of the Arabtabia, so long as the Allies were yet distant, falling back when our cavalry seemed going to attack it, and countermarching at once to the old ground when Liprandi saw that the French and the English Commanders were inclined to acquiesce in his conquest.

The Russian cavalry, supported by its attendant batteries, was drawn up across the North Valley, with its left resting on the lowest slopes of the Causeway Heights, and its right on the Fedioukine Hills.

Nor was Liprandi's little army the only force with which the Allies would now have to cope, for Jabro-kritsky, having descended from the Mackenzie Heights, was debouching from the Tractir road, and preparing to take up a position on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.

These Russian forces had no pretension to match themselves against the troops which the Allies on the Chersonese could, sooner or later, send down for the relief of Balaclava; but, on the other hand, it was certain that a long time must elapse before the infantry dispatched from the upland could be brought into action against the assailants of Balaclava; and the configuration of the ground was such, that every French or English battalion engaged in its descent from the Chersonese could be, all the while, seen by the enemy. Liprandi, therefore, could act at his ease; and it was for no trifling space of time that this privileged security lasted. He perhaps under-reckoned the probable duration of the license which he thus might enjoy; but the actual result was, that from the seizure of Canrobert's Hill to the moment when the Allies were ready to come into action, there elapsed a period of some three hours.¹

These troops, though liable after a while to be over-matched by the Allies, were for the time secure against the attack of infantry.

The period of license thus enjoyed by Liprandi.

So, although the moment might come when, by the nearer approach of the Allies marching down from the upland, Liprandi would be reduced to the defensive, or else compelled to retire, yet, for the time, the Russian General was not only secure against the contingency of being attacked by infantry,

¹ Canrobert's Hill is stated to have been taken at 7.30, and it was half-past ten before the Allies had any of their infantry reinforcements so far in advance as to be ready to undertake an attack.

but also had such prey within reach as might tempt him to become the assailant.

The arrival of Jabrokritsky, now debouching from Trac-
The forces now threatening Balacclava. tir, entitled Liprandi to consider that troops which had come thus near were a present accession of strength; and, taken altogether, the Russian troops actually under Liprandi, or near enough now to co-operate with him, were a force complete in all arms, and numbering, as we saw, some 25,000 men with 78 guns. Yet (now that our cavalry had been withdrawn to the foot of the Chersonese), the only field force with which Sir Colin Campbell stood ready to oppose all these Russian troops in front of Kadiköi was a single battery of field-pieces, 400 men of the 93rd Highlanders, commanded by Colonel Ainslie,¹ 100 invalids under Colonel Daveney, who had been sent down to Balacclava for embarkation; and, besides, two battalions of Turks, not hitherto carried away by the ebb of the Mussulman people.

Liprandi did not seize the occasion. He, perhaps, had failed to divine the extreme weakness of the little gathering which undertook to defend the gorge of Kadiköi; but, be that as it may, he attempted no attack with his infantry upon the approaches of Balacclava. For a long time he remained in a state of inaction; but at length when his period of license was approaching its close, he resorted to that singular venture with his cavalry of which we shall now have to speak.

IV.

Some of our countrymen have imagined that this enter-
The design with which this was resorted to. prise of Liprandi's cavalry was a real attempt on the part of the enemy to possess himself of Balacclava; but the Russians declare that the object really contemplated was only that of ruining a park of artillery believed to be near Kadiköi;² and, judging from the apparently hesitating nature of the movement, as well as from the fact of its having had no support from the infantry,

¹ Only six companies of the regiment were at first available for this service in front of Kadiköi; the two remaining companies of the battalion being on duty, under the command of Major Gordon, in the inner line of defense. Major Gordon, however, with the force under his orders, rejoined the main body of the battalion before the moment of its encounter with the Russian cavalry.

² Todleben.

there would seem to be ground for believing that some minor purpose of the kind indicated by the Russians was the one really entertained. The Russian cavalry had been brought into discredit by submitting to be null at the Battle of the Alma; and it seems not unlikely that expiation of former shortcomings may have been one of the objects in view.

Be this as it may, General Ryjoff with the main body of the Russian cavalry, and supported by field-batteries, began to move up the North Valley.¹

The advance of the Russian cavalry.
Campbell's arrangements for defending the approach by Kadiköi.

The 93rd Highlanders, now augmented to a strength of about 550 by the accession of the two companies under Gordon, were drawn up in line, two deep, upon that rising ground in front of the village of Kadiköi which was afterward called the 'Dun-robin' or 'Sutherland' Hillock. Tower of the Coldstream, and Verschoyle, another young officer of the Guards, chancing to be in Balaclava this morning with some thirty or forty men, had seized the occasion for showing the warlike qualities of energy, high spirit, and prompt judgment; for they gathered their people together, brought them up to the front, ranged them quickly along with the Highlanders, and in this way brought Campbell a small accession of strength to eke out his scant means of defense.² The hundred invalids, under Colonel Daveney, were drawn up on the left of the 93rd.³ On either flank of the scanty body of British infantry thus posted, there stood a battalion of Turks.⁴ Campbell's means of defense were materially aided by Barker's field-pieces, already in battery upon convenient ground near the hillock, as well as by a portion of the batteries constituting the inner line of defense, and especially, it seems, by a battery of two heavy guns under the command of Lieutenant Wolf of the Royal Artillery.

The advance of the Russians soon brought their artillery

¹ With respect to the numerical strength of this great body of cavalry, see *post*, p. 423. According to General Todleben, it comprised 2300 horsemen, being fourteen squadrons of hussars and nine sotnias of Cossacks, pp. 387, 393-94.

² I am indebted solely to Colonel (now Sir Anthony) Sterling's very valuable MS. letters for the knowledge of the service thus rendered.

³ Campbell's dispatch says the invalids were drawn up 'in support;' but I have reason for thinking that the statement in the text is accurate.

⁴ This account of the disposition made by Sir Colin Campbell may seem to differ in some minute particulars from his published dispatch; but there are matters on which the testimony of a subordinate officer is more conclusive than the report of his chief.

Campbell with- to a ground within range of Campbell's small
 drew his men force; and, two of the Highlanders, besides some
 to the foot of of the Turks, being wounded by the fire then
 the hillock, and opened, Campbell sought to give his men shelter.
 caused them to He therefore moved them back to the foot of the
 lie down.

hillock which their ranks had hitherto crowned, and caused
 them there to lie down. Preparing for such an eventuality
 as that of the gorge being forced, he dispatched Colonel
 Sterling to Balaclava with orders to apprise the commander
 of the frigate which lay in the harbor of the pending
 attack.

Meanwhile the Russian cavalry continued to advance up
 the North Valley; but four squadrons detached
 themselves from the mass, and came shaping their
 way for the gorge of Kadiköi—the ground Camp-
 bell stood to defend.¹ When these horsemen
 were, within about a thousand yards of him,
 Campbell gave a brisk order to his little body of
 foot, directing them at once to advance, and again

Body of horse
 detached from
 the main body
 of the Russian
 cavalry, and
 seen to be now
 advancing to-
 ward the gorge
 of Kadiköi.
 Campbell's sol-
 diers again
 crown the
 hillock.

crown the top of the hillock. This was done at
 the instant by the Highland battalion and the
 few score of English soldiers who had come up to range
 alongside it. The troops did not throw themselves into a
 hollow square (as is usual in preparing for cavalry), but sim-
 ply formed line two deep. On this slender array all was
 destined to rest; for the two battalions of Turks which had
 hitherto flanked the Queen's troops were by this time with-
 out cohesion. It would seem that the disintegration of the
 Mussulman force had begun at the moment when Campbell
 withdrew his line to the foot of the hillock, and was com-
 pleted, some few instants later, upon the evident approach of
 the Russian cavalry. At all events, these two battalions of

Flight of the
 Turks.

Turks were now dissolved or dissolving. For the
 most part, both officers and men turned and fled,
 making straight as they could for the port, and they cried,
 as they went, Ship! ship! ship!

By this defection in presence of the enemy's advancing
 cavalry, Campbell was suddenly shorn of two-
 thirds of the numerical strength engaged in de-
 fending the gorge; and the few hundred British
 soldiers who had hitherto constituted but a fraction of his

¹ According to Todleben, the force must have been vastly more than
 400 strong—consisting, he says, of nine squadrons, partly belonging to the
 regiment called the 'Saxe-Weimar' Hussars, and partly made up of Cos-
 saks; but I accept Campbell's estimate of the force, and he puts it at 400.

force were now almost all that remained to him upon the hillock in front of Kadiköi.¹ Whilst he waited the movements of an enemy who was altogether some 25,000 strong, he could not help seeing how much was now made to depend upon the steadfastness of the few hundred men who remained with him still on the hillock. He had, however, so great a confidence in his Highlanders that he judged he could safely impart to them the gravity of the occasion. He rode down the line and said: 'Remember there is no retreat from here, men! You must 'die where you stand!'² The men cheerily answered his appeal saying, 'Ay, ay, Sir Colin; we'll 'do that.'³

It was whilst our men were still lying on their faces at the foot of the hillock that the four Russian squadrons began their advance; and it is said that the mission of this detached force was to try to seize one of the batteries connected with the inner line of defense. The horsemen, it seems, rode on, not expecting a combat with infantry; when suddenly they saw the slender line of the Highlanders springing up to the top of the hillock. Not unnaturally the Russian horsemen imagined that they were falling into some ambush;⁴ and on the other hand, the men of the 93rd, with a wild impetuosity which was characteristic of the battalion as then constituted, showed a mind to rush forward as though undertaking to charge and exterminate cavalry in the open plain; but in a moment Sir Colin was heard crying fiercely, 'Ninety-third! Ninety-third! damn all that eagerness!' and the angry voice of the old soldier quickly steadied the line. The Russian squadrons had come within long musketry range. The Highlanders and the men alongside them delivered their fire; and although they emptied no saddles, they wounded some horses and men.⁵ The horsemen thus met abandoned at

¹ I say *almost*, because there were men among the Turks who manfully stood their ground. It would be a great error to question the courage of the fugitives. The one bane of the Turkish forces is the want of officers to whom the men can look up. Without that ingredient cohesion is apt to fail, however brave men may be.

² These words were heard by Captain (now Major) Burroughs, the officer then in command of the 6th company of the 93rd.

³ And these.

⁴ Communications from the Russian officers to ours.

⁵ Same source.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

EXPLANATION OF SIGNS.

The site of the English Light Cavalry Camp, thus.

The site of the English Heavy Cavalry Camp, thus.

N. B. Orders had been given to strike these Camps in the early morning, but at the time here indicated, *i.e.*, about 10 A.M., considerable traces of them remained.

At the time here indicated the Russians had captured the Redoubts 1, 2, 3 and 4, and established themselves in the three first, leaving the No. 4 Redoubt unoccupied. Jabrokritsky, with between 7 and 8 Battalions, 4 Squadrons and 14 Guns, is represented as established on the Rediukine Hills, but he had barely taken up his position at the time here indicated.

The four Squadrons dispatched against Sir Colin Campbell are in the midst of their encounter with the 93rd Highlanders, whilst the Turkish Troops are retreating in confusion upon Balacava.

Under the command of General Ryjoff, the main body of the Russian Cavalry, having already advanced some way up the Valley, is inclining to its left and passing over the Causeway Height toward the site of the Light Cavalry Camp.

Scarlett with six Squadrons of Heavy Dragoons is marching upon the ground in front of Kadiköi, and is already close to the ground toward which the Russian Cavalry is advancing. His order of march is shown in the text.

Between the Redoubts 5 and 6, and nearly upon the spot occupied in the Map by the letter H, there was a plantation which has not been indicated in the Official surveys.

The positions of General Canrobert and of Lord Raglan were upon the crest in front of the French "Corps of Observation."



the assailing squadrons. once their advance upon Campbell's front, and wheeled to their left as though undertaking to turn his right flank. Sir Colin turned to his aid-de-camp, and—speaking of the officer who led the Russian squadrons—said, 'Shadwell! that man understands his business.' To meet his assailant's change of direction, Campbell caused the grenadier company of the 93rd, under Captain Ross, to bring the left shoulder forward, and show a front toward the north-east.

Stopped at once by this ready manœuvre, and the fire that it brought on their flank, the horsemen wheeled again to their left, and retreated. They retreated together, but not in good order; and the fire of our artillery increased their confusion.

Thus was easily brought to an end the advance of those 400 horsemen who had found themselves, during a moment, in the front of a Highland battalion. Springing out of no foregone design against Campbell's infantry, the attack fell so short that it scarcely gave any example of what might be attempted by horsemen against a body of foot drawn up in line, and two deep. The Queen's troops arrayed on the hillock were

Feebleness of the charge undertaken by these Russian squadrons.

The nature of the trial sustained by the Queen's troops formed up on the hillock.

able, indeed, to prove their mettle; but the occasion they found was not such a one as is given to infantry by a resolute onslaught of horse. The trial they had to pass through on this morning of the 25th of October was not one directly resulting from any kind of sharp combat, but still it was a trial imposed upon them by the hitherto adverse tenor of the engagement, and, in that sense, by stress of battle. Without being at all formidable in itself, the advance of the four Russian squadrons marked what might well seem at the moment to be an ugly, if not desperate crisis in the defense of the English seaport. Few or none, at the time, could have had safe grounds for believing that, before the arrival of succors sent down from the upland, Liprandi would be all at once stayed in his career of victory; and in the judgment of those, if any there were, who suffered themselves to grow thoughtful, the whole power of our people in the plain and the port of Balaclava must have seemed to be in jeopardy; for not only had the enemy overmastered the outer line of defense, and triumphantly broken in through it, but also, having a weight of numbers which, for the moment, stood as that of an army to a regiment, he already had made bold to be driving his cavalry at the very heart of the En-

glish resources, when the Turkish battalions—troops constituting two-thirds of that small and last body of foot with which Campbell yet sought to withstand his assailant—dissolved all at once into a horde of fugitives thronging down in despair to the port. If, in such a condition of things, some few hundreds of infantry men stood shoulder to shoulder in line, confronting the victor upon open ground, and maintaining, from first to last, their composure, their cheerfulness, nay, even their soldierly mirth, they proved themselves by a test which was other than that of sharp combat, but hardly, perhaps, less trying.

And the Highlanders whilst in this joyous mood were not without a subject of merriment; for they saw how the Turks in their flight met a new and terrible foe. There came out from the camp of the Highland regiment a stalwart and angry Scotch wife, with an uplifted stick in her hand; and then, if ever in history, the fortunes of Islam waned low beneath the manifest ascendant of the Cross; for the blows dealt by this Christian woman fell thick on the backs of the Faithful. She believed, it seems, that, besides being guilty of running away, the Turks meant to pillage her camp; and the blows she delivered were not mere expressions of scorn, but actual and fierce punishment. In one instance, she laid hold of a strong-looking, burly Turk, and held him fast until she had beaten him for some time, and seemingly with great fury. She also applied much invective. Notwithstanding all graver claims upon their attention, the men of the 93rd were able to witness this incident. It mightily pleased and amused them. It amuses men still to remember that the Osmanlis, flying from danger and yearning after blissful repose, should have chosen a line of retreat where this pitiless dame mounted guard.¹

V.

If a man has to hear that in the open forenoon of an October day a body of Russian horse which numbered itself by thousands could come wandering into the precincts of the English camp without exciting early attention on the part of our cavalry people, he ought to know what was the cause which made such an incident possible.

Toward the west of the Balaclava plain, the ground was

¹ She was a very powerful woman. In later years—I do not know the origin of the appellation—she used to be known in the regiment by the name of the ‘Kokana.’

so undulating, and the view of it here and there so obstructed by orchards or vineyards, that although an observer well placed would be able to descry the advance of any enemy's force long, long before it could be close at hand, yet the near approach of even great bodies of troops might be hidden from the mind of a general who contented himself with the knowledge that was to be got from low ground. It may be easily imagined that, in the existing condition of things, our cavalry generals could not venture to separate themselves from their troops by even those slight distances which divided the low ground from neighboring heights; but then also they failed to charge others with the duty of maintaining a watchful look-out from any of the commanding knolls and ridges which featured the landscape around them; and from this single omission there well might come two broods of error—the first brood consisting of ‘surprises,’ like the one which gave rise to this comment—the other brood comprising those ugly misconstructions which must always be likely to occur where he who sends orders can survey the whole field, and he who would try to obey them has only a circumscribed view.

The main body of the Russian cavalry, under the orders of General Ryjoff, moved briskly up the North Valley, having with it some 32 pieces of field-artillery; and as yet, the force did not bend southward (as the four detached squadrons had done), but pushed on so far up toward the west (without being assailed by our cavalry), that at length it incurred two shots, both discharged from the line of batteries which fringed the edge of the Chersonese. Checked apparently by this fire, the Russian cavalry, which had previously seemed to be one immense column, now showed itself to consist of two distinct masses, and during some moments it seemed disposed to fall back; but presently, the whole force, acting closely together, wheeled obliquely aside toward the line of the Woronzoff road, and began to cross over the Causeway Heights, as though minded to invade the South Valley, or else, at the least, to survey it. Lord Cardigan's brigade had just been moved to a position more advanced than before, and it now fronted toward the east. Therefore, although the configuration of the ground was such as to keep General Ryjoff in ignorance of what he had on his flank, yet,

Want of arrangements for an effective look-out.

Advance of the main body of the Russian cavalry.

Its change of direction.

when he thus passed over the heights, he was moving (obliquely) across the front of our Light Cavalry.

So far as I have heard, there is no ground at all for believing that, when the Russian horse thus wheeled and faced to the south, it had yet had a glimpse of the foe with which, in hard fight, it was destined to be presently striving; but as soon as the foremost horsemen of the leading column had moved up to the top of the ridge, they all at once found that a great occasion was come.

Long before the flight of the Turkish battalions in the gorge of Kadiköi, Lord Raglan's sure glance had enabled him to detect their unstable condition; and he had, therefore, sent an order directing that eight squadrons of Heavy Dragoons should be moved down to support them. Lord Lucan had intrusted the task to Brigadier-General Scarlett, the officer who commanded our Heavy Brigade; and Scarlett was in the act of executing Lord Raglan's order, when the Russian cavalry, as we have just been seeing, turned away from the valley and moved up over the summit of the Causeway ridge. Having with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons—regiments numbering altogether six squadrons—and having, besides, provided that to make up the 'eight,' the two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards should follow him, Scarlett was marching along the South Valley, and making his way toward the east, with the Causeway Heights on his left.

For the purpose of seeing how these troops were brought into action, the order of march should be known. The movement being regarded as a movement within our own lines, and one therefore proceeding through ground in the unchallenged dominion of the English, was not conducted with the military precautions which would have been otherwise judged necessary, and no horsemen covered the march by moving along the top of the Causeway ridge. Scarlett did not apparently entertain an idea that Russian cavalry could come so high up the North Valley as the 'Number Five' Redoubt, and manœuvre on the ground which it reached, without bringing our Light Cavalry down on it.¹ Therefore no special directions were thought to be needed for this little march—a

The march of the eight squadrons of Heavy Dragoons which had been sent under Scarlett toward the approaches of Kadiköi.

Cause which induced Scarlett to dispense with precautions.


¹ The sketch, *post*, 429—which, however, is not offered as a plan indicating the actual position of the respective forces—may aid the comprehension of the text.

march through our own camping-ground—and no more elaborate operation was intended than that of moving all the three regiments by the same route in open column of troops.

The order of march. It chanced, however, that in turning one of the inclosures which obstructed its path, the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings took the right-hand side of the obstacle, whilst the other squadron passed by the left of it; and in this way it resulted that the movement went on in two columns, the right-hand column being led by the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings, and closed by the 5th Dragoon Guards; whilst the left-hand column was led by the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings, and closed by the two squadrons of the Scots Greys. Those three last-named squadrons were moving in open column of troops, but the right-hand column marched by 'threes.'¹

The ground which had been reached by the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings and the Greys at the time now in question;

At the moment of the sudden discovery which will be presently mentioned, the six squadrons thus led by Scarlett were marching in a direction nearly parallel with the line of the Causeway ridge, at a distance of some seven or eight hundred yards from its summit; and the left-hand column was so shaping its course as to be able to skirt the remains of the Light Brigade camp, and also the lower fence of a vineyard there sloping down southward in the eye of the sun. The camp had been imperfectly struck;



¹ General Scarlett's impression was, that all six squadrons were moving upon the same line of march, and in open column of troops; but minute inquiry led to the conclusion stated in the text.

but some tents were yet standing, and the picket-ropes had not been removed.

General Scarlett with Elliot, his aid-de-camp, was on the left of the column formed by the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings and the Scots Greys. Intent upon the special duty which had just been assigned to his squadrons by Lord Raglan's last order, he was keenly bending his sight in the direction of the Highland battalion which defended the approaches of Kadiköi, when Elliot cast a glance toward the ridge on his left, and saw its top fretted with lances. Another moment and the skyline was broken by evident squadrons of horse. Elliot, young as he was, had yet been inured to war, and he quickly was able to assure himself not only that powerful masses of Russian cavalry were gathered, and gathering, on the ridge, but that they fronted toward the South Valley and were looking down almost at right angles upon the flank of our marching column. Of course, the aid-de-camp instantly directed the eyes of his chief to the summit of the ridge on his left. For a moment, Scarlett could hardly accept Elliot's conclusion; but in the next instant he recognized the full purport of what had happened, and perceived that he was marching across the front of a great mass of Russian cavalry, which looked down upon the flank of his column from a distance of but few hundred yards, and might be expected, of course, to charge down on it. This, then, was the occasion which fortune had proffered to the Russian cavalry.

Scarlett's resolve was instantaneous, and his plan simple. He meant to form line to his left, and to charge with all six of his squadrons. Accordingly he faced his horse's head toward the flank of the column, and called out, 'Are you right in front?' The answer was, 'Yes, Sir!' Then Scarlett gave the word of command, 'Left wheel into line!'

The troops nearest to Scarlett were those which formed the left-hand column—that is, the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings, which was in front, and the two squadrons of the Greys which brought up the rear. Those three squadrons were the force which constituted 'Scarlett's three hundred.'

Scarlett conceived at this time that the 5th Dragoon

¹ This was a very apt question; for, as we shall afterward see, some portions of the Heavy Brigade were marching 'left in front.'

Guards would form up in prolongation of his front on the left of the Greys; and, to leave a clear front for the regiment thus supposed to be coming into line, he found it necessary that the 'three hundred' should move some way east of the

Ground taken vineyard before commencing their onset. He there-
to the right. fore gave an order to 'take ground to the right.'

The 5th Dragoon Guards had not yet so closely approach-
The 5th Dra- ed as to be ready to align with Scarlett's 'three
goon Guards. 'hundred;' and it seems that Eliot, the Brig-
adier's aid-de-camp, delivered to the regiment an order which
was regarded as directing it to act in support to the Greys.¹
The position which the 5th Dragoon Guards actually took
up was on the left rear of the Greys. On the right of the
5th Dragoon Guards, but divided from it by a considerable
interval, there stood the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings.

The 4th Dragoon Guards and the Royals were approach-
The 4th Dra- ing; so altogether, besides the first line, there
goon Guards were seven squadrons which might ultimately
and the Royals were approach- take part in the conflict, though not until after the
ing. moment when the foremost 'three hundred' would
be already engaged.

The embarrassment of determining whether he will direct,
or whether he will lead, is one which very com-
The decision monly besets the mind of a cavalry general who
that must be come to by the commands several regiments just about to engage
about to by the Commander- in a conflict with powerful adversaries; but it
in-Chief of a force of cav- pressed upon Scarlett with a somewhat unusual
alry when severity; for he had no time to be delegating au-
about to at- thority, or giving effective instructions for the
tack, in regard guidance of his supports; and, in one point of
to the place view, it might be bold to take it for granted that
where his per- a general in command of several squadrons could
sonal presence will be most re-
quired. be warranted in leaving a large proportion of them to come
into the fight their own way; but then, on the other hand,
our troops were young, were new to battle; and, it being
determined that a very scant number of them were to be led
on—and that, too, up hill—against a vast mass of cavalry
which reckoned itself by thousands, there was ground for be-
lieving that they might need the example of a general offi-
cer, not for the purpose of mere encouragement, but in order
to put them above all doubt and question in regard to their
true path of duty.


¹ I believe General Scarlett has no recollection of having sent this order; but the proof of the words given in the text seems irresistibly strong.



BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

Plan

Showing the Order in which the Six Squadrons with General Scarlett were marching when the approach of the Russian Cavalry was first observed.



Site of
Light Cavalry
Camp

* General
Scarlett

1st Squadron of
Greys
Marching in open
Column of Troops
2nd Squadron of
Imiskillings

5th Dragoon Guards
Marching by threes

1st Squadron of
the Imiskillings
marching by threes

In such a dilemma, shall a man be the Leader or the General? He can not be both. Shall he strive to retain the control over all his troops, as does an infantry General sending orders this way and that? Or rather, for the sake of leading his first line, shall he abandon for the moment his direct authority over the rest, and content himself with that primitive act of generalship which is performed by showing the way? The soundness of Scarlett's decision may fairly be questioned;¹ but he chose as chose Lord Uxbridge in the last of the battles against the great Napoleon;² nay, he chose as did Murat himself, for when the great cavalry chief was a king and a commander of mighty numbers, he still used to charge in person, and to charge at the head of his squadrons.

And now, all at once, by the arrival of his Divisional General, Scarlett found himself relieved from any anxiety occasioned by his decision. It seems that, after having dispatched Scarlett and his Heavy Dragoons on the mission assigned to them by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lucan had been apprised by one of Lord Raglan's aids-de-camp of the enemy's advance up the valley with a large body of cavalry; and that presently, upon having his glance directed to the right quarter, he himself had not only descried Ryjoff's masses of horse, but had been able to see that a portion of them was bending southward across the Causeway ridge. Thereupon, it appears, he had first given his parting instructions to Lord Cardigan, the commander of the Light Brigade, and had then ridden off at speed in the track of Scarlett's left column. When, upon overtaking the squadrons, he found them moving in column of troops with their left flank toward the enemy, he believed that this operation (though in reality, perhaps, it had resulted from Scarlett's second order to take ground to the right) was a continuance of the march toward Kadi-köi. He therefore conceived that, to save time in what he took to be a pressing emergency, it was his duty at once, and in person, to give such directions to the troops as he judged

¹ For the reason adverted to in the preceding paragraph.

² Our cavalry Generals have very commonly adopted this way of performing their duty; but the decision of Lord Uxbridge (afterward the Marquess of Anglesea) is a specially convenient example of the dilemma referred to in the text; for on the one hand his personal leadership of the first line resulted in a charge of surpassing splendor; but then also great losses followed, because it was found that practically, his anterior directions to the supports did not seem applicable a few moments later, and at all events, were not obeyed in a manner accordant with Lord Uxbridge's design.

to be needed, without first apprising General Scarlett, and conveying the orders through him. Accordingly, therefore, by his personal word of command, he directed the troops to wheel into line;¹ and it seems that he was heard and obeyed by the Greys, but not by the Inniskillings; for that last regiment received no orders except those which came from the lips of General Scarlett. It is evident that, at such a time, any clashing of the words of command which proceeded from the two generals might have been dangerous; but in their actual result, Lord Lucan's separate, though concurring orders wrought little or no confusion.

Hitherto, the divisional commander and his brigadier had not come in sight of one another; but whilst Scarlett (after having once wheeled, and then taken ground to the right) was again giving orders to wheel, a second time, into line, Lord Lucan rode up to him; and, in the face of the enemy's masses of horse then closely impending over them, the General of the division and the General of brigade found moments enough for the exchange of a few rapid words. According to General Scarlett's recollection of what passed, he explained why it was that, after first wheeling into line, he had found it necessary to take ground to his right, and received an assurance that his intended attack would be supported by Lord Lucan with other troops.

Lord Lucan, indeed, believes that, in expressing his wish to have the charge executed, he spoke as though giving an order which had originated with himself, and that he said to his Brigadier:—'General Scarlett, take these four squadrons'—the four squadrons of the Greys and the Inniskillings—'and at once attack the column of the enemy;² but if he used words of command where words of mere sanction were what the occasion required, it seems probable that he ended the conversation with a more appropriate phrase, saying simply to Scarlett:—'Now, then, do as you like.' Whatever were the words interchanged, they at all events proved that Scarlett's determination to lead an immediate charge against the

¹ Indeed if Lord Lucan's impression be accurate, he delivered in succession the same three orders that were given by Scarlett—*i. e.*, orders to wheel into line, to take ground to the right, and (for the second time) to wheel into line. In my judgment, any dispute as to which of the two generals was the first to give the orders would be too trivial to deserve public attention; but if there be a military reader who thinks otherwise, he will probably perceive that the truth can be deduced from the facts stated in the text.

² What Lord Lucan took to be 'four' were in reality three squadrons. See *ante*, p. 430.

enemy's cavalry had the sanction of his divisional commander.

Of course, it must be well understood that the attack we shall have to speak of took place under Lord Lucan's actual and personal authority. Holding command over the whole division of which the Heavy Dragoons formed a part, he had come up so early as to have ample time for preventing the charge if he had thought fit to do so; and as it happened that, far from preventing, he eagerly sanctioned, the charge, nay, personally helped on the preparations for the measure, and undertook to support it by fresh troops—he made himself in the fullest sense responsible for the operation, and became, in all fairness, entitled to a corresponding share of any merit there was in the design. He either ordered or sanctioned the charge; and the question, 'Who led it?' will not be brought into dispute.

Lord Lucan being present before the moment of the attack, it followed that the attack was under his authority.

Positions of the six squadrons at the moment anterior to Scarlett's charge.

When the operation of wheeling a second time into line had been brought to completion by the Inniskillings and the Greys, our six squadrons ranged thus: In first line there stood the second squadron of the Inniskillings, with the Greys on their left. In second line the first squadron of the Inniskillings was on the right rear of the other Inniskilling squadron; and on its left there was the 5th Dragoon Guards, forming up in left rear of the Greys.

The whole force thus ranged or ranging was between 500 and 600 strong; and the three squadrons in front which had first to encounter alone the whole of the enemy's masses, numbered something less than 300.

By the concurring opinions of Lord Lucan and of many French officers, including General Canrobert, and also, I believe, General Morris, the mass of Russian cavalry preparing to descend upon these 300 dragoons was estimated as amounting, at the least, to 3500 men; and (unless it be understood that Jëropkine's six squadrons of Lancers were in another part of the field, or that the horsemen receding from the fire of the 93rd Highlanders had not rejoined the main body) it would result from even the official acknowledgment of the Russians that this mass of horse was some 3000 strong.¹ Even supposing the

The numbers of the Russian cavalry confronting Scarlett.

¹ Strictly, 2900. For the particulars of this force, and for inquiry as to the question whether the two exceptions suggested by the above parenthesis should, or should not be made, see note in the Appendix.

force to have comprised but two-thirds of that number—and I can not allow myself to state it at more than about 2000—the column was still one of no common weight and massiveness. It need hardly be said that the same numerals which import but a moderate strength, if applied to foot-soldiers, are many times more potent when used for the reckoning of cavalry. Our island people rarely cast their eyes upon such a spectacle as that of cavalry in mass; and yet, without having done so, they can hardly conceive the sense of weight that is laid upon the mind of a man who looks up the slope of a hill at a distance of a few hundred yards, and sees there a column of horse—even if it were but 2000 strong—close gathered in oblong or square.

And that—so far as concerned its power of manœuvring—this great body of horse was in a high state of efficiency, it soon gave proof; for when the squadrons had gathered on the summit of the ridge, their leader for some reason determined that he ought to take ground to his left, and the change was effected with a briskness and precision which wrung admiration from some of our best cavalry officers.

So soon as the column had taken all the ground that was thought to be needed, it fronted once more to the English. Then presently, at the sound of the trumpet, this huge mass of horsemen, deep-charged with the weight of its thousands, began to descend the hillside.

Making straight for the ground where our scanty three hundred were ranging, and being presently brought to the trot, it came on at a well-governed speed, swelling broader and broader each instant, yet disclosing its depths more and more. In one of its aspects, the descending of this thicket of horsemen was like what may be imagined of a sudden yet natural displacement of the earth's surface; for to those who gazed from afar the dusky mass they saw moving showed acreage rather than numbers.

All this while, the string of the 300 redcoats were forming Scarlett's slender first line in the valley beneath, and they seemed to be playing parade. At the moment I speak of, the troop officers of the Greys were still facing their men; and their drill rules, it seems, had declared that they must continue to do so till the major of the regiment should at length bring them round by giving the order, 'Eyes right!' Not yet would the Greys consent to be disturbed in their ceremonies by the descending column.

It was with seeming confidence that Scarlett sat eying the

approach of the Russian mass, whilst the three squadrons ranging behind him went composedly on with the work of dressing and re-dressing their front ; yet the moment seemed near when, from the great depth of the column and the incline of the ground, the front ranks of the Russians would have less to dread from their foe than from the weight of their own troops behind them ; and unless the descent of the column should be presently stayed, even the enemy himself (though by chance his foremost squadrons should falter) might hardly have any choice left but to come sweeping down like a torrent, and overwhelming all mortal resistance.

But before the moment had come when the enemy, whether liking it or not, would find himself condemned to charge home, he began, as it seemed, to falter. He slackened the pace. He still slackened—his trumpets were sounding—he slackened, and came to a halt.

The Russian cavalry began to slacken pace, and at length came to a halt.

Our cavalry-men, so far as I know, have failed to hit on any solution of what they regard as a seemingly enormous mistake on the part of General Ryjoff ; and the Russians, not caring to dwell on the story of their conflict with our Heavy Dragoons, have never thrown light on the question. It, however, seems likely that a commander leading down his massed thousands with design to attack may have judged that he was met by a formidable obstacle when he saw extending before him a camp imperfectly struck, where some of the tents were yet standing and where also some horses were picketed.¹

If such was General Ryjoff's apprehension, he may well have been strengthened in it by observing the deliberately ceremonious preparations of the scanty red squadrons below : because he would be led to infer that their apparent sense of security must be based on knowledge of the ground in their front, and the hindrances with which it was strewed.

Or, again, it may be that, from the first, the enemy had intended to halt at what he judged a fit distance, for the purpose of executing and perfecting the manœuvre which must now be described.

Either whilst the mass was descending, or else as soon as it halted, a partial deployment was effected, which brought the force, taken as a whole, into a state of formation not new to St. Petersburg, though but little affected elsewhere. In prolongation of

Deployment effected by the Russians on each flank of their column.

¹ Sick horses.

the two front ranks of the column both to the right and to the left, two wings or fore-arms were thrown out, and this in such way that whilst the trunk—if thus one may call it—was a huge weighty mass of great depth, the two limbs which grew out from it were constituted by a formation in line. In this way, the appalling effect of great weight was supposed to be combined with the advantage which belongs to extension of front; and evidently the designer imagined that, by the process of wheeling them, the two deployed lines might be made puissant engines for defense or for counter-attack. By inclining them more or less back the arms might be made to cover the flanks of the column; whilst, by folding them inward, they might be so wielded as to crush all close comers with an easy and pitiless hug. The mass which acted in support had a front commensurate with that of the column it followed, but without any deployment from the flanks. It advanced so exactly on the track of the body in front, and soon showed so strong a tendency to close upon it, that virtually it added its weight to the weight of the great mass it followed, without attempting to aid it by any independent manœuvres. So although, whilst these horsemen were marching, and even during part of the conflict, a space could be seen still existing between the first mass and the second, yet, so far as concerns their bearing upon the fight, the two columns were substantially as one.

Around the serried masses thus formed there circled a number of horsemen in open or skirmishing order.

When the extension of the Russian front had developed itself, Scarlett failed not, of course, to see that enormously as his thin line of two ranks was over-weighted by the vast depth of the column before him, the extent to which he was outflanked both on his right hand and on his left was hardly less overwhelming; but whether he still expected that the 5th Dragoon Guards would align with the Greys, or whether he by this time understood that it would be operating on their left rear, he at all events looked trustfully to the help that would be brought him by this his own regiment as a means of resistance to the forces which were outflanking him on his left. Toward his right, however, he equally saw the dark squadrons far, far overlapping his front; and, for the checking of these, he knew not that he had even so much as one troop close at hand, for he supposed at that time that

Scarlett now was not only enormously over-weighted by the column in his front, but also enormously out-flanked by his adversaries.

Looking to the 5th Dragoon Guards to help him on his left, Scarlett sought to provide a force which might in some measure counteract the forces which outflanked him toward his right.

his first line included the whole of the Inniskillings. Scarlett, therefore, dispatched Major Conolly, his brigade-major, with orders to bring forward one or other of the two regiments which had not marched off with the rest, and oppose it to the enemy's left.

It seemed evident that, for the English, all rational hope must depend upon seizing the occasion which the enemy's halt was now proffering; and to the truth of this conviction the Divisional General and his Brigadier were both keenly alive. Lord Lucan, indeed, grew so impatient of delay that he more than once caused his trumpeter to sound the 'charge;' but Scarlett and all his people were much busied in preparing; and, so far as I have heard, no attention was awakened by the sound of the divisional trumpet.

Importance of seizing the occasion which the enemy's halt presented. Anxiety of both Lord Lucan and General Scarlett for the commencement of the charge at the earliest practicable moment.

Step taken (without effect) by Lord Lucan for accelerating the movement. The hopelessness of seeking to shake the Russian column by the means in which cavalry assailants are accustomed to trust.

Though our people saw clearly enough that at all hazards, and notwithstanding all disparity of numbers, the enemy's impending masses must be attacked by Scarlett's scant force, they still had no right to imagine that they could achieve victory, or even ward off disaster, by means of the kind which a General of Cavalry is accustomed to contemplate. When an officer undertakes a charge of horse, his accustomed hope is, that he will be able to shatter the array of the foe by the momentum and impact of his close serried squadrons led thundering in at a gallop; and, indeed, it is a main part of his reckoning that the bare dread of the shock he thus threatens will break down all resistance beforehand. For Scarlett, there could be no such hope. The scantiness of his numbers was not of itself a fatal bar to the prospect of conquering by impact; but he was so circumstanced as to be obliged to charge up hill and over ground much impeded in some places by the picket-ropes and other remains of the camp. Nor was this the worst. The vast depth of the column forbade all prospects of shattering it by a blow; for even though the troopers in front might shrink, and incline to give way under the shock of a charge, they would be physically prevented from making a step to the rear by the massiveness of the squadrons behind them.

However desperate the intended attack might be, no one seems to have questioned.

But, however desperate the task of Scarlett's three hundred dragoons, no one of them seems to have questioned that it was right to attack; and, the element of doubt being thus altogether

ed that it was right. excluded, they at least had that strength which belongs to men acting with a resolute purpose.

Except in the instances of combats under the walls of besieged fortresses, it can rarely occur that armies, or large portions of armies, are not only so near and so well placed for the purpose of seeing, but also so unoccupied with harder tasks as to be able to study a combat going on under their eyes; and still more rare must be the occasions which modern warfare allows for seeing a conflict rage without looking through a curtain of smoke; but, besides our Light Cavalry Brigade which stood near at hand, there had gathered large numbers of military observers—including French, English, and Turks—who, being at the edge of the Chersonese upland, were on ground so inclined as to be comparable to that from which tiers upon tiers of spectators in a Roman amphitheatre used to overlook the arena; and the ledges of the hillside were even indeed of such form as to invite men to sit whilst they gazed. The means that people had of attaining to clear perceptions were largely increased by the difference that there was between the color of the Russian and that of the English squadrons. With the exception of a few troops which showed their uniform—the pale-blue pelisse and jacket of a hussar regiment—all the Russian horsemen, whether hussars, or lancers, or Cossacks, whether officers or troopers, were enveloped alike in the murky gray outer-coats which, by this time, had become familiar to the eye of the invaders. The gray was of such a hue that, like the gray of many a lake and river, it gathered darkness from quantity; and what people on the Chersonese saw moving down to overwhelm our ‘three hundred,’ were two masses having that kind of blackness which belongs to dense clouds charged with storm.

The English dragoons, on the other hand, were in their scarlet uniform, and (with the exception of the Greys, who had the famed ‘bearskins’ for their head-gear) they all wore the helmet. The contrast of color between the gray and the red was so strong that any even slight intermixture of the opposing combatants could be seen from the Chersonese. So great had been the desire of the English in those days, to purchase ease for the soldier at the expense of display, that several portions of our dragoon accoutrements had been dis-

The great numbers of military spectators who were witnesses of the combat.

Distinctive colors of the uniforms worn by the Russians and the English dragoons.

carded. The plumes of the helmets had been laid aside, and our men rode without their shoulder-scales, without the then ridiculed stock, and, moreover, without their gauntlets.

Whilst the gazers observed that troop-officers in front of our first line were still facing to the men, still dressing and re-dressing the ranks, they also now saw that, in front of the centre of the Greys, and at a distance from it of five or six horses' length, there was gathered a group of four horsemen. Two of these were side by side, and a little in front of the others. Of the two foremost, the one on the left wore the cocked-hat which indicated the presence of a Staff-officer, and suggested indeed, at first sight, that the wearer might be the General who commanded the brigade; but a field-glass corrected the error, showing instantly that the horseman who thus caught the eye from a distance was no more than a young lieutenant—Lieutenant Alexander Elliot, the aid-de-camp of General Scarlett. But to the right of the young aid-de-camp there was another horseman, on a thorough-bred bay, standing fully, it seemed, sixteen hands. To judge from his head-gear, this last horseman might seem to be no more than a regimental officer of dragoons—for he wore the same helmet as they did—but an outer-coat of dark blue, thrown on, it seemed, over his uniform, served to show that he must be on the Staff. Because of the bright contrast disclosed between the warm summer hue of his features and a drooping mustache white as snow, it was possible to see from afar that this officer must be General Scarlett. Of the two horsemen who kept themselves a little in rear of the General, the one was his trumpeter, the other his orderly. This last man had attained to high skill as a swordsman, and was a valorous, faithful soldier. If it were not for the general spread of incredulity, it would be acknowledged that he drew his lineage from some mighty giantess of former ages, for he bore the surname of Shegog.

Scarlett's yearning at this moment was for the expected prolongation of his line toward its left, and he compelled himself to give yet some moments for the forming of his 5th Dragoon Guards; but on his right, the one squadron of the Inniskillings (the squadron which he took to be the whole regiment) was both ready and more than ready. Differing in that respect from the rest of the 'three hundred,' the squadron had a clear front, and the sense of this blessing so inflamed it with

Scarlett, placed in front of the Greys, was waiting for the prolongation of the line toward his left, but on his right the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings was ready and eager.

warlike desire, that during the moments of delay, Scarlett had to be restraining the line by waving it back with his sword. The squadron chafed proudly at the touch of the curb, and it seemed that if the General were to relax his care for an instant, it would bound forward up the hillside, and spring all alone at the column.

The custom of the service requires that an officer who has the immediate command of a body of cavalry engaged in the duty of charging shall be the actual leader of the onslaught in the strictest sense, riding forward at a distance of at least some few yards in advance of his squadrons; but it must not be supposed that those who originated or sanctioned this practice were acting in contemplation of any such circumstances as those which now existed, or that they ever intended to subject a general officer, or indeed any other human being, to the peculiar species of personal hazard which Scarlett had resolved to confront.

The custom which requires that in a cavalry charge the commanding officer shall place himself in advance of his squadrons.

In its general operation the practice does not exact such a task as that which Scarlett undertook.

As tested by its general operation, the practice is not one which unduly exposes the life of the chief; for when a strong body of horse is hurled at full pace toward the foe, it commonly happens that either the attack or the resistance gives way before the moment of impact; but in this rare example of a

slow, yet resolute, charge of three hundred, directed up hill against broad and deep masses of squadrons which reckoned their strength by thousands, it seemed nearly certain from the first that the General leading it must come, and come almost singly, into actual bodily contact with a host of adversaries, and remain for a time engulfed in it, because the enemy's front ranks were so barred against all retreat by the squadrons behind them, that there could be no hope of

The distance at this time between Scarlett and the enemy's column.

putting the body to flight by the mere approach of our squadrons.

At this time, the distance between the Russians and General Scarlett is believed to have been about 400 yards.

For the better understanding of what presently followed, it is well to know that when a brigadier is directing a movement which must be executed by only a portion of his force, the notes of the brigade trumpet do not instantly and directly take effect

The mode in which the directions of a brigadier circumstanced as

Scarlett was at this time are usually made to take effect, and in which squadrons are moved from a halt to a charging pace.

upon the troops; because the order of the brigadier, in the case supposed, must be repeated by the regimental officers. It will also be useful to remember that squadrons in general are not moved from a halt to a charge by a single word of command. When the process is gone through with full deliberation, the first order is this:—‘The line will advance at a walk!’ and, the trumpet successively sounding the orders which follow, the force is brought on to its final task through the stages of ‘Trot!’ ‘Gallop!’ ‘Charge!’

Now Scarlett well knew how much all depended upon striking at the enemy’s masses whilst yet they stood halted;² and, so far as concerned his own orders, he was hardly in the humor for traveling through all the anterior stages. He turned to his trumpeter and said at once, ‘Sound the charge!’

Whilst the notes were still pealing, and before they could take full effect upon the squadrons behind him, Scarlett moved forward at a trot; and although the impediments of the camping-ground made it necessary for a rider in this the first part of the onset to pick his way with some care, yet the horse Scarlett rode was a horse of such stride and power, that his rate of advance was not slow, even over the obstructed ground; and, as soon as the clear field which was at length gained enabled the leader to get into a gallop, the distance between him and his squadrons was swiftly increased. In a few moments, he was so far in advance of them that Elliot judged it right to call the attention of the chief to the position of his squadrons. Those squadrons were by this time advancing; but the impediments of the camping-ground proved of course more obstructing to the serried ranks of the Greys than to a horseman with only one companion and two attendants. Scarlett could not question that the distance between him and his squadrons had become extravagantly great; but still judging, as he had judged from the first, that it was of vital moment to strike the enemy’s column whilst halted, he rather desired to accelerate the Greys than much to retard his own pace. Therefore, still pressing forward, though not quite so swiftly

Scarlett’s orders to his trumpeter.

Scarlett’s advance.

¹ The walk, I believe, is often if not indeed generally omitted; but the other three stages are *de règle*.

² According to the impression of Lord Lucan—differing in that respect from those who took part in the execution of the charge—the Russian column by this time had resumed its advance down the hill.

as before, he turned partly round in his saddle, shouted out a 'Come on!' to the Greys, and invoked them with a wave of his sword.

When the squadrons attained to clear ground, they began to reduce the space which divided them from their leader; but it is computed that, at the moment of Scarlett's first contact with the enemy's column, the distance between him and the squadrons which followed him was still, at the least, fifty yards.

The Brigadier now found himself nearing the front of the column at a point very near its centre, and the spot at which Scarlett thus rode was marked by the presence of a Russian officer who sat erect in his saddle some few paces in front of his people, and confronting the English intruder.

Scarlett by this time was charging up at high speed, and, conjoined with the swiftness thus attained, the weight of a sixteen-hands horse gave his onset a formidable momentum. The Russian officer turned partly round in his saddle, with a gesture which seemed to indicate that he sought to beckon forward his people, and cause them to flood down over the four coming horsemen; but already Scarlett and his aid-de-camp were closing. Moved perhaps by such indication of rank as was to be gathered in one fleeting moment from the sight of a Staff-officer's hat, the Russian officer chose Elliot for his adversary, and was going to make his first thrust, when along the other side of him, rushing close past the elbow of his bridle-arm, General Scarlett swept on without hindrance, and drove his way into the column.

Scarlett swept past the bridle-arm of the Russian officer, and drove a way into the column.

It was by digging his charger right in between the two nearest troopers before him that Scarlett wedged himself into the solid mass of the enemy's squadrons. When a man has done an act of this kind, and has lived to speak of it, it is difficult for him to be sure of what might be happening close around him, but Scarlett observed that of the adversaries nearest to him, whom he had not, he knew, gravely wounded, there were some who dropped off their horses without having been killed or wounded by him; and it seemed to him, if he were to judge only from his own eyes, that they were throwing themselves to the ground of their own accord.

It was well perhaps, after all, that Scarlett, in leading the charge, was extravagantly ahead of his troops; for it seems

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he was able to drive so far into the column as to be protected by the very bodies of his adversaries from the shock which must needs be inflicted by the Greys and Inniskillings when charging the front of the column.

From the moment when the Brigadier had thus established himself in the midst of his foes, it resulted, of course, that his tenure of life was by the sword, and not by the sword which is a metaphor, but by that which is actual, and of steel. Scarlett, it seems, had no pretension to be more than a passably good swordsman, and he had the disadvantage of being near-sighted; but he knew how to handle his weapon, and in circumstances which exposed him to attack from several at the same time, he had more need of such unflagging industry of the sword-arm as might keep the blade flashing here, there, and on all sides in quickly successive whirls, than of the subtle, the delicate skill which prepares men for combats of two.

It was partly, perhaps, from the circumstance of Elliot's approaching him on the side of his sword-arm that the Russian officer in front of the column chose the aid-de-camp for his antagonist instead of the chief; but, be that as it may, he faced Elliot as he approached, and endeavored to cut him down. Evading or parrying the cut, Elliot drove his sword through the body of the assailant, and the swiftness with which he was galloping up whilst delivering this thrust was so great that the blade darted in to the very hilt; but until the next moment, when Elliot's charger had rushed past, the weapon, though held fast by its owner, still could not be withdrawn. Thence it resulted that the Russian officer was turned round in his saddle by the leverage of the sword which transfixed him. In the next instant, Elliot, still rushing forward with great impetus, drove into the column between the two troopers who most nearly confronted him, and then, with a now reeking sword, began cleaving his way through the ranks. Shegog and the trumpeter came crashing in after; so that not only Scarlett himself, but all the three horsemen who constituted his immediate following, were now engulfed in the column.

A singular friendship had long subsisted between the Scots Greys and the Inniskilling Dragoons. It dated from the time of that famous brigade in which three cavalry regiments were so brought together as to express by their aggregate title the union

General Scarlett in the column.

Elliot's encounter with the Russian officer in front of the column.

The three horsemen who rode with Scarlett were now all, like their chief, engulfed in the column.

The ancient friendship between the Scots Greys and the Inniskillings.

killing Dra-
 goons.

of the three kingdoms, yet offer a sample of each ;¹ but the circumstance of the Greys and the Inniskillings having been brigaded together in the great days can hardly be treated as alone sufficing to account for the existence and duration of this romantic attachment ; for it so happens that the sentiment which thus bound together the thistle and the shamrock has never included the rose. The friendship between the Scottish and the Irish regiment had the ardor of personal friendship, and a tenacity not liable to be relaxed by mere death ; for a regiment great in history bears so far a resemblance to the immortal gods as to be old in power and glory, yet have always the freshness of youth. Long intervals of years often passed in which the Greys and the Inniskillings remained parted by distance, but whenever it became known that by some new change of quarters the two regiments would once more be brought together, there used to be great joy and preparation ; and whether the marching regiment might be the Greys or the Inniskillings, it was sure to be welcomed by the other one with delight and with lavish attentions.

When last the sworn friends were together in what they might deign to call fighting, they were under the field-glass of the great Napoleon. Then, as now, the Greys charged in first line, and on the left of the Inniskillings.²

Of the two comrade regiments, each had its distinguishing characteristics. The Inniskillings, with still some remaining traces in their corps of the old warlike Orange enthusiasm, were eager, fiery, impetuous.³

The Scots Greys, with a great power of self-restraint, were yet liable to be wrought upon by their native inborn desire for a fight, till it raged like a consuming passion. From the exceeding tenacity of their nature, it resulted that the combative impulses, when long baffled by circumstances, were cumulative in their effect, and the events of the day — the capture of British guns under the eyes of our horsemen — the marching, the countermarching, the marching again, without ever striking a blow, and finally,

¹ The 'Union Brigade.' The regiment which in that historic brigade represented England was the 'Royals.'

² It had been intended by Lord Uxbridge that they should act in support, but circumstances superseded his directions, and caused them to charge in first line.

³ The proportion of the regiment recruited from Ireland was very much smaller than it had been in former times, but still the Orange element, coupled with the force of regimental tradition, was enough to warrant the statement contained in the text.

the dainty dressing of ranks under the eyes of the enemy's host—all these antecedent trials of patience had been heating and still heating the furnace by the very barriers which kept down the flame. If, with the Inniskillings, the impetuosity I spoke of was in a great measure aggregate, that yearning of the Scots for close quarters was, with many, the passion of the individual man, and so plain to the eye that the trooper became something other than a component part of a machine—became visibly a power of himself. English officers who were combative enough in their own way, yet saw with wonder not unmingled with a feeling like awe that long-pent-up rage for the fight which was consuming the men of the Greys.

In the earlier part of the advance now at length commenced by the three squadrons, there was nothing that could much impress the mind of an observer who failed to connect it in his mind with the prospect of what was to follow; and a somewhat young critic was heard to condemn the advance by declaring it 'tame.' The truth is—and that we discovered before, whilst tracing the steps of Scarlett—that the Greys had to pick their way as best they could through the impediments of the camp; and although Colonel Dalrymple White with the 2nd squadron of the Inniskillings had clear ground before him, he was too good an officer to allow the fiery troops he was leading to break from their alignment with the obstructed regiment on his left.

But when the Greys got clear of the camping-ground, both they and the Inniskilling squadron on their right began to gather pace; and when the whole line had settled into its gallop, there began to take effect that spontaneous change of structure which often attends cavalry charges, for the front rank began to spread out, and from time to time the rear-rank men, as opportunities offered, pushed forward into the openings thus made for them. This change was carried so far that in large portions of the line, if not through its whole extent, the two ranks which had begun the advance were converted by degrees into one. The 'three hundred,' whilst advancing as they did at first in two ranks, were enormously outflanked by the enemy, and it seems that from this circumstance men were instinctively led to give freer scope to the impulses which tended to a prolongation of front.

There was now but small space between our slender line

The Russian
horsemen be-
gan resorting
to firearms.

of 'three hundred' and the dark serried mass which had received their leader into its depths; and the Russian horsemen—so ill-generaled as to be still kept at the halt¹—began here and there firing their carbines. Colonel Griffith, commanding the Greys, was so struck, it seems, by a shot in the head as to be prevented from continuing to lead on his regiment.

The two squadron-leaders of the Greys were in their places; and of these Major Clarke, the leader of the right squadron, was the senior officer, but he did not yet know that he had acceded to the temporary command of the regiment, and continued to lead the right squadron.

Besides Major Clarke, thus leading the 1st squadron, and being in command of the regiment, the officers who now charged with the Greys were these:—Captain Williams led the 2nd squadron; Manley, Hunter, Buchanan, and Sutherland were the four troop-leaders of the regiment; the adjutant was Lieutenant Miller; the serre-files were Boyd, Nugent, and Lenox Prendergast. And to these, though he did not then hold the Queen's commission, I add the name of John Wilson, now a cornet and the acting adjutant of the regiment, for he took a signal part in the fight.

Besides Colonel Dalrymple White, who was present in person with this moiety of his Inniskillings, the officers who charged with this, the 2nd squadron of the regiment, were Major Manley, the leader of the squadron; Lieutenant Rawlinson, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Weir.

I believe that after General Scarlett and the three horsemen with him, who had already engulfed themselves in the dark sloping thicket of squadrons, the next man who rode into contact with the enemy's horse was Colonel Dalrymple White, the commander of the Inniskillings, and then acting in person in front of his second or left-hand squadron. Straight before him he had a part of the enemy's column so far from where Scarlett went in as to be altogether new ground (if so one may speak of a human mass), whilst, by casting a glance in the direction of his right front, he could see how enormously the enemy was there outflanking him; but he followed in the spirit with which Scarlett had led, and drove his way into the column.

¹ See foot-note *ante*, p. 443.

Whilst Major Clarke was leading in the right squadron of the Greys without knowing that he had acceded to the command of the regiment, an accident befell him, which might seem at first sight—and so indeed he himself apparently judged it—to be one of a very trivial kind, but it is evident that in its effect upon the question of his surviving or being slain it trebled the chances against him. Without being vicious, his charger, then known as the ‘Sultan,’ was liable to be maddened by the rapture of galloping squadrons, and it somehow resulted from the frenzy which seized on the horse that the rider got his bearskin displaced, and suffered it to fall to the ground. Well enough might it appear to the pious simplicity of those Russians troopers who saw the result, and not the accident which caused it, that the red-coated officer on the foremost gray horse rode visibly under the shelter of some Satanic charm, or else with some spell of the Church holding good, by the aid of strong faith, against acres upon acres of swords; for now, when Clarke made the last rush, and dug ‘Sultan’ through their ranks, he entered among them bare-headed.

The difference that there was in the temperaments of the two comrade regiments showed itself in the last moments of the onset. The Scots Greys gave no utterance except to a low, eager, fierce moan of rapture—the moan of outbursting desire. The Inniskillings went in with a cheer.

With a rolling prolongation of clangor which resulted from the bends of a line now deformed by its speed, the ‘three hundred’ crashed in upon the front of the column. They crashed in so weightily that no cavalry, extended in line and halted, could have withstood the shock if it had been able to shrink and fall back; but whatever might be their inclination, the front-rank men of the Russian column were debarred, as we saw, from all means of breaking away to the rear by the weight of their own serried squadrons sloping up the hillside close behind them; and it being too late for them to evade the concussion by a lateral flight, they had no choice—it was a cruel trial for cavalry to have to endure at the halt—they had no choice but to await and suffer the onslaught. On the other hand, it was certain that if the Russian hussar being halted should so plant and keep himself counter to his assailant as to be brought into diametric collision with the heavier man and the heavier horse of the Inniskillings or the Greys whilst charging direct at his front, he must and would be overborne. It might, therefore, be

The charge of
the three hun-
dred.

imagined that many of the troopers in the front rank of the Russian column would now be perforce overthrown, that numbers of our dragoons would in their turn be brought to the ground by that very obstacle—the obstacle of overturned horses and horsemen—which their onset seemed about to build up, and that far along the front of the column the field would be encumbered with a heap or bank of prostrated riders and chargers, where Russians would be struggling for extrication intermingled with Inniskillings or Greys. Such a result would apparently have been an evil one for the ‘three hundred,’ because it would have enabled the unshattered masses of the enemy to bring their numbers to bear against such of the redcoats as might still remain in their saddles.

It was not thus, however, that the charge wrought its effect. What had first been done by Scarlett and the three horsemen with him, what had next been done by Dalrymple White, and next by the squadron-leaders and other regimental officers whose place was in front of their men, that now, after more or less struggle, the whole of these charging ‘three hundred’ were enabled to achieve.

The result of their contact with the enemy was a phenomenon so much spoken of in the days of the old war against the French Empire, that it used to be then described by a peculiar but recognized phrase. Whether our people spoke with knowledge of fact, or whether they spoke in their pride, I do not here stay to question; but in describing the supposed issue of conflicts in which a mass of Continental soldiery was assailed by English troops extended in line, it used to be said of the foreigners that they ‘accepted the files.’¹ This meant, it seems, that instead of opposing his body to that of the islander with such rigid determination as to necessitate a front-to-front clash, and a front-to-front trial of weight and power, the foreigner who might be steadfast enough to keep his place in the foremost rank of the assailed mass would still be so far yielding as to let the intruder thrust past him and drive a way into the column.

Whatever was the foundation for this superb faith, the phrase, as above interpreted, represents with a singular exactness what the front rank of the Russian column now did.

¹ It was to infantry, I believe, that the words used to be applied; but it has been adjudged that they describe with military accuracy the reception which was given by the Russian column to Scarlett’s ‘three hundred.’ Lord Seaton—Colonel Colborne of the illustrious 52nd Regiment—was one of those who handed down the phrase to a later generation.

These horsemen could not fall back under the impact of the charge; and, on the other hand, they did not so plant themselves as to be each of them a directly opposing hindrance to an assailant. They found and took a third course. They 'accepted the files.' Here, there, and almost every where along the assailed part of the column, the troopers who stood in front rank so sidled and shrank that they suffered the Grey or the Inniskillinger to tear in between them with the license accorded to a cannon-ball which is seen to be coming, and must not be obstructed, but shunned. So, although, by their charge, these few horsemen could deliver no blow of such weight as to shake the depths of a column extending far up the hillside, they more or less shivered or sundered the front rank of the mass, and then, by dint of sheer wedge-work and fighting, they opened and cut their way in. It was in the nature of things that at some parts of the line the hindrance should be greater than at others.¹ but speaking in general terms, it can be said that, as Scarlett had led, so his first line righteously followed; and that, within a brief space from the moment of the first crash, the 'three hundred,' after more or less strife, were received into the enemy's column.

Lord Raglan was so rich in experience of the great times, and so gifted with the somewhat rare power of swiftly apprehending a combat, that he instantly saw the full purport, and even divined the sure issue, of what our dragoons were doing; but it was not without some dismay on the part of other English beholders, that Scarlett and his 'three hundred' were thus seen to bury themselves in the enemy's masses. And with every moment, the few thus engulfed in the many seemed nearer and nearer to extinction. For a while, indeed, the Inniskillinger and the Grey—the one by his burnished helmet, the other by the hue of his charger, and both by the red of their uniforms—could be so followed by the eye of the spectator as to be easily seen commingling with the dark-mantled masses around them; but the more the interfusion increased, the greater became the seeming oppressiveness of the disproportion between the few and the many; and soon this effect so increased, that if a man gazed from the heights of the Chersonese without the aid of a field-glass, he could

¹ Such hindrances must have chiefly occurred at spots where a few of our troopers may have chanced to be clumped together for some moments. Amidst all the stores of information on which I rely, I find no proof that any of our people were detained on the outside of the column by stress of combat.

hardly ward off a belief that the hundreds had been swamped in the thousands.

Yet all this while, General Scarlett and the 'three hundred' horsemen who had followed him into the column were not in such desperate condition as to be helplessly perishing in this thicket of lances and swords. If, indeed, they had faltered and hovered with uncertain step in the front of the great Russian column till it might please General Ryjoff to sound 'the trot,' they must have been crushed or dispersed by the descending weight of his masses; but our horsemen, by first charging home and then forcing their way into the heart of the column, had gained for themselves a strange kind of safety (or rather of comparative safety), in the very density of the squadrons which encompassed them. It is true that every man had to fight for his life, and that too with an industry which must not be suffered to flag; but still he fought under conditions which were not so overwhelmingly unfair as they seemed to be at first sight.

Scarlett's men, as we know, were 'heavy dragoons,' whilst the Russians were either hussars or troops of other denominations, ranging under the head of 'light cavalry;' but in the fight now about to be waged this difference was of less importance than might be imagined. The weight of our men and the weight of their horses had served them well in the charge; and even in the closely-locked combat of few against many to which they had now committed themselves, the red-coated troopers were likely to be advantaged by their greater height from the ground and the longer reach of their sword-arms; but in point of defensive accoutrements they were less protected than the light cavalry were with whom they had to contend. Except the helmets worn by the one squadron of the Inniskillings, the 'three hundred' had no sort of covering or accoutrement contrived for defense.¹ They were without their shoulder-scales, and even without their gauntlets. The Russians, on the other hand (with the exception of a very small proportion of them who wore and disclosed their pale-blue hussar jackets), were all encased in what was (for the purpose of this peculiar combat) a not inefficient suit of armor; for the thick, coarse, long gray outer-coat

¹ The bearskins of the Greys gave no doubt great protection, but can hardly be said to have been contrived for the purpose.

which they wore gave excellent protection against the cuts of an Englishman's sabre, and was not altogether incapable of even defeating a thrust;¹ whilst the shako was of such strength and quality as to be more effectual than a helmet against the edge of the sword.²

In such skill as is gained by the sword exercise, there was not perhaps much disparity between the combatants; but the practice of our service up to that time had failed to provide the troopers with those expedients of fence which he would be needing when assailed in the direction of his bridle-arm; and this of course was a somewhat imperiling defect for a horseman who had to combat in a crowd of enemies, and was liable to be attacked on all sides.

Though reckoned by thousands, and having for the moment no heavier task than that of overwhelming or shaking off somewhat less than three hundred assailants, the Russians were prevented from exerting the strength of their column by the very grossness of its numbers, formed up as they were on a limited space, and wedged into one compact mass. Still no one among the 'three hundred,' whether fighting in knots with others, or fighting all alone in the crowd, could fail to be under such actual stress of simultaneous assailants as to have to confide in his single right arm for all means of defense against numbers; and, upon the whole, it would seem that the mere physical conditions of the fight were largely in favor of the Russians; but in regard to the temper of the combatants, there were circumstances which tended to animate the few and to depress the many. Under conditions most trying to cavalry, the Russians evinced a degree of steadfastness not unworthy of a nation which was famous for the valor of its infantry; but kept as they had been at a halt, and condemned (in violation of the principles which govern the use of cavalry) to be passively awaiting the attack, it was impossible for them to be comparable in ardor, self-trust, and moral ascendant to horsemen exalted and impassioned by the rapture of the charge, and now in their towering pride riding this way and that with fierce shouts through the patient long-suffering mass.

¹ The edges of our men's sabres seemed to rebound from the loose thick gray cloth, and sometimes—I know one instance especially—the point of a sword thrust hard at a Russian thus clothed was bent back by the resistance it encountered.

² One day the Vicomte de Nöé and an English officer undertook to test the strength of a Russian shako; and the Vicomte declares that they were actually unable to cleave it with a hatchet.

In some parts of the column the combatants were so closely locked as to be almost unable, for a while, to give the least movement to their chargers; and whenever the red-coated horseman thus found himself inwedge and surrounded by assailants, it was only by the swift-circling 'moulinet,' by an almost ceaseless play of his sabre whirling round and round overhead, and by seizing now and then an occasion for a thrust or a cut, that he was able to keep himself among the living; but the horse, it seems, during these stationary fights, instinctively sought and found shelter for his head by bending it down, and leaving free scope for the sabres to circle and clash overhead. At other places—for the most part perhaps in those lanes of space which were constituted by the usual 'intervals' and 'distances' intersecting the mass—there was so much more freedom of movement that groups of as many as ten or twelve Russians who had fallen out of their ranks would be here and there seen devoting themselves to a common purpose by confederating themselves, as it were, against particular foes, and endeavoring to overwhelm the knot of two or three Greys or Iniskillingers which they deemed to be the most in their power. Where this occurred, the two or three redcoats, more or less separated from each other, would be seen striving to force their way through the masses before them, and attended on their flanks and in their rear by a band of assailants, who did not, most commonly, succeed in overpowering the tall horsemen, but persisted nevertheless in hanging upon them. Our troopers, thus encompassed, strove hard, as may well be supposed, to cut down the foes within reach; but in general the sabre seemed almost to rebound like a cudgel from the thick gray outer-coat of the Russian horseman; and, upon the whole, there was resulting as yet but little carnage from this singular example of a fight between a heavy column of halted cavalry and the knots of the taller horsemen who were riving it deeper and deeper.

With but few exceptions, the Scots Greys were of the race which the name of their regiment imports; and, from a conjuncture of circumstances which must needs be of rare occurrence in modern times, the descendants of the Covenanters had come upon an hour when troopers could once more be striving in that kind of close fight which marked the period of our religious wars—in that kind of close fight which withdraws the individual soldier from his fractional state of existence, and exalts him into a self-depending power. A Scots Grey, in the middle of our own century, might have no en-

raging cause to inflame him; but he was of the blood of those who are warriors by temperament, and not because of mere reasons. And he, too, had read his Bible. Men who saw the Scots Grey in this close fight of Scarlett's, travel out of humanity's range to find beings with which to compare him. His long-pent-up fire, as they say, had so burst forth as to turn him into a demon of warlike wrath; but it must not be inferred from such speech that he was under the power of that 'blood frenzy' of which we shall afterward see an example; and the truth can be satisfied by acknowledging that, as his fathers before him had ever been accustomed to rage in battle, so he too, in this later time, was seized and governed by the passion of fight. When numbers upon numbers of docile obedient Russians crowded round a Scot of this quality, and beset him on all sides, it did not of necessity result that they had the ascendant. Whilst his right arm was busy with the labor of sword against swords, he could so use his bridle-hand as to be fastening its grip upon the long-coated men of a milder race, and tearing them out of their saddles.

Engaged in this ceaseless toil of fighting for life, as well as for victory, the Greys and the Inniskillingers were hardly so self-conscious as to be afterward able to speak at all surely of the degree of confidence with which they maintained this singular combat of the few against many; but of those who observed from a distance, there was one who more swiftly and more surely than others could apprehend the features of a still pending conflict. Almost from the first, Lord Raglan perceived that our horsemen, though scant in numbers, and acting singly or in small knots, still showed signs of having dominion over the mass they had chosen to invade.¹ Whether the cause of this ascendant be traced to the greater height and longer reach of our horsemen, to the unspeakable advantage of being the assailants, to the inborn pride and warlike temperament of our men, or finally, to all these causes united, the actual result was that the redcoats, few as they were, seemed to ride through the crowd like sure tyrants. The demeanor of the Russian horsemen was not unlike what might have been expected. Gazing down as they did from a slope, even those who were not in the foremost ranks could see the exceeding scantiness of the force which had made bold to attack them, and accordingly they seemed to remain

¹ The conflict, Lord Raglan wrote, 'was never for a moment doubtful.'—*Public Dispatch*.

steady and free from alarms of the kind which seize upon masses; but still the individual trooper who chanced to be so placed in the column as to have to undergo the assaults of one of the Scots Greys or Inniskilling dragoons, seemed to own himself personally overmatched, and to meet the encounter almost hopelessly, like a brave man oppressed by the strong. Without apparently doubting—for there was no sign of panic—that overwhelming numbers must secure the general result, he yet found that, for the moment, those mere numbers could not give him the protection he needed, and he would so rein his charger, and so plant himself in his saddle, and so set his features, as to have the air of standing at bay. Of the objects surrounding our people whilst engaged in this closely-locked fight, none stamped themselves more vividly on their minds than those numberless cages of clenched teeth which met them wherever they looked.

From the time when the 'three hundred' had fairly closed with the enemy, there was but little recourse to carbine or pistol; and the movement of the horses within the column being necessarily slight, and on thick herbage, there resulted little sound from their tramp. The clash of sabres overhead had become so steady and ceaseless, and its sound so commingled with the jangle of cavalry accoutrements proceeding from thousands of horsemen, that upon the whole it was but little expressive of the numberless separate conflicts in which each man was holding to life with the strength of his own right arm.

In regard to the use men made of their voices, there was a marked difference between our people and the Russian horsemen. The islanders hurled out, whilst they fought, those blasts of malediction, by which many of our people in the act of hard striving are accustomed to evoke their full strength; whilst the Russians in general fought without using articulate words. Nor, instead, did they utter any truculent, theological yells of the kind which, some few days later, were destined to be heard on the battle-field. They had not, as yet, been sanctified. It was not till the 4th of November that the army of the Czar underwent that fell act of consecration which whetted his people for the morrow, and prepared those strange shrieks of doctrinal hate which were heard on the ridges of Inkerman. But although abstaining from articulate speech and from fierce yells, the gray-mantled horseman in general was not therefore mute. He sometimes evolved, whilst he fought, a deep, gurgling, long-drawn sound, close akin to an inchoate roar; or else—and

this last was the predominant utterance—a sustained and continuous ‘zizz,’ of the kind that is made with clenched teeth; and to the ears of those who were themselves engaged in the fight, the aggregate of the sounds coming thus from the mouths of the Russians was like that of some factory in busy England, where numberless wheels hum and buzz. And meanwhile, from those masses of Russian horsemen who stood ranged in such parts of the column as to be unable to engage in bodily combat, there rose a low murmur of that indefinite kind which attests the presence of a crowd without disclosing its humor. As heard on the edge of the Chersonese, a mile and a half toward the west, the collective roar which ascended from this thicket of intermixed combatants had the unity of sound which belongs to the moan of a distant sea.

If this struggle bore closer resemblance to the fights of earlier ages than to those of modern times, it had also the characteristic of being less destructive than might be imagined to life and limb. General Scarlett’s old Eton experience of what used to be there called a ‘rooge’ was perhaps of more worth to him than many a year of toil in the barrack-yard or the exercise-ground. Close wedged from the first in an enemy’s column, and on all sides hemmed in by the Russians, he was neither killed nor maimed, for the sabre which stove in his helmet was stopped before reaching his skull, and the only five wounds he received were, each of them, so slight as to be for the time altogether unheeded. By some chance, or possibly as a consequence of wearing a head-gear which announced the presence of a Staff-officer, Lieutenant Elliot, the aid-de-camp of the Brigadier, was beset with great determination by numbers gathering round him on all sides; and although his skill as a swordsman and the more than common length of his blade enabled him for a while to ward off the attacks of his many assailants, they at length closed about him so resolutely that it seemed hardly possible for a single horseman thus encompassed by numbers to defend himself many more moments; but at this very time, as it happened, his charger interposed in the combat.¹ The horse had become so angered by the pressure of the Russian troop-horses closing in upon his flanks and quarters, that, determining to resent these discourtesies, he began to lash out with his heels,

¹ If it had depended upon Elliot himself, I should never have heard of the circumstances here mentioned. He was an entire stranger to me, and it is to others that I owe the great advantage of having been brought into communication with him.

and this so viciously as not only to ward off attacks from the rear, but even in that direction to clear a space. There were four or five Russians, however, who resolutely addressed themselves to the task of extinguishing Elliot; and at a moment when he had somewhat overreached himself in returning the thrust of a Russian trooper—a man with blue-looking nose and a savage, glittering eye—he received a point in the forehead from his hideous adversary. At the same time, another of his assailants divided his face at the centre by a deep-slashing wound, whilst a third dealt a blow on the head which cut through his cocked-hat, and then by the sabre of yet a fourth assailant he was so heavily struck in the part of the skull behind the ear that, irrespectively of the mere wound inflicted by the edge of the weapon, his brain felt the weight of the blow.¹ There followed a period of unconsciousness, or rather, perhaps we should call it, a period erased from the memory, for Elliot remained in his saddle, and it is hard to say how he could have been saved if the effect of the blow had been so disabling as to prevent him from using his sword-arm. It is true, he was much hacked, having received altogether in this fight no less than fourteen sabre-cuts, but he lived nevertheless,—nay lived, I observe, to be returned as ‘slightly wounded,’ and to find that his name, though most warmly and persistently recommended by Scarlett, was kept out of the public dispatches.²

¹ The wound which divided his face was so well sewn up that it has not much marred his good looks.

² This resulted from a decision of Lord Lucan’s. Lord Lucan conceived it to be his duty to suppress Scarlett’s dispatch recommending Elliot’s services for official recognition, and to name only one of the cavalry aids-de-camp as amongst those who had ‘entitled themselves to the notice of the ‘Commander of the Forces;’ but—and now comes what to the uninitiated must seem almost incredible—the aid-de-camp whom Lord Lucan honored with this distinction in exclusion of Elliot and in defiance of Scarlett’s dispatch, was an officer (Lord Lucan’s first aid-de-camp) who, as it happened, had not had an opportunity of being in any of the cavalry charges. When I first became acquainted with this monstrous inversion, I believed that I could not do otherwise than ascribe it to Lord Lucan, and I resolved to comment upon his decision in the way which so gross a misfeasance would deserve if it were the act of a free agent. I suspend my determination in this respect, because farther inquiry has led me to apprehend that, if Lord Lucan had named the right man instead of the wrong one, he would have been regarded as outraging the custom of the service beyond all the measure of what any one not holding supreme command could be expected to attempt. Supposing that be so, Lord Lucan, of course, can not fairly be charged with more blame than other men of equal authority who continue a vicious practice without protesting against it; but if he, on this ground, is to be absolved, what is to be said of an army system which compels such a falsifi-

Of course, the incursion of the Brigadier and the three horsemen with him had more of the character of a 'forlorn hope' than could belong to the enterprise of the squadrons which followed him into the column; but, upon the whole, these combats of Scarlett's and his aid-de-camp were more or less samples of that war of the one against several which each of the 'three hundred' waged.

This close bodily fighting put so great and so ceaseless a strain upon the attention and the bodily power of the combatants, that, with some, it suspended to an extraordinary degree all care about self. Thus Clarke, for example, who had led on his squadron bare-headed, was so deeply cut on the skull by the edge of a sabre as to be startling to the eyes of others by the copious channel of blood which coursed down his head and neck; yet he himself, all the while, did not know he had received any wound. And along with this ennobling interruption of man's usual care after self, there was often a fanciful waywardness in his choice of the objects to which he inclined attention. Colonel Dalrymple White, for example, after riding alone, as we saw, into an untouched part of the column at the head of his second squadron, had received such a heavy sabre-cut on his helmet as cleaved down home to the skull; and although he remained altogether unconscious of the incident thus occurring to himself, he found his attention attracted and even interested by an object which did not concern him. He saw a fair-haired Russian lad of seventeen, enwrapped like the rest in the coarse heavy over-coat which was common to officers and men; and what seems to have interested him,—for he looked with the eyes of a man who cares much for questions of race—was the powerlessness of a leveling costume to disguise the true breed, and the certainty with which, as he thought, he could detect gentle blood under the common gray cloth of a trooper. 'He looked,' says Colonel White,—'he looked like an Eton boy.' The boy fought with great bravery; but it was well if he had no mother, for before the fight ended he fell, his youthful head cloven in two.

Though each man amongst the 'three hundred' was

cation? Well, what in such case would have to be said is this: that the military reputation of England is at the mercy of a Trade-Union, which compels people placed in authority to enforce its rules for the repression of excellence by official inversions of fact.

It may be worth while to add that Elliot could not be named for the Victoria Cross because what he did was no more, after all, than his duty. See in the Appendix papers relative to the exclusion of Elliot's name.

guided, of course, in his path by the exigencies of the particular combats in which he engaged, and though many besides were so locked in the column from time to time as to be able to make little progress, yet, upon the whole, the tendency of the assailants was to work their way counter to the ranks of the enemy's squadrons, and by degrees both Greys and Manley's squadron of Inniskillings pressed farther and farther in, till at length, it would seem, there were some who attained to the very rear of the column.¹ These did not, however, emerge into the open ground in rear of the column (where a line of the Cossacks stood ranged in open order), but preferred to keep back and remain fighting within the column, taking, each of them, such direction as best consisted with the exigencies of personal combat. Now it happened that, by this time, the Russians—though not perhaps even imagining the idea of retreat—had still so much followed their inclination to be hanging upon the flanks and the quarters of every Scots Grey whilst advancing, that very many of them now faced toward their rear, and from this cause apparently it resulted that in seeking, as he naturally would, to be front to front with those who were most keenly besetting him, many a Scots Grey who had cut his road through from the front to the rear of the column, now found himself busied in once more riving the column, but riving it in the opposite direction. Whatever the cause, it is certain that there set in, as it were, a back eddy, and that the Greys for the most part were now cleaving the mass of their foes by a movement in the direction of the Russian front. There was a change, however, in the demeanor of the Greys, for whereas in the earlier moments of the fight they had seemed to be altogether intent upon slaughter, they now wore the more careless aspect of men who had proved their ascendant.

But although in reality this back current of the Greys formed an actual continuation of their attack, it was still, in the literal sense of the term, a retrograde movement; and toward the proper left of the column where Manley's squadron of the Inniskillings was fighting, men could more or less see the direction in which the Greys moved, without perceiving the circumstances which governed their course. The sight of a number of the Greys in apparent retreat was not the only cause which now tended to overcast hope.

The great Russian column was proving that, notwithstand-

¹ This rests rather upon the observation of men who gazed from above than upon the distinct assertion of combatants who had penetrated thus far.

ing the mismanagement which had exposed it whilst halted to the almost insulting attack of three squadrons, it still was of too firm a quality to be all at once disintegrated and brought to ruin by the incursion of the small groups of the redcoats who were riving it in opposite directions; and it now began to seem likely that in this conflict of three hundred against a column numbered by thousands, mere time might govern the issue by lessening every minute the relative power of the few. At this juncture also the huge and dense Russian mass began to enforce a sense of the power that there is, after all, in the mere weight of numbers; for—without by this movement appearing to disclose any weakness—the column now swayed to and fro, and swayed so mightily as to make a man own himself helpless against the bodily weight of a crowd which could rock him one way or the other against all the strength of his will.

So although the 'three hundred' still toiled at their work of close fighting with a strength of resolve which knew no abatement, there yet were some of their numbers—and that, perhaps, amongst those most gifted with warlike instinct—who hardly now suffered themselves to imagine that the enterprise of the three squadrons which had forced their way into the heart of this column (without having brought it to ruin by the shock of their up-hill charge) could be wrought, after all, into a victory by dint of mere personal combats with vastly outnumbering horsemen.

Whilst this was the state of the fight as it seemed to men locked in close strife, there were, all at once, heard British cheers sounding in from outside of the column, sounding in from one quarter first, but then almost instantly from another, and close followed by a new kind of uproar. Presently, from the south-east there sounded the shout of a squadron which Inniskilling men knew how to recognize, and with it a crash—a crash prolonged for some moments—in the direction of the Russian left front. Then, and from the same quarter, there broke out the roar of fresh tumult which was unlike the din of the fight going on in the midst of the column, and had rather the sound of such combat as might be waged by armed horsemen when not closely locked. The column, which every moment had been more and more heavily swaying, now heaved itself up the hillside, and this time without being commensurately lifted back, as before, by the reaction of the moving power.

But the time has now come for observing the manœuvres of those two deployed Russian wings which, on the right

hand as well as the left, prolonged the front ranks of the column.

At the time when Scarlett's 'three hundred,' after closing upon the front of the column, had hardly done more than begin their labor of man-to-man fighting, the commander of the Russian cavalry made bold to undertake one of those new manœuvres for which the peculiar structure of his winged column is supposed to have been specially fashioned. Remembering, it would seem, the teachings of St. Petersburg, he resolved to surround the three squadrons which were charging through the front of his column, and enfold them in the hug of the bear. Therefore on the right hand and on the left, the wings or fore-arms which grew out from the huge massive trunk began to wheel, each of them, inward.

There was many an English spectator who watched this phase of the combat with a singular awe, and long remembered the pang that he felt when he lost sight of Scarlett's 'three hundred.' To such a one the dark-mantled squadrons overcasting his sight of the redcoats were as seas where a ship has gone down, were as earth closing over a grave. One of the ablest of our Light-Cavalry officers has striven to record the feelings with which he looked down on this part of the fight:—'How can such a handful resist, much more make way through, such a legion? Their huge flanks overlap them, and almost hide them from our view. They are surrounded, and must be annihilated. One can hardly breathe!'

Yet if any observer, thus trembling for the fate of Scarlett's 'three hundred,' had had his gaze less closely riveted to one spot, he would have seen that however desperate might be the condition of this small body of horsemen, now seemingly lost in gross numbers, there was no fresh ground for alarm in this singular manœuvre of the Russian cavalry. General Scarlett had attacked the great column with so small a proportion of his brigade, that, when the 'three hundred' had engulfed themselves in the column, there still remained four distinct bodies of Heavy Dragoons (consisting altogether of seven squadrons), which, sooner or later, the English might bring to bear upon all the fresh exigencies of the combat; and it is plain that to some, nay, to most, of these seven squadrons, the enemy's in-wheeling flanks were offering no common occasion. On the other hand, the Russians, notwithstanding their great

The manœuvres of the two Russian wings.

The circumstances under which they were attempted.

numerical strength, had so committed themselves to the plan of acting in mass as to be virtually without 'supports;' for although, as we saw, there was a part of the force which at first had been placed some way in rear of the main body, the distance was shortened in the course of the advance down the slope; and after the halt of the main column, the supporting force so closed down upon it as virtually to destroy the separation between the two bodies, and to merge them in one cumbrous mass.

The seven squadrons of which we just spoke constituted the forces now preparing to act in support, which Lord Lucan, by his personal directions, might still endeavor to wield. He was on the ground from which the Greys had advanced when beginning their attack. Already he had dispatched an order directing Colonel Hodge to charge with the 4th Dragoon Guards,¹ and he states that by voice and by gesture—for at the moment he had no aid-de-camp at hand—he tried to enforce the instant advance of a regiment on his left rear; but he adds that nevertheless that regiment remained obstinately halted.² Lord Lucan did not give any

¹ And unless Lord Lucan's memory deceives him, the order was to charge the enemy's column *on its right flank*. I should have so stated it in the text, if it were not that the officer (not Colonel Hodge) who *received* the order describes it as merely this:—'Lord Lucan desires him' (Colonel Hodge) 'to charge at once with the 4th Dragoon Guards.' I think, however, that Lord Lucan's impression of what he said is probably quite accurate; and indeed it would seem that his version of the order which he *gave* may be reconciled with this account of the terms in which it was *delivered*, because, as we shall see, the position which had been already taken up by the regiment made it obvious without words that the column, if attacked by the 4th Dragoon Guards, must be attacked in flank. See *post*, page 466.

² With equal confidence he declares that the regiment thus appealed to was the 1st Dragoons, the regiment we call the Royals. The statements submitted to my consideration oblige me to believe him mistaken; but he was the commander of the division to which the Royals belonged, and he manfully gave effect to his impression by acts of a decisive kind—by acts of which one, at the least, was public. These are circumstances which make it right for me to acknowledge beforehand that what I shall by and by say of the final advance of the Royals is unsanctioned by Lord Lucan's dispatch, and diametrically opposed to the impression which his mind has received. With the exception of the Greys, there was nothing in the uniforms of our Heavy Dragoon regiments, as worn on this day, which would enable a spectator at a distance of many paces to distinguish one from another. I at first felt embarrassed by the prospect of being compelled by evidence to reject the firm persuasion of the Divisional General, who was present in person and an actor in the scene; but I ultimately ascertained that he was mistaken in re-

other directions to the squadrons constituting his second line. Becoming apparently impatient to push on to the front, he ultimately rode up by our right to the (proper) left flank of the Russian column.

We knew that from the first, three squadrons¹ of the Heavy Brigade had been preparing to second the onslaught of Scarlett's 'three hundred;' but at the moment of Scarlett's attack two more of his regiments were approaching the scene of the fight; and in speaking successively, as I am now going to do, of some movements or attacks which were executed by the 4th Dragoon Guards, by the Royals, by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and by Captain Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings, I pass simply, for the present, from our left to our right, without intending to represent that these nearly simultaneous operations took place, one after another, in that very order of time which would correspond with the order of narration.

The 4th Dragoon Guards had not yet established itself on the ground pointed out by Lord Raglan's first order, when Colonel Hodge, its commander, became aware of the enemy's advance, and knew that his corps was to follow the squadrons which had already marched with Scarlett. He at once moved off in open column of troops, and the subsequent exigencies of the combat give an interest to the fact that he marched 'left in front.'

Besides Lieutenant-Colonel Hodge, its commander, the officers of this regiment were Major Forrest, Captain Forster, Captain M'Creagh, Captain Webb, Captain Robertson, and four subalterns; namely, M'Donnel, Fisher, Muttlebury, and Deane.

Whilst the regiment was clearing the south of the vineyard, it all at once came in sight of the vast dusky column of Russian cavalry now streaked by the incursions of the redcoats. Indeed, those who looked from beneath were so favored by the slope of the ground on which the column stood ranged, that from where he now rode with the 1st squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards, Captain Forster was able to see

gard to the identity of the force which stood on his right after Scarlett's final advance, and that the correction of this error would so dislocate his account of what he saw in the direction of his left rear as to remove a main part of the difficulty that I had felt.

¹ Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings and the two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards.

General Scarlett—he could distinguish him by the blue frock-coat and the glittering helmet—still fighting in the midst of the column, and some way in front of his men.

The men of the 4th Dragoon Guards had been advancing with their swords in their scabbards;¹ but at sight of a combat going on, though they still were divided from it by a distance of some hundreds of yards, the men instinctively drew. In exact accordance with the design of Lord Lucan, Colonel Hodge at once determined to attack the column in flank.² As soon as he had cleared the south of the vineyard he changed direction; and, despite the close presence of the enemy, he boldly continued to advance in what may be called marching order; for, still keeping his regiment in open column of troops, he began to move up the hillside by the somewhat narrow space that there was between the easternmost fence of the vineyard and the (proper) right flank of the column. He said to Captain Forster, who commanded his right squadron, 'Forster, I am going on with the left squadron. As soon as your squadron gets clear of the vineyard, front, form, and charge.' Hodge went on in person with his left squadron; and soon, both that and Forster's squadron were wheeled and formed up with their front toward the enemy's right flank. The operation by which the whole regiment thus fronted to its right with each squadron at once in its place, was made easy and quick by the circumstance that it had been moving 'left in front.'

The enemy made a hasty endeavor to cover the flank thus threatened by an evolution from the rear of his masses; but the troops which he moved for the purpose were too late to complete their manœuvre, and Colonel Hodge had the satisfaction of seeing that although Russian horsemen engaged in this attempt were interposing themselves between him and the flank of the column, they might be struck in the midst of their effort by the charge of his 4th Dragoon Guards.

In the days of his boyhood when Hodge steered the 'Victory,' there used to be a terse order which readily came to his lips as often as the boat crossed the river; and now when he had come to be so favored by Fortune as to find himself at the head of his regiment with no more than a convenient reach of fair galloping ground between him and the flank of the enemy's column, the remainder of the business before

¹ Colonel Hodge, I believe, had a theory that the practice of marching with drawn swords was only fitted for peace-time.

² I do not say *in obedience* to the order, because I can not undertake to say that it had yet been received.

him was exactly of such kind as to be expressed by his old Eton word of command. What yet had to be done could be compassed in the syllables of:—‘Hard all across.’¹

For bringing under one view the several positions from which the Russian column was destined to be assailed by our supports, it was convenient to begin with the regiment on our extreme left; but it must be understood that these movements of the 4th Dragoon Guards took place at a time somewhat later than that which might appear to be assigned to them by the order they have in the narrative.

The Royals had received no order to leave their position under the steepes of the Chersonese;² but from the ground where the regiment stood posted, the preparations for the then impending fight could be easily seen; and apparently it was assumed that the fact of the regiment being left without orders must have sprung from mistake. At all events, the Royals moved rapidly off toward the scene of the combat.

In its approach to the scene of the fight, this regiment was coming on past the south of the vineyard when Scarlett’s ‘three hundred,’ having already delivered their charge, and being part buried in the column, the right wing of the enemy was all at once seen by the Royals to be folding inward, as though it would envelop the Greys. The sight of the enemy’s cavalry deliberately wheeling in upon the rear of a British regiment, kindled so vehement a zeal in the hearts of the Royals, and so eager a desire to press instantly forward to the rescue, that there was no ceremonious preparation for a charge. A voice cried out, ‘By God, the Greys are cut off! Gallop! gallop!’ Then there broke from the Royals a cheer. Their trumpets sounded the gallop, and without for a moment halting, but endeavoring to ‘form line ‘on the move,’ the regiment sprang hastily forward. Indeed, the movement of the first or right squadron was so rapid that the left squadron could not perfectly come up with it, and the regiment made its attack in short echelon of squadrons. In this order, but with its ranks imperfectly formed, the regiment advanced at a gallop against the right

¹ The direction given by the steerer to the crew of an Eton longboat when about to cross the river.

² The brigade comprised *ten* squadrons, whilst Lord Raglan’s order for the movement toward Kadiköi extended to only *eight*. This difference, I take it, was the cause of the Royals having been left without orders; but the emergency created by the sudden appearance of the Russian cavalry was regarded as a full warrant for the movement.

flank and rear of the in-wheeling line. In spite of this onset, the Russian wing continued its wheeling movement so long as to become defenseless on its extreme right. At the near approach of the Royals, that outer part of the wheeling line which was the most immediately exposed to its assailants broke off from the rest; and then the horsemen who had composed it were either flying or involved in confusion, or else—for several of the Russian hussars made bold to do thus—were valorously advancing and making their way round the flank of the advancing English; but meanwhile, by all this confusion, the inner or left remnant of the Russian wing was so far covered from the attack, and even, it would seem, from the sight of the Royals, that it went on with the execution of the orders received, and continued to wheel inward.

The English regiment carried on its attack to a point at which it was just brought into contact with the broken extremity of the enemy's deployed line; and a few sabre-cuts were exchanged;¹ but farther than this the Royals did not push their advantage; for the discomfiture of a part of the wing did not visibly involve the great column; and considering the disordered state of the regiment, Colonel Yorke judged it prudent to rally his men before they were thrown into contact with a huge mass of troops still preserving their thickest formation. Accordingly, and at a time when only a few of its pursuing troopers had as yet ridden in amongst the retreating horsemen, the regiment was halted and ordered to re-form.

Besides Colonel Yorke, who commanded the regiment, the officers present with the Royals at the time of its re-forming were Major Wardlaw,² Captain Elmsall, Captain George Campbell, Captain Stocks; and the following subalterns—namely, Pepys, Charlton, Basset, Glyn, Coney, George Robertson, Hartopp, and Sandeman.

An exploit performed at this time was observed with some

¹ Of the Royals I understand two were there wounded, of whom one was Sergeant Pattenden.

² Major Wardlaw (now Colonel Wardlaw, the officer now commanding the regiment), though suffering from illness, had found strength enough to enable him to be with the regiment in the earlier part of the day, but afterward his sickness increasing, he had been forced to go back to camp. Afterward, whilst sitting or lying down outside his tent-door, he saw our Heavy Dragoons with the enemy in their front, and then instantly mounting his charger (which he had caused to be kept saddled with a view to such a contingency), he found means to reach the scene of conflict at the time when the regiment was re-forming.

interest by numbers of the Light Brigade men, then gazing down at the fight. Troop-sergeant-major Norris of the Royals, having been separated by a mischance from his regiment, was a little in rear of it, and hastening to overtake his comrades, when he found himself beset on open ground by four Russian hussars, who must have ridden past the flank of our people. Norris, however, though having to act alone against four, found means to kill one of his assailants, to drive off the rest, and to capture the charger of the slain man.

Farther toward our right, and so placed as to be in support to the Greys, though somewhat outflanking their left, there stood the 5th Dragoon Guards. It was commanded by Captain Desart Burton; and the rest of the officers then acting with the corps were Captain Newport Campbell, Captain Inglis, Lieutenant Halford, Lieutenant Swinfen, Lieutenant Temple Godman (the adjutant of the regiment), Cornet Montgomery, Cornet Neville, Cornet Ferguson, and Cornet Hampton. The regiment had at length been formed up in line; but its two squadrons were in inverted order, the first being on the left, and the second on the right. For a moment there seemed to be a question whether it might not be prudent to transpose the squadrons into their respective places, but the pressure of time was too cogent to allow of long ceremony; and, without first correcting its order of formation, the regiment moved forward. It had to pass over ground much obstructed by remnants of the Light Brigade camp; Captain Campbell's charger, for instance, was overthrown by a picket-rope which crossed his line of advance; and I believe that, though Neville owed his mortal wound to the lance of a Cossack, he had first been brought to the ground by one of these camp obstructions.

At this time, the inner, and still unbroken part of the enemy's right wing had already wheeled in over an arc represented by an angle of nearly sixty degrees; and, strange as the statement may seem, there still is sound proof of the fact that the obedient Muscovite troopers continued thus to wheel inward till they had come to be obliquely in front of the column, and with their backs toward our 5th Dragoon Guards. It is true that amongst these wondrously submissive horsemen there were some who so far fronted as to find means of hastily using their carbines against our people; but it seems to be established that a portion, at least, of the in-wheeling line did really suffer itself to be charged in rear by our 5th Dragoon Guards. It could not but be that many of the Russians would be cut down or unhorsed when the

English regiment charged in, as it did, amongst troopers thus rendered defenseless by the nature of their own manœuvre; but, on the other hand, very many were protected from the edge of the sword—nay even, indeed, from its point—by the thickness of their long, ample coats; and, upon the whole, there were numbers of horsemen, some English, some Russian, who thronged up against that part of the column where the Scots Greys were eddying back; so that Russians belonging to the column, and Russians belonging to the right wing, and men of the Scots Greys and men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, were here forced and crowded together in one indiscriminate melley.¹ Nor were these the only components of the crowd. Men of the same brigade, but having tasks assigned them elsewhere, broke away from their duties in camp, and—some of them on invalid chargers—found means to gallop up into the fight. Amongst these, two regimental butchers, each busy with his sword, were conspicuous because of their shirt-sleeves. Moreover, there could be seen here and there a man of the Light Brigade, who, for sake of the strife, had stolen away from his regiment, and was mingled with the rest of the combatants.

And, at the part of the column thus assailed by the 5th Dragoon Guards, there was a change in the bearing of the combatants—a change brought about, it would seem, by exceeding weariness of the sword-arm, but in part too by another cause. After three or four minutes of a new experience, it proved that a man could grow accustomed, as it were, to the condition of being in a throng of assailants, and take his revel of battle in a spirit as fond as at the beginning, yet by this time less anxious, less fierce, less diligent. Those truculent Scots, who had cut their way in without speaking, were now, whilst they fought, hurraing. The din of sheer fighting had swelled into the roar of a tumult.

Alexander Miller, the acting Adjutant of the Greys, was famous in his regiment for the mighty volume of sound which he drove through the air when he gave the word of command.² Over all the clangor of

The melley that was formed in the part of the column attacked by the 5th Dragoon Guards.

Change in the bearing of the combatants.

Efforts made to rally the Greys.

¹ In strictness, perhaps, this word should be spelled 'mesley,' or 'masly' (not 'medley,' a word from another root), but I follow the mode which obtains in 'pell-mell.' The word is so familiar to Englishmen of different classes of life, and so well derived from old French, that there is no reason for allowing it to be supplanted by any such mincing substitute as 'mêlée.'

² I dare not speak of the distance at which, as I learn, his voice could

arms, and all the multitudinous uproar, his single voice got dominion. It thundered out, 'Rally!' Then, still louder, it thundered, 'The Greys!'¹

The Adjutant, as it chanced, was so mounted that his vast, superb form rose high over the men of even his own regiment, and rose higher still over the throng of the Russians. Seized at once by the mighty sound, and turning to whence it came, numbers of the Scots saw their towering Adjutant with his reeking sword high in the air, and again they heard him cry, 'Rally!'—again hurl his voice at 'The Greys!'

He did not speak in mere vehemence, like one who, although he cry 'Rally!' means only a war-cry or cheer. He spoke as an officer delivering the word of command. But to rally?—the Greys to rally? It well might seem a desperate task to attempt what troops call a 'rally' in the midst of the enemy's thickset squadrons, but the greater height of the Scots Greys and their chargers as compared with the invaded mass, made it possible for the taller horsemen, now seeing one of their officers, and hearing his word of command, to begin to act together. And, the notion of using the lessons of the barrack-yard in the midst of the Russian host was carried yet farther. When troop-officers are forming and dressing a line they, of course, front toward their men; and since it was difficult for a man in the melley to know which might be the front, and which might be the rear, there was the more need of guidance. The Adjutant deliberately fronted down the slope in the direction by which the Russians had advanced, and threw into his closing monosyllable the giant strength of his voice when he shouted, 'Face—me!' By many of the men of his regiment he was seen. By many more he was heard. And now, also, on the right of the Adjutant, the young Cornet Prendergast, raised high above the ground by the great height of his charger, and on the other side Clarke, the leader of the 1st squadron—Clarke still rode bare-headed and streaming with blood—could be seen with their swords in the air, undertaking to rally the Greys. Men under this guidance tried to gather together the best way they could in a throng; and, by facing toward the Adjutant (as the thunder of his voice had enjoined), they began to show the rudiments of a front.

make itself heard, but I may so far venture as to say that the distance was such as to be computed by the mile.

¹ It seems that, even when this regiment is addressed in the vocative case, it is customary to retain the definite article, and address it as 'The Greys.'

When Scarlett dispatched his Brigade-Major, with orders to bring up some troops which might more or less confront the vastly outflanking strength of the enemy's left, he supposed that Major Conolly would have to execute this order by riding back in search of the 4th Dragoon Guards or the Royals; and it was not without pain that he thought himself compelled thus to exile a gifted cavalry officer from the fight during several critical minutes. Major Conolly, however, found means to see the object of the order attained without losing his share of the combat; for, glancing in that direction opposite to the Russian left in which it was judged to be of vital need to have an English force posted, he saw, and saw with great joy, that one of the red squadrons was already there. Quickly reaching the force, he found that it was the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings, commanded by Captain Hunt, who, however, was under the orders of Major Shute, the field-officer then present with this part of the regiment. Conolly was instantly sure that, under the direction of these officers, the squadron would be so wielded as to do all that was possible toward the execution of Scarlett's wish, and he at once determined to act with it in the approaching fight.

With the exception of its leader no captain was present with this squadron, and only one subaltern—namely, Lieutenant Wheateroff, who commanded one of the troops. The other troop was commanded by a non-commissioned officer—that is, by the troop sergeant-major.¹

Major Shute was an officer of a high order of ability, and Captain Hunt, the squadron-leader, had not only prowess of that quiet and resolute kind which most inspires trust and devotion, but had also that priceless qualification for the wielding of cavalry which is gained by experience of war.

At the moment of the surprise, as we know, this squadron of the Inniskillings had been farther advanced on the road toward Kadiköi than any other of Scarlett's troops; and it resulted that the position of the squadron at the time when the 'three hundred' had wheeled into line, was in the direction of Scarlett's right rear. The squad-

The order given by Scarlett to Major Conolly.

Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings.

The officers present with the squadron.

Major Shute.
Captain Hunt.

Position of the squadron.

¹ I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the name of this non-commissioned officer. If he is alive, and chances to see this, he will perhaps supply the blank.

ron was so placed as to be fronting, not full, but obliquely toward the enemy's left flank.

When the Russian left wing had not only disclosed the intent to wheel inward, but even had effected good progress in the execution of the manœuvre, Major Shute ordered Hunt to charge it.

Free from the camp impediments which had obstructed the charge of Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings. Scarlett's 'three hundred,' and afterward the 5th Dragoon Guards, the interval which divided this squadron of the Inniskillings from the enemy was all good galloping ground, and Hunt moving forward at the head of his squadron, and then rapidly increasing, and still increasing, its swiftness, attained, before the moment of impact, to a full charging pace. The roar of the fight going on was calculated to overlay other sounds, and the thick, stiff elastic herbage which clothed the soil, was well enough fitted to muffle to the utmost the tramp of horses; but even after giving full weight to these circumstances, it is scarce possible to hear of what happened without more or less of astonishment.

The troops of the Russian left wing had not only continued their in-wheeling movement, but had carried the manœuvre so far that, at the moment of the impact, they had their backs turned toward the squadron which charged them. Piercing their line like an arrow, Captain Hunt shot through it, and was followed in the next instant by the squadron behind him, which came crashing on upon the rear of the wheeling horsemen, consigning some to slaughter, and driving in the rest of them, a helpless, unresisting throng, upon the front of the column. So swift and so weighty had been the charge that, if so one may say, it welded men into a mass. Of the tightness with which horsemen were locked in the melley, some idea may be formed if I say that, when Conolly found his arms laden and weighed down by the dead body of a Russian trooper which had fallen across them, he was for some time prevented from casting off his unwelcome burthen by the density and close pressure of the throng which encompassed him on all sides. But although in this melley, a horseman, of his own will, could not alter his relative place, yet that throng, of which he had come to be for the moment an almost passive component, was not altogether motionless. It heaved; and, this time, as has been already learned—for we come once again to a moment before spoken of—the swaying of the mass which before had been to and fro, was perceptibly in the up-hill direction—in the

direction that had been given it (as some imagined) by the impact of Captain Hunt's charge, and the weight of the fugitive troops driven in upon the front of the column. It would seem, therefore—for otherwise the swaying of the mass in an up-hill direction could hardly have gone on so continuously—that already the pressure of the squadrons which formed the centre and rear of the column must have been loosening.

And this might well be; for in another quarter, the attack of the 4th Dragoon Guards was now taking effect. Captain Forster, with the right squadron of the regiment, had already charged into the melley which was gathered on the right flank of the column; whilst farther up the hillside, but acting in the same direction against the enemy's right flank, Colonel Hodge, having charged in person at the head of the left squadron of his regiment, and having burst his way into the column, was driving fast through it from flank to flank—driving through it without losing men—and so faithfully working out the old precept of 'hard all across!' as to be already on the point of emerging from the mass of the Russian cavalry at a spot opposite to the one by which he had entered it.

Seeing that the column through which Hodge thus rended his way had been pierced and riven from the first by Scarlett's 'three hundred,' that already it had been brought to such a condition as to allow of the 4th Dragoon Guards cutting through it without getting harmed, and that both its huge wings had been shattered and driven in confusedly upon its front and flanks by the Royals, by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and finally by Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings, it would be rash to assign to the attack of any one corps the change which now supervened; but, whatever the cause, that resistance to all rearward movement which had long been exerted by the enemy's deep-serried squadrons now began to relax. Less and less obstructed, and less closely locked than before, the melley or throng that had been jammed into a closely-locked mass by the last charge of the Inniskillings continued to heave slowly upward against the slope of the hill. Presently the Russians who had hitherto

The breaking of the column. maintained their array caused or suffered their horses to back a little. The movement was slight, but close followed by surer signs. The ranks visibly loosened. In the next instant, the whole column was breaking.

Retreat of the whole body. In the next, all the horsemen composing it had dispersed into one immense herd, and—still hang-

ing together as closely as they could without hindrance to their flight—were galloping up the hillside and retreating by the way they had come.

Nearly at the moment when the column began to break, General Scarlett had at length cut his way through it. He had entered it, as we know, at the centre of its front, and at the head of the Greys. The part of the column from which he emerged was its left flank; and those of his people whom he then had the nearest to him were men of the Inniskilling Dragoons.

We saw that even during the fight, and whilst still involved in the throng, the Scots Greys had endeavored to rally; and some way to their left, but in the same alignment, the Royals (having numbers of men of other regiments intermixed with their squadrons) were still re-forming their ranks; but no other part of our Heavy Brigade had even attempted as yet to recover its state of formation; and as it was inferred that the enemy might have some force on the other slope of the ridge which would be ready to act in support, our officers were more eager to rally their scattered troopers than to encourage pursuit. Indeed almost at the instant of emerging from the depths of the column—he came out of it panting and vehement as though fresh from violent bodily effort¹—Colonel Hodge had laid his commands on the two first trumpeters he could see, and caused them to sound the rally.

Notwithstanding this desire to effect a rally at once, many of our dragoons pursued the retreating enemy for some distance, but not with their strength in such a state of coherence as to be able to make the victory signal by extensive destruction or capture of prisoners; and being happily under good control, they were checked and brought to a halt before coming under the fire which awaited them from the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.

The troop of horse-artillery which accompanied the Light Brigade had by this time some pieces in battery which discharged a few shots at the retreating horsemen; and under the special directions of Sir Colin Campbell, a like fire was directed against them from two of Baker's guns.

It seems that in this singular combat our Heavy Dragoons

¹ Lord Lucan, who, as we saw, had ridden up by the (proper) left flank of the Russian column, saw Hodge in the act of coming out from it. He also saw General Scarlett emerge.

Results of the fight between the Russian cavalry and Scarlett's Brigade.

had 78 killed and wounded—the Russians a much larger number;¹ but it is not by counting the mere losses on either side that this cavalry fight can be judged. On the one hand, our troopers had so great an advantage from their longer, more commanding reach, and on the other, the Russians were so well protected by their shakos and their heavy gray coats, that the carnage resulting from the actual fight bore no proportion to the scale, the closeness, and the obstinacy of the conflict; but also, for want of the mere slaughtering and capturing power that can be exerted in pursuit by squadrons which are not in a state of dispersion, the English dragoons were prevented from conveying to the world any adequate notion of the victory they had gained. When they had been rallied and re-formed, they not only disclosed no abounding exultation, but even evinced a sense of disappointment which bordered on anger. The men found that at the close of what had seemed to them a life-and-death struggle, the enemy had at last been enabled to gallop off without sustaining grave loss, and their inference was that they had been fighting almost in vain. They were mistaken. Without having wrought a great slaughter or captured a host of prisoners, they had gained so great an ascendant that of all the vast body which is known to have been opposed to them there was hardly one squadron which afterward proved willing to keep its ground upon the approach of English cavalry.

The admiration excited by the exploit of Scarlett's Brigade.

But if the men of our Heavy Brigade were themselves ill content on account of the seeming barrenness of their victory, it was otherwise with the spectators who had witnessed the fight—who had seen the few wrestling with the many and finally gaining the day. The admiration with which the French had watched the fight was expressed by them with a generous enthusiasm. 'It was truly magnificent'—so spoke a French general officer who had witnessed the fight—'it was truly magnificent; and to me who could see the enormous numbers opposed to you, the whole valley being filled with Russian

¹ I have no sufficient means of giving the losses which the Russians sustained in this fight. I can say, however, that (according to General de Todleben) the whole loss which the Russians sustained in the battle was 550, and that, according to Liprandi, their loss in infantry was comparatively small, their loss in cavalry heavy. I may add, that their loss in cavalry, whatever it was, must have resulted almost entirely from their fight with our Heavy Dragoons.

‘cavalry, the victory of the Heavy Brigade was the most ‘glorious thing I ever saw.’ The moment the Russian column was seen to be broken, our dragoons were greeted from afar by a cheer from the 93rd Highlanders; and before the Brigade had completed its rally, Sir Colin Campbell galloped up. When he had come close to the Greys, he uncovered and spoke to the regiment. ‘Greys! gallant Greys!’ he said, according to one of the versions, ‘I am sixty-one years ‘old, and if I were young again I should be proud to be in ‘your ranks.’ Afterward, accosting Lord Lucan, he declared to him that the oldest officer could not have done better. The French sent to Lord Lucan their tribute of enthusiastic admiration; and an aid-de-camp came down from Lord Raglan with two gracious syllables for Scarlett conveyed in the message, ‘Well done!’

The congratulation addressed to General Scarlett by Lord Raglan.

Supposing that General Ryjoff was properly obeyed, it would seem that he became chargeable with several grave errors, and in particular,—

Comments upon the fight.

1st, For massing his squadrons in such a way as to be virtually fighting without any force detached from his first line—in other words, without any ‘supports.’

2nd, For his halt.

3rd, For attempting and continuing the wheeling movement of his deployed wings in the face of the English ‘supports.’

Anterior to the actual bodily fighting, there was a phase of the engagement which seems to be deserving of remembrance. I speak of the moments when the Russian column of horse, with all its vast weight, was moving down the hillside against Scarlett’s few horsemen, then suddenly caught in their march, and hastening under great stress of time to prepare a front for the enemy. The admirable composure then evinced by our people of all ranks must have been seen by the enemy, and perhaps may have governed the issue, by inducing him to come to a halt.

A commander of horse, in general, is accustomed to seek his victory by gathering a great momentum, and directing the force of his onset against some object more or less fragile—as, for example, against a body of infantry drawn up in a hollow square; but these were not the conditions under which Scarlett had to attack; and accordingly, his feat has

¹ Colonel (now General) Beatson was the officer to whom the French general—I can not at this moment give his name—addressed the above words.

hardly supplied a good instance of what men commonly mean when they speak of a cavalry charge. On the contrary, the physical impossibility of overthrowing the enemy by the mere shock of a cavalry charge was the very circumstance which gave to this fight its peculiar splendor. When Scarlett rode straight at the centre of a hanging thicket of sabres and lances which not only outflanked him enormously on his right hand as well as his left, but confronted him too with the blackness of squadrons upon squadrons in mass, he did not of course imagine that by any mere impact of his too scanty line he could shake the depths of a column extending far up the hillside; but he thought he might cleave his way in, and he knew that his people would follow him. He survived the enterprise, and even proved to the world that close fighting under the conditions which he accepted might be a task less desperate than it seemed; but his hopefulness, if hopefulness he had when he drove his horse into the column, could hardly have been warranted, at the time, by the then known teachings of human experience.¹

By the judgment of Lord Lucan—not tested, however, by the hand of the watch—it has been computed that the time occupied by the fight, from the moment when General Scarlett commenced his charge, to the one when the Russian mass broke, the time was about eight minutes.

In order that the Allies should be able to reap from this fight of our Heavy Brigade any fruits at all proportioned to its brilliancy, it was necessary that they should have had on the ground some fresh and unbroken squadrons which would pursue the retreating mass, and convert its defeat into ruin, or at least into grievous disaster. Were no such squadrons at hand?

The means needed for bringing upon the Russians the full consequences of their defeat.

VI.

Whilst this combat of Scarlett's was raging, people witnessed, hard by, a more tranquil scene, and one which indeed was so free from all the tumult of battle as to offer a kind of repose to eyes wearied with gazing at strife. Overlooking the flank of the Russian cavalry in its struggle with Scarlett's brigade, and at a distance from the combatants which has been computed at 400 or 500 yards, there stood ranged, in two lines, a body of near 700 men. They all of them bore

¹ What is the closest historical parallel that can be found for the charge of Scarlett's three hundred?

arms; they all wore military uniforms; and each man was either mounted, or else had his charger beside him. They were troops of the same nation as Scarlett's combating regiments. In truth, they were nothing less than the famous

The Light Brigade at the time of Scarlett's engagement. Light Brigade of the English; but, strange to say, these superb horsemen were engaged for the time as spectators, maintaining a rigid neutrality in the war which they saw going on between Russia and our Heavy Dragoons.

Impatience of the brigade; Of the impatience with which our Light Cavalry chafed when they found themselves withheld from the fight, some idea perhaps may be formed by any one who recalls to his mind the far-famed exploit they were destined to be performing at a later hour of the same day. It was not without a grating sense of the contrast that, whilst thus condemned to inaction, they saw Scarlett hotly engaged; and although the commander of the Light Brigade, in giving vent to his mortification, used one of those cavalry forms of speech which express approval or endearment in words of imprecation, it is not for that the less true that the sentiment which really blended with his natural vexation was one of admiring and generous envy. Lord Cardigan and of Lord Cardigan. was himself the public informant who adduced in a court of justice this picturesque proof of his feelings—"We were spectators," says one of his witnesses, 'of that encounter; and those who heard and saw Lord Cardigan during the time that was going on, will not easily forget the chagrin and disappointment he evinced when riding up and down our line. He constantly repeated, "Damn those Heavies, they have the laugh of us this day."'

The surprise with which the neutrality of the Light Brigade was observed. As may well be supposed, this abstention of our Light Cavalry was observed by the Russians with surprise and thankfulness, by the Head-Quarters Staff of the English with surprise and vexation, by the French with surprise and curiosity. If

Canrobert and those of his people who looked down upon the plain of Balaclava grew warm and enthusiastic in their admiration of Scarlett's exploit, they were all the more ready with questions, surmises, and reasonings when they saw that, during the fight thus maintained by one of our two cavalry brigades against a largely outnumbering force, the other brigade remained motionless—nay, even in part dismounted. The impressions of the French in regard to the English lie deposited for the most part in layers or strata, disclosing the periods of the several formations; and

if the nature of the comments which were uttered could be inferred from known habits of thought and of speech, it might be found that the theory put forward by any French officer of serving to account for the phenomenon was adopted in general by his comrades of the same age, and repudiated by such of them as were either much older or much younger; but whether, with their gray-headed colonel, the more aged officers of a regiment made sure that the Count of Cardigan was a great feudal chief, with a brigade composed of his serfs and retainers, who, for some cause or other, had taken dire umbrage, and resolved, like Achilles, that his myrmidons should be withheld from the fight; or whether, on the authority of the major—less aged, though equally confident—they held that the feudal system in England had been recently mitigated, and that the true solution of the enigma was to be found in the law of ‘Le box’—the law making it criminal for an Englishman to interrupt a good fight, and enjoining that singular formation which Albion called ‘a ring;’—whatever, in short, might be the variety of special theories which these French observers adopted, there was one proposition at least in which all would be sure to agree. All, all would take part in the chorus which asserted that the English were a heap of ‘originals.’

Yet, amongst the French officers thus striving to solve the enigma, one at least was inclined to trace the neutrality of our Light Brigade to a cause of miscarriage which, far from being exclusively English, has often condemned the great cavalry forces of the Continent to the imputation of losing opportunities. No less clearly than any of his comrades the Vicomte de Nöé perceived the strange error which had been committed; but he traced it to a want of that initiative power which enables a general of cavalry to seize his occasion.¹

When we turn from the surmises of the French to our English sources of knowledge, and there seek to find out the spell which palsied Lord Cardigan’s squadrons, we learn that the brigade was kept where it stood by the interpretation which its chief had been putting upon Lord Lucan’s parting instructions. The Brigadier had been left in the position

The cause which palsied the Light Brigade at the time of Scarlett’s engagement.

¹ ‘Repulsed with loss,’ says the Vicomte, ‘it [the Russian cavalry] regained the heights, where it might have been annihilated if the English Light Cavalry, under the orders of Lord Cardigan, had charged it during its retreat. There was the occasion, there should have been exercised the initiative of the cavalry general, and later in the day it was made apparent that bravery is no sufficient substitute for initiative.’

he occupied with directions to defend it against any attack; but other words accompanied this direction; and upon the whole, after giving to the terms of the order, as gathered by him at the time, the best construction which his unaided judgment would furnish, Lord Cardigan haplessly came to the conclusion that it was his duty to abstain from attacking the enemy in flank whilst our Heavy Dragoons were attacking him in front, and to suffer the Russian cavalry to retreat from before him—nay, almost, one may say, to retreat across his front—without undertaking to pursue it.¹

Lord Lucan, of course, did not mean that his Light Cavalry should meet a conjuncture like the one which actually occurred by remaining in a state of inaction; but how far the mistake may have derived a seeming warrant from any obscurity or from any misleading tendency in his instruction, that, of course, is a question dependent on the words that were used.² If no such palliation shall be established, it must

¹ See the accompanying sketch-plan representing Lord Cardigan's idea of the respective positions of the Russian cavalry and of the two English brigades. The plate is upon a reduced scale, but is, in other respects, a facsimile of the drawing which Lord Cardigan prepared for me. The special purpose for which he prepared the drawing was to show what the position was which he considered that he had to defend.

² Lord Cardigan's statement is: 'I had been ordered into a particular position by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, my superior officer, with orders on no account to leave it, and to defend it against any attack of Russians. They did not, however, approach the position.'—*Affidavit of Lord Cardigan*. Lord Lucan's version of the order he gave is this—'I am going to leave you. Well, you'll remember that you are placed here by Lord Raglan himself for the defense of this position. My instructions to you are to attack any thing and every thing that shall come within reach of you, but you will be careful of columns or squares of infantry.' Lord Lucan, I believe, considers that when the Russian cavalry advanced up the North Valley to within a few hundred yards of Lord Cardigan, when they moved (obliquely) across Lord Cardigan's front, and proceeded under his eyes to attack English regiments, they did 'approach the position,' nay, did actually invade it, thereby bringing about the exact contingency under which Lord Cardigan (according to his own version of the instructions) was ordered to defend the position 'against any attack of Russians.' On the other hand, it may be thought that even according to Lord Lucan's version of his own words, they were such as, in the judgment of a peace-service man like Lord Cardigan, might not unnaturally appear to have a fettering tendency. Such phrases as '*placed here*,' and '*defense of this position*,' followed by the instruction to attack whatever might '*come within reach*,' were plainly dangerous. I know not on what ground Lord Lucan thought that Lord Raglan placed the cavalry where he did in order to charge it with the defense of this position. I have always understood that Lord Raglan's object in bringing in his cavalry under the steepes of the Chersonese was—not to defend any position, but—to have it in hand, and prevent it from becoming perniciously entangled in combats.

Dupree Army

Butterby

Fac-simile (*Reduced*) of a Plan sketched by Lord Cardigan with a view to show what was the 'particular position' which he says in his affidavit he had been 'ordered on no account to Leave' and to defend 'against any attack of Russians.'

N.B. This sketch must be looked upon simply as a representation made by Lord Cardigan, and not as one adopted by the Author.

W. G. G. G.

(Fax)

*Light Brigade
before attack of
the Russian Army*

forwarded to the

Army General

Lord Cardigan

*English Cavalry
Heavy Brigade*

*Sketch of
the Russian Charge*

Light Brigade

be judged that Lord Cardigan's abstention resulted from an honest failure of judgment, from an undue confidence in himself, and from an imperfect acquaintance with the business of war, but also from strong sense of duty—from that same sense of duty, remember, which was destined to be his guide in the hour then coming, and to carry him down the North Valley on a venturesome, nay, desperate service. Still, the miscarriage of Lord Cardigan's endeavor to construe the order aright did actually result in the spectacle which we have just been witnessing; and, it being apparent that the inaction to which he imagined himself condemned was calculated to be gravely injurious to the public service, it seems useful to inquire whether the mishap was one of those incidents of war which carry no lesson, or whether, on the contrary, it can be traced to a malpractice on the part of the Home Government which might be avoided in future wars.

The kind of experience which has a tendency to prevent men from putting sensible constructions on orders.

The task of endeavoring to put a right construction upon orders given in war, and especially in battle, is often an anxious and difficult one, yet so enormously important that the honor, nay, the fate of a nation, may depend upon the way in which it is discharged. Now, it would seem that there is one kind of experience which, if long continued, has a peculiar tendency to disqualify an officer for the duty of putting sensible constructions upon orders concerning the business of war. The experience I speak of is that which is possessed by an officer who has served many years in a standing army without having had the fortune to go through a campaign. Such a man, during his whole military life, has been perpetually dealing with fixed conditions and petty occurrences which are mostly of a kind that can be, in a measure, provided for beforehand by even that limited forecast which the rules of an office imply; and as soon as his training has taken its effect to the utmost, he may be said to represent the true opposite of what a commander should be who has to encounter emergencies. So long as soldierly duties are confined to mere preparation and rehearsal, they can be effectively performed by the industrious formalist; but in war all is changed. There, the enemy interposes, and interposes so roughly that the military clock-work of peace-time is ruthlessly shattered. As a guide for construing momentous orders delivered in the hour of battle to a general of the peace-service training, the experience of the barrack-yard becomes a snare. His new theatre of action is so strange, so vast, and so dim—for he now has to meet the unknown—

that unless he can rise with the occasion, throwing open his mind and changing his old stock of ideas, he becomes dangerous to his country—becomes dangerous, of course, in proportion to the extent of the command with which he has been entrusted. Supposing the natural capacity equal, there is no stirring missionary, no good electioneerer, no revered master of hounds, who might not be more likely to prove himself equal to the unforeseen emergencies of a campaign than the general officer who is a veteran in the military profession, and, at the same time, a novice in war. If indeed a general who has hitherto had no experience of war is still in so early a period of his life as to have unimpaired the natural flexibility of youth, he may quickly adapt his mind to the new exigency; but when a State gives high command to an officer who is not only encased with military experience all acquired in peace-time, but is also advanced in years, it fulfills at least two of the conditions which are the most likely to bring about misconstructions of even the plainest orders; and if to these precautions the Government adds that of taking care that the selected General shall be a man of a narrow disposition and a narrow mind—a man cleaving to technicalities and regulations with a morbid love of uniformity—then, indeed, it exhausts a large proportion of the expedients which can be used for insuring miscarriage.

England, ruling as she does over various and wide-spread dependencies, is so often forced into warlike operations of more or less magnitude, as to be free from the predicament of having at her command no war-trying officers. Therefore, when, with such means at her disposal, she still trusts important commands to her peace-serving officers, she has not the plea of necessity. She acts in sheer wantonness. She needs, as it were, a strong swimmer, and hastens to take a man who never has happened to bathe. She wants a skillful ship's captain to maintain her strength on the ocean, and for this purpose chooses a bargeman who has plied thirty years on canals.

As a warning instance of miscarriage resulting from this evil practice, Lord Cardigan's mistake has great worth; because it was so obviously occasioned both by his experience, and by his want of experience—by the abundant military experience which had gathered upon him in peace-time, and by the want of that other experience which men gain in war. Many an officer long versed in peace-service might have made an equivalent mistake; but, on the other hand, it is probable that in such a conjuncture as that in which

Lord Cardigan found himself, no man who ever had wielded a squadron in the field would have thought himself condemned to inaction.

The example was made the more signal by an incident which occurred at the time. Whilst Lord Cardigan sat in his saddle, expressing, under cavalry forms of speech, his envy of the Heavy Dragoons, and adhering to that hapless construction of Lord Lucan's order, which condemned him, as he thought, to a state of neutrality, he had at his side an officer, comparatively young, and with only the rank of a captain, who still was well able to give him that guidance which, by reason of his want of experience in war, he grievously, though unconsciously, needed. Captain Morris, commanding the 17th Lancers, one of the regiments of the Light Brigade, and then in his thirty-fourth year, was a man richly gifted with the natural qualities which tend to make a leader of cavalry, but strengthened also by intellectual cultivation well applied to the business of arms, and clothed, above all, with that priceless experience which soldiers acquire in war. After having first armed himself with a portion at least of the education which Cambridge bestows, he had served with glory in India. In 1843 he had been present at the battle of Maharajpore. In 1846 he fought at the battle of Buddiwal. At the battle of Aliwal in the same year he was wounded whilst charging with his regiment into a mass of Sikh infantry. He was in the battle of Sobraon; he crossed the Sutlej, and entered Lahore with the army. When opportunities of gaining warlike experience were no longer open to him, he returned to the labor of military study, and carried away from Sandhurst ample evidences of his proficiency in higher departments of military learning. Captain Morris was one of those who might have been wisely intrusted with an extended command of cavalry. Few could be more competent to point out to Lord Cardigan the error he was committing—to show him in two words how to construe Lord Lucan's order, and to explain to him that when cavalry has to hold a 'position,' it is not, for that reason, forced to abstain from resisting the enemy.¹

Pereceiving with vivid distinctness the precious opportunity which the fortune of war was offering, Morris eagerly

¹ I say 'resisting,' because the advance of the Russian cavalry was an actual invasion of the English position—nay, even of the very camping-ground of the Light Brigade.

prayed that the Light Cavalry might advance upon the enemy's column of horse; or, if that could not be conceded, then that he at least, with his regiment, might be suffered to undertake an attack. That he imparted his desire to Lord Cardigan, and that Lord Cardigan rebuffed him, I can not doubt;¹ but for the present purpose—for the purpose, namely, of illustrating the mischief of intrusting high command to a veteran of the peace-service unversed in war—the sworn statement of Lord Cardigan is sufficiently instructive. After speaking of Captain Morris's alleged interposition, he goes on to say that 'Captain Morris never gave any advice, or 'made any proposal of the sort;' that 'it was not his duty 'to do so;' and that he 'did not commit such an irregularity.'

When the Oxford undergraduate stopped short of presuming to snatch his fellow-student from a watery grave, on the theory that it was indecorous for one lad to rescue another without having first been presented to him, the objection was perhaps overstrained, but, at all events, it proceeded from the formalist who stood on the bank, and not from the one in the river. Here, more wonderfully—for Morris was willing, nay offered, to rescue Lord Cardigan from his error—it was the drowning man who, on grounds of a stiff etiquette, protested against being saved.

If Lord Cardigan's idea of an 'irregularity' was upheld by the sanction of the Horse Guards, it must be acknowledged that our Home dispensers of military power had performed their task with a rare completeness. They found a man who was of an age, and endowed with natural qualities, highly favorable to effective command, who had had rich experience in the business of war, who had earned for himself a large

¹ I do not forget (as will presently be seen) that Lord Cardigan has denied this; but my proofs are ample: and indeed Lord Cardigan, though he places the incident at a moment when it had become too late to act with effect, has himself acknowledged to me that Captain Morris sought to push forward with his regiment, and that he (Lord Cardigan) stopped the attempt. Both with respect to the fact itself and the time of its occurrence, Captain (afterward Colonel) Morris has been explicit. In a letter addressed by him to the Horse Guards he wrote thus:—'Having read.....a letter 'from Major Calthorpe, in which he throws between Lord Cardigan and 'myself the settlement of the question as to whether I asked Lord Cardigan, on the 25th of October, 1854, to attack the Russian cavalry in flank 'at the time they were engaged with the Heavy Brigade, and which Lord 'Cardigan most positively denies, I wish to declare most positively that I 'did ask Lord Cardigan to attack the enemy at the time and in the manner 'above mentioned.' See also the conclusive testimony contained in the second affidavit of the Honorable Godfrey Charles Morgan filed in the suit of Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe.

share of glory in combats and pitched battles. Him they placed under a General fifty-seven years old, who, without any warlike experience, still sincerely presumed himself competent to the exigencies of high command in the field; and then they crowned their work by causing or allowing the army to understand that it would be an 'irregularity' for the man who had learned war on the Sutlej to tender his opportune counsel to the one who had come from Hyde Park.

A brigade of light cavalry drawn up in two lines on good turf, and employed in the occupation of gazing upon a fight sustained against a great stress of numbers by their comrades the Heavy Dragoons; the man of the Sutlej entreating that the brigade might advance to the rescue, but rebuffed and overruled by the higher authority of the man from the banks of the Serpentine who sits erect in his saddle, and is fitfully 'damning the Heavies' instead of taking part in their fight—these might seem to be the creatures of the brain evoked perhaps for some drama of the grossly humorous sort; but because of the sheer truth, their place is historic; and if comedy seems to result, it is comedy prepared in Whitehall. It is comedy too of that kind which sometimes teaches and warns. By the will of our military authorities at home, the man versed in war was placed under the man versed in quarrels. Lord Cardigan had been charged to command; Captain Morris had to obey. The exaggerations men look for in satire were forestalled and outdone by the Horse Guards.

In its actual bearing upon events, the neutrality of the Light Cavalry proved less hurtful than at first it seemed likely to be; because Scarlett's dragoons, after all, found means to achieve their victory without help from the other brigade. If Scarlett's 'three hundred' had been overwhelmed and destroyed, both the terms of Lord Lucan's instruction and the inaction maintained by Lord Cardigan would have been cruelly judged. As it was, the miscarriage, however pernicious in its other consequences, did at least bring glory upon our arms, because it withheld from Scarlett's dragoons that support which must have dimmed their victory by making it more easy of attainment. It is true that if the Light Brigade, although abstaining from the thick of the fight, had been suffered at the right moment to advance in pursuit, it might possibly have effected captures by a swift and skilled use of the moments during which such a work was practicable; but any force pursuing the enemy

beyond a short distance must have very soon come under fire from the guns on the Fedioukine Hills.

Lord Lucan, as may well be supposed, was bitterly vexed by the inaction of his Light Brigade, and at the close of the combat he sent one of his aids-de-camp with a message which enjoined Lord Cardigan in future, whenever his Divisional General might be attacking in front, to lose no opportunity of making a flank attack. The message added, that Lord Lucan would always be ready to give a like support to Lord Cardigan.¹

I have traced the fault up to its sources. If ever there were to be uttered a taunt which should impute the inaction of Lord Cardigan to any cause worse than mistake, this short, cogent answer would follow, 'He led the "Light Cavalry charge."'²

VII.

From the easternmost ledges of the Chersonese, the chiefs of the two Allied armies, together with great numbers of their people, had been keenly looking down, as we learned, upon the combat of Scarlett's dragoons; but the bulk of these spectators—first anxious and afterward enraptured—were content to regard the encounter as a trial of cavalry prowess resulting in proportionate glory; and, so far as I know, Lord Raglan was the only officer in the field whose swift instinct informed him at the moment of the way in which this isolated engagement of horsemen might be brought to bear upon the issue of the battle. Years after that day, when in times of peace and amidst the narratives, the maps and the plans of the once warring nations were collated and studied, it at last became easy enough for the French and the English to understand the extent of the change which had been wrought in the enemy's position by the victory of our Heavy Dragoons; but it was given to Lord Raglan to perceive all this at the time.


The defeat of the Russian cavalry carried with it, of

¹ It is right to say that Lord Cardigan has questioned this, but to add, that proof which I must regard as conclusive is in my possession.

² There is a curiously strong chain of testimony which goes to show that at or toward the close of the Heavy Cavalry fight, the Light Brigade was moved down into the South Valley, and brought into the rear of the ground from which our Heavy Dragoons had made their attack; but counter-testimony of a very cogent kind opposes itself to this conclusion. The decision of the question, although it might have a personal bearing of some interest, is not important in any other point of view.

The change that was wrought in the positions of the Russians by the defeat of their cavalry. course, the retreat of the powerful artillery which the horse had escorted; and not only was the English camp and its vicinity now free from even the sight of an assailing force, but all that part of the North Valley which divided the Fedioukine Heights from the line of the Turkish redoubts was left without troops. The change wrought by Scarlett's dragoons was therefore such, that whereas the Russians, half an hour before, had had a miniature battle array which enabled them for the moment to take the offensive and penetrate even home to the English cavalry camp, they were now all at once reduced to what one may call two weak columns—two weak columns having the whole breadth of the North Valley between them, no longer connected with one another except by their rear, and each of them so placed as to be impotently protruding its small narrow head in the face of the divisions coming down from the Chersonese, and debouching in strength upon the plain. An array which before might have been likened to the closed fist of the pugilist, was changed, all at once, to a hand with the two centre fingers retracted and the other two fingers protruding:¹ Lord Raglan per-

¹ This diagram may aid the elucidation.



H →

- A B—Jabrokritsky's infantry and artillery disposed on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.
 C D—Liprandi's infantry and artillery posted along the line of the captured Turkish redoubts, where the English guns remained.
 C—The position of the Odessa regiment.
 E E—The defeated Russian cavalry, with a Cossack battery in front of them.
 F—Lord Cardigan's Light Cavalry Brigade.
 G—General Scarlett's Heavy Cavalry Brigade.
 H—The direction by which French and English reinforcements were approaching.
 J K—The North Valley.

ceived that in the compass of those brilliant minutes which had been used to such purpose by Scarlett's dragoons, they had done the main part of his appointed task by almost winning a battle for him without the aid of a single foot-soldier or horseman sent down from the main Allied camp. What Lord Raglan's purpose, he instantly sought to do was, to seize on the victory which this cavalry fight seemed to open to him by proceeding at once to the recapture of the Causeway Heights.

The arrangements for the recovery of the heights had been made, as we saw, long ago, several hours before the occurrence which had now so much lightened the task; and, if the requisite marches of our infantry divisions had attained completion, Sir George Cathcart, at the head of the 4th Division, would have been ready to advance against the Arabtabia¹ Redoubt by the line of the Causeway ridge; whilst H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge with the 1st Division would have supported the attack by moving along the South Valley. The Duke of Cambridge, it would seem, had lost no time in obeying the order, and was as far in advance toward his assigned place as Lord Raglan expected him to be;² but Cathcart unhappily had failed to march by the route prescribed to him, and was not yet on his appointed ground. Lord Raglan long before had been expressing his astonishment at not seeing Cathcart's battalions in march, and had sent messenger after messenger to endeavor to find where he was, and to learn the cause of his delay. It is true that, before the moment we speak of, Cathcart's Division had at length made its appearance, but it still had a good way to march before it could commence the intended attack. Lord Raglan's vexation was great, for he felt all the evil of any delay in seizing the advantage which the fortune of war was offering.

Being in this strait, and judging also, with what we now know to have been a true foresight, that the weak chain of Russian infantry columns which stretched toward him endwise along the line of the redoubts would prove somewhat soft to the touch, he determined, as he was entitled to do, to make an appeal to his cavalry. He did not do this apparently because the cavalry arm was the one which he would most willingly have selected for his purpose if he had any freedom

Circumstances under which Lord Raglan determined to appeal to his cavalry.

¹ The Redoubt also called Number Three.

² I found this upon what may be called proof of a negative kind; i.e., I have never seen or heard of any complaint in regard to the length of time occupied by His Royal Highness's march.

of choice, but because his infantry reinforcements were not yet far enough in advance, and the time was too precious to be lost. Be that as it may, he dispatched to Lord Lucan a written instruction which in the subsequent controversies was generally called 'the third order.' It ran thus: 'Cavalry
The third order. 'to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry which have been ordered [to] advance on two fronts.' Whilst directing that actual attacks against the enemy on the heights should be made to depend upon opportunity, this order, it should be observed, was peremptory and unconditional in requiring that our cavalry should advance; and since it came, not from a distant commander, but from one who looked down upon the whole field, and had before his eyes all the requisite ingredients of a positive resolve, it is difficult to see how the words could become open to misconception.

Lord Lucan, however, so read the order as to conceive it his duty to do no more for the moment than mount
Lord Lucan's construction of it. his cavalry, move the Light Brigade to another position hard by across the North Valley, and cause his Heavy Dragoons to remain on the slope of the rise there awaiting the infantry, which, to use his own language, 'had not yet arrived.' Having made these dispositions, Lord Lucan kept his cavalry halted during a period which he has computed at from thirty to forty minutes.² If it be asked why, when ordered to advance, he kept his cavalry halted during a period of from thirty to forty minutes, the answer is that he reasoned. By choosing his way of proceeding—not because it was enjoined in terms, but—because he imagined it to be 'the only way that could [have] been rational-

¹ It seems that in the original order the word 'to' was omitted—that there was what looked like a full stop after the word 'ordered'—and that the word 'advance' was written with a capital A; but the copy which Lord Lucan afterward furnished to Lord Raglan was as given in the text, and I therefore imagine that, notwithstanding the clerical errors above mentioned, the order at the time must have been read aright by Lord Lucan. The question seems to be unimportant, for the order is not made at all less cogent by reading it with its clerical errors uncorrected. I should not have adverted to the matter if it were not that Lord Lucan—I do not see why—laid stress upon it in his speech addressed to the House of Lords. The copy in my possession is in the handwriting of Lord Lucan himself, and was furnished by him to Lord Raglan. Therefore, *for the purpose of proving the tenor of the instruction really conveyed to the mind of Lord Lucan*, the copy is evidently more authentic than the original.

² By computations upon another basis this period is extended to fifty or fifty-five minutes.

'ly intended,' he effected an actual inversion of Lord Raglan's order, and persuaded himself that, instead of the cavalry advancing (as directed) with the prospect of being supported by the infantry, it was the infantry that ought first to advance, the cavalry acting only in support.¹ The avoidance of delay, as we saw, was the very object which the English Commander had in view when he resolved to appeal to his squadrons. In the mind of Lord Raglan, the length of the ground which still had to be traversed by his infantry was a reason for appealing to the cavalry arm; whilst, on the other hand, Lord Lucan judged that that same length of ground was a reason for delaying his advance; so that the very exigency which caused Lord Raglan to desire the immediate aid of the cavalry was the one which induced Lord Lucan to withhold it.

From the height which he had occupied during the whole morning, and with the officers of his Staff around him, Lord Raglan watched for the moment when his cavalry, in obedience to the orders he had dispatched, would begin its advance, and he watched with the expectation—an expectation which we now know to have been well founded—that the movement would cause the enemy to abandon his already relaxing hold, and give up the captured redoubts. He watched in vain. His cavalry did not move forward.

The impatience
and anger
amongst men of
the Head-Quarter
Staff.

From the way in which he saw the Russians withdrawing their cavalry and their artillery, but also from the general aspect of the field, he knew that the minutes then passing were minutes of depression to the enemy, and therefore of opportunity for the English. It may well be imagined that at such a time the delayed compliance with his order was provoking; and if his words and his features betrayed mere vexation, or, at all events, well-governed anger, the more youthful men of his Staff were not, I imagine, so careful as to suppress their murmurs of impatience and indignation.

In this temper the Head-Quarter Staff were gazing upon the field, when some of them who had been pointing their field-glasses along the line of the Causeway ridge perceived

¹ Lord Lucan's own account of the way in which he attempted to construe this order, and of the mental process by which he attained his conclusion, is as follows: 'Lord Lucan having taken up the position clearly directed was prepared to carry out the remainder of his instructions by endeavoring to effect the only object, and in the only way that could rationally [have] been intended—viz., to give all the support possible to the infantry in the recapture of the redoubts, and subsequently to cut off all their defenders.'

all at once, as they thought, that the enemy was bringing forward some teams of artillery horses, with the lasso tackle attached to them;¹ and they did not doubt—what otherwise seemed very probable—that the enemy, who was evidently preparing to retreat, must be seeking to carry off with him as trophies the English guns taken from the Turks.

It seems probable that, before this, Lord Raglan's patience must have almost come to its end, and that, without any new motive, he would have presently dispatched a reminding and accelerating message to Lord Lucan; but the announcement of the artillery-teams coming up to carry off English guns may well have determined his choice of the moment for taking the step, and it gave him an opportunity—which, even in a moment of anger, his kind and generous nature would incline him to seize—an opportunity of softening the communication he had to make to the commander of his cavalry; for evidently the pressure which was to be applied to Lord Lucan, would be relieved in some measure of its inculpatory aspect, by basing the necessity for instant action upon a new fact. Accordingly, Lord Raglan determined to repeat with increased urgency his hitherto disobeyed order for the advance of the cavalry, and to give to its commander a fresh motive for dispatch, by pressing upon him the special object of endeavoring to prevent the enemy from carrying off the guns. This determination he expressed in terms intimating that the Quartermaster-General, who was close at his side, should give immediate effect to it. With a pencil, and a slip of paper rested upon his sabretash, General Airey quickly embodied in a written order the instruction thus given him; but before Lord Raglan allowed the paper to go, he dictated some additional words which Airey at once inserted. The paper when thus completed became what men have called 'the fourth order.'²

It was supposed that Major Calthorpe (an officer of the cavalry, and one of Lord Raglan's aids-de-camp), who chanced to stand ready and expectant, would be charged with the mission; but Lord Raglan called for Captain Nolan (the aid-de-camp of the Quartermaster-General), and specially desired that the order should be intrusted to him.

Nolan was no common man. Surrounded as he was at Head-quarters by men of the world whose pleasant society

¹ I do not myself doubt the accuracy of the impression thus formed, though, in the absence of proof from Russian sources, I have avoided the language of positive assertion.

² The terms of the order will be given in a later page.

Captain Nolan. must have been apparently well calculated to moderate a too wild devotion to one idea, he yet was an enthusiast—an enthusiast unchilled and unshaken. His faith was that miracles of war could be wrought by squadrons of horse, that the limits of what could fairly be asked of the cavalry had been wrongly assigned, and that—if only it could be properly constituted and properly led—the cavalry, after all, was the arm which should govern the issue of battles. Then, adding to this creed an unbounded trust in the warlike quality of our troopers, he went on to conclude that the dominion of England in the world could best be assured by the sabre. He knew that where the question of cavalry excellence could be narrowed to a question of cavalry fighting, the English horsemen had been used to maintain their ascendant. The great day of Blenheim, he knew, was won in the main by our cavalry. With a single brigade of our cavalry at Salamanca, Le Marchant had cut through a French army. Nolan imagined that nothing but perverse mismanagement and evil choice of men prevented England from having what he held to be her own—from having an ascendant among nations resting mainly, or at all events largely, upon the prowess of her squadrons. Because this faith was glowing within him, Nolan had sorrowed and chafed at the unobtrusive part taken by our cavalry in the earlier days of the invasion. His journal, going down to the 12th of October, lies open before me. It teems with impatience of the comparative inaction to which our cavalry had been condemned; and discloses a belief—a belief based apparently, in part, upon somewhat wild processes of reason—that the commander of our cavalry was the man upon whom blame should rest. Nolan must have been solaced, one may suppose, nay, enraptured, by the feat of our Heavy Dragoons; but, on the other hand, he could not but be tortured by having to witness the inaction to which the Light Brigade stood condemned, whilst their comrades were fighting, and for this (if he knew not that the commander of our cavalry was present elsewhere) he probably blamed Lord Lucan. Besides, at the moment we speak of, an occasion had been offering itself to the cavalry, and Lord Raglan, as we know, had been ordering it to advance without being yet obeyed. Upon the whole, therefore, it is easy to understand that Nolan must have been burning with anger and zeal.

This was the officer to whom, by Lord Raglan's direction, General Airey delivered the order. Without having had their observance quickened, at the time, by any foreboding

sentiments, men still remember how swiftly the messenger sped on his errand. That acclivity of some seven or eight hundred feet, which divided our Head-Quarter Staff from the plain of Balaclava below, was of just such a degree of steepness that, whilst no rider of merely ordinary experience and boldness would like to go down it at a high rate of speed, and whilst few of those going slowly would refrain from somewhat easing the abruptness of the path by a more or less zigzag descent, the ground still was not so precipitous as to defy the rapid purpose of a horseman who had accustomed himself, in such things, to approach the extreme of what is possible. The special skill gained by such trials, with the boldness needed for using it, Nolan had in full measure; and he was armed with cogent words for the man whom he had brought himself to condemn as the obstructor of cavalry enterprise. Straight, swift, and intent—descending, as it were, on sure prey—he swooped angering down into the plain where Lord Lucan and his squadrons were posted.

VIII.

Although a period of some thirty, forty, or fifty minutes had since elapsed, the position of the Russian army was still nearly the same that it had been when Lord Lucan received his third order.¹ Jabrokritsky, with some 8 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 14 guns, was established on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills; and Liprandi, with his infantry and field-artillery still lingering upon the sites of the captured redoubts, continued to protrude so far west along the chain of the Causeway Heights as to have one of his regiments—the regiment of Odessa—drawn up near the Arabtabia Redoubt;² but the whole of his defeated cavalry had been withdrawn to a position so far down the North Valley as to be within a mile of the aqueduct, and about a mile and a half from the ground where Lord Lucan was posted. Drawn up across the North Valley, far in rear of the foremost Russian battalions, this large but discomfited body of horse connected Liprandi's corps-army with the troops of General Jabrokritsky, but connected it only by the rear—connected it in such a way that these forces together were the three sides of an oblong, and could be likened, as we saw, to the hand of a man with the

¹ The order directing him to advance, and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the Causeway Heights. The words of the order are given at p. 491.

² The Number Three Redoubt.

two centre fingers held back and the other two fingers extended.¹ The Odessa regiment formed the tip of that lesser finger which represents the extension of Liprandi's column along the chain of the Causeway Heights. Except at their rear, the two columns thus protruding were divided the one from the other by the whole breadth of the North Valley; and without straying into surmise, it can be stated that they were, each of them, in a condition to be more or less completely rolled up by an attack of cavalry, or even—without waiting for actual collision—by the mere sight of squadrons approaching.²

Close in advance of the discomfited Russian cavalry, and, like them, fronting up the North Valley, some twelve pieces of the Don Cossack ordnance were in battery.³

At a later moment the smoke from this battery served to screen the horsemen behind it from the sight of the English; but at the time now spoken of, this great body of Russian cavalry, though a mile and a half off, could be descried by one standing on the ground where Lord Cardigan was posted. From the effect of distance and close massing, the dusky, gray columns looked black.

Besides the main body of the Russian cavalry which thus stood drawn up in rear of the Cossack guns, Liprandi now had at his disposal six squadrons of lancers under the command of Colonel Jeropkine;⁴ and these horsemen, divided into two bodies of three squadrons each, were so posted—the one in a fold of the Fedioukine Hills, and the other in a ravine on the side of the Causeway Heights—as to be able to fall upon either flank of any Allied troops which, in pressing Liprandi's retreat, might pursue it far down the North Valley.

The subsequent course of events made it needless for Liprandi to say, in his public dispatch, that after the combat with Scarlett's dragoons he had determined to retreat; but

Intentions of
Liprandi at
this period of
the action.

I regard it as certain that, at the time now spoken of, he harbored no idea of defending the Causeway Heights against any real attack. So far as

¹ See the diagram *ante*, p. 489.

² For proof of this—proof by actual experiment—both as regards the column posted along the line of the Causeway Heights, and as regards the other column—the one on the Fedioukine Hills—see later pages narrating the retreat of the Odessa battalions and (subsequently) of the forces on the Fedioukine Hills which were put to flight by D'Allonville.

³ Eight pieces (*i. e.*, one battery), according to Russian official accounts; but oral testimony shows that the real number of these guns was twelve—*i. e.*, a battery and a half.

⁴ A force called the 'combined lancers.'

concerned his liability to be assailed by infantry, he was able to prepare his retreat with a great deliberation; for the march of the Allied battalions, creeping down from the Chersonese, was so open to the view of an adversary in the valley below, as to show him how long it must be before they could come into action; but it was otherwise in regard to any attack undertaken by our division of cavalry; and if the tenor of the instructions given to good troops could be safely inferred from their actual movements, it might be treated as certain that the Odessa battalions had orders to fall back upon the near approach of our squadrons.

Such seems to have been the position and attitude of the forces now confronting Lord Lucan, and such the condition of things that Lord Raglan had sought to deal with by the order which Nolan was bringing. Lord Raglan, as we know, had the advantage of seeing all from high, commanding ground; but nothing less than his peculiar and instinctive faculty for the reading of a battle-field could have enabled him at the instant to grasp the whole import of what to others was a dim, complex scene, devoid of expression, and to send down an order so closely adapted to the exigency as the one which he had dispatched. To strike at the nearest of the Russians that could be found on the Causeway Heights—or, in other words, at those Odessa battalions which stood ranged in front of the Arabtabia—this plainly was the task which (by reason of there being no infantry division yet present on the ground) invited the enterprise of our squadrons; and this also, we shall see, was the task which the order now coming enjoined.

We shall see that the French, when so minded, could direct an attack with their cavalry upon the head of the Russian detachment now holding the Fe-dioukine Hills—an attack somewhat similar in its nature to the one which Lord Raglan desired to have made against the tip of Liprandi's position on the Causeway Heights. In truth, there were two ranges of heights, each affording to the cavalry of the Allies so good a point for attack, that the one was decisively chosen—though chosen in vain—by Lord Raglan, and the other by General Morris, the Commander of the French cavalry division.¹

But between the two ranges, thus each of them inviting at-

¹ See again the diagram *ante*, p. 489, and the plan facing p. 508, taking care to understand that the *first* position of the Odessa regiment and of the batteries near it is the one applicable to this part of the narrative.

Lord Raglan's perfect apprehension of the state of the battle.

Two points in the enemy's position available for attack.

The valley
that lay be-
tween them.

tack, there unhappily lay a smooth valley, which offered itself to those horsemen who might either be weary of life, or compelled by a sense of duty to go down and commit self-destruction.

Our Heavy Dragoons were on one of the slopes of the Causeway ridge, not far from the scene of their late victory. Lord Cardigan's brigade stood, drawn up in two lines, and so placed as to be fronting straight down the North Valley.

Arrival of No-
lan with the
'fourth order.'

Lord Lucan was sitting in the saddle in front of his troops, and between the two brigades, when Nolan came speeding from the Commander-in-Chief, and made haste to deliver the paper with which we saw him intrusted. By pursuing a theory that he seems to have formed in regard to the real authorship of directions from the English Head-quarters, Lord Lucan had taught himself to mistake the channel for the source, and to imagine that General Airey must be often the originator of orders which, in fact, he was only transmitting. For this reason, and as tending, perhaps, to account in some measure for the way in which the order was about to act upon the mind or the temper of the general to whom it was addressed, it is worth while to remember two circumstances which would have been otherwise unimportant. The bearer of the order, as it chanced, was the aid-de-camp of General Airey, and its words were in General Airey's handwriting.

The order ran thus: 'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.

(Signed)

'R. AIREY.'

Whether taken alone, or as a command reinforcing the one before sent, this order has really no word in it which is either obscure or misleading. By assigning 'the guns' as the object, Lord Raglan most pointedly fixed the line of the Turkish redoubts as the direction in which to advance; and it must not be said that the expression left room in the mind of Lord Lucan for a doubt as to what guns were meant. He well knew that the guns indicated by the 'fourth order' were the English guns taken in the forts—in the forts crowning those very 'heights' which, more than half an hour before, he had been ordered to retake if he could;¹ and no one,

¹ In the controversies arising out of the Light Cavalry charge, it was sometimes argued that there was a doubt as to what were 'the guns' to

indeed, had more poignant reason than Lord Lucan for knowing what the guns were; because he was the commander of the force which—rightly, perhaps, but not, of course, without mortification—had had to stand by and be witness whilst Liprandi effected the capture.

If collated with the third order, the written words brought down by Nolan seem to come with accumulated weight and decisiveness. By the third order, the commander of our cavalry had been directed to advance, and take any opportunity of recovering the heights—those heights, be it remembered, where the enemy was posted with the seven English guns he had captured; and now, by this fourth order, Lord Lucan—being requested to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy from carrying away the guns—was, for the second time, told that he must operate against the Russians on the Causeway Heights, and was furnished with a new and special motive for energy and dispatch. Construed singly, the fourth order looks clear as day; read along with the former direction it looks equally clear, but even more cogent; for, when so considered, it appears to visit Lord Lucan with something like an expression of impatience and displeasure for having allowed more than half an hour to pass after the receipt of the third order without trying to recover the ‘heights.’

I am not without means of explaining how it became possible for Lord Lucan to raise a controversy upon the subject, but the circumstance which opened to him that opportunity was one occurring after the battle;¹ and the question we now have to treat is the meaning of the few written words which Nolan delivered. After applying to those simple words all such knowledge as I have of the relevant facts, I remain unable to learn how Lord Lucan could read the fourth order without seeing that it directed him to attempt an advance against the head of Liprandi’s column—against the head of the column then occupying those same Causeway Heights where the English guns had been taken. That the order thus interpreted was one which Lord Raglan had most

which the fourth order pointed; and that circumstance makes it convenient to say and to prove, once for all, that Lord Lucan at the time knew very well what ‘the guns’ were. In his dispatch addressed to Lord Raglan, on the 27th of October, 1854—the day next but one after the battle—he writes: ‘The Heavy Brigade having now joined the Light Brigade, the division took up a position with a view of supporting an attack upon the heights; when, being instructed to make a rapid advance to our front to prevent the enemy carrying the guns lost by the Turkish troops in the morning, I ordered,’ etc.

¹ This will be shown in a later page.

perfectly adapted to the exigency of the hour, we shall by and by see valid proof.

Lord Lucan, however, had no sooner read this order, than there was awakened in his mind that spirit of hostile criticism which so marred his usefulness as a subordinate. He proceeded to sit in judgment upon the command of his chief, and at once, without mercy, condemned it. His own account declares that he 'read the 'order with much consideration'—'perhaps consternation,' he says, 'would be the better word—at once seeing its impracticability for any useful purpose whatever, and the consequent great unnecessary risk and loss to be incurred.' The formation of this strangely decisive opinion upon the merits of an order sent him by his Commander-in-Chief, was rendered the more inappropriate by the fact, that the Commander who sent the order had the whole field of battle before him, whilst the critic who undertook to condemn it was so placed (upon the lower ground) that to him neither enemy nor guns were in sight;¹ nor must it be forgotten that this condemnation of the order was based upon its written words unalloyed by any oral addition, and stands earlier in point of time than that outbreak of Nolan's which was afterward alleged as a warrant for the course pursued by Lord Lucan.

But, unhappily, Lord Lucan did not content himself with a silent condemnation of the order. With the bearer of the note for his listener, he suffered himself to run out against the order of his chief. Conceiving (erroneously) that he rightly understood the nature of the enterprise which Lord Raglan's written words had enjoined, he urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it.²

By this language apparently Lord Lucan challenged the messenger to encounter him in wordy dispute, and to defend, if he could, the order of the Commander-in-Chief.

Nolan was a man who had gathered in Continental service the habit of such extreme and such rigid deference to any general officer, that his comrades imagined him to be the very last man who in that point would ever prove wanting; but perhaps that very reverence for the military hierarchy which had hitherto rendered him so superlatively respectful to gen-

¹ 'Neither enemy nor guns being in sight.'—*Speech of Lord Lucan in the House of Lords.*

² 'After carefully reading the order, I urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it.'—*Lord Lucan's speech in the House of Lords.*

eral officers, may have made him the more liable to be shocked by the reception which Lord Lucan was giving to the order of the Commander-in-Chief. Up to this moment, however, Nolan was not so ungovernably indignant as to be guilty of more than imparting an authoritative tone to the words in which he answered Lord Lucan's denunciation of the order. 'Lord Raglan's orders,' he said, 'are, that the cavalry should attack immediately.'

Then quickly, and in a tone of impatience, caused, it seems, by what he imagined to be the absurdity of the attack thus enjoined, Lord Lucan said to Nolan, 'Attack, Sir! attack what? What guns, Sir?'

This angry, impatient question was destined to put an end to all prospect of eliciting from Nolan any quiet explanation of the mission with which he came charged, or any of that priceless information in regard to the enemy's position which, coming as he did from high ground, the aid-de-camp was well able to give. To use the homely, nay feminine, language which describes the action of the emotional forces, Lord Lucan's words set Nolan going. Throwing his head back, and pointing with his hand in a direction which Lord Lucan says confidently was toward the left-front corner of the valley, the aid-de-camp replied, 'There, my lord, is your enemy; there 'are your guns.'² Lord Lucan declares that these words were addressed to him in a 'most disrespectful but significant 'manner;'³ and, even without too much relying upon gesture or cadence of voice, it is easy to see that the apostrophe thus uttered by Nolan was almost in the nature of an indignant rebuke—an indignant rebuke inflicted by a captain upon a lieutenant-general in front of his troops.

Just men will therefore acknowledge that this outbreak of Nolan's was only too well fitted to enrage a general officer, and, by enraging him, to disturb his judgment; but, apart from the effect they might produce upon the temper of Lord Lucan, the gestures and the words of the aid-de-camp can not fairly be wrought into the kind of importance which was afterward assigned to them in controversy. The tenor of the apostrophe as recorded by Lord Lucan himself shows plainly enough that, by pointing generally to the direction in which the enemy might be found, Nolan's gestures and words were

¹ I here follow Lord Lucan's written narrative. According to his speech in the House of Lords, his words were, 'Where and what to do?'

² Lord Lucan's written narrative and speech. As to this answer of Nolan's both those accounts agree; but the speech, in saying how Nolan pointed, says, 'to the farther end of the valley.'

³ Ibid.

meant to convey a taunt, not to give topographical guidance; and this is made the more evident by taking care to remember that, when the words passed between the Lieutenant-General and the Aid-de-camp, they were neither of them on ground from which any Russians could be seen; for a messenger, who was so blindly placed at the moment as not to have a glimpse of the enemy, could hardly have so trusted to his own and his hearer's recollection of the local bearings as to think of attempting to designate a particular object of attack by pointing to its supposed position.

The haze that was at one time engendered by controversy carried on with imperfect materials is yet farther cleared off by observing the angle of difference between the route of the Causeway Heights, which Lord Raglan had enjoined, and the fatal way down the North Valley. Vast and terrible as was the contrast in point of consequences between taking the right way and taking the wrong one, the divergence of the one route from the other at the spot where Nolan made the gesture is represented by an angle of little more than twenty degrees. How is it possible that, where the difference of direction between the two routes at the point of departure had so moderate a width, and where also there was no sight of a Russian battalion or squadron to guide the eye or the hand, the aid-de-camp could have even seemed to forbid the one route or to enjoin the other, by the way in which—burning with anger—he tauntingly pointed to the ‘enemy’?

Nolan was one of the last men in the whole army who would have been capable of sending our squadrons down the North Valley instead of to the line of the heights; for, besides that he had come fresh from the high ground which commanded a full view of the enemy's position, and had just been gathering the true purpose of the orders from the lips of Lord Raglan himself, it so happens that he had a special and even personal interest in the recapture of the heights and the guns, because he had maintained, and maintained for a time, against the judgment of some of our Engineers, that the construction of redoubts on the line of the Causeway Heights was an expedient measure. With the overstrained notions he had of what squadrons of horse might achieve, he can not have failed to ascribe the loss of a position thus specially valued by him to the general officer whom he long had regarded as the obstructor of all cavalry enterprise, and it may well be imagined that he came down exulting in the terms of an order which was framed for compelling Lord Lucan to try to recover the guns. The notion of his having intended to divert

our cavalry from the Causeway Heights and send it down the North Valley seems altogether untenable.

If Nolan had been the bearer of a mere verbal order, then, indeed, this outbreak of his might have been in a high degree embarrassing. It might have forced Lord Lucan to consider whether he should send for farther instructions, or whether he should instantly gallop up to a ground from which he could have such a survey of the enemy as to know where to attempt an attack; or, finally, it might have put him to the task of endeavoring to winnow the communication addressed to him, by calming the overexcited aid-de-camp, and bringing him to say, if he could, how much of the words he had uttered were words really intrusted to him as a message by the Commander-in-Chief. But Lord Raglan, as we saw, had provided that his directions should be set down on paper; and after Nolan's outbreak, it became more than ever the duty of Lord Lucan to bend his mind faithfully to the written words of the order, examining as well as he could the condition of things to which it applied, and not forgetting that he had, all the while, in his hands another order, hitherto unexecuted, which enjoined him to advance and try to recover those same heights on which the guns spoken of in the 'fourth order' had been placed and lost by the Turks.

Lord Lucan has since spoken and written as if his choice lay between the plan of sending the Light Cavalry down the North Valley, and the plan of not advancing at all; but the truth is, that neither in the 'third order,' nor in the 'fourth order,' nor, lastly, in the taunting injunctions of the aid-de-camp, was there left any room to set up a doubt upon the question whether our squadrons should or should not advance; for by all these three channels alike there had come down strong mandates enjoining our cavalry to move forward and endeavor something against the enemy. I repeat that the fullest, the most generous, allowance ought to be made for the anger and consequent disturbance of mental faculty which Nolan's outbreak was but too well fitted to occasion; but it is not, for that, the less true that a steady perusal at this time of Lord Raglan's written instructions by a cavalry commander of sound judgment, who was also unruffled in temper, and acquainted with the state of the field, must have led to an immediate advance of our squadrons—to an immediate advance of our squadrons, not, of course, down the fatal North Valley, but against the line of the Causeway Heights, where the English guns had been lost.

How Lord Lucan should have dealt with an aid-de-camp who had made bold to apostrophize him in the way we have seen, that is a question which soldiers, with their traditional canons, will best determine. Since the messenger came fresh from a spot where he had been hearing the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, and looking down with full command of view upon the position of an enemy invisible from the low ground, he could not but be fraught with knowledge of almost immeasurable worth; and apparently the immediate interests of the public service required that an effort should be made to undo the mischief which had been caused by provoking his indignation, and endeavoring to bring him back to such a degree of composure as to allow of his imparting what, only a few minutes before, he had been hearing and seeing. On the other hand, the due maintenance of military subordination is, of course, transcendently important; and it has been judged, as I learn, by men held to be of authority in such matters, that after the utterance by Nolan of his last taunting words, Lieutenant-General Lord Lucan should have put the Captain under arrest. The course least susceptible of a rational defense was that of treating Captain Nolan's indignant apostrophe as a word of command from Head-quarters, and regarding the scornful gesture which accompanied his words as a really topographical indication.

This last course, however, as I understand him, is the one Lord Lucan's determination. which Lord Lucan took; for, as soon as he had heard the taunting words, and marked the insulting gesture, he determined to govern his action, not exclusively by the written instructions which he held in his hand, but in part by the angry and apparently rhetorical apostrophe of the excited Captain. Nay, in spite of the two written orders, one pointing to the 'heights,' and the other to the 'guns' on those heights, as the object of the enterprise, he determined to follow what he judged to be the direction of Nolan's outpointed arm as a guiding indication of the quarter in which the attack should be made.

Dividing the Causeway Heights (where Lord Raglan desired to attack) from the line of the Fedioukine Hills (where D'Allonville was destined to charge), there opened, as we saw, that North Valley where riders seeking their death—without themselves being able to strike in attack or defense for the first full mile of their road—might nevertheless run the gauntlet between two prepared lines of fire, having always before them for a goal—which some of the survivors

might touch—the front of a Russian battery, and the whole strength of Ryjoff's squadrons.¹ Toward this valley, as we saw, Lord Lucan thought Nolan was pointing when he uttered his taunting apostrophe.

So Lord Lucan now proceeded to obey what he judged to be the meaning of the 'fourth order,' as illustrated by the aid-de-camp's words and gesture. Believing that it had really become his duty to send a force down the North Valley, he selected Lord Cardigan and the Light Brigade as the man and the men who must first be offered up in obedience to the supposed commands of Lord Raglan. At a trot and alone, he rode off to the ground in front of the 13th Light Dragoons, where Lord Cardigan sat in his saddle.

IX.

Lord Lucan now personally imparted his resolve to Lord Cardigan. There is some difference between the Lord Lucan's order to Lord Cardigan. impressions that were formed of this interview by Lord Lucan on the one hand and Lord Cardigan on the other; Lord Lucan believing that with the 'fourth order' in his hand he imparted its contents, or at all events the main tenor of it, to Lord Cardigan, and directed him 'to advance,' without in terms enjoining an 'attack,' whilst Lord Cardigan's statement is that he was ordered 'to attack the Russians in the valley about three-quarters of a mile distant with the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers.'²

Lord Lucan's idea as to the way in which this direction of his ought to have been executed is as follows:—He says: 'After giving³ to Lord Cardigan the order brought to me 'from Colonel⁴ Airey by Captain Nolan I urged his Lordship

¹ This statement is not too extensive; for Jeropkine's Lancers were not under General Ryjoff, the officer commanding the bulk of the Russian cavalry.

² Private memorandum in Lord Cardigan's handwriting, and by him forwarded to Lord Raglan 27th October, 1854. I prefer this to Lord Cardigan's subsequent account, as being earlier—within two days of the battle—and being also a statement deliberately prepared for the Commander of the Forces. The 'three-fourths of a mile' was, of course, estimate only, and it applied to an extent of ground which was really more than a mile and a quarter. The two regiments which he mentions as those with which he had attacked were the troops constituting his first line.

³ He does not mean that he handed the paper to Lord Cardigan, but that he either read it over to him, or gave him the tenor of it. According to Lord Cardigan, no such communication took place.

⁴ He means General Airey.

‘to advance steadily, and to keep his men well in hand.’
‘My idea was that he was to use his discretion and act as circumstances might show themselves; my opinion is that keeping his four squadrons under perfect control he should have halted them so soon as he found that there was no useful object to be gained, but great risk to be incurred; it was clearly his duty to have handled his brigade as I did the Heavy Brigade, and so saved them from much useless and unnecessary loss.’

Lord Cardigan did not so understand the task which was devolving upon him. From the way in which his brigade was fronting at the time, he considered that an indefinite order to advance was an order to advance down the valley against the far distant guns and black masses of cavalry which were seen to be drawn up across it; and whatever were the words really used, Lord Cardigan certainly understood that without assailing either of the enemy’s two protruded columns he was ordered to run the gauntlet between them for a distance of more than a mile, with the purpose of then charging the battery which crossed the lower end of the valley, and charging it moreover in front.

Understanding that he was thus instructed, Lord Cardigan judged it right to point out the true import of an order to advance down the valley. So, on hearing the words of his Divisional General, he brought down his sword in salute, and answered, ‘Certainly, Sir; but allow me to point out to you that the Russians have a battery in the valley in our front, and batteries and riflemen on each flank.’² Lord Lucan, after first expressing his concurrence in what he gathered to be the tenor of Lord Cardigan’s observation, went on to intimate—he shrugged his shoulders whilst speaking—that there was no choice but to obey.³

Then, without farther question or parley, Lord Cardigan tacitly signified his respectful submission to orders, and began that great act of military obedience which is enshrined in the memory of his fellow-countrymen. He turned quietly to his people and said: ‘The brigade will advance!’

¹ The way in which Lord Lucan handled the Heavy Brigade in the North Valley will be seen in a later page.

² Lord Lucan’s belief is that Lord Cardigan’s warning pointed only to the forces on the Fedioukine Hills, and not to those in front or those on the right flank.

³ He said, according to Lord Lucan, ‘I know it, but Lord Raglan will have it. We have no choice but to obey.’ According to Lord Cardigan, Lord Lucan said, ‘I can not help that; it is Lord Raglan’s positive orders that the Light Brigade attacks immediately.’

Before the two Generals parted, Lord Lucan announced to Lord Cardigan his determination to narrow the front of the brigade by withdrawing the 11th Hussars from the first line, and causing it to act in support. Unless Lord Lucan's memory deceives him, he also enjoined Lord Cardigan 'to advance very 'steadily and quietly,' and to 'keep his men well in hand.'

It has been judged, that although the observation ventured by Lord Cardigan in answer to Lord Lucan's first words of instruction had somewhat the character of a remonstrance, it still was amply warranted by the occasion; and this, as I gather, was the opinion entertained by the Commander-in-Chief. When Lord Raglan gave the tenor of the remonstrance in a private letter addressed to the Duke of Newcastle, he prefaced the statement by saying that Cardigan was 'as brave as a lion.'² Indeed, it would seem that from the moment in which he learned the nature of the task imposed upon him to the one when he bowed to authority and composedly accepted his martyrdom, Lord Cardigan's demeanor was faultless.

X.

As altered by Lord Lucan at the moment of directing the advance, the disposition of the Light Brigade was as follows:—The 13th Light Dragoons, commanded by Captain Oldham, and the 17th Lancers, commanded by Captain Morris, were to form the first line; the 11th Hussars, commanded by Colonel Douglas, was ordered to follow in support;³ and the third line was composed of the 4th Light Dragoons under Lord George Paget, and the 8th Hussars, or rather, one may say, the main portion of it, under Colonel Shewell.⁴ Lord Cardigan, as commander of the whole brigade, had to place himself at the head of the first line. The second line, consisting

Dispositions
for the ad-
vance of the
cavalry down
the North
Valley.

¹ I have not ventured to put the statement in an absolutely positive form, because Lord Cardigan, I believe, has no recollection of having received this direction.

² Letter dated the 28th of October, 1854. See this letter in the Appendix.

³ Before the change thus ordered by Lord Lucan the three first-named regiments had been all in first line. I speak of the change actually *effected*, and not of the one *contemplated* by Lord Lucan. He meant to have placed the 4th Light Dragoons in the same alignment as the 11th Hussars; but his orders to that last purpose were never communicated to the 4th Light Dragoons. The order for the 11th Hussars to drop back and act in support was given by Lord Lucan in person to Colonel Douglas.

⁴ A troop of the 8th Hussars, commanded by Captain Chetwynd, had been abstracted from the regiment to act as escort to the Commander of the Forces, and was at the Head-quarters camp.

of only one regiment, was commanded by Douglas, its colonel; and the two regiments comprising the third line were in charge of Lord George Paget. Each of these regiments stood extended in line two deep. The Light Cavalry was to be supported by Scarlett's victorious brigade; and with two of Scarlett's regiments—that is, the Greys and the Royals brought forward in advance of the other regiments of Heavy Dragoons—Lord Lucan determined to be present in person. We shall have to learn by and by that there occurred a conjuncture—and that too at a cardinal time—when the link which connected the two brigades was haplessly suffered to break; but nevertheless it should be understood that the advance of not only our Light Cavalry but also our Heavy Dragoons was meant to form one operation. We shall find that both of the brigades (though not in any thing like the same degree) were exposed to the trials and the losses which the nature of the onslaught involved.¹

Lord Cardigan placed himself quite alone at a distance of
Lord Cardigan
and his Staff. about two horses' lengths in advance of his Staff,
 and some five horses' lengths in advance of the
 centre of his first line.

When once a body of cavalry has been launched upon a course which is to end in attack, it has to dispense for a while with reliance upon full, explicit orders conveyed by word of mouth; and although there may come the time when the trumpet shall be sounding 'the gallop,' and when afterward it shall be sounding 'the charge,' yet, upon the whole, the troops of the first line obtain guidance mainly by carefully watching the leader who rides at the head of the force; and, the empire of words being thus superseded for the time by the signaling, if so one may call it, which is effected by the pace and the position of a single horseman, it seems right, by a kind of analogy, that one who would listen to the story of a cavalry onslaught extending along a great distance should be able—as well as may be in the mind's eye—to see and distinguish the leader. There is the more reason for this, since it happens that in the course of the controversies springing out of the Light Cavalry charge there arose a question of mistaken identity which has an important bearing upon Lord Cardigan's military reputation.

¹ The above observation seems to be rendered necessary by the not unnatural tendency to concentrate attention upon that part of the operation which was performed by the Light Brigade. Besides the casualties in the Divisional Staff which accompanied the Greys and the Royals, these regiments, as we shall see, sustained no inconsiderable losses whilst engaged in the duty of supporting the Light Brigade.

Lord Cardigan had so good a stature that, although somewhat long in the fork, he yet sat rather tall in the saddle, and notwithstanding his fifty-seven years, he had a figure which retained the slenderness of youth. His countenance, highly bred and of the aquiline cast, had not been without such humble share as a mere brother might be expected to have of that beauty which once made famous the ancient name of Brudenell. Far from disclosing the real faults of his character, the features of the man rather tended to confirm the first popular impression that was created by the tidings of the Light Cavalry charge, and to indicate a nature which might have in it something of chivalrous, nay even Quixotic exaltation. His blue, frank-looking, genial eyes revealed none of the narrowness of disposition which I have thought myself obliged to ascribe to him. As might be supposed, he had an excellent cavalry seat, and was erect—but also stiff—in the saddle. He wore the uniform of his old regiment, the 11th Hussars; but instead of dangling loose from his shoulders, his pelisse—richly burthened in front with gold lace—was worn closely put on like a coat, and did not at all break or mitigate the rigid outline of his figure.¹ The charger he rode was a thorough-bred chestnut, with marks of a kind visible from afar, which in controversy it may be well to remember. On the near side before, as well as on the near side behind, the horse had one white leg.² In the small group which represented the Brigade-Staff, Lieutenant Maxse, assistant aid-de-camp, and Sir George Wombwell, extra aid-de-camp to Lord Cardigan, were, it seems, the only officers present.³

¹ In the Crimea at this time the Hussar regiments wore the pelisse in the same way as Lord Cardigan.

² Under the off hind fetlock, also, the horse—he still survives, or did a few months ago—has a stain of white, but so small as not to be visible from a distance. As far as could be seen by any one on the field of battle not coming close to the horse, he had no white stains on his legs, except one high ‘white stocking’ before and another high ‘white stocking’ behind, both the ‘white stockings’ being on the near side. General Liprandi, when questioning English prisoners with a view to identify the English officer whom he had seen galloping back, seems to have spoken of the horse as a chestnut *with white heels*, only one of the witnesses saying that the Russian General asked as to the rider of a chestnut with *white legs*.

³ The death of Captain Lockwood (an excellent officer, who was aid-de-camp to Lord Cardigan) has thrown difficulty in the way of knowing where he was at any given period of the combat, except its very last phase; and there is an idea (not confirmed by Lord Cardigan) that he was carrying a message from his chief at the time when the advance began. Major Mayow, the brigade-major, had been on the sick-list, and although, as we shall learn, he found strength enough upon seeing the prospect of an engagement,


Although the part of the enemy's line which Lord Cardigan meant to attack lay as yet very distant before him, it was evident, from the position of the flanking batteries betwixt which he must pass, that his brigade would not long be in motion without incurring a heavy fire; and, upon the whole, he seems to have considered that almost from the first his advance was in the nature of a charge.

Followed immediately by his first line, and, at a greater distance, by the other regiments of his brigade, Lord Cardigan moved forward at a trot, taking strictly the direction in which his troops before moving had fronted, and making straight down the valley toward the battery which crossed it at the distance of about a mile and a quarter.

Before Lord Cardigan had ridden a hundred paces in advance, he encountered a sight which filled him with anger. Right before him he saw Captain Nolan audaciously riding across his front from left to right;¹ but not content with a trespass which alone would have been shocking enough to Lord Cardigan's orderly mind, Captain Nolan, turning round in his saddle, was shouting, and waving his sword as though he would address the brigade. We now know that when Nolan thus strangely deported himself, he was riding in a direction which might well give significance to his shouts and his gestures; for, instead of choosing a line of advance like that pursued by Lord Cardigan, he rode crossing the front of the brigade, and bearing away to the right front of our advancing squadrons, as though he would go on to the spot on the Causeway Heights where the Odessa regiment stood

to join the brigade and take a signal part in the combat, he was busied, in general, with the troops, and did not ride much with the Staff.

¹ This diagram, by an officer who was one of the nearest of all the observers, points out the way in which Nolan's direction deviated from that of Lord Cardigan:—



posted. Regarded in connection with this significant fact, the anxious entreaties which he sought to express by voice and by signs would apparently mean something like this—

His probable
object.

‘You are going quite wrong! “You are madly going down this North Valley between flanking fires, where you won’t have an enemy in your front for the next mile. This—the way you see me going—this is the direction to take for doing what Lord Raglan has ordered. Bring up the left shoulder, and incline to your right as you see me doing. This, this is the way to get at the enemy!”’

Failing, however, to surmise that Nolan’s object might be that of averting mistake and supplying a much-needed guidance, Lord Cardigan, at the time, only saw in the appeal of the aid-de-camp a ridiculous and unseemly attempt to excite the brigade—nay, even to hurry it forward. Considering, however, that Nolan must have been acting with a full knowledge of the enemy’s position, as well as of Lord Raglan’s true meaning, and that at the time of his appealing thus eagerly to our Light Cavalry by gesture and voice, he was not only on the right front of our line, but was actually bearing away diagonally in the very direction of the Causeway Heights, there is plainly more room for surmising that the aid-de-

¹ Lord Cardigan, however, in writing addressed to myself, has distinctly confirmed the statements which show that Nolan was riding diagonally *across* the front of the brigade. Supposing my interpretation to be right, the desire of an officer not only to have his chief’s order faithfully executed, but likewise to save our superb Light Brigade from self-destruction, might well excuse Nolan’s interference; but it may be also observed that there had obtained at our Head-quarters a practice of sending an officer of the Quartermaster-General’s Staff to guide Lord Lucan (topographically) in the execution of the orders intrusted to him; and on that special ground, as well as for the more general reason, Nolan might have imagined that he was warranted in trying to save the brigade from the error of taking a route which he knew to be the wrong one. His attempt no doubt was made at a very late moment; but I have no reason for supposing that Nolan had the least idea of the mistake which was about to be perpetrated, until he saw the brigade begin to advance *without having first changed front*. After that (if my interpretation be right) he did not lose a moment in his efforts to rescue the brigade from the error into which he then saw it falling. He had just been speaking to Morris, announcing to him, in what I understand to have been a sufficiently cool and collected way, that he meant to accompany the brigade; but the moment the brigade began to advance without having first inclined its front toward what Nolan knew to be the true point of attack, he began to move diagonally across the front, and this so fast and with such appearance of excitement—excitement very natural to one who was then in the very act of discovering the fatal error, and eagerly trying to stop it whilst yet it was possible to do so—that Morris shouted out to him, ‘That won’t do, Nolan! we’ve a long way to go, and must be steady.’

camp's anxiety had been roused by seeing our squadrons advance without having first changed their front, and that what he now sought was to undo the mistake of Lord Lucan, to bend our troops from the path which led down the fatal North Valley, and make them incline to their right—make them so incline to their right as to strike the true point of attack which Lord Raglan had twice over assigned.

But a Russian shell bursting on the right front of Lord Nolan's fate. Cardigan now threw out a fragment which met Nolan full on the chest, and tore a way into his heart. The sword dropped from his hand; but the arm with which he was waving it the moment before still remained high uplifted in the air, and the grip of the practiced horseman remaining as yet unrelaxed still held him firm in his saddle. Missing the perfect hand of his master, and finding the accustomed governance now succeeded by dangling reins, the horse all at once wheeled about, and began to gallop back upon the front of the advancing brigade. Then from what had been Nolan—and his form was still erect in the saddle, his sword-arm still high in the air—there burst forth a cry so strange and appalling that the hearer who rode the nearest to him has always called it 'unearthly.' And in truth, I imagine, the sound resulted from no human will, but rather from those spasmodic forces which may act upon the bodily frame when life, as a power, has ceased. The firm-seated rider, with arm uplifted and stiff, could hardly be ranked with the living. The shriek men heard rending the air was scarce other than the shriek of a corpse. This dead horseman rode on till he had passed through the interval of the 13th Light Dragoons. Then at last he dropped out of the saddle.

Question as to the degree in which blame justly attached to Nolan. An officer of the Guards, who set down at the time in his journal what he had learned of this part of the battle, went on to say lightly in passing, that the blame of the error would be laid upon Captain Nolan, because the Captain was dead. Whether based on sound reason or not, the prophecy was amply fulfilled. None, so far as I know, have yet questioned that, when wrought into anger by the reception given to Lord Raglan's order, the aid-de-camp was guilty of a high military offense—the offense of openly taunting a general officer in front of his troops; and the limit of the evil thus done will never be measured, for no man can reckon and say how much an insulting apostrophe may have tended to disturb the judg-

ment of the Lieutenant-General upon whom at that moment the fate of our cavalry was depending; but when this has been freely acknowledged, it is hard to see any other or heavier share of the blame that can justly be charged against Nolan's memory. The notion of his not understanding the order he brought, the notion of his mistaking a mile and a quarter of unoccupied valley for those occupied heights which our cavalry was to try to recover, the notion of his seeking to annul Lord Raglan's order in regard to the captured guns, the notion of his intending (by a taunt and an outpointed hand) to send our troops down the North Valley—all these, it would seem, for reasons already disclosed, are too grossly improbable to be worthy of acceptance; and unless error lurks in fair inference, he was in the very act of striving to bend the advance of our squadrons, and bring them to the true point of attack, when death came and ended his yearnings for the glory of the cavalry arm.

The shell which slew Nolan was the first, I believe, of the missiles which our squadrons, now advancing, encountered; and the gunners on the Fedioukine Hills were still only awakening—awakening almost incredulously—to the singular occasion which their foe seemed coming to offer them, when—unknown at the time to our people—a movement was made by the Russians, which shows with how sound a judgment Lord Raglan had acted when he ordered, and ordered twice over, the advance of our cavalry.

Movement on the part of the enemy which shows the exact adaptation of Lord Raglan's written orders to the exigency of the hour.

In both of the two last orders, as we saw, the position of the enemy on the Causeway Heights was assigned as the ground which our horsemen should endeavor to win; and although our Light Cavalry, now advancing at a trot, had been launched from the first in a wrong direction, yet the ulterior purpose of pushing the attack down the valley had not yet so developed itself as to be discernible by the enemy. To him for the moment, and until our troops had moved down a distance of some hundreds of yards, this superb advance of our cavalry was so far similar to the advance which Lord Raglan had directed, and which Liprandi was plainly expecting, that at the mere sight of our squadrons there began to take place, on the part of the Russians, that very surrender of ground—nay, that very surrender of captured guns—which Lord Raglan had

expected to obtain when he sent down his third and fourth orders. The weak and protruding column of infantry by which Liprandi had hitherto clung to the line of the Causeway Heights, and of the captured redoubts, began all at once to curl up. As already we know, the head of that column was formed by the Odessa regiment, a force numbering four battalions, which stood drawn up on the heights near the Arabtabia Redoubt.¹ Well, upon the approach of our Light Brigade those battalions at once fell back, abandoned the defense of the Arabtabia, retreated to such a distance as to be a good way in the rear of even the Redoubt 'Number Two,' and threw themselves at length into hollow squares, thereby apparently indicating that they expected the triumphant advance of our squadrons along the very route which Lord Raglan had assigned, and that, so far at least as concerned the westernmost portion of Liprandi's morning conquest, they had no mind to obstruct our cavalry in its task of effecting a recapture.² It would be hardly an overstrained use of language to say that without hearing Nolan, or seeing the paper he carried, the Russians understood Lord Raglan's order, and (until they saw it annulled by the advance of our troops down the valley) were full ready to conform to its pressure.

Even at this late moment, and after all the misconception that had occurred, if Lord Lucan had turned at last in the direction assigned to him by his written orders, he would have found himself master at once of two out of the seven captured guns, with (apparently) a rich opportunity of not only securing the ulterior recovery of the two other lost redoubts and the five other English guns, but also inflicting

¹ Otherwise called the 'Number Three' Redoubt.

² In General Todleben's plan—not in the text of his book—this retreat of the Odessa regiment upon the approach of our Light Brigade is faithfully recorded; but the 'Legende' of the official 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient,' which discloses a great amount of careful labor and inquiry on the part of the officers who undertook to record and illustrate the Russian movements at Balaclava, has put the same fact into words; and as I consider that the retrograde movement of the Odessa regiment is the most satisfactory proof that could well be furnished of the sound judgment with which Lord Raglan acted when he, twice over, ordered his cavalry to advance to the line of the redoubts, I venture to give the passage: 'A l'approche de la cavalerie légère Anglaise, le regiment d'Odessa a quitté sa position près de la Redoute 'No. 4 [i. e., in front of the Redoubt No. 3, see the plan]. Ses bataillons 'se sont formés en carré plus en arrière.' See the plan. Of course I am not entitled to quote the French Atlas as an authoritative record of Russian movements, but, as I have said, the statement is in strict accordance with Todleben's plan.

upon Liprandi a calamitous defeat ;¹ for although the enemy's right wing was untouched, and although, toward his left, he still held his ground from Kamara to the second redoubt, yet the means on which he had relied for connecting the head of his column with the troops of General Jabrokritsky had been ruined by the defeat of his cavalry at the hands of Scarlett's dragoons. His grasp of the field was relaxing ; and indeed it could hardly be otherwise, for now that the Allies in force were completing their descent into the plain of Balaclava, Liprandi's continued obtrusion of troops in the direction of the Causeway Heights was no longer warranted by his relative strength.

At first, as was natural, the enemy's gunners and riflemen were so far taken by surprise, as to be hardly in readiness to seize the opportunity which Lord Cardigan was presenting to them ; and indeed for some time, the very extravagance of the operation masked its character from the intelligence of the enemy, preventing him from seeing at once that it must result from some stupendous mistake ; but the Russians at length perceived that the distance between our Heavy Brigade and Lord Cardigan's squadrons was every moment increasing, and that, whatever might be the true meaning of the enterprise in which our Light Cavalry had engaged, the red squadrons were not under orders to give it that kind of support which the Englishman calls ' thorough-going.' This once understood, the enemy had fair means of inferring that the phenomenon of ten beautiful squadrons moving down the North Valley in well-ordered lines, was not the commencement of any thing like a general advance on the part of the Allies, and might prove, after all, to be hardly the result of design. Accordingly, with more or less readiness, the forces on the Causeway Heights, the forces on the Fedioukine Hills, and the twelve-gun battery which crossed the lower end of the valley, became all prepared to inflict upon our Light Cavalry the consequences of the fault which propelled it. It is true that the main body of the Russian cavalry, drawn up in rear of the confronting battery, had been cowed by the result of its encounter with Scarlett's dragoons ; but when that has been acknowledged as a qualification of what is coming, it may be said that the

¹ That men may judge how far such a surmise may be warranted, I invite an examination of the accompanying plan.

three sides of the quadrangle in which our cavalry moved, were not only lined with Russians, but with Russians standing firm to their duty.

Soon, the fated advance of the Light Brigade had proceeded so far as to begin to disclose its strange purpose—the purpose of making straight for the far distant battery which crossed the foot of the valley, by passing for a mile between two Russian forces, and this at such ugly distance from each as to allow of our squadrons going down under a doubly flanking fire of round-shot, grape, and rifle-balls, without the opportunity of yet doing any manner of harm to their assail-

Powerful fire
opened upon
the advancing
brigade from
both flanks.

ants. Then, from the slopes of the Causeway Heights on the one side, and the Fedioukine Hills on the other, the Russian artillery brought its power to bear right and left, with an efficiency

every moment increasing; and large numbers of riflemen on the slopes of the Causeway Heights, who had been placed where they were in order to cover the retreat of the Russian battalions, found means to take their part in the work of destroying our horsemen. Whilst Lord Cardigan and his squadrons rode thus under heavy cross-fire, the visible object they had straight before them was the white bank of smoke, from time to time pierced by issues of flame, which marks the site of a battery in action; for in truth the very goal that had been chosen for our devoted squadrons—a goal rarely before assigned to cavalry—was the front of a battery—the front of that twelve-gun battery, with the main body of the Russian cavalry in rear of it, which crossed the lower end of the valley; and so faithful, so resolute, was Lord Cardigan in executing this part of what he understood to be his appointed task, that he chose out one of the guns which he judged to be about the centre of the battery, rode straight at its fire, and made this, from first to last, his sole guiding star.

With the two regiments constituting the first line, there rode the following officers: Besides Captain Oldham, the officer commanding the 13th Light Dragoons, the officers with the regiment were—Captain Goad, Captain Jenyns, Captain Tremayne, Lieutenant Percy Smith (acting Adjutant), Lieutenant Edward Lennox Jervis, Cornet Montgomery, and Cornet Chamberlayne; whilst with the 17th Lancers there were Captain Morris (in command of the regiment), Captain Robert White, Captain Winter, Captain Webb, Captain Godfrey Morgan, Lieutenant Thomson, Lieutenant Sir William Gordon, Lieutenant Har-

Officers acting
with the two
regiments of
the first line.

topp, Lieutenant Chadwick (Adjutant), Cornet Wombwell,¹ and Cornet Cleveland.

Pressing always deeper and deeper into this pen of fire, the devoted brigade, with Lord Cardigan still at its head, continued to move down the valley. The fire the brigade was incurring had not yet come to be of that crushing sort which mows down half a troop in one instant, and for some time a steady pace was maintained. As often as a horse was killed, or disabled, or deprived of the rider, his fall, or his plunge, or his ungoverned pressure, had commonly the effect of enforcing upon the neighboring chargers more or less of lateral movement, and in this way there was occasioned a slight distension of the rank in which the casualty had occurred; but, in the next instant, when the troopers had ridden clear of the disturbing cause, they closed up, and rode on in a line as even as before, though reduced by the loss just sustained. The movement occasioned by each casualty was so constantly recurring, and so constantly followed by the same process,—the process of re-closing the ranks, that, to distant observers, the alternate distension and contraction of the line seemed to have the precision and sameness which belong to mechanic contrivance. Of these distant observers there was one—and that too a soldier—who so felt to the heart the true import of what he saw that, in a paroxysm of admiration and grief, he burst into tears. In well-maintained order, but growing less every instant, our squadrons still moved down the valley.

Their pace for some time was firmly governed. When horsemen, too valorous to be thinking of flight, are brought into straits of this kind, their tendency is to be galloping swiftly forward, each man at the greatest pace he can exact from his own charger, thus destroying, of course, the formation of the line; but Lord Cardigan's love of strict, uniform order was a propensity having all the force of a passion; and as long as it seemed possible to exert authority by voice or by gesture, the leader of this singular onset was firm in repressing the fault.

Thus when Captain White, of the 17th Lancers (who commanded the squadron of direction), became 'anxious,' as he frankly expressed it, 'to get out of such a murderous fire, 'and into the guns, as being the best of the two evils,' and endeavoring, with that view, to 'force the pace,' pressed forward so much as to be almost alongside of the chief's bridle-

¹ Wombwell, though near his own regiment—being on its right flank—was not doing duty with it, because as we saw he was on Lord Cardigan's staff.

Lord Cardigan's rigid way of leading the brigade.

arm, Lord Cardigan checked this impatience by laying his sword across the Captain's breast, telling him at the same time not to try to force the pace, and not to be riding before the leader of the brigade. Otherwise than for this, Lord Cardigan, from the first to the last of the onset, did not speak nor make sign. Riding straight and erect, he never once turned in his saddle with the object of getting a glance at the state of the squadrons which followed him; and to this rigid abstinence—giving proof, as such abstinence did, of an unbending resolve—it was apparently owing that the brigade never fell into doubt concerning its true path of duty, never wavered (as the best squadrons will, if the leader, for even an instant, appears to be uncertain of purpose), and was guiltless of even inclining to any default except that of failing to keep down the pace.

Increasing difficulty of restraining the pace in the first line.

State of the first line.

So far as concerned the first line, this task was now becoming more and more difficult. When the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers had passed so far down the valley as to be under effective fire from the guns in their front, as well as from the flanks right and left, their lines were so torn, so cruelly reduced in numbers, as to be hardly any longer capable of retaining the corporate life or entity of the regiment, the squadron, the troop; and these aggregates began to resolve themselves into their component elements—that is, into brave, eager horsemen, growing fiercely impatient of a trial which had thus long denied them their vengeance, and longing to close with all speed upon the guns which had shattered their ranks. The troopers here and there could no longer be restrained from darting forward in front of the officers; and the moment this license obtained, the ceremonious advance of the line was soon changed to an ungoverned onset. The racing spirit broke out, some striving to outride their comrades, some determining not to be passed.

Casualties in Lord Cardigan's personal Staff.

In the course of the advance, Lieutenant Maxse, Lord Cardigan's second aid-de-camp, was wounded; and when the line had come down to within about a hundred yards of the guns, Sir George Wombwell, the extra aid-de-camp, had his horse killed under him. We shall afterward see that this last casualty did not end the part which Wombwell was destined to take in the battle; but for the moment, of course, it disabled him, and there was no longer any Staff-officer in the immediate personal following of the General who led the brigade.

But although he rode singly, and although, as we have

Continued advance of Lord Cardigan and his first line.

seen, he rigidly abstained from any retrograde glance, Lord Cardigan, of course, might infer from the tramp of the regiments close following, and from what (without turning in his saddle) he could easily see of their flanks, that the momentum now gathered and gathering was too strong to be moderated by a commander; and, rightly perhaps avoiding the effort to govern it by voice or by gesture, he either became impatient himself, and drew the troops on more and more by first increasing his own speed, or else yielded (under necessity) to the impatience of the now shattered squadrons, and closely adjusted his pace to the flow of the torrent behind him. In one way or in the other, a right distance was always maintained between the leader and his first line. As before, when advancing at a trot, so now, whilst flinging themselves impetuously deep into the jaws of an army, these two regiments of the first line still had in their front the same rigid hussar for their guide, still kept their eyes fastened on the crimson-red overalls and the white near hind-leg of the chestnut which showed them the straight, honest way—the way down to the mouths of the guns.¹

Lord Cardigan insists that he was not the originator of the high speed which they reached in this part of their onset; whilst some, on the other hand, say that the squadrons never ceased from their duty of studiously watching the leader, and that the swiftness of Lord Cardigan was the cause which hurried forward the line. The truth, perhaps, is intermediate; for it seems not unlikely that the rapid pace of the leader, and the eagerness of the squadrons behind him, were causes which acted and reacted alternately the one on the other; but with whomsoever originating, and whether dictated by a sound warlike judgment, or by mere human instinct, the desire to move more and more swiftly was not unwarranted. Even at the cost of sacrificing military order, for the moment, it was seemingly wise, after all, in the straits to which our squadrons had been brought, to let every man close upon the battery with all the speed he could gather.²

Alone, in a sense, though close followed, and with no regimental labor on his hands, Lord Cardigan had more leisure

¹ The chestnut had two 'white stockings,' both rather high up the leg. Both these 'white stockings' were on the near side, and to people following Lord Cardigan the white stocking behind was, of course, the one which most caught the eye.

² This I understand to be an opinion now recognized as sound by officers most competent to judge.

for thought than the chief part of those he was leading; and for that reason simply, if not for any other, there is an interest in hearing him say how it fared with him mentally at the time of undergoing this trial. He has not been reluctant to disclose the tenor of the ideas which possessed themselves of his mind whilst he thus led his troops down the valley. From moment to moment he was an expectant of death; and it seems that death by some cannon-ball dividing his body was the manner of coming to an end which his fancy most constantly harbored; but there is a waywardness in the human mind which often prevents it from laying a full stress on any one thought, however momentous; and despite the black prospect of what the next moment might bring, Lord Cardigan—not knowing that his anger was with the dead—still dwelt, as he rode, on the incident which had marked the commencement of the advance—still raged, and raged against Nolan for having ridden in front of him, for having called out to his troops.¹ By thus affording distraction to one who supposed himself doomed, hot anger for once, it would seem, did the work of faith and philosophy.

Lord Cardigan and his first line had come down to within about eighty yards of the mouths of the guns, when the battery delivered a fire from so many of its pieces at once as to constitute almost a salvo. Numbers and numbers of saddles were emptied, and along its whole length the line of the 13th Light Dragoons and 17th Lancers was subjected to the rending perturbation that must needs be created in a body of cavalry by every man who falls slain or wounded, by the sinking and the plunging of every horse that is killed or disabled, and again by the wild, piteous intrusion of the riderless charger appalled by his sudden freedom coming thus in the midst of a battle, and knowing not whither to rush, unless he can rejoin his old troop, and wedge himself into its ranks. It is believed by Lord Cardigan that this was the time when, in the 13th Light Dragoons, Captain Oldham, the commander of the regiment, and Captain Goad, and Cornet Montgomery, and, in the 17th Lancers, Captain Winter² and Lieutenant Thomson, were killed—when Cap-

¹ The accuracy of Lord Cardigan's impression as to the thought chiefly occupying his mind at this time is confirmed by what we know from other sources of the first utterances to which he gave vent after coming out of the charge. No one was more struck than Lord Cardigan was by the strange and 'unearthly' shriek which Nolan had uttered; but oddly enough, he failed to infer that the cry was one immediately preceding death.

² Captain Winter about this time was seen alive and in his saddle, but it seems probable that he had then already received his mortal wound.

tain Robert White and Captain Webb and Lieutenant Sir William Gordon were struck down.¹ The survivors of the first line who remained undisa-abled were feeble by this time, in numbers scarce more than some fifty or sixty;² and the object they rode at was a line of twelve guns close supported by the main body of the Russian cavalry, whilst on their right flank as well as on their left, there stood a whole mile's length of hostile array, comprising horse, foot, and artillery. But by virtue of innate warlike passion—the gift, it would seem, of high Heaven to chosen races of men—the mere half of a hundred, carried straight by a resolute leader, were borne on against the strength of the thousands. The few, in their pride, claimed dominion: Rushing clear of the havoc just wrought, and with Cardigan still untouched at their head, they drove thundering into the smoke which enfolded both the front of the battery and the masses of horsemen behind it.

Whilst the first line thus moved in advance, it was followed, at a somewhat less pace, by the three regiments which were to act in support. The officers present with these regiments—I take them from left to right—were as follows: With the 11th Hussars, besides Colonel Douglas who commanded the regiment, there rode Captain Edwin Cook, Lieutenant Trevelyan, Lieutenant Alexander Dunn, Lieutenant Roger Palmer, and George Powell Houghton. With the 4th Light Dragoons, besides Lord George Paget who commanded the regiment, there were present Major Halkett, Captain Alexander Low, Captain George John Brown, Captain Portal, Captain Hut-ton, Lieutenant Sparke, Lieutenant Hedworth Jolliffe, Cor-net Wykeham Martin, Cornet William Affleck King, and Cornet Edward Warwick Hunt. With

The advance of the three regiments acting in support.

Officers present with the 11th Hussars.

With the 4th Light Dragoons.

With the 8th Hussars.

¹ Sir William Gordon survived and recovered, but afterward retired from active service. I have heard that he was an officer of great ability, with an enthusiastic zeal for his profession; and his retirement has been quoted to me by cavalry men as an instance of the way in which the perverse arrangements of our military system tend to drive able men from the service. It seems that (upon principles analogous to those adopted by the trades-unions) the sacred rights of mediocrity are maintained with a firmness which too often defeats the patient ambition of a highly gifted soldier.

² The grounds of this necessarily rough computation are, 1st, the strength of the two regiments as ascertained at the muster after the battle; and 2nd, the absence of proofs showing that any numerous casualties occurred in these two regiments at a later moment.

the 8th Hussars (which had only three of its troops present) there rode, besides Colonel Shewell who commanded the regiment, Major de Salis, Captain Tomkinson, Lieutenant Seager (the Adjutant), Lieutenant Clutterbuck, Lieutenant Lord Viscount Fitzgibbon, Lieutenant Phillips, Cornet Heneage, Cornet Clowes, and Cornet William Mussenden.

Of the regiments thus acting in support the foremost was the 11th Hussars. In obedience to the order personally delivered to Colonel Douglas by Lord Lucan, the regiment had altered its relative position; and, instead of forming the left of the first line, it now advanced in support of the 17th Lancers. Next came Lord George Paget's regiment, the 4th Light Dragoons. Whilst intrusting to Lord George Paget the charge of what he had intended to be his second line—that is, the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars—Lord Cardigan had said, with what was taken to be a somewhat marked emphasis, ‘I expect your best support; mind, Lord George, your best support!’ Lord George said, ‘Of course, my lord, you shall have my best support;’ but the eager injunction he had received so continued to ring in his ears during the critical minutes which followed, that he was more careful to keep near the first line than to preserve his connection with the 8th Hussars. His order to the 8th Hussars had been, ‘4th Light Dragoons will direct;’ and this order of course, if obeyed, would have sufficiently maintained the connection between the two regiments; but the instruction, it would seem, had not been effectually heard, or, at all events, was not kept in mind; for the officers of the 8th Hussars apparently entertained a belief that theirs was the directing regiment of the line in which it had to act. Whatever the cause, it is certain that Colonel Shewell was most resolute in keeping down the pace of the regiment, and would not allow it to assume the same speed as the 4th Light Dragoons. Also it happened, from some unknown cause, that the regiment bore more toward its right than did the 4th Light Dragoons; and from the difference of pace thus combined with the difference of direction, it resulted that both the interval and the distance which separated the two regiments were suffered to be continually increasing. For some time Lord George Paget labored with voice and gesture to call on, and call in to his side the diverging regiment; and it seems that he dispatched a message to Colonel Shewell with the same object; but his efforts were vain; and presently the increasing pace of the first line made him give his whole care to the

The order in which the ‘supports’ advanced.

duty of following it with a sufficient closeness; for the sound of that 'Mind, Lord George, your best support!' still haunted his memory, and it seemed to him that there was no evil so great as the evil of lagging behind.

Nor was the task of bringing and keeping the regiment to the pace of the first line so easy as it might seem at first sight; for the squadron-leaders, being both of them men of singular firmness, would not suffer themselves nor their troops to be hurried by stress of fire, nor even by the impatience of their chief; and therefore, whilst Lord George was laboring to force the pace, and from time to time crying 'Keep up!' the two imperturbable squadron-leaders so ignored any difference there might be for such purpose between wearisome practice at home and desperate service in battle, that without remission or indulgence the teachings of Hounslow Heath and the Curragh were repeated in this fatal valley. The crash of dragoons overthrown by round-shot, by grape, and by rifle-ball, was alternate with dry 'technical precepts: 'Back, right flank!' 'Keep back, Private This!' 'Keep back, Private That!' 'Close in to your centre!' 'Do look to your dressing!' 'Right squadron, Right squadron, keep back!'

The increasing distance between the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars soon became so great as to make Lord George Paget discard for the time all idea of reuniting them into one line; and, accordingly, with his now isolated regiment, he continued to press forward at a rate which was in great measure dictated to him by the speed of the first line. He observed, however, that in his front there was another regiment which had also become isolated; for, in obedience to Lord Lucan's direction—a direction never communicated to Lord George Paget—the 11th Hussars had by this time dropped back, so as to be acting in support to the left of the first line. In these circumstances, Lord George Paget determined that, by advancing in support to the 13th Light Dragoons, and by somewhat accelerating his pace, he would try to align himself with the 11th Hussars. In coming to this determination Lord George was governed only by the exigency of the occasion; but it so happened that, without knowing it, he was bringing the disposition of the 'supports' to that exact form which his Divisional General had intended to order; for, as soon as Lord George should succeed in overtaking the 11th Hussars, the second line would be formed, as Lord Lucan had intended, by two regiments. Meantime, however, and up to the moment when Lord George's pur

pose attained to completion, the three regiments now following the first line were in echelon of regiments.¹

When the 8th Hussars began to encounter the riderless horses dashing back from the first line, there was created some degree of unsteadiness, which showed itself in a spontaneous increase of speed; but this tendency was rigorously checked by the officers, and they brought back the pace of the regiment to a good trot. Of the three officers commanding the three troops, one—namely, Captain Tomkinson—was at this time disabled. Another, Lord Fitzgibbon, was killed; and several men and horses fell; but Lieutenant Seager and Cornet Clowes took the vacant commands, and those of this small and now isolated regiment who had not been yet slain or disabled moved steadily down the valley.

In some respects this advance was even more trying to the supports than to the first line; for, although the supports were destined to suffer much less than our first line from the twelve Cossack guns in their front, yet, passing as they did between batteries and numbers of riflemen and musketeers, where the gunners and the marksmen were now fully on the alert, they incurred heavy loss all the time from the double flank fire through which they were moving; and yet did not (as did ultimately the first line) come under such stress of battle as to be warranted in cutting short their probation by a vehement and uncontrolled rush. Throughout their whole course down the valley the officers and the men of the 11th Hussars, the 4th Light Dragoons, and the 8th Hussars never judged themselves to be absolved from the hard task of maintaining their formation, and patiently enduring to see their ranks torn, without having means for the time of even trying to harm their destroyers. These three regiments, moreover, were subjected to another kind of trial from which the first line was exempt; for men not only had (as had had the first line) to see numbers torn out of their ranks, and then close up and pass on, but were also compelled to be witnesses of the havoc that battle had been making with their comrades in front. The ground they had to pass over was thick-

¹ Thus :—

11th Hussars.

4th Light Dragoons.

8th Hussars
(less one of its troops).

ly strewn with men and horses lying prostrate in death, or from wounds altogether disabling; but these were less painful to see than the maimed officers or soldiers, still able to walk or to crawl, and the charger moving horribly with three of his limbs, whilst dragging the wreck of the fourth, or convulsively laboring to rise from the ground by the power of the fore-legs when the quarters had been shattered by round-shot.

And, although less distressing to see, the horses which had just lost their riders without being themselves disabled, were formidable disturbers of any regiment which had to encounter them. The extent to which a charger can apprehend the perils of a battle-field may be easily underrated by one who confines his observation to horses still carrying their riders; for, as long as a troop-horse in action feels the weight and the hand of a master, his deep trust in man keeps him seemingly free from great terror, and he goes through the fight, unless wounded, as though it were a field-day at home; but the moment that death or a disabling wound deprives him of his rider, he seems all at once to learn what a battle is—to perceive its real dangers with the clearness of a human being, and to be agonized with horror of the fate he may incur for want of a hand to guide him. Careless of the mere thunders of guns, he shows plainly enough that he more or less knows the dread accent that is used by missiles of war whilst cutting their way through the air, for as often as these sounds disclose to him the near passage of bullet or round-shot, he shrinks and cringes. His eyeballs protrude. Wild with fright, he still does not most commonly gallop home into camp. His instinct seems rather to tell him that what safety, if any, there is for him must be found in the ranks; and he rushes at the first squadron he can find, urging piteously, yet with violence, that he too by right is a troop-horse—that he too is willing to charge—but not to be left behind—that he must and he will ‘fall in.’ Sometimes a riderless charger thus bent on aligning with his fellows, will not be content to range himself on the flank of the line, but dart at some point in the squadron which he seemingly judges to be his own rightful place, and strive to force himself in. Riding, as it is usual for the commander of a regiment to do, some way in advance of his regiment, Lord George Paget was especially tormented and pressed by the riderless horses which chose to turn round and align with him. At one time there were three or four of these horses advancing close abreast of him on one side, and as many as five on the other. Impelled by

terror, by gregarious instinct, and by their habit of ranging in line, they so 'closed' in upon Lord George as to besmear his overalls with blood from the gory flanks of the nearest intruders, and oblige him to use his sword.

Familiar pulpit reflections concerning man's frail tenure of life come to have all the air of fresh truths when they are pressed upon the attention of mortals by the 'ping' of the bullet, by the sighing, the humming, and at last the 'whang' of the round-shot, by the harsh 'whirr' of the jagged iron fragments thrown abroad from a bursting shell, by the sound—most abhorred of all those heard in battle—the sound that issues from the moist plunge of the round-shot when it buries itself with a 'slosh' in the trunk of a man or a horse. Under tension of this kind prolonged for some minutes, the human mind, without being flurried, may be wrought into so high a state of activity as to be capable of well-sustained thought; and a man, if he chose, whilst he rode down the length of this fatal North Valley, could examine and test and criticise—nay, even could change or restore that armor of the soul, by which he had been accustomed to guard his serenity in the trials and dangers of life.

One of the most gifted of the officers now acting with the supports was able, whilst descending the valley, to construct and adopt such a theory of the divine governance as he judged to be the best-fitted for the battle-field. Without having been hitherto accustomed to let his thoughts dwell very gravely on any such subjects of speculation—he now all at once, whilst he rode, encased himself body and soul in the iron creed of the fatalist; and, connecting destiny in his mind with the inferred will of God, defied any missile to touch him, unless it should come with the warrant of a providential and foregone decree. As soon as he had put on this armor of faith, a shot struck one of his holsters without harming him or his horse; and he was so constituted as to be able to see in this incident a confirmation of his new fatalist doctrine. Then, with something of the confidence often shown by other sectarians not engaged in a cavalry onset, he went on to determine that his, and his only, was the creed which could keep a man firm in battle. There, plainly, he erred; and, indeed, there is reason for saying that it would be ill for our cavalry regiments, if their prowess were really dependent upon the adoption of any highly spiritual or philosophic theory. I imagine that the great body of our cavalry people, whether officers or men, were borne forward and sustained in their path of duty by moral forces of another kind

—by sense of military obligation, by innate love of fighting and of danger—by the shame of disclosing weakness—by pride of nation and of race—by pride of regiment, of squadron, of troop—by personal pride; not least, by the power of that wheel-going mechanism which assigns to each man his task, and inclines him to give but short audience to distracting, irrelevant thoughts.

But, whatever might be the variety of the governing motives which kept every man to his duty through all the long minutes of this trying advance, there was no variety in the results; for what it was his duty to do, that every man did; and as often as a squadron was torn, so often the undisa- bled survivors made haste to repair it. The same words were ever recurring—‘Close in! Close in!’ ‘Close in to the centre!’ ‘Close in!’

It was under this kind of stress—stress of powerful fire on each flank, and signs of dire havoc in front—that the three regiments (in echelon order, but with an always diminishing distance between the 11th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons) moved down to support the first line. Except that the pace of the 8th Hussars was more tightly restrained than that of the 11th Hussars or the 4th Light Dragoons, the conditions under which the three regiments respectively acted were, down to this time, much alike. Sustaining all the way cruel losses without means of reprisal, but always preserving due order, and faithfully running the gauntlet between the fire from the Causeway Heights and the fire from the Fedioukine Hills, they successively descended the valley.

Lord Cardigan and his first line, still descending at speed on their goal, had rived their way dimly through the outer folds of the cloud which lay piled up in front of the battery; but then there came the swift moment when, through what remained of the dimness, men at last saw the brass cannons gleaming with their muzzles toward the chests of our horses; and visibly the Russian artillerymen—unappalled by the tramp and the aspect of squadrons driving down through the smoke—were as yet standing fast to their guns.

By the material obstacle which they offer to the onset of horsemen, field-pieces in action, with their attendant limber-carriages and tumbrils behind them, add so sure a cause of frustration to the peril that there is in riding at the mouths

of the guns, that, upon the whole, the expedient of attacking a battery in front has been forbidden to cavalry leaders by a recognized maxim of war. But the huge misconception of orders which had sent the brigade down this valley was yet to be fulfilled to its utmost conclusion; and the condition of things had now come to be such that, whatever might be the madness (in general) of charging a battery in front, there, by this time, was no choice of measures. By far the greater part of the harm which the guns could inflict had already been suffered; and I believe that the idea of stopping short on the verge of the battery did not even present itself for a moment to the mind of the leader.

Lord Cardigan moved down at a pace which he has estimated at seventeen miles an hour, and already he had come to within some two or three horses' lengths of the mouth of one of the guns—a gun believed to have been a twelve-pounder; but then the piece was discharged; and its torrent of flame seemed to gush in the direction of his chestnut's off fore-arm. The horse was so governed by the impetus he had gathered, and by the hand and the heel of his rider, as to be able to shy only a little at the blaze and the roar of the gun; but Lord Cardigan being presently enwrapped in the new column of smoke now all at once piled up around him, some imagined him slain. He had not been struck. In the next moment, and being still some two horses' lengths in advance of his squadrons, he attained to the long-sought battery, and shot in between two of its guns.

There was a portion of the 17th Lancers on our extreme left which outflanked the line of the guns, but with this exception the whole of Lord Cardigan's first line descended on the front of the battery; and as their leader had just done before them, so now our horsemen drove in between the guns; and some then at the instant tore on to assail the gray squadrons drawn up in rear of the tumbrils. Others stopped to fight in the battery, and sought to make prize of the guns. After a long and disastrous advance against clouds and invisible foes, they grasped, as it were, at reality. What before had been engines of havoc dimly seen or only inferred from the jets of their fire and their smoke, were now burnished pieces of cannon with the brightness and the hue of red gold—cannon still in battery, still hot with the slaughter of their comrades.¹ In defiance of our cavalry

¹ There is reason for believing that the pieces were twelve-pounders.

raging fiercely amongst them, the Russian artillerymen with exceeding tenacity still clung to their guns. Here and there indeed gunners were seen creeping under the wheels for safety, but in general they fought with rare devotion, striving all that men could, in such conditions of fight, against the sabres and lances of horsemen. They desired at all hazards to save their Czar's cannon from capture by removing them in haste from the front; and apparently it was to cover this operation—an operation they had already begun to attempt—that the gunners, with small means of resistance, stood braving the assaults of dragoons.

It so happened that Captain Morris, the officer in command of the 17th Lancers, was advancing in front of his left squadron, and thence it resulted that the portion of the regiment which outflanked the battery fell specially under his personal leadership.¹

As soon as Morris had ridden so far through the smoke as to be able to see beyond it, he found that he had before him—with no line of guns intervening—a body of regular cavalry, and he seems to have understood that the force thus immediately opposed to him consisted of not less than two squadrons;² though he could not apparently see whether these two squadrons stood isolated or were acting in conjunction with other bodies of horse. We now know, however, that the body of horse Morris had on his front was one overlapping the battery, and connected with the right wing of that great body of Russian cavalry which stood posted across the valley in rear of the

Their metal had that reddish tinge which is observable in the sovereigns coined of late years by the English Mint.

¹ Before the change by which Lord Lucan reduced the three regiments of the first line to two, the centre of the 17th Lancers was the centre of the line; and, Lord Cardigan's proper position being then in front of that centre, Captain Morris thought it right to avoid being unduly near the general of the brigade by placing himself in front of his left squadron. Having once taken that place, he kept it, notwithstanding the change.

² In words, so far as I know, Morris spoke only in general terms of the force as a 'body of cavalry;' but whilst lying in bed ill from his many wounds he contrived (though his arm was fractured) to sketch a little plan of the combat; and in this the Russian force immediately opposed to him is represented in a way which indicates the presence of not less than two squadrons.

guns. On the other hand, the portion of the 17th Lancers which was thus confronted by the right wing of the Russian cavalry could hardly have numbered more than some twenty horsemen;¹ and this scanty force, being now at the close of a rapid advance carried on for more than a mile under destructive fire, was not moving down with such weight and compactness—nor even, in truth, at such a high rate of speed—as to be able to deliver that shock which is the object of a cavalry charge. It was plain, however, that, with all such might as was now possible, the blow must be dealt; for the Russian horsemen, by remaining halted, were offering once more to the English that priceless advantage which they had given to Scarlett in the earlier part of the day. The density of the smoke had prevented the commander of the 17th Lancers from seeing that three-fourths of his horsemen were confronted by the battery;² and he apparently believed that, in executing a charge against the enemy's cavalry, he would be carrying with him the whole remains of his regiment.³

Be this as it may, Morris, turning half round in his saddle, called out to his people, and said, 'Now re-
Morris's charge. member what I have told you, men, and keep 'together.' Then he put his spurs into 'Old Treasurer,' and, followed by that fraction of the regiment which ranged clear of the battery, drove full at the squadron confronting him.

In resistance to the onset of a handful of Lancers thus descending upon their close serried ranks, the Russians still remained halted; and in the moments which passed whilst galloping down to attack them, Morris used to the utmost his well-practiced eyes without being able to discern any one sign of wavering. The only movement he could detect in the enemy's ranks was of a kind showing readiness to join in close combat. The Russian troopers in front of him were

¹ It is known that, besides the whole of the right squadron of the 17th Lancers, a large portion of the left squadron (probably not much less than a troop) was confronted by the battery, and entered it; and if also it be true, as I imagine it must be, that by far the greater part of the casualties which ultimately reduced the regiment to a strength of only 37 had already occurred, it would seem to follow that there can hardly be any wide error in the surmise which puts the force engaged in Morris's charge at a number not exceeding twenty.

² This is proved, as I think, by a little sketch-map in which he conveyed his impression as to the position of the guns.

³ This is inferred from the fact mentioned in the foregoing note and from the general tenor of Colonel Morris's narrative.

perceptibly drawing their horses' heads in the direction of the bridle-arm, as though seeking to gain larger space for the use and free play of their swords.

In the direct front of the ranks thus awaiting the charge of our horsemen, there was sitting in his saddle a Russian who seemed to be the squadron-leader. Morris drove his horse full at this officer, and in the instant which followed the contact, the sword of the assailant had transfixed the trunk of the Russian, passing through with such force that its hilt pressed against the man's body. The handful of men whom Morris was thus leading against the Russian cavalry followed close on their chief, drove full down at the charge on the enemy's array of Hussars, and so broke their way into his strength as to be presently intermingled, the few with the many—the twenty gay, glittering Lancers, with the ranks of the dusky gray cavalry.

Seeing perhaps, with more or less distinctness, that they were undergoing an attack from only a handful of Lancers, some portions of the Russian Hussars whose ranks had thus been invaded did not choose to confess themselves vanquished, although their array had been broken, and these remained on the ground, but the rest galloped off; and their English assailants, or such of them as were yet undisa- bled, swept on in pursuit.

Scarcely, however, had this happened, when those Russian Hussars who had not given way were joined by numbers of Cossacks pouring in from the flank; and they now once more had dominion of the very ground where their ranks, half a minute before, had been broken by Morris's charge. For the moment there was nothing to hinder the enemy from capturing any of the English who here remained wounded and disabled.

Of these Morris himself was one; and his misfortune was

Morris wound-
ed and taken
prisoner.

a consequence of the determination which induced him to 'give point' to his adversary. 'I don't know,' he would afterward say—'I don't know how I came to use the point of my sword, but it is the last time I ever do.' When his sword, driving home to the hilt, ran through the Russian squadron-leader whom he had singled out for his first adversary, the Russian tumbled over on the off side of his horse, drawing down with him in his fall the sword which had slain him; and since Morris, with all his strength, was unable to withdraw the blade, and yet did not choose to let go his grasp of the handle, or to disengage himself from the wrist-knot, it resulted that, though

still in his saddle, he was tethered to the ground by his own sword-arm.¹

Whilst thus disabled, Morris received a sabre-cut on the left side of the head which carried away a large piece of bone above the ear, and a deep, clean cut passing down through the acorn of his forage-cap, which penetrated both plates of the skull. By one or other of these blows he was felled to the ground, and for a time he lay without consciousness. As soon as he had regained his senses, he found himself lying on the ground; but his sword was once more in his power, for by some means (to him unknown) it had been withdrawn from the body which before held it fast, and being joined to him still by the wrist-knot, was now lying close to his hand. He had hardly recovered his senses and the grasp of his sword when he found himself surrounded by Cossacks thrusting at him with their lances. Against the numbers thus encompassing him Morris sought to defend himself by the almost ceaseless 'moulinet,' or circling whirl of his sword, and from time to time he found means to deliver some sabre-cuts upon the thighs of his Cossack assailants. Soon, however, he was pierced in the temple by a lance-point, which splintered up a piece of the bone, and forced it in under the scalp. This wound gave him great pain; and, upon the whole, he believed that his life must be nearly at its end; but presently there appeared a Russian officer, who interposed with his sword, striking up two or three of Cossack lances, and calling out loudly to Morris, with assurances that if he would surrender he should be saved. Accordingly Morris yielded up his sword, and became a prisoner of war.

At nearly the same time, and not far from the same spot, another officer of the 17th Lancers fell alive into the hands of the enemy. This was Lieutenant Chadwick. Before he reached the line of the battery, his charger had received so many wounds, and lost so much blood, as to be all but incapable of stirring, though yet remaining on his legs. In spite of the singular and tormenting disadvantage of thus having under him an almost immovable horse, Chadwick found means to defend himself for some time against the stray Cossacks and other dragoons who, one after another, beset him; but at length he was caught in the neck by a Cossack lance, which lifted him out

Other incidents
in this part of
the field.

¹ Thrust home with the momentum belonging to a horse charging down at high speed, the blade, it would seem, must have been forced through so much bone and muscle as to be held fast against any mere pull which Morris could apply.

of his saddle, and threw him to the ground with such force as to stun him. When his senses returned, and whilst he still lay on the ground, he succeeded in defending himself with his revolver against a Cossack who sought to dispatch him; but presently, from the direction of our right rear, other Cossacks, to the number of eight or ten, rode down yelling, with lances poised, and to these (when they circled around him, and made signs that he might have quarter if he would throw down his pistol) Lieutenant Chadwick at length surrendered.

At this time, and in this part of the field, several of the wounded English who lay on the ground without means of defending themselves were dispatched by the Cossacks; but I have not been compelled to learn that men were guilty of acts such as these where any Russian officer was present.

It was before our supports had come down, and whilst the English were still combating in the battery or pushing their onset beyond it, that the enemy, for a moment, was thus able to exercise dominion in rear of Lord Cardigan's first line.

Of those who swept on at the instant without staying to subdue the resistance of the artillerymen, Lord Cardigan from the first had been one. After charging into the battery, he continued his onset with but little remission of speed; and although the smoke was so thick as to put him in danger of crushing his legs against wheels, he pierced his way through at a gallop between the limber-carriages and the tumbrils, by a gangway so narrow as hardly to allow a passage for two horsemen going abreast. Of necessity, therefore, his people who had hitherto followed him strictly now had to seek out other paths for their still continuing onslaught. Some, by bending a little, when necessary, to their right or to their left, found gangways more or less broad for their passage through the ranks of the artillery-carriages, and others made good their advance by sweeping round the flanks of the battery, but a few only were able to follow close on the track of their leader, and all these, sooner or later, were cut off from him by the incidents of battle.

In this way it happened that Lord Cardigan had already become almost entirely isolated, when, still pursuing his onward course, he found himself riding down singly toward a large body of Russian Cavalry.

Continued advance by Lord Cardigan in person.

His isolation.

His advance toward a large body of Russian Cavalry.

alry, then distant, as he has since reckoned, about eighty yards from the battery. This cavalry was retreating, but presently it came to a halt, went about, and fronted. Lord Cardigan stopped, and at this time he was so near to the enemy's squadrons that he has reckoned the intervening distance at so little as twenty yards. The same phenomenon which had enforced the attention of some of Scarlett's dragoons in the morning now presented itself under other conditions to Lord Cardigan. All along the confronting ranks of the gray-coated horsemen, he found himself hungrily eyed by a breed of the human race whose numberless cages of teeth stared out with a wonderful clearness from between the writhed lips, and seemed all to be gnashing or clenched. It is believed that this peculiar contortion of feature, so often observed in the Russian soldiery, was not, in general, an expression of any thing like brutal ferocity, but rather of vexation, and keen, eager care, with a sense of baffled energy. Lord Cardigan himself imagines that, with the feelings of the Russian troopers whilst eying him, the thought of gain possibly mingled; for his pelisse being rich, and worn close at the time like a coat, showed a blaze of gold lace to the enemy.

It can rarely occur to any man to be able to recognize a friend or acquaintance across the dim barrier of distance or smoke which commonly divides hostile armies in a modern battle-field; but in the part of the valley to which Lord Cardigan's onset had brought him the air was clear, and I am assured that an officer of the house of Radzivill, then serving with the Russian cavalry, was able to recognize, in the gorgeous hussar now before him, that same Earl of Cardigan whom he had formerly known or remarked during

the period of a visit to England.¹ This officer
Endeavor to take him prisoner. says that he ordered some Cossacks to endeavor to capture his London acquaintance, enjoining them specially to bring in their prisoner unhurt, and that, the better to whet their zeal, he promised them a tempting reward.

Certainly, the bearing of the Cossacks who now came forward against Lord Cardigan was very much what might have been expected from men who had received such instructions as these. Two of them only, in the first instance, came up close to him, and these not, as I gather, in a trucu-

¹ My informant assures me that he had this from Prince Radzivill himself.

lent way, for they seemed as though they would have liked to make him prisoner. Lord Cardigan, however, showing no signs of an intention to surrender, they began to assail him with their lances, and for a moment his demeanor was like that of a man who regarded the movements of the Cossacks as disorderly rather than hostile; for—full of high scorn at the wretchedness of their nags—he sat up stiff in the saddle, and kept his sword at the slope. Presently, however, he found himself slightly wounded by a thrust received near the hip, and in peril of being unhorsed by a lance which caught hold of him by the pelisse, and nearly forced him out of his saddle. Yet that last effort seems to have been made by a Cossack who was himself almost in retreat; for the man at the time had his back half turned to Lord Cardigan, and the thrust he delivered was the one known to science by the name of the ‘right rear point.’ The assailant had possibly learned by this time that his comrades a little way off were flying from the English cavalry, and that he must not be too slow in conforming,

It was right, of course, that instead of submitting to be taken prisoner, or to be butchered by overwhelming numbers, Lord Cardigan, being nearly alone, and altogether unaided, should disengage himself, if he could, from the reach of his assailants by a sufficing movement of retreat, and this he accordingly did; but before he had galloped far back, and whilst still on the Russian side of the battery, he found that he already had extricated himself from personal molestation, and had leisure to determine what next he would do.

Being now on the verge of that period in the battle when Lord Cardigan’s course of action became such as to leave room for question and controversy, if not for unsparing blame, I would here interpose, and say that, home down to the moment when he found himself almost alone in the presence of the enemy’s cavalry, he had pursued his desperate task with a rare, and most valorous persistency. And English officers, I know, will take pleasure in learning that, from the moment when he quietly said, ‘The brigade will advance,’ to the one when, nearly alone in the presence of the enemy’s cavalry, he stiffly awaited his assailants with his sword at the slope, Lord Cardigan performed this historic act of devotion without word or gesture indicative of bravado or excitement, but rather with the air of a man who was performing

The movement in retreat by which he disengaged himself from his Cossack assailants.

The devotion with which, down to this time, Lord Cardigan had led his brigade.

an every-day duty with his every-day courage and firmness.¹

When Lord Cardigan had withdrawn himself from the reach of his Cossack assailants, he still continued to retire, and passed once more through the battery into which he had led his brigade. He then saw men of the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers retreating in knots up the valley, and he apparently imagined that the horsemen whom he thus saw retiring constituted the entire remnants of his first line. There, however, he erred. So far as I have learned, there was no group of English horsemen still remaining 'effective' which, at this time, had moved to the rear; and indeed I have never yet heard of any one ascertained exception of either officer or man which ought to forbid me from saying in general terms that the Light Dragoons and the Lancers whom Lord Cardigan saw retreating were, all of them, men disabled—men either disabled by their own wounds, or else by the wounds of their chargers. It must be remembered, however, that the number of men thus in one way or other disabled was so huge in proportion to the whole strength of the regiments, as to give a seeming, though fallacious ground for the wrong impression which their appearance produced upon Lord Cardigan's mind. It is certain enough, as we shall afterward learn more fully, that effective remnants of the 13th Light Dragoons and of the 17th Lancers pushed on their attack down the valley in the direction of the aqueduct; but Lord Cardigan solemnly declares—and declares, I believe, with truth—that, at the time, he could see none of his first line except those who, being most of them already some way toward the rear, were retreating up the slope of the valley. In these circumstances, he satisfied himself that, so far as concerned the business of rallying or otherwise interfering with the shattered fragments of his first line, there was

¹ During the advance down the valley, Captain Morris, who could not have been under a bias favorable to the commander of the brigade (see *ante*, p 486), was on the left rear of Lord Cardigan, and at no great distance from him. When asked as to the manner in which Lord Cardigan had led the brigade, Morris used to say, 'Nothing could be better. He (Lord Cardigan) put himself just where he ought, about in front of my right squadron, and went down in capital style.' When specially asked whether Lord Cardigan had led 'quietly,' Morris answered, 'Quite so; just as it ought to be—in short, like a gentleman'—'an expression from his lips conveying 'much,' so says the narrator of the conversation, 'to any one who knew him.'

nothing he could usefully do, without first following their retreat.

But then Lord Cardigan, though acting as the more immediate leader of the first line, was also in command of the whole brigade, and had charge, amongst others, of the three regiments which formed his supports. Was he warranted in leaving those regiments to fight their way in, or to fight their way out without giving them the advantage, if any, which the presence of their Brigadier might confer?

Lord Cardigan answers this question by propounding the theory that his primary duty was with the first line, and by also asserting that he could nowhere see his supports. He determined to follow the horsemen whom he saw falling back. Without seeing occasion to deliver any order, or to hold up his sword for a rally, he continued the movement by which he had withdrawn himself from the Cossacks, and remounted the slope of the valley.

It might be thought that, since he left a main part of his brigade in the fangs of the Russian army, Lord Cardigan, when resolved to fall back, would have sought to turn his retrograde journey to a saving purpose by flying to Lord Lucan or General Scarlett, and entreating that some squadrons might be pushed forward to extricate the remains of his brigade. Perhaps, though he has not so said, he exerted the utmost resources of his mind in the endeavor to see what, if any thing, could be done for the salvation of his troops, then engulfed, as it were, in a hostile army, and was painfully driven to the conclusion that no reinforcements could help them; but, so far as I know, he has not been accustomed to speak of any such mental efforts. Resolved as he was from a sense of personal honor to execute to the letter, and without stint of life, whatever he might make out to be his clear duty, he yet never seemed to attain to such a height above the level of self as to feel what is called public care. And certainly his own account, if taken as being complete, would tend to make people think that, although, as might be expected, he was magnanimously regardless of his mere personal safety, yet, in other respects, he much remembered himself, and all but forgot his brigade. It occurred to him, he says, at the time, that it was an anomalous thing for a General to be retreating in the isolated state to which he found himself reduced, and he therefore determined to move at a pace decorously slow.

Whatever were his governing motives, and whatever was his actual pace, he rode back alone toward the spot where

Scarlett at this time was halted.¹ The first words he uttered were characteristic, and gave curious proof that the anger provoked by an apparent breach of military propriety had not been at all obliterated by even the 'Light Cavalry Charge.' He began to run out against the officer who had galloped across his front at the commencement of the onset, and was continuing his invective when Scarlett stopped him by saying that he had nearly ridden over Captain Nolan's dead body.² Lord Cardigan afterward resumed his westerly movement, and rode back to the neighborhood of the ground from which his brigade had advanced.

Supposing Lord Cardigan to be accurate when he says that he could neither see any still-combating remnants of his first line, nor any portion of his supports, there are two monosyllables—more apt than the language of scholars—by which hunting-men will be able to describe his predicament, and to sum up a good deal of truth in a spirit of fairness. For eight or ten minutes, Lord Cardigan had led the whole field, going always straight as an arrow : he then was 'thrown out.' Perhaps if he had followed the instincts of the sport from which the phrase has been taken, he would have been all eye, all ear, for a minute, and in the next he would have found his brigade. But with him, the sounder lessons of Northamptonshire had been overlaid by a too lengthened experience of the soldiering that is practiced in peace-time. In riding back after the troops which he saw in retreat up the valley, he did as he would have done at home after any mock charge in Hyde Park.

It will always be remembered that he who retired from the now silenced battery was the man who, the foremost of all a few moments before, had charged in through its then blazing front, and that that very isolation which became the immediate cause of his misfortune, was the isolation, after

¹ It is stated by General Scarlett that Lord Lucan was present at this time ; but Lord Lucan, on the other hand, has stated that Lord Cardigan did not ride up to or approach him until afterward when all was over. Whoever is acquainted with the tenor of the affidavits filed in Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe will see, from my use of the word 'toward,' instead of 'to,' that I avoid adopting, and also avoid contradicting, the passage of Lord Lucan's affidavit in which he says : he saw Lord Cardigan pass up the valley at a distance from him of about 200 yards. If Lord Lucan's impression in that respect be accurate, Lord Cardigan must have made a loop movement, passing first up the valley and then riding back to Scarlett.

² General Scarlett states that 'immediately previous' to this conversation he had pointed out to Lord Lucan a body of troops (which he took to be the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars) retreating under the Fedoukine Hills.

all, of a leader who had first become parted from his troops by shooting on too far ahead of them.

Lord Cardigan was not amongst the last of the horsemen who came out of the fight; and his movement in retreat was so ordered as to prevent him from sharing with his people in the combats which will next be recorded. It must therefore be acknowledged that his exit from the scene in which he had been playing so great a part was at least infelicitous, and devoid of that warlike grace which would have belonged to it if he had come out of action only a little while later with the remnant of his shattered brigade; but despite the mischance, or the want of swift competence in emergency, which marred his last act, he yet gave, on the whole, an example of that kind of devotion which is hardly less than absolute. He construed his orders so proudly, and obeyed them with a persistency at once so brave and so fatal, that—even under the light evolved from a keen, searching controversy—his leadership of this singular charge still keeps its heroic proportions.

The handful of men which had charged under Morris pursued the defeated Hussars in the direction of our left front, and drove them in on their supports; but when the Russians found out that their heavy squadrons were suffering pressure from what, after all, was no more than a small knot or group of horsemen, they turned upon their assailants; and the little band of Lancers then beginning at last to retreat, came back intermixed more or less with the enemy's gray-coated horsemen.

Presently they were met by some men of their own regiment who turned with them, and joined their retreating movement.¹ The united groups of these 17th Lancer men were pursued by the Russian cavalry, and soon found also that they were threatened on their flank by a large number of Cossacks.² To avoid being cut off by those Cossacks, they inclined sharply toward their then left, but in vain, for the Cossacks closed upon them. They, however, fought their way through their assailants, and made good their retreat, passing up the valley obliquely toward the ground where Scarlett was posted.

¹ The men they thus met were those who (as will be presently mentioned) were acting under Sergeant O'Hara.

² These apparently were the Cossacks who had poured in from the flank and were able to take prisoners as already described whilst the Lancers who charged under Morris were passing on in pursuit.

The rest of the first line, having broken straight into the battery, had either engaged themselves in the task of spear-ing and cutting down the obstinate artillerymen, or else had pushed forward betwixt the limbers and the tumbrils to assail the cavalry in rear of the guns. These men of the first line, however, were all broken up into small groups and knots, or else acting, each singly, as skirmishers.

The groups of combatants constituting the main remnants of the first line.

One of these groups had in it some of those very few men of the 13th Light Dragoons who yet remained undisabled, and Captain Jenyns, then in command of the regiment, endeavored to keep it together; but the largest fraction of the first line consisted of that part of the 17th Lancers, which, not having been engaged in Morris's charge, and not having yet pressed on against the enemy's cavalry, was engaged with the Russian artillerymen in the battery. Morris himself, as we saw, having first been cut down, had fallen into the hands of the enemy; and, there being but few other officers at this time who remained alive and undisabled, the men knew of nothing better to do than to try to complete their capture of the battery.

The group under Captain Jenyns.

Group formed of men of the 17th Lancers.

At the part of the battery which had been entered by these men of the 17th Lancers, the Russian artillerymen were limbering up and making great exertions to carry off their guns, whilst our Lancers, seeing this, began to busy themselves with the task of hindering the withdrawal of the prey, and in particular the leftmost portion of them, under the direction of Sergeant O'Hara, were stopping the withdrawal of one of the guns which already had been moved off some paces, when a voice was heard calling, 'Seventeenth! Seventeenth! this way! this way!'

The voice came from Mayow, the officer who held the post of brigade-major; but also it chanced that, with the first line, Mayow was the officer next in seniority to the commander of the brigade (whom he could not, he says, then see), and it was in that condition of things that he took upon himself to direct the operations of this still fighting remnant.

Mayow's assumption of command over these.

Mayow judged that if these men remained combating in the battery they would be presently overwhelmed by the cavalry which he saw in his front, and that, desperate as the expedient might seem, the course really safest and best was at once, with any force that could be gathered, to attack the Russian horsemen whilst still they

Mayow's order to the men.

were only impending, and before they became the assailants. Therefore warning the Lancers that if they remained in the battery they would presently be closed in upon and cut to pieces, he called upon them to push forward. He was obeyed; but from the way in which, at the time, he chanced to be carrying the pistol then held in his hand, his order was in part mistaken; for O'Hara supposed that the brigade-major, by pointing, as he seemed to be doing, toward his left front, must be intending to order an advance in that direction. Accordingly O'Hara, with the Lancers acting under his immediate guidance, moved off toward his left front, and there then only remained about fifteen men who continued to act under

The group of the 17th Lancers which branched off under O'Hara.

Mayow.

Putting himself at the head of these last, Mayow led them against a body of Russian cavalry which stood halted in rear of the guns.¹ With his handful of Lancers he charged the Russian horsemen and drove them in on their second reserve, pushing forward so far as to be at last some five hundred yards in the rear (Russian rear) of the battery, and in sight of the bridge over the aqueduct on the main road which led to Tchorgoun.

The group of the men of the 17th Lancers acting under the personal guidance of Mayow.

Mayow's charge.

His advance in pursuit.

It may well be imagined that, intruding, as he was, with less than a score of horsemen, into the very rear of the Russian position, and dealing with a hostile cavalry which numbered itself by thousands, Mayow was not so enticed by the yielding, nay, fugitive, tendency of the squadrons retreating before him, as to forget that the usefulness of the singular venture which had brought him thus far must depend, after all, upon the chance of its being supported. He halted his

little band; and whether he caught his earliest

His halt.

glimpse of the truth with his own eyes, or whether he gathered it from the mirthful voices of his Lancers saying something of 'the Busby-bags coming,' or 'the Busby-bags taking it coolly,' he at all events learned to his joy that exactly at the time when he best could welcome its aid, a fresh English force was at hand.² The force seen was only one squadron, but a squadron in beautiful order; and, though halted when first discerned, it presently resumed its advance, and was seen to be now fast approaching.

¹ This was probably the body which went about and fronted when Lord Cardigan in person approached it.

² The 'Busby-bag' is the familiar name for the head-gear of the English Hussar, and—upon the *pars pro totâ* principle—for the Hussar himself.

Operations of the forces actively supporting the first line.

It will now be convenient to observe the operations of the troops which were actively supporting Lord Cardigan's first line, and to take them in the order of from left to right.

The feelings with which the French saw our Light Cavalry advance down the North Valley.

It was with a generous admiration, yet also with a thrilling anxiety, and with a sentiment scarce short of horror, that the French saw our squadrons advance down the valley, and glide on, as it were, to destruction; but especially was strong feeling aroused in that warlike body of horse which stood ranged, as we know, on the left rear of the ground whence our Light Brigade had advanced.

The Chasseurs d'Afrique.

Though originating in arrangements somewhat similar to those by which our Irregular Cavalry in India is constructed, and though mounted on Algerine horses, the horsemen called 'the Chasseurs d'Afrique' were French at the time now spoken of, and they constituted an admirably efficient body of horse; but if all the four regiments which composed it were equal the one to the other in intrinsic worth, the one which had had the fortune to be in the greatest number

The celebrated 4th Regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

of brilliant actions was the 'Fourth.' From the frequency with which the corps had chanced to be moved in Algeria, it went by the name of the 'Traveler' regiment. From the period of its merely rudimentary state in 1840, home down to this war against Russia, the career of the regiment had been marked by brilliant enterprises. When the Duc d'Aumale performed that famous exploit of his at Taguin, overruling all the cautions addressed to him by general officers and resisting the entreaties of his Arab allies (who implored him to wait for his infantry), it was with this 'Fourth' regiment of the African Chasseurs, supported only by some Spahis or native horsemen, that the youthful Prince broke his way into the great esmala of Abdel Kader, swept through it like a hurricane, overtook and defeated the enemy's column, cut off its retreat, rode down the Emir's new battalions of regular infantry, and made himself master of all.¹ After the Duc d'Aumale himself, no one perhaps knew better what this famous regiment could do than that very General Morris.

Morris, the officer commanding the whole of the French Cavalry Division, and now present in person with his first brigade; for he it was who with this superb 'Fourth,' and

¹ In May, 1843.

one other of the regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, had issued at the Battle of Isly from that famous amassment of troops which Bugeaud used to call his 'boar's head,' and carried by his onslaught sheer ruin into the army of Morocco.

This was the General who had ridden down to be present in person with the troops of his first brigade, and this 'Fourth' was one of the two regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique of which the brigade consisted. General d'Allonville commanded the brigade.

During the earlier moments of the fatal advance down the valley, it could not but be difficult to infer that the operation was to be one of an irrational kind, there being at first no clear reason for imagining that the Light Brigade would really descend betwixt the open jaws of the enemy, instead of proceeding, as Lord Raglan had ordered, to recapture the lost Turkish heights;¹ but when, after some time,

His determination.

Morris saw that our Light Brigade was still moving straight down the valley, and avoiding the heads of both the enemy's columns in order to run the gauntlet between them, he could not, of course, help perceiving that a terrible error was in course of perpetration. He was not, however, a man to see this and stand aghast, doing nothing to succor the English. He resolved to venture an enterprise in support of Lord Cardigan's attack, and on one side at least of the valley—Lord Lucan was on the other with his Heavy Dragoons—to endeavor to silence the enemy's fire. The force which he determined to assail was the one which lay nearest to him—the one under General Jabrokritsky on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills; and the immediate object of his intended attack was a battery (divided into two half-batteries of four guns each) which was guarded on its right by two battalions of foot and on its left by two squadrons of Cossacks.²

General Morris chose for this service his famous 'Fourth' or 'Traveler' regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique; and General d'Allonville, the officer in command of the brigade, was himself to conduct the attack.

Accordingly, the chosen regiment moved forward under D'Allonville. The front of the assailing force was formed by two squadrons of the regiment under

D'Allonville's attack.

¹ I have already said that at the point whence our Light Brigade advanced, the angle of difference between the right road and the wrong one was only about twenty degrees; and it well might be some time before a spectator could convince himself that the brigade was really going down the valley.

² The two battalions of foot were 'Black Sea Cossacks.'

the immediate command of Major Abdelal, and these were supported by the two remaining squadrons of the regiment under Colonel Champeron. Champeron's two squadrons were in echelon; and it seems that, though acting in support to the first line during the earlier part of the advance, these two squadrons, upon approaching more closely to the enemy, were to incline away to their left, and then, again bringing round the left shoulder, to fall upon the two battalions of foot which constituted the infantry support to the guns.

The ground about to be invaded was much broken and scrubby, being encumbered with a tall undergrowth reaching up to the girths of the saddles; but the want of smooth even turf was not likely to be discomposing to men who had learned war in the ranges of the Atlas. Abdelal's two squadrons, advancing briskly in foraging order, and bringing round the left shoulder whilst moving, broke through the enemy's line of skirmishers, and having by this time a front which was nearly at right angles with the front of the Russian guns, drove forward with excellent vigor upon the flank of the nearest half-battery, and already were near to their goal, when with singular alacrity, the guns of the half-battery thus attacked, and those also of the other half-battery which had not been directly assailed, were limbered up by the Russians and briskly moved off at a trot, whilst the two battalions of foot which constituted the infantry supports to the guns fell back all at once, without waiting for the impact of Champeron's two squadrons then rapidly advancing against them; and, moreover, the Cossack squadrons on the left of the battery which constituted its cavalry supports went about and began to retreat.

Then, to arrest the overthrow with which he seemed menaced, or to cover the retreat of his guns, General Jabrokritsky in person put himself at the head of two battalions of that famous 'Vladimir' regiment which had proved itself well just five weeks before in its fight with our troops on the Alma, and proceeded to hazard the somewhat rare enterprise of advancing with foot-soldiers against cavalry; but already the object of General Morris had been attained, and—exactly, as it would seem, at the right moment—he caused the 'recall' to be sounded. In an instant the victorious squadrons glided

Moderate extent of the losses sustained by D'Altonville in proportion to the service rendered.

back to their place in the brigade; and it soon appeared that the losses, though involving certainly a considerable deduction of strength from a body of only a few hundred horsemen, were small in proportion to the brilliancy of the service these

BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

The Light Cavalry Attack at its culminating moment.
Charge of D'Allonville with the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique.

EXPLANATION.

Site from which a Field Battery has been moved, thus, ○ ○ ○ ○ ○


At this time, the Russian Battery had been captured by the Light Brigade; and the whole mass of the Russian Cavalry in rear of it having been put to flight, the small remains of our Light Cavalry were pressing the retreat of the Enemy's squadrons. Captain Jenyns, commanding the 13th Light Dragoons, was with some few of his troopers amongst the English horsemen in the front.

The disordered state of the Battery was occasioned by the brave and pertinacious efforts of the Russian Artillerymen to limber up and withdraw their guns in despite of the English horsemen then in actual occupation of the Battery.

Numbers of wounded and disabled horsemen of the Light Brigade are retreating up the valley.

D'Allonville's charge is taking effect and has silenced the whole of the fire from the Fedioukine Hills.

On each side of the valley there are three Squadrons of Jeropkine's Lancers which had not shared the defeat sustained by the main body of the Russian Cavalry.



SCALE, 4 INCHES TO A MILE.

squadrons had rendered. They had ten men killed (of whom two were officers) and twenty-eight wounded; but in the course of the swift moments during which these losses befell them, they had neutralized (for the requisite time) the whole of the enemy's infantry on the Fedioukine Hills, had driven his artillery there posted into instant retreat, and in this way had not only done much toward the attainment of a general victory, but, failing that result, had prepared for our Light Brigade, whenever the moment for its retiring up the valley should come, a complete immunity from one at least of the two flanking fires under which it had been condemned to advance.

Well imagined, well timed, undertaken with exactly apt means, performed with boldness as well as with skill, and then suddenly, at the right moment, arrested and brought to a close, this achievement was not only brilliant in itself, but had the merit of being admirably relevant, if so one may speak, to the then passing phase of the battle, and became, upon the whole, a teaching example (on a small scale) of the way in which a competent man strikes a blow with the cavalry arm. The troops engaged in this enterprise were not the fellow-countrymen of those whose attack they undertook to support; but that is a circumstance which, far from diminishing the lustre of the exploit, gave it only a more chivalrous grace. The names of General Morris and General d'Allonville are remembered in the English army with admiration and gratitude.

When the 11th Hussars had so far descended the valley as to be close to the battery, it appeared that the right troop of their right squadron was confronted by some of the Russian guns, whilst all the rest of the regiment outflanked the line of the battery, and had clear ground before it. Meeting little or no obstruction to their progress from the mounted and dismounted artillerymen who were busy with their teams in the hope of carrying off their Czar's precious ordnance, this right troop passed in through the battery, and pushed on beyond the limbers and tumbrils which were in rear of the guns. Then the regiment was halted.

The Russians who stood gathered in the most immediate proximity to the 11th Hussars were a confused number, including, it seems, artillerymen and cavalry. They were in a state of apparent helplessness; and one of their officers, not

disguised, as was usual, in the gray outer-coat of the soldiers, but wearing the epaulettes of a full colonel, came up, bare-headed, to the stirrup of Lieutenant Roger Palmer, and voluntarily delivered his sword to him. Palmer handed over the sword to a corporal or sergeant at his side, and did not of course molest the disarmed officer, though the condition of things was not such as to allow of taking and securing prisoners.

It soon appeared, however, that this tendency to utter surrender was not as yet general; for when the crowd cleared and made off, it disclosed to the 11th Hussars some squadrons of Russian Lancers formed up and in perfected order.¹

The 11th Hussars re-formed their ranks and made ready to charge; whilst on their part the Russian horsemen brought their lances smartly down as though for an immediate attack. They did not, however, advance. Repeating the mistake already committed that day in the face of Scarlett's dragoons, and again under Morris's charge, and again under Shewell's, they remained at a halt, awaiting the attack of our horsemen. Douglas seized the occasion thus given him, and led down his Hussars at the charging pace. For a while, the Russians awaited him with a great steadfastness, and it seemed that, in a few moments, there must needs be a clash of arms; but when our Hussars had charged down to within a short distance of them, the Russians, all at once, went about and retreated. Far on, and into the opening of the gorge which divides the aqueduct from the eastern base of the Fedioukine Hills, the 11th moved down in pursuit.

On the immediate right of the 11th Hussars, and so little in rear of them (by the time they had reached the battery) as to be separated by a distance of no more than some twenty or thirty yards, Lord George Paget was advancing with

¹ These were not Cossacks, but regular Lancers. A reader who might be comparing this narrative with the official accounts of the Russians, would have some right to ask what Lancers these could be, because Jeropkine's Lancers (called by the Russians the 'Combined Lancers') were not in this part of the field, and the official accounts mention no other Lancers. It is, however, a fact proved decisively by the evidence of our officers, that both in the Heavy Cavalry charge and upon this occasion, squadrons of Lancers (not Cossacks) were present. Supposing that the Russian official accounts did not actually omit any forces really present, the solution, I believe, is this: portions of the Russian Hussars had been converted into Lancers, without undergoing a corresponding change in the official designation of the force.

The 4th Light Dragoons. the 4th Light Dragoons. For some time, this regiment had been driving through a cloud of smoke and dust, which so dimmed the air as to hide from them all visible indications of the now silent battery; but upon their nearer approach, the Czar's burnished brass pieces of ordnance were almost suddenly disclosed to view; and our Light Dragoons saw that, at the part of the battery they confronted, the mounted men there appearing were artillery drivers trying to carry off the guns. Then an officer of the regiment—and one too, strange to say, who had hitherto been most inexorably rigid in enforcing exactness—brought his hand to the ear, and delivered a shrill 'Tallyho!' which hurled forward the hitherto well-ordered line, and broke it up into racing horsemen. In the next instant, with an ungoverned rush, our dragoons broke into the battery.

The combat
which there
followed.

There, with the artillery teams, brought up for the purpose, and by means of the lasso harness, the Russians were making extreme exertions to carry off their guns; and, since these people were not only bold, strong, and resolute, but contending for an object very dear to them, a fierce struggle began. In their eagerness to be putting forth their bodily strength by cutting and slashing, very many of our men neglected the use of the point; and, for the most part, the edge of the sabre fell harmless upon the thick gray outer-coats of the Russians. In the midst of the strife, one young cornet—Cornet Edward Warwick Hunt—became so eager to prevent the enemy from hauling off one of the pieces that, after first 'returning' his sword, he coolly dismounted, and at a moment when the six wretched artillery horses and their drivers were the subject of a raging combat, applied his mind with persistency to the other end of the traces or 'prolong,' and sought to disengage the gun from the harness; a curious act of audacity in the thick of a fight for which, unless I mistake, his colonel both damned and admired him. There were some amongst our men, and even amongst our officers, who performed hideous wonders in the way of slaughter; for the Russians were under such cogent obligation to save their Czar's cherished ordnance from capture, and were, many of them, so brave and obstinate, that even the sense of being altogether unequal to strive against an onslaught of English cavalry did not suffice to make them yield. There was one of our officers who became afflicted, if so one may speak, with what has been called the blood-frenzy. Much gore besmeared him,

and the result of the contest was such as might seem confirmatory of the vulgar belief as to the maddening power of human blood. This officer, whilst under the frenzy, raged wildly against human life, cutting down, it was said, very many of the obstinate Russians with his own reeking hand.¹ Other officers of a different temperament made use of their revolvers with a terrible diligence.

From his bearing at this time, it seemed that Lord George Paget scarce approved this kind of industry on the part of his officers. At all events, he so acted as to convey the impression that he reserved his energy and attention for the purposes of command, and did not conceive it his duty (except in actual self-defense) to become, with his own hand, a slayer of men.

As might be expected, the obstinacy of the Russians, interrupted in their task of carrying off the guns, was very unequal; and if some fought so hard as to involve our people in the combat we have just been speaking of, there were others who attempted no active resistance. Several drivers, for instance, threw themselves off their horses, and so crept under them, as in that way to seek and find shelter. In the end our Dragoons got the mastery, and not only succeeded in preventing the withdrawal of all the pieces of cannon which they had seen in the line of the battery at the time of their entering it, but also arrested and disabled some other guns—already a little way from the front—which the enemy was in the act of removing. The business of repressing the enemy's obstinate endeavors to carry off his guns was of such duration that again there interposed a long distance between the 4th Light Dragoons and the regiment (the 11th Hussars) with which Lord George Paget had sought to align himself; for whilst the 4th Light Dragoons remained combating on the site of the battery, Colonel Douglas, as we know, was advancing; but his task in the battery being almost complete, Lord George with a part if not with the whole of his troops, now pressed forward once more in the hope of being able to combine the next operations of his regiment with those of the 11th Hussars.

Farther advance of Lord George Paget.

The 8th Hussars, we remember, was on the extreme right of the forces advancing in support. Reduced to one-half of its former strength by that triple fire through which it had been passing, but still in excellent or-

¹ I have heard that, after the battle, when this officer had calmed down, there was so great a reaction in his nervous system, that he burst into tears, and cried like a little child.

der, and maintaining that well-steadied trot which Colonel Shewell had chosen as the pace best adapted for a lengthened advance of this kind, this regiment had continued its advance down the valley, had moved past the now silent battery at a distance of a few horses' lengths from its (proper) left flank, had pressed on beyond it some three or four hundred yards, and by that time had so passed through the jaws of the enemy's position, as to be actually for the moment in a region almost out of harm's way—in the region, if so one may speak, which lies behind the north wind.¹ Colonel Shewell then halted the regiment. Making only now one squadron—and that a very weak one—its remains stood formed up to their front.

Colonel Shewell, it seems, had the hope that an order of some kind would presently reach him; and he well might desire to have guidance, for the position into which he had pushed forward his regiment was somewhat a strange one. On three sides—that is, on his front, and on the rising grounds which hemmed in the valley on either flank—Colonel Shewell saw bodies of the enemy's cavalry and infantry; but the Russian forces in front of him, both horse and foot, were in retreat, and numbers of them crowding over the bridges of the aqueduct. Yet nowhere, with the exception of his regiment, now reduced to a very small squadron, could he descry any body of our cavalry in a state of formation, though before him, in small knots or groups, or acting as single assailants, he saw a few English horsemen who were pressing the retreat of the enemy, by pursuing and cutting down stragglers.

After continuing this halt during a period which has been reckoned at three, and also at five, minutes, Colonel Shewell resumed his advance.

These remains of the 8th Hussars formed the small but still well-ordered squadron, which we saw coming down toward the spot where Mayow had checked the pursuit, and halted his small group of Lancers.

It seems right to survey the circumstances in which the Allied forces stood at this critical and interesting period of the combat. At the bare apprehension of the advance against the Causeway Heights which Lord Raglan had twice over ordered, Liprandi, as we

State of the
battle at this
period.

¹ I need hardly say that the idea of referring to the 'country of the Hy-perboreans' as a modern illustration, belongs to Mr. Lowe. See his celebrated speech in the House of Commons, 1866.

saw, had retracted the head of the column there established in the morning, and had probably at this time no higher hope than that of being able to retreat without seeing his infantry and artillery involved in the overthrow which was sweeping his cavalry out of the field. On the Fedioukine Hills, the head of Jabrokritsky's column was rolling up under D'Altonville's brilliant attack. In the low ground between the Causeway Heights and the Fedioukine Hills, the condition of things was this: Having intruded itself, as we know, a mile deep into a narrow valley, hemmed in on three sides by Russian forces of all arms, our Light Cavalry Brigade had overthrown all the forces which before confronted it, and was disposed for the moment as follows: The still combating remains of the first line were broken into groups and small knots, numbering, perhaps, altogether, after the retreat of the men acting under O'Hara, as many as thirty. Of these, some were combating in a desultory way, with little other purpose than that of defending themselves, and endeavoring to make out what best they could do in the confusion; but others, as we saw, were hanging upon the skirts of the Russian squadrons, and, in effect, pressing on the retreat by assailing the people who lagged. The group of some fifteen men under Mayow had coherence enough, as we saw, to be able to put to flight the body of horse which encountered them.

On our extreme left, Colonel Douglas, with his 11th Hussars, now counting a little more than 50 sabres, was pursuing the retreat of the Russian Lancers which had given way under his charge; and on his right rear, Lord George Paget (having quelled the attempts of the Russians to carry off their guns) was advancing with a part at least of the 4th Light Dragoons, a regiment now reckoning, perhaps, about the same numbers as the 11th Hussars. These two regiments formed our left; and although at this moment they were not so placed as to be visible the one to the other, the direction of Douglas's advance was so far known to Lord George Paget as to make it likely that the two regiments might find means of acting together in concert, with a force, when united, of about 100 sabres. In the event of their doing so, Lord George Paget, as the senior officer, was the one who would be entitled to take the command.

Toward our centre, we had no troops at all in a state of formation; but on our extreme right, as we know, the 8th Hussars, now reduced to a strength of about 55, and commanded by Colonel Shewell, was advancing toward the group

under Mayow. The event proved that this group of fifteen under Mayow was still in a state of coherence which rendered it capable of acting with military efficiency in concert with other troops, and it may therefore be said that Colonel Shewell (who was senior to Mayow) had under his orders a force of about 70 sabres.

Altogether, these undisaabled combatants numbered perhaps about 220 or 230, of which only about 170 were in a state of formation. The two wings (if so we may call disconnected forces) were not visible the one to the other, and no communications passed between them.

In the absence of any general who might come to take in person the direction of these combatants, Lord George Paget, as we saw, was the senior officer on our left; on our right, Colonel Shewell.

From before the 230 English horsemen thus thrust into the very rear of the enemy's position, the bulk of that powerful body of Russian horse which numbered itself by thousands was strangely enough falling back. We now know that the retreat was much more general than our people at the time could perceive, and that, excepting Jeropkine's six squadrons of Lancers, almost the whole of the enemy's cavalry had been not merely beaten but routed.¹ Apparently, also, as indeed might well be, these fugitive squadrons carried panic along with them as they rode;² for away, on the eastern slopes of Mount Hasfort, where no English could dream of pursuing, battalions of infantry were thrown into hollow squares, as though awaiting from moment to moment a charge of victorious cavalry.


Thus much some brave men were able to do toward wringing an actual victory from even the wildest of blunders.

¹ Liprandi, in his dispatch, admits the retreat of his cavalry, but says that the movement was a ruse of General Ryjoff's to draw the English on. 'The English cavalry,' he says, 'appeared more than 2000 strong. Its impetuous attack induced Lieutenant-General Ryjoff [the commander of the Russian cavalry] to turn back upon the route to Tchorgoun to draw the enemy.' General de Todleben, however, discards that way of explaining the retreat, and says frankly that our Light Cavalry utterly overthrew the bulk of the Russian cavalry. Using the word 'Cardigan,' in a sense importing the Light Brigade, he says: 'Cardigan flung himself against the Don Cossack battery which was in advance, sabred the gunners, then charged our cavalry, utterly overthrew it [*la culbute*], and advanced far beyond the line of the redoubts in pursuit of our cavalry, which retreated toward Tchorgoun.'

² See the plan taken from General de Todleben. To eyes accustomed to such things, it expresses an almost headlong retreat more forcibly than words.

Note. The insertion of this Plan must not be taken as a representation that it is accurate; the object is to impart to others that general impression in regard to the nature of the Rout which seems to have prevailed amongst those to whom General Todleben appealed for information.

The part of General de Todleben's Plan which shows the state of Rout into which the main body of the Russian Cavalry was thrown by the English Light Cavalry Charge and the hollow squares formed in resistance to our horsemen by two battalions of Russian Infantry.



Thus much; but considering that this singular overthrow of the many by the few was occurring, after all, a mile deep in the enemy's realms, and that, even although partly rolled up, the forces of Jabro-kritsky on the north, and of Liprandi on the south, yet lined, on both sides, the lower slopes of the valley, it was evident, of course, that the ascendant of little more than two hundred horsemen now driving whole thousands before them would only prove momentary and vain, unless it should be upheld by fresh troops coming down in support, or else by an attack on the Causeway Heights of the kind which Lord Raglan had ordered. Were the red squadrons coming to clench the victory, and by victory to rescue their comrades?

We must turn to the commander of our cavalry, and to the regiments of the Heavy Brigade, with which he was present in person.

Amongst all those struggles between the judgment and the feelings by which man is liable to be tortured, hardly any can be more distressing than that which rends the heart of a chivalrously-minded commander who is bringing himself to determine that, in obedience to the hard mandates of Duty, and for the preservation of the troops which still remain in his hands, he will suffer an adventured portion of his force to go on to its fate unsupported; and especially must he be troubled in spirit if the words which drove his people into a desperate path were words from his own lips.

Wild as was the notion of sending a force to run the gauntlet between the Fedioukine Hills and Causeway Heights, yet, supposing the sacrifice to be irrevocably vowed, Lord Lucan seems to have formed a good conception of the way in which it could best be performed. He saw that in such an undertaking extension of front was an object of vastly less importance than the maintenance of an un-failing connection between the troops employed along the whole line of the advance. In short, he considered that the first line should be followed at intervals by successive lines of support, all forming the links of a chain so connected that, happen what might, the whole British cavalry would be a body of troops acting together under one commander, and constituting a powerful unit. It was in part execution of this plan that he had divided the Light Brigade into three lines; and, intending to effect a corresponding disposition of Scarlett's Dragoons, he trusted that the several links thus provided would form an unbroken chain of sufficing length.

The advance of our cavalry, however, had gone on but a short time when it became apparent that Lord Cardigan's severe and increasing pace was much greater than that which Lord Lucan had adopted for the Heavy Dragoons; and the Russians who lined the two ranges of heights were not only quick in their perception of this difference, but sagacious enough to infer from it a want of connecting purpose in the movements of the two brigades. The moment was approaching when it would be necessary for Lord Lucan to make a painful choice, and either to conform with his Heavy Dragoons to Lord Cardigan's pace, or else—a cruel alternative—to let the chain break asunder.

In his own person—and the keenness of his far-reaching sight made him apt for this service—Lord Lucan strove hard to prolong the connection between his two brigades by riding on in advance of his Heavy Dragoons, and following his Light Cavalry with straining eyes; but he had not long passed the Number Four Redoubt when he was rudely compelled to perceive that he had entered on the path of destruction already traversed by his Light Cavalry, and was drawing forward his Heavy Dragoons to the verge of a like disaster. His aid-de-camp, Captain Charteris—fulfilling an incurable presentiment—fell dead at his side; Lord William Paulet, his Assistant-Adjutant-General, was struck, or unbattered by a shot or a shell; Major M'Mahon, his Assistant-Quartermaster-General (not, however, at quite the same time), had his horse struck by grape; and Lord Lucan himself was wounded in the leg by a musket-ball, his horse being also struck by shot in two places.¹

Lord Lucan was not, however, disabled by the wound; and, continuing his advance, he passed quickly so far down the valley as to be on ground nearly parallel with the Arabtabia Redoubt:² but the distance between his two brigades, which he thus, as it were, sought to span or bridge over by his personal presence, was increasing with each stride of our Light Cavalry squadrons. Growing more and more faint to the sight, those splendid, doomed squadrons were sinking and sinking into the thick bank of smoke which now closed in the foot of the valley; and even if no new motive had interposed, Lord Lucan could scarcely have withheld his decision many moments more. What happened, however, was that, upon

¹ The apparently absolute indifference of Lord Lucan under this fire was specially remarked by an officer—not at all an admirer of his divisional chief—whose testimony enabled me to make the statement contained in a former page—p. 382.

² The same as Number Three Redoubt.

looking back, he perceived the Royals and the Greys to be undergoing a destructive cross-fire; and then, at all events, if it had not done so before, the terrible question forced itself upon him, and peremptorily exacted a decision. Should he risk the loss of his second brigade by flinging it after his first, or submit to one disaster (if disaster it was to be) for the sake of avoiding fresh hazards? He was the link which connected one brigade with the other; and so long as he might choose to hold fast to each, he would be realizing his own conception of the several successive supports, and sustaining his Light Cavalry force with the power of his Heavy Brigade: but also he would be grievously imperiling this, his second and last brigade, by drawing it down with him into the gulf where his first brigade seemed disappearing. Should he, then, hold fast or let go?

He let go. Elsewhere, the reasons which governed him shall be given in his own ampler words; but the sentence which he uttered at the moment contains the pith of his argument. Determining that the Greys and the Royals should at once be halted, he said to Lord William Paulet, 'They have sacrificed the Light Brigade: they shall not the Heavy, if I can help it.'

It was only after two successive movements in retreat that the Royals and the Greys were relieved from the fire to which they had been exposed.

The Greys and the Royals ordered to fall back.

Severity of the fire which had been sustained by these regiments.

This fire had indeed been heavy; and—under conditions very trying to horsemen—both regiments sustained it with a firmness so admirable, that even the out-dazzling splendor of their morning's achievement did not blind a skilled judge of such things to the merit of this warlike endurance.

In the Royals alone—and this was a more than decimating loss—as many as twenty-one were disabled by death, or by wounds inflicted upon themselves or their horses. Colonel Yorke, the commanding officer, received a wound which cruelly shattered his leg, and he was disabled for life.¹ So also was Captain George Campbell. Captain Elmsall and Lieutenant Hartopp were, both of them, wounded severely; and Lieutenant Robertson had a horse shot under him.

¹ In support of Lord Lucan's impression respecting the part taken by the Royals in the Heavy Cavalry charge, the alleged acquiescence of Colonel Yorke in words addressed to him by Lord Lucan will be probably insisted upon. If that should happen, it will be well to remember that the shattering and terrible wound above mentioned long made it impossible for Colonel Yorke to undertake any such task as that of remonstrating against Lord Lucan's words.

Lord Lucan had come to the conclusion that 'the only use
Lord Lucan's conclusion as to the only use that could now be made of the Heavy Dragoons. 'to which the Heavy Brigade could be turned
The Brigade kept halted accordingly. 'was to protect the Light Cavalry against pursuit in their return;' and he judged that for that service the position to which he had now brought back the Heavy Dragoons was sufficiently advanced. There, accordingly, the brigade remained halted.

Lord Lucan being present in person, General Scarlett had no authority to determine upon the extent to which his brigade should be ventured in supporting the advance of the Light Cavalry; and at the time when the Heavy Dragoons received their first order to retreat, he was still unaware of the decision which had produced this result. Yielding to a natural eagerness, he had ridden forward some sixty
General Scarlett and Colonel Beatson. yards in advance of his brigade; and I imagine that he and Colonel Beatson (the aid-de-camp then at his side) must have been the last of those acting with the Heavy Dragoons to whom the advancing brigade remained visible.¹ They saw our Light Cavalry fade away into the smoke which hung thick at the foot of the valley.

This parting was disruption—disruption in the very crisis
The full import of Lord Lucan's decision. of the exigency—disruption of that chain which hitherto had been binding into one the strength of the whole English cavalry.

To repress the idea of going down with fresh troops to the rescue, to abstain from all part in the combat below the battery where the Light Brigade was engulfed, to allow the communication between the two brigades to remain broken without risking even one squadron in an attempt to restore it—this, all this, was the import of the painful decision to which, by a sense of hard duty, Lord Lucan had found himself driven.

Our present knowledge of what was going on at the foot

¹ This was the time when General Scarlett (finding suddenly that his brigade was retiring, and not knowing that the movement had been ordered by Lord Lucan) sent back his trumpeter with orders to sound the halt. At the sound the brigade instantly halted, and fronted beautifully, as at parade. As I have named Colonel Beatson, let me here say that I have abundant proofs before me of the warmth with which General Scarlett expressed his grateful recognition of the Colonel's services in the Crimea; and it is only from the want of that detailed information which none but the Colonel himself (who is now in India) would be able to give me that I have been prevented from narrating the part that he personally took in the battle. See in the Appendix papers illustrative of his distinguished services.

of the valley tends to show that a decision in the opposite direction would have been likely to produce good and brilliant results;¹ but that same present knowledge which we now have is exactly what at the time was most wanting: and of course it is no more than right that the soundness of an officer's judgment should be viewed in its relation to those circumstances only which were fairly within the range of his knowledge or surmise when he had to make his resolve.²

The Heavy Dragoons at this time were but little if at all vexed by fire; and there was nothing to distract their thoughts from the Light Brigade, or from the pain of dwelling on their own condition as bystanders withheld from the combat. At first, the gray boundary of their sight was from time to time pierced by the flashes from the battery at the foot of the valley; the thunder of the guns was still heard, and the round-shot, one after another, came bowling along up the slope; but next there followed a time when the cloud at the foot of the valley remained blank without issues of flame, when a terrible quiet had succeeded to the roar of artillery, when no token of the fight could be seen, except a disabled or straggling horseman or a riderless charger emerging here and there from the smoke. Thenceforth the cause of anguish to those who gazed down the valley was no longer in what they could now see or hear, but in what they otherwise knew, and in what they were forced to imagine. They knew that beyond the dim barrier, our Light Brigade was engulfed. On the thought of what might be its fate they had to be dwelling, whilst they themselves remained halted.

We descend once again to the borders of the aqueduct, where little more than two hundred of our horsemen, divided into several bodies, were hanging upon the retreat of almost the whole Russian cavalry; but we go there, this time, with the knowledge that the ascendant of the few over the many will not be supported by the regiments which Lord Lucan was keeping in hand.

On our right, and on the line of the principal road which

¹ See the state of the field as shown *ante*, p. 550, and the plan illustrating the statement.

² With respect to Lord Raglan's opinion as to the way in which Lord Lucan supported the Light Brigade, see his letter of the 16th of December, 1854, in the Appendix.

Colonel Mayow
and his fifteen
lancers.

Their junction
with the 8th
Hussars.

led, over the bridge, to Tchorgoun, we left Colonel Mayow with some fifteen men of the 17th Lancers. Upon descrying the English squadron, which had come down, as we saw, in the direction of his right rear, Mayow hastened to join it, and was presently in contact with the squadron which represented the 8th Hussars. It appeared that Colonel Shewell, the commander of the 8th Hussars, had not been killed or disabled; and, Mayow being now once more in the presence of an officer senior to himself, the temporary command which the chances of battle had cast upon him came at once to an end. He had been commanding less than a score of men during only a few minutes; and yet, with these means and within this limit of time, he had attained to a height of fortune which is not always reached by those who are described in the army lists as field-m Marshals and generals. He had had sway in battle.

The fifteen men whom Mayow had brought with him were ranged on the left of the 8th Hussars; and this little addition brought up Colonel Shewell's strength to about seventy. The panic which was driving from the field the whole bulk of the enemy's horse plainly did not extend to the Russian infantry on the eastern part of the Causeway Heights; for looking back toward their then right rear, our Hussars at this time were able to see the gray battalions still holding their ground, in good order. Nor was this all; for presently the glances cast back in nearly the same direction disclosed some new-comers.

Liprandi's
battalions on
the Causeway
Heights.

Three squadrons of Russian Lancers were seen issuing from behind one of the spurs of the Causeway Heights, and descending into the valley. Another instant, and this body of Lancers was wheeling into line, and forming a front toward the Russian rear, thus interposing itself as a bar between the English and their line of retreat. These three squadrons of Lancers—the half of Colonel Jeropkine's regiment—were the force which had been placed, as we saw, in one of the folds of the Causeway Heights at the time when Liprandi was making arrangements for covering his retreat.

Three squad-
rons of Jerop-
kine's Lancers
seen forming
in rear of the
8th Hussars.

At the moment when Colonel Mayow joined the 8th Hussars, Colonel Shewell had asked him, 'where Lord Cardigan 'was;' and Mayow having replied that he did not know, it

¹ This question of 'Where is Lord Cardigan?' will be found recurring; but commanders of course can not be every where at the same time, and it must not be understood that when an officer asks this question, he inferentially suggests ground of blame against the General for not being visible at a

resulted that Colonel Shewell, as the senior officer present, became charged with the duty of determining how the emergency should be met by the troops within reach of his orders. It does not, however, appear that there was much scope for doubt. After an almost momentary consultation with the senior officers present, including Colonel Mayow and Major de Salis, Colonel Shewell gave the word 'Right about wheel!' and the squadron, with its adjunct of fifteen Lancers, came round at once with the neatness of well-practiced troops on parade. Colonel Shewell and Major de Salis put themselves in the front, and Lieutenant Seager commanded the one squadron into which, as we saw, the remains of the 8th Hussars had been fused. Mayow led the small band of Lancers which had attached itself to the Hussars.

His charge.

The seventy horsemen rode straight at the fluttering line of gay lances which the enemy was then in the very act of forming. The three Russian squadrons thus wheeling into line were at a distance from Shewell of something less than 300 yards, and the two leading squadrons had already established their line, but the third squadron was still in process of wheeling. Once more in this singular battle of horsemen, our people had before them a body of cavalry which passively awaited the charge. With his seventy against three hundred, Shewell needed some such counterbalancing advantage as that; but he might have lost his occasion if he had been wanting in that swiftness of decision which is one of the main conditions of excellence in a cavalry officer, for it was to be inferred that upon the completion of the manœuvre by their third squadron, the Russians would charge down on our people.

Colonel Shewell proved equal to the occasion. He lost not one moment. He was a man whose mind had received a deep impress from some of the contents of the Bible; but those who might differ from his opinions still recognized in him a man of high honor who extended the authority of conscience to the performance of military duties; and it has not been found in practice that a piety strictly founded on the Holy Testaments (taken fairly, the one with the other)

particular moment and on a particular spot. It is right, however, to mention these dialogues; because they show, or tend to show, a devolution of authority creating fresh responsibilities. Thus, for instance, it resulted from the dialogue given in the text that Colonel Shewell, as senior officer, became the commander of that part of the first line which was within reach of his directions.

has any such softening tendency as to unfit a man for the task of fierce bodily conflict.¹

As in the battles of old times, so now, and not for the first time, this day, he who was the chief on one side singled out for his special foe the man who seemed chief on the other. Shewell had not the advantage of being highly skilled as a swordsman, and being conscious of his deficiency in this respect, he asked himself how best he could act. The result was that he determined to rely upon the power which can be exerted by sheer impact. He resolved that, whilst charging at the head of his little band of horsemen, he would single out the Russian officer whom he perceived to be the leader of the opposing force, and endeavor to overthrow him by the shock of a heavy concussion. To do this the more effectively he discarded the lessons of the riding-school, clenched a rein in each hand, got his head somewhat down; and, as though he were going at a leap which his horse, unless forced, might refuse, drove full at the Russian chief. The assailant came on so swift, so resolute, and, if so one may speak, with such a conscientious exactness of aim that, for the Russian officer who sat in his saddle under the disadvantage of having to await the onset, there remained no alternative at the last moment but either to move a little aside or else be run down without mercy by this straightforward, pious hussar. As was only natural, the charger of the Russian officer shrank aside to avoid the shock; and Shewell, still driving straight on, with all his momentum unchecked, broke through the two ranks of the Lancers. He was well

Defeat and
flight of the
Russian Lan-
cers.

followed by his seventy horsemen. Upon their close approach some of the Russian Lancers turned and made off; but the rest stood their ground and received the shock prepared for them. By that shock, however, they were broken and overthrown. It is true that in the moment of the impact, or in the moments immediately following, men had, some of them, a fleeting opportunity for the use of the sword or the lance, and one at least of our Hussars received a great number of slight wounds from the enemy's spearheads; but the clash was brief. The whole of these three Russian squadrons were quickly in retreat, a part of them going back into the fold betwixt the Causeway

¹ One of Shewell's companions in arms—a man well entitled to deliver a judgment on the merits of his lost comrade—has said of him, 'I knew the man with whom I had to deal—I knew that I was dealing with one of the most honorable, the most gallant, the most conscientious, the most single-minded men it has ever been my good fortune to meet with.'

BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

The 8th Hussars (reduced to one squadron but having with it a few men of the 17th) charging three squadrons of Jeroophines' Lancers.

To the
Allied Camps



Q

Colonel Sherrell



8th Hussars
reduced to one squadron




About 15 men of the
17th Hussars under
Colonel Mayow

To the
Aqueducts

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Jeroophines' Lancers



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Heights from which just before they had issued, whilst the rest fled across to the Fedioukine Hills; and there is reason for inferring that these last attached themselves to the other three squadrons of their regiment which had been posted, as we saw, on the northern side of the valley.

After having thus conquered their way through the body of Lancers opposed to them, Colonel Shewell and those who had followed him in his victorious charge could see a good way up the valley; but their eyes searched in vain for an English force advancing to their support; and, in truth, the very attempt which Jeropkine's Lancers had just been making, went far to show that no English succors were near; for it is evident that the endeavor to cut off our Hussars by showing a front toward the Russian rear would never have been made by troops which were able to see a red squadron coming down to the support of their comrades. Therefore, having now cut open a retreat not only for themselves, but also for such of the other remnants of the Light Brigade as might be near enough to seize the occasion, Shewell's regiment and the men who had joined it continued to pursue the direction in which they had charged, in other words to retire. Colonel Shewell, it seems, did not judge that the condition of things was such as to warrant any attempt at the usual operation of governing a retreat by fronting from time to time with a portion of the force; and those who remained of the seventy had only to withdraw up the valley with such speed as they could. In this movement they were followed by Captain Jenyns and the few men of the first line—men chiefly, it is supposed, of the 13th Light Dragoons—who had been acting under his guidance, or riding, at all events, near him.

When our retreating horsemen had ridden clear of Jeropkine's discomfited Lancers, they began once more to incur severe fire from those batteries on the Causeway Heights and those rifles in the same part of the field which had thinned their ranks during the advance; but they were not molested by cavalry, and they observed, without knowing the cause of the change, that there was silence on the Fedioukine Hills.¹

It happened, as might be expected, that, in the trail of our small body of retreating Hussars, there were both mounted and dismounted men who had been so disabled by their own wounds or by the wounds or the overwearied state of their

¹ This result, as we know, was owing to D'Allonville's attack with the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

horses as to be more or less lagging behind. The sight of these disabled horsemen did not so far tempt Jeropkine's defeated squadrons as to bring them all back into the valley; but his Lancers, here and there coming singly, or else in small knots, pressed on, for a time, in pursuit, and killed or took some of the stragglers. Amongst others moving on foot was Major de Salis. With a rare generosity he had given up his own charger to a disabled trooper of the 8th Hussars, and the Major was seen leading the horse whilst the wounded man sat in the saddle.

Soon the efforts of the enemy's horsemen to kill or take any straggler they might find in their power were checked by their own fellow-countrymen; for the gunners who manned the batteries on the Causeway Heights would not suffer their energies to be paralyzed by the presence of a few Russian Lancers, intermixed here and there with our stragglers; and when it became plain that Jeropkine's horsemen were incurring fire from their own brethren, the trumpet sounded the recall, and they desisted from their efforts. Then some of our disabled horsemen, who had been surrounded by Lancers, were enabled, after all, to escape. Thus, for instance, Lieutenant Phillips, who had just had his horse shot under him, and Private Brown, who had been disabled in both hands, were attacked by Lancers; and although Phillips was able to keep off the assailants with his revolver, both he and the soldier whom he was protecting must have been on the point of being either dispatched or taken, when, the recall being sounded, the Lancers rode off, and both Phillips and the soldier he had guarded made good their way back to our lines. In like manner also Lieutenant Clowes, whose horse had been shot under him, and who was himself wounded by grape, found himself freed from the Lancers who had had him in their power; but he was so much exhausted by loss of blood as to be unable to drag himself far. After the close of the battle he was picked up by the Russians, and became, of course, their prisoner.

When last we were glancing at the state of the combat on our extreme left, Colonel Douglass with his 11th Hussars was pursuing a body of the enemy's cavalry far down toward the strip of low ground which divides the eastern slope of the Fedioukine Hills from the banks of the aqueduct; whilst Lord George Paget, with the 4th Light Dragoons (excepting, it seems, a part of the

The 11th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons.

regiment still busied in resisting the enemy's attempt to carry off some of the guns), was once more endeavoring to co-operate with Colonel Douglas, and for that purpose pushing on his advance in the right rear of the 11th Hussars. The 4th Light Dragoons was in a somewhat disorganized state, brought about by its recent combat in the battery, where each man, speaking generally, had been fighting in his own way.

Colonel Douglas had carried his pursuit far down toward the bank of the aqueduct, when at length he found himself confronted by bodies of cavalry too large to be fair opponents for his little band of Hussars. He therefore fell back; and the Russian cavalry, in their turn, made a show of pursuing, but in a harmless, irresolute way. Presently the 4th Light Dragoons, whilst advancing, was met on its left front by the 11th Hussars in retreat; and at the sight of their comrades retiring, the men of the 4th Light Dragoons being still in the disorganized state which had resulted from its desultory combat in the battery, were surprised into an act of imitation. They hesitated, stopped, and, without word of command, went about, aligning themselves in their retreat with the 11th Hussars.

Masses of the enemy's cavalry were at this time pursuing the 11th Hussars, and the foremost bodies of them were already within about forty yards, but in a disorderly state, and disclosing once more that appearance of hesitation and bewilderment which had been observed in the morning at the time of the Heavy Cavalry charge; but the enemy was overwhelmingly strong in numbers, and now that two English regiments had successively retreated before him, it was to be expected, of course, that he would begin to act with increasing boldness.

When Lord George Paget saw the enemy's horse at a distance of only some forty yards from our two retreating regiments, he judged the moment to be critical. With the whole power of his voice, he shouted out to his Dragoons, 'If you don't front, my boys, we 'are done!'

Lord Anglesea used to say that 'cavalry are the bravest 'fellows in the world in advance; but that when once they 'get into a scrape, and have their backs turned to the enemy, 'it is a difficult matter to stop and rally them.' If Lord George was perchance one of those who had heard this saying from the lips of his father, he could hardly have been without some misgiving. For once, however, the saying did

Approach of
the Russian
cavalry in pur-
suit.

Lord George
Paget's appeal
to his regi-
ment.

not hold good. The men of the two regiments who at this moment remained together were only, as was computed, about 70 in number, and not, as a body, in a good state of order; but nevertheless, at the word of command, they came to a halt, and began to front toward the enemy. It was at this time that the young Lieutenant Jolliffe did opportune service. Facing boldly toward the newly-fronting troopers in despite of the numbers advancing against him from behind, he held up his sword for a rally, and so well used his voice as to be able to cause numbers of the 4th Light Dragoon men who were straggling and bewildered to understand what had to be done, and at once form up with their comrades. At the sight of the front thus presented to them, the Russians were instantly checked; and it is believed that our troops saved themselves from a crushing disaster by their ready obedience to Lord George Paget's appeal.

Its effect.

Discovery of a body of Russian cavalry formed up across the line of retreat.

But during the very moments that were occupied by this operation of fronting toward the pursuers, it was becoming known to our officers and men that the enemy had interposed a fresh body of horse in a new, and indeed opposite, quarter. Roger Palmer—that young lieutenant of the 11th Hussars to whom the Russian colonel had delivered his sword—was singularly gifted with long sight, and casting his glance toward our left rear, he saw in that direction, but at a distance of several hundred yards, a considerable body of cavalry, which he assured himself must be Russian. He reported this to his chief. Colonel Douglas at first scarce believed that the squadrons thus observed could be Russian; and, it being perceptible that the force consisted of Lancers, men were able, for a while, to indulge a pleasant surmise, and to imagine that the Lancers descried in our rear, at a distance of several hundred yards, must be our own ‘Seventeenth.’ Presently, however, Roger Palmer convinced Colonel Douglas that the headgear of the cavalry descried was Russian; and in another moment all doubt was at an end; for our officers and men could then see that the newly-interposed troops were formed up across the slope of the valley, with a front toward the Russian rear, as though barring the retreat of our people. So, there being then certain knowledge that the English were between two powerful bodies of Russian cavalry, it became necessary to use the very next moments in determining how to meet the emergency. Seeing Major Low close to him on the left, Lord George Paget, it seems, exclaimed: ‘We are in a desperate scrape. What

Means for meeting the emergency.

‘the devil shall we do?’ And in the next moment Lord George seems to have perceived that the answer to the question he had put should be elicited from some one entitled to command.

It was evidently with that purpose in his mind, and not from any notion of indulging in irony, that Lord George then asked the same question which had been put once before, but on the other side of the valley—the question of ‘Where is Lord Cardigan?’ Whatever were the terms of the answer elicited from Major Low, it became plain that for the moment, at all events, no guidance was to be had from the General commanding the Brigade, and that the emergency must be met without the aid of Lord Cardigan.¹ Lord George Paget was the senior officer present; and the few rapid words which he and Colonel Douglas found time to exchange were enough to prove them agreed upon the course that ought to be taken.²

It was determined that, with the whole of the little band which had been formed from the remnants of the two united regiments, our men should endeavor as best they could to break through the newly-interposed force of Russian Lancers, and should do this without persisting in the attempt to oppose a front to the cavalry advancing from the opposite direction. Our men well understood the predicament in which they stood; and Lord George Paget halloed out to them, ‘Well, you must go about, and do the best you can. Threes about!’

The order was obeyed, and both regiments now fronted toward the body of Lancers which stood barring their line of retreat. In both regiments strenuous exertions were made to get the men together; and wherever, in this little band, an officer sat in his saddle, there also there was a sword in the air, and a voice commanding the rally. The force was joined by some troopers belonging to the first line.

In the hastily-attempted array which was now in some slight measure formed, the (proper) rear-rank formed the front, and the officers had to follow, instead of leading, their line. In such a position they were evidently more likely than the rest of the force to be cut off by the Russian Lancers: but this was not all; for behind them, as we know, and at a dis-

¹ Of the purport of the answer given to this question I have not yet obtained sufficing proof; but its alleged tenor will be found in the affidavits of Edden and David Thomas.

² In the circumstances stated should it be judged that the whole of the body thus acting in concert came out under the command of Lord George Paget?

tance of but a few yards, they had the bodies of the Russian cavalry which had come up in pursuit from the neighborhood of the aqueduct. Thus placed, our officers were not only exposed beyond measure to the dangers of the hour, but also shut back in positions unfavorable to the exercise of command.

With but little attempt at the preservation of order, the English horsemen moved off at such speed as they could command, driving straight toward the thicket of lances which threatened to bar their retreat. They presently began to incur the fire of some Russian artillery; but, upon the whole, this effort of the enemy's gunners proved to be an advantage to our people, for, without inflicting heavy loss upon our retreating horsemen, it delivered them from the pursuit of the cavalry in their then rear. The body of Russian Lancers which stood barring the retreat of our horsemen was that moiety of Jeropkine's six squadrons which had been placed, as we saw, on the north side of the valley and in the fold of the hills inclosing the road from Tractir; but there is reason for believing that these three squadrons had been joined by some portions at least, if not by the whole of those other three squadrons through which Colonel Shewell had broken.


Hitherto, the position taken up by the Lancers now undertaking to cut off Lord George Paget and Douglas had been exactly of the same kind as that of the three squadrons on the other side of the valley which attempted, and attempted in vain, to bar Colonel Snewell's retreat; for, just as their comrades had done before, these Lancers stood ranged with a front toward the Russian rear; but, upon the nearer approach of our people, the force they were going to assail disclosed a new plan of action; and it is not improbable that the overthrow which the first three squadrons had undergone, may have so far influenced Colonel Jeropkine as to cause this change in his tactics.

The force, it seems, was a double column of squadrons, having two strong squadrons abreast, and being two, if not three squadrons deep.¹ It was in a perfect

Position of the
interposed
force.

Its formation
and apparent
strength.

¹ We saw that the portion of Jeropkine's Lancers which was originally placed on this side of the valley consisted of only three squadrons; but we also saw, that of the other three squadrons overthrown by Colonel Shewell some part at once crossed the valley, and it is evidently probable that they did this with the intention of joining their comrades in the gorge of the Tractir road. Also, those of the Lancers who at first fled southward, must have found in a few moments that they were flying from nothing; and it seems likely that they too would very soon turn or cross over the valley, to the point where their comrades were stationed. I am able to say, on good grounds, that the



BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA.

The 4th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars retreating across the front of Jeroptine's Right hand column of Lanciers.

N.B. The Russian Column consisted originally of only three Squadrons, but there is ground for inferring that it had been joined at this time by a large proportion of the other three Squadrons belonging to the same regiment; and it being the opinion of officers who observed it that the strength of the force was certainly not less than four Squadrons, it is here represented as comprising that number.

state of formation, and directly confronting our retreating horsemen; but when the remnants of the two English regiments drew near them, the commander of these Russian

Its sudden
change of
front.

Lancers retracted all at once the right shoulder, and wheeled his squadrons half back; so that, instead of continuing to oppose a direct barrier in the face of our returning Dragoons, his force now stood ranged in such way as to flank the line of retreat, and became in that way much more formidable than before. The movement was executed with a precision which made the strength of the close serried squadrons seem more than ever overwhelming to the few score of English horsemen now moving, each man as he could, with hardly a trace of formation. The evident purpose of the manœuvre was to enable the Russian column to descend upon the flank of the English, and overwhelm them at the moment of passing. The direction in which the English moved was such that, supposing it to continue unchanged, the Russian column would have a distance of about thirty yards to go through in order to come down upon the flank of our horsemen at the intended moment.

When he saw this manœuvre and detected its purpose, Lord George Paget determined that he would endeavor to oppose some semblance of a front to the new front the enemy had formed; and accordingly he shouted to the men, 'Throw 'up your left flank!' But in the din which prevailed, his words, it would seem, were but little heard; and, instead of attempting, as they moved, to form up a front toward their right, our people, in the course they now took, inclined somewhat to their left.

At a moment which seems to have been rightly enough chosen, the Russian column commenced its advance, and descended at a trot to the very verge of the point where the two hostile forces thus moving at right angles with one another seemed going to meet; but then all at once the column was halted, and again the Russian horsemen displayed that same air of hesitation and bewilderment which our people had observed several times before on that day—hesitation and bewilderment not apparently resulting from any want of firmness on the part of the men, but rather from their not knowing what to do next.

Advance and
sudden halt of
the column.

time which intervened between Shewell's combat and the affair I am now speaking of, was sufficient to allow of this movement taking place. Upon the whole, it seems probable that all the six squadrons of the regiment were at this time together, and if so, the column, with its front of two, had a depth of three squadrons.

When a body of cavalry has been moved forward some way at a gallop, or even at a trot, and then is brought to a halt, it very commonly happens that the flanks overshoot the centre, and render the line concave. It was so with the Russian column; and its right flank especially, at the moment of the halt, had swung forward in advance of the centre. Therefore now when our horsemen undertook to ride across the front of the column, they had before them some lances on the extreme right of the enemy's line, who had so far edged forward as to be directly obstructing the path of retreat; but with this exception, the foe our men had to overcome or evade was entirely on their right flank.

Then there occurred a contact of hostile forces for which, The nature of the collision which then occurred. I imagine, it would be hard to find a parallel. In a very irregular body, and with a hardly perceptible trace of their old line formation, the English went on; and the Russian mass then advancing a little, or rather, it might be said, heaving forward, collision occurred. The body retreating grazed its right flank against the enemy's front; but, incredible as it may seem, was allowed to scrape by, moving right across the faces of the men in the foremost rank, and receiving or parrying the thrusts of their lances without undergoing any other than that momentary attack which a lancer who remains strictly halted can attempt against a dragoon in the act of galloping past him. What happened was that those of the English horsemen who chanced to be on the extreme right of their retreating body, found themselves so close to the enemy's lances as to have to fend them off with the sabre; but the number of attacks which any one man had to encounter whilst passing along the front of two squadrons, was not, it seems, so great as might be imagined; and Lord George Paget, whose position exposed him more than most others, has said that the number of lances which he had to ward off with his sword did not exceed three or four. It was well for our horsemen that the foe was on their right flank, where the sword-arm could work with advantage.¹

Along the main part of the Russian front, each collision, if so it can be called, which occurred, between lancer and swordsman, was a collision of barely one moment; because the assailant, in each instance was not an unfettered man, but

¹ Since the period spoken of in the text, the broadsword exercise of our cavalry has been so altered, under the suggestion, I believe, of Major Miller (late of the Scots Greys), as to provide better guards than before on the side of the bridle-arm.

the mere component of a mass which had come to a halt ; whilst every rider assailed was a rider in movement—a rider driving past the fixed column as swiftly as his tired beast could go, and rasped only, if so one may speak, by a thicket of lances in passing : but in that part of the enemy's right flank where his squadrons curled round in front of our people, the struggle which proved to be necessary for forcing a passage was somewhat less momentary ; and Lieutenant Roger Palmer, for one, became engaged at that point in what may be called a personal combat. This brief combat ended, however, as did the other collisions, in the failure of every attempt to cut off the retreat of the English ; and, without receiving much harm in the course of this singular traverse, our people got past.¹ ' We got by them,' writes one of our officers,—' we got by them—how, I know not. It is a mystery to me. . . . There is one explanation, and one only—the hand of God was upon us !'

That is an explanation of the deliverance from a cavalry scrape which lies out of the reach of dispute ; but if any gross mortals, intent on mere War-Office business, were attempting to examine causation at the terrestrial end of the chain, it might be useful for them to know in what stage of each combat it was that this hesitating embarrassment of the Russian cavalry so often evinced itself ; and there is the more reason for the inquiry since the firmness of the Muscovite soldier is so well established as to exclude the explanation which might be applicable to the troops of a less valorous nation, if they were to be frequently disclosing incompetence in the critical moment of a combat. The bewilderment of the Russian cavalry has almost always disclosed itself at that very point where the lessons acquired in the exercise-ground, or even in mock battles at home, would carry the pupil no farther ; and hardly any instance of this could well be more striking than the one we have just seen displayed by Jeropkine's Lancers. Long and painfully trained, those docile Muscovites had come all at once to the border which divides the things that are military from the things that are warlike. Whenever they charged at St. Petersburg under the eyes of Father Nicholas, the son of Paul, they always, of course, stopped short without doing harm to those other troops of their Czar who might make-believe to oppose them. They had now done no less, but also no more. It might sound para-

¹ It is possible that men might have been unhorsed and killed by the Russian lancers without its becoming known that the deaths were so occasioned ; but my impression is that few casualties resulted from this encounter.

doxical to say that the remnants of these two English regiments owed their escape to the high state of discipline to which their adversaries had been wrought; but certainly if this Russian mass had consisted of an equal number of bold, angry plowmen on horseback, with pitchforks in hand, the eighty or ninety disordered dragoons who might try to brush across the faces of their rough foes, would be in danger of incurring grave losses. As it was, our people found themselves saved yet again, as they had been saved before, by the bewilderment of troops who were too 'military' to be warlike.

It was something for our people to be no longer encountered in their homeward course by a barrier of hostile cavalry; but, at the first aspect of it, their plight was still desperate; for being but few, and in disorder, and having a long extent of up-hill ground which must be traversed before they would stand in safety, they were on horses now cruelly jaded; whilst the hostile squadrons behind them had not only the strength and the weight of numbers and of solid formation, but also were fresh.

However, those Russian artillerymen who had twice before guarded our cavalry by toiling for its destruction, now once more helped its retreat. It is true that, from a cause then unknown to our retreating horsemen (who, of course, had not witnessed the achievement of D'Allonville and his Chasseurs d'Afrique), the guns on the Fedioukine Hills which had shattered their ranks whilst advancing were now silent; but from the Causeway Heights on the opposite side of the valley there opened a diligent fire against the remnants of the two retreating regiments; and as before had occurred with other bodies of the enemy's cavalry, so now this new effort of the Russian artillerymen served to keep back Jeropkine's Lancers, and prevent them from undertaking the destructive pursuit of our horsemen, which would otherwise have been in their power.

Besides being scanty in numbers, these retreating remnants of the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars were by this time so much broken up into small groups, or knots, or single horsemen, that they no longer presented to the enemy's gunners the broad easy mark that is offered by a regiment of cavalry in a state of formation; but if there was now no formed squadron that could be opened and cleaved by shell or by round-shot, each dragoon individually still had to be reckoning on the death that might come the next mo-

The two retreating regiments after having passed the barrier interposed by the Russian Lancers.

ment ; and this the last trial which the soldier passed through was that of riding for life, with the torment of being forced to ride slowly ; for he had to toil on up hill under a heavy fire, at the laggard and always decreasing pace which represented the utmost remaining power of his wearied horse.

The ground traversed by these remnants of the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars, was strewn with such ruins of brilliant squadrons as might well be more distressing to them than to any other regiment, except, perhaps, the 17th Lancers. Lord George Paget's and Colonel Douglas's regiments in the course of their advance had encountered ugly traces of battle, but they now, as they rode, saw the marks of a yet more terrible havoc ; and, this time, a great proportion of those they saw dead, or dying, or cruelly disabled, were men of their own regiments. Amongst the wounded comrades and friends thus passed, some were walking erect, though feebly, some limping, some crawling ; and it was grievous to have to see the still living remains of horses with the trappings upon them of the 4th Light Dragoons or the 11th Hussars, some violently struggling to get up, though perhaps with more than one limb shattered, or floundering back with cruel weight upon their disabled riders. Of those who lay wounded and dying upon the ground thus retraced by our people, there was one who extended his arm, saying—but no, I pass on, and yet leave here the half-written sentence. There are some to whom it will speak.

As the pace of each rider had long since had no other limit than the last strength of his sinking horse, it resulted, of course, that, after a while, the single horseman and the groups or knots of those who kept together were divided by lengthened intervals. The greater number of them were still toiling on up the valley under heavy fire without knowing how much farther they would have to go before they might call their lives their own, when at length—and this came by surprise—they all at once caught a glad sound. In their front they heard an English cheer. It ceased, but was presently followed by another, and then again by another. These greetings were the welcome bestowed by spectators upon each officer or group of horsemen coming up the incline, and returning, as it were, from out of the abyss.

Lord George Paget (whose wearied horse had long been failing him in pace) was one of the last of the shattered brigade who rode laboring in up the valley. Some officers moved forward to greet him, and one of these was Lord Cardigan.

Lord George Paget then uttered an exclamation which has now no importance either historical or personal; but it had a bearing, some thought, upon a question formerly in controversy, and was therefore, at one time, so much spoken of that the suppression of the words (though they are now altogether immaterial) might confuse and be misunderstood. Seeing Lord Cardigan approach composedly from an opposite direction, Lord George Paget exclaimed to him, 'Halloa! 'Lord Cardigan, weren't you there?' Naturally, the bystanders smiled: but Lord Cardigan saw that no jest was intended, and answered at once with perfect simplicity and truthfulness as one soldier might to another.¹

Lord George Paget now ventured—he seemed to be speaking in grief, and in apprehension of the dismal answer he might receive—he ventured to ask after the fate of the first line. 'I am afraid,' he said, 'there are no such regiments in existence as the '13th and 17th, for—I can give no account of them.' Hardly, however, had he spoken, when he saw on the brow of the hill some clusters of men standing by their horses, and among them some Lancers. Then he knew—for the English had only one Lancer regiment—that, so far at least as concerned the 17th, the disaster fell short of extinction.

One of those who returned to our lines with the remnant of the 4th Light Dragoons had been a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. I speak of Sir George Wombwell. When last we saw Wombwell he was not far from the front of the battery, but his charger had just been shot under him. He so quickly succeeded in catching and mounting a stray horse as to be able to join the 4th Light Dragoons when they came on, and advance with them down to the guns. There, however, his newly-caught horse was

¹ According to the version which I prefer—and it does not much differ from others—Lord Cardigan answered, 'Wasn't I, though?' and then turning to Captain Jenyns said, 'Here, Jenyns, did not you see me at the guns?' Jenyns answered that he did; and he could well bear witness, because he was very near to Lord Cardigan at the moment of his entering the battery. The colloquy never had any importance, except in so far as it tended to show that there was an interval of time between the retreat of Lord Cardigan and that of Lord George Paget; and its value in that respect has been superseded by the ampler knowledge we now possess—knowledge placing the fact beyond the reach of doubt.

killed under him (as his own charger had been some minutes before), and, this time, he found himself surrounded by twenty or thirty Russian Lancers, who took from him his sword and his pistol, and made him prisoner. It happened that Captain Morris (then also, as we know, a prisoner, and with his head deeply cut and pierced by sabre and lance) was brought to the spot where Wombwell stood; and it is interesting to observe that, in spite of his own dreadful condition, Morris had still a word of timely counsel that he could give to a brother officer. 'Look out,' he said to Wombwell—'look out and catch a horse.' At that moment, two or three loose horses came up, and Wombwell, darting suddenly forward from between the Russian Lancers who had captured him, seized and mounted one of these riderless chargers, and galloped forward to meet the 4th Light Dragoons, which he then saw retiring. He succeeded in joining the regiment, and, with it, returned to our lines.

When Captain Morris (unhorsed and grievously wounded, found himself surrounded by Russian dragoons, it was to an officer, as we saw, that he surrendered his sword.¹ That officer, however, quickly disappeared, and then the Russian horsemen—Morris took them to be Cossacks—rushed in upon their prisoner, and not only robbed him of all he had about him, but convinced him by their manner and bearing that they were inclined to dispatch him. Morris, therefore, broke away from them, and ran into the midst of the thickest smoke he could see. Then, a riderless horse passing close to him, Morris caught at the rein, and was dragged by it a short distance, but afterward fell and became unconscious.

Upon regaining his senses Morris became aware of the presence of a Cossack, who seemed as though he had just passed him, but was looking back in a way which seemed to indicate that he had seen the English officer move, and would therefore dispatch him. Morris gathered strength from the emergency, found means to get on his feet, and once more sought shelter in the thickest smoke near him. Whilst standing there, he found himself almost run down by another loose charger, but was able to catch hold of the horse's rein, and to mount him. He turned the horse's head up the valley, and rode as fast as he could; but just as he fancied he was getting out of the cross-fire his new horse was shot under him, and fell with him to the ground, giving him a

¹ See *ante*, p. 532.

heavy fall, and rolling over his thigh. Then again for some time Morris was unconscious; and when he regained his senses, he found that the dead horse was lying across his leg, and keeping him fastened to the ground. He then 'set to work' to extricate his leg, and at length succeeded in doing so. Then, getting on his feet, he ran on as well as he could, stumbling and getting up over and over again, but always taking care to be moving up hill, till at last, when quite worn out, he found himself close to the dead body of an English Staff-officer—the body, he presently saw, of his friend Nolan.

Remembering that Nolan had fallen at a very early period in advance of the brigade, Morris inferred that he must be nearly within the reach of his fellow-countrymen; so, being now quite exhausted, he laid himself down beside the body of his friend, and again became unconscious.

Besides the three deep ugly wounds received in his head, Morris, in the course of these his struggles for life, had suffered a longitudinal fracture or split of the right arm, and several of his ribs were broken.¹

There was a circumstance in the lives of Nolan and Morris which made it the more remarkable that the dead body of the one and the shattered frame of the other should be thus lying side by side. On the flank march, Morris and Nolan, who were great allies, had communicated to each other a common intention of volunteering for any special service that might be required in the course of the campaign; and they found that each of them, in anticipation of the early death that might result from such an enterprise, had written a letter which, in that event, was to be delivered. Morris had addressed a letter to his young wife, Nolan had addressed one to his mother. Under the belief that the opportunity for hazardous service of the kind they were seeking might be close at hand, the two friends had exchanged their respective letters: and now, when they lay side by side, the one dead and the other unconscious, each of them still had in his pocket the letter intrusted to him by the other.²

When Morris recovered his consciousness he found him-

¹ The longitudinal splitting of the arm was of the kind which, it seems, is scientifically described as a 'Saliswitch fracture.'

² The letter found in the pocket of Nolan—*i. e.*, the one addressed to Mrs. Morris by her husband—was sent through the usual channels; but it is presumed that counteracting intelligence was sent by the same post.

self in an English hospital tent.¹ Terribly as he had been wounded and shattered, he did not succumb.²

Amongst the remnant of our Light Cavalry, now once more gathering together, there was, of course, a sense of the havoc that had been made in what, half an hour before, was Lord Cardigan's splendid brigade; but, for a while, this feeling was much interrupted by the joy of seeing comrade after comrade trail in from out of the fight, and in spite of the ruin their force had incurred, the men were from time to time cheering.

When the remnants of the brigade had formed up, Lord Cardigan came forward and said, 'Men! it is a mad-brained trick,³ but it is no fault of mine.' Some of the men answered, 'Never mind, my lord! we are ready to go again.' Lord Cardigan replied, 'No, no, men! you have done enough.'

It was upon one of the slopes which look southward toward Balaclava that the muster took place; and, for some time, stragglers and riderless chargers were coming in at intervals; but at length there was a numbering of horses, and afterward the melancholy roll-call began. As often as it appeared that the name called out there was no one present to answer, men

¹ I believe that the satisfaction of having taken the requisite steps for bringing in the shattered frame of his commanding officer is justly enjoyed by Sergeant O'Hara, the same officer whom we saw exerting himself at the battery captured by the first line. He had been informed by Private George Smith of the spot where Morris lay.

² Up to the commencement of the campaign Morris had been keeping himself in an almost constant state of high 'training;' and, by some, the possession of the bodily force that was needed for enabling him to go through what he did has been attributed in part to that cause, though the indomitable courage and determination of the man were probably his chief resource. Morris was able the following year to take part again in war service, and did not die till the July of 1858. The suppression of the Bengal mutinies had been the task which, in 1857, drew him and his regiment to the East; and it was to the climate of India that at length he surrendered his life. He was much thought of in our army as a valorous and skilled cavalry officer, and with so high a reputation for straightforwardness and accuracy, that once, when a general officer imprudently ventured to put himself in conflict with Morris upon a matter of fact, there was a smile at the 'impar congressus,' no one who knew Morris consenting to imagine it possible that he could be the one who mistook.

³ According to another version, 'a great blunder.'

contributed what knowledge they had as to the fate of their missing comrade, saying when and where they last had seen him. More or less truly, if they knew it not before, men learned the fate of their friends from this dismal inquest.

The killing of
the disabled
horses.

And then also came the time for the final and deliberate severance of many a friendship between the dragoon and his charger; for the farriers, with their pistols in hand, were busied in the task of shooting the ruined horses.

Upon counting the brigade, it appeared that the force, which numbered 673 horsemen when it went into action, had been reduced to a mounted strength of

The losses suffered by the
brigade.

195;¹ and there was one regiment, it seems, namely the 13th Light Dragoons, which, after the charge, mustered only ten mounted troopers. From a later examination it resulted that, in officers and men killed and wounded, the brigade had suffered losses to the number of 247, of whom 113 had been killed and 134 wounded; and that (including 43 horses shot as unserviceable on account of their wounds) the brigade had 475 horses killed, besides having 42 others wounded.²

It has been stated by one who had good means of knowing the truth, that of all the officers acting with the first line, those who came out of action without a wound received by either the horse or the rider, were only two in number.³

Lord Cardigan, as we saw, was wounded though not disabled; and of the three officers who acted as his aids-de-camp, one, Captain Lockwood, was killed; another, Lieutenant Maxse, wounded; and the third, Sir George Wombwell, as we before learned, had two horses shot under him.

In the 4th Light Dragoons, Major Halkett and Lieutenant Sparke were killed, and Captain Brown and Captain Hutton were both wounded severely.⁴

In the 8th Hussars, Lieutenant Lord Fitzgibbon was killed,

¹ It will be vain to seek for any correspondence between the result of the first muster and the casualties. Many wounded men and wounded horses might be present at the muster; and on the other hand, neither the unwounded men whose chargers had been killed, nor the unwounded horses which came back into our lines without their riders would contribute to 'the mounted strength' as ascertained at the first muster.

² These figures may not agree exactly with other returns, but I have good reason for believing them to be accurate.

³ It should be observed that I do not adopt the statement as one necessarily accurate; for the authority on which it rests, though coming from an official source, is not itself strictly official, and there may have been some omission.

⁴ It is said that Captain Hutton was seen vigorously using his sword in the battery at a time when he had his thigh broken.

and Lieutenant Clutterbuck, Lieutenant Seager, and Cornet Clowes were wounded. Of the ten officers who went into action with the regiment, Colonel Shewell and Cornet Heneage were the only two of whom it could be said that both they and their chargers were unstricken.

In the 11th Hussars, Captain Cook, Lieutenant Trevelyan, and Lieutenant Houghton were wounded. The wound of Houghton proved mortal.

In the 13th Light Dragoons, Captain Oldham, its commander, and Captain Goad, and Cornet Montgomery were killed.

In the 17th Lancers, Captain Morris, who commanded the regiment, was, as we saw, grievously wounded; Captain Winter and Lieutenant Thompson were killed; Captain Webb was mortally wounded; Captain Robert White was wounded severely; Lieutenant Sir William Gordon also was wounded; and Lieutenant Chadwick, as we saw, was both wounded and taken prisoner.

It is believed that the last man killed was Captain Lockwood, an officer who has been already mentioned as one of the three aids-de-camp of Lord Cardigan.

The supposed fate of Captain Lockwood. For some time, there was a hope that he might be alive; and there is still some uncertainty in regard to his movements during the charge, and the way in which he met his death. At the moment when the Light Cavalry began its advance, he was probably in the performance of some duty which separated him from the other aids-de-camp. Indeed, there is an idea that he rode to the ground where some of our battalions were halted, addressed a general whom he there found, and announcing that the Light Cavalry was about to engage in an ugly task, urged that it should be supported by infantry.¹ Supposing that he did this, and that the brigade moved forward before he returned to it, he would have been likely to gallop off in all haste down the valley to regain his place near Lord Cardigan; but all I have learned is, that some time after the retreat of Lord Cardigan, and indeed at a moment when all the remains of the brigade had already come out of action, Captain Lockwood rode up to Lord Lucan, and, speaking in a way which disclosed anxiety and distress as though for the fate of his chief, said, 'My lord, can you tell me where is Lord Cardigan?' and that, upon Lord Lucan's replying that Lord Cardigan had

¹ It seems to have been understood that Lockwood made the request at the instance of Lord Cardigan; but this Lord Cardigan entirely denies. The answer to the general thus appealed to was, it is said, to the effect that he had no authority.

passed him some time, Lockwood rode away. It is imagined that he must have mistaken the meaning of the answer, and that, regarding it as an intimation that Lord Cardigan had again advanced, he must have galloped down the fatal valley, and there met his death; for he was never afterward seen in the English camp, either dead or alive, and the Russians did not number him among their prisoners. He was an excellent officer, much valued in the 8th Hussars, the regiment to which he belonged.

Seeing that our squadrons drove into the heart, nay into the very rear of the enemy's position, and then had no means of retreat unless they could cut their way back through his interposed forces, the strangest feature in the statistics of the battle is the list of prisoners. With our cavalry so completely in their fangs as to have it a mile and a quarter deep in their position, the Russians took hardly one prisoner who had not been disabled by his own wounds or those inflicted upon his horse. They took but fifteen unwounded prisoners altogether; and I believe that almost all these—if not indeed all, without even a single exception—were men whose horses had been killed or disabled.

Another strange circumstance of this combat is the comparative impunity which the remnants of our Light Cavalry were suffered to enjoy after once they had closed with the enemy. A detailed statement of the casualties which occurred after the seizure of the battery could hardly be furnished, but I am persuaded that they were few. It was in descending the valley that our people incurred the main loss.

Who brought the first line out of action? If an unwary civilian were to put this question to a soldier, he might find that, without knowing it, he was using a phrase so technical as to bring upon himself a technical and somewhat illusory answer.¹ But if it be ask-

¹ In the military art there is a very inconvenient want of words and phrases with an exclusively technical import; and the result is, that soldiers find themselves obliged to affix technical meanings to ordinary expressions—a practice insuring ambiguity, and tending, of course, to misconceptions. When a military man speaks of a regiment, or any other force, and says that he 'brought it out of action,' he does not mean that he did any thing particular; all he means is, that he came out senior officer. In that, the merely technical sense of the phrase, Lord Cardigan, of course, was the officer who 'brought the first line out of action.'

ed who gave to the main fighting remnants of the first line that guidance and help by which they were ultimately extricated from the enemy's gripe, the answer must be based upon a knowledge of those occurrences which I have sought to record. From this I imagine it will be gathered that, although there were individuals of the first line who came out on the northern side of the valley with the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars, the number—a very small number—which could best be regarded as representing the first line, was that which came out on the south of the valley with the 8th Hussars. It was only during the period of the advance from the battery to the neighborhood of the aqueduct, and of the movement back thence to where stood the 8th Hussars, that Colonel Mayow had, in any sense, the charge of the first line. As soon as he had joined Colonel Shewell, he was in the presence of his military superior; and he acknowledges, apparently, that any command which he had been assuming in his character of senior officer then came at once to an end. It seems plain that the main undischarged remnant of the first line was extricated from the power of the enemy by Colonel Shewell of the 8th Hussars.

With regard to the supports, there was no co-operation at the close of the combat between the force on our right and the force on our left, and they came out in two distinct bodies. The 8th Hussars on our right was brought out by Colonel Shewell its commanding officer. On our left, there were two regiments which co-operated in their retreat, and with these, Lord George Paget was the senior officer.¹

Immediately after the muster, Lord Cardigan rode up to Lord Raglan in order to make his report. Lord Raglan said to him, in a severe and very angry way, 'What did you mean, Sir, by attacking a battery in front, contrary to all the usages of warfare, and the customs of the service?'

Lord Cardigan answered: 'My lord, I hope you will not blame me, for I received the order to attack from my supe-

¹ The question whether Lord George as senior officer acquired the command of the whole body formed by the two co-operating regiments (the 4th Light Dragoons, Lord George's own regiment, and the 11th Hussars, commanded by Colonel Douglas) is one of a technical kind which soldiers can best determine; but the facts on which the solution depends are given *ante*, p. 566.

‘rior officer in front of the troops;’ and he then proceeded to give an account of the part he had taken.

Subsequently, and after all full inquiry, Lord Raglan not only determined that the justification thus offered was sound, but also, it seems, formed an opinion that Lord Cardigan’s whole conduct in the affair of the charge had been admirable. ‘Lord Cardigan,’ he wrote in private, some five days after the action, ‘acted throughout with the greatest steadiness and gallantry, as well as perseverance.’

Upon meeting Lord Lucan at a later moment, Lord Raglan said to him, ‘You have lost the Light Brigade!’

Lord Lucan at once denied that he had lost the Light Brigade; and, as the ground for his denial, stated that he had only carried out the orders, written and verbal, conveyed to him by Captain Nolan.

Then it was that Lord Raglan is said to have uttered a sentence which, supposing it to be accurately reported, did certainly supply Lord Lucan with fair means of raising a controversy, and even gave him, as many may think, a kind of argumentative victory. The Commander of the Forces had no copy of either the ‘third’ or the ‘fourth’ order; and, for that reason alone, even if there were no other, he might not improbably desire to avoid or defer all discussion founded upon the wording of the documents. Accordingly, he did not say, as he might have done: ‘I ordered—I ordered in writing—that the cavalry should advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights, and you kept it halted for more than half an hour. I ordered—I ordered in writing—that the cavalry should advance rapidly to the front, that it should follow the enemy, and try to prevent him from carrying away the guns, meaning of course, as you well know,’ our lost English guns, and yet with this order in your hand you caused Lord Cardigan to go down the valley instead of advancing upon the “heights,” and to attack the front of a distant Russian battery, after running the gauntlet for a mile and a quarter between crossing fires.’ What Lord Raglan did say according to Lord Lucan, was to this effect: ‘Lord Lucan, you were a Lieutenant-General, and should therefore have exercised your discretion, and, not approving of the charge, should not have caused it to be made.’

Whatever, abstractly speaking, may be the value of the reason thus said to have been adduced by Lord Raglan, it

¹ For proof that Lord Lucan did know this, see the foot-note *ante*, p. 498.

was evidently one so far open to question as to give Lord Lucan an excellent opportunity of raising a controversy against his chief. Up to that moment, the predicament of Lord Lucan was simply the predicament of a man who had misconceived his instructions, and imagined that he must advance down the valley instead of trying to recover the heights; but now, all at once, if his impression of what Lord Raglan said be accurate, he found himself raised into the position of one who, being mortal, and having like other mortals committed an error, has had the good fortune to be rebuked for it in terms fairly open to question; and he was as competent as any man living to make vigorous use of the advantage thus gained. Accordingly, when opportunity offered, he argued with great cogency against the theory that he should have disobeyed an order which he could not approve, urging soundly that Lord Raglan's survey of the field from the high ground of the Chersonese was necessarily much more complete than that which could be commanded by any one in the plain below; and that to venture to disobey the order under such circumstances, would have been to disobey a General who was not only armed with the superior authority of a Commander-in-Chief, but also with superior knowledge.

Thus then it resulted that, independently of the substantial merits of the question as they stood at the time of the combat, Lord Lucan was so much advantaged afterward by the alleged tenor of the blaming words as to be able to place himself—not, of course, in the right, but—still in the attitude of one who can take fair exception to the terms in which his chief has reproved him.

It might be thought at first sight that, correlatively with the anger and the pain evinced by Lord Raglan, there would be exultation on the part of Liprandi; but this was not so. On the contrary, he seems to have been thrown into a state of angry vexation; and perhaps, after all—for in war reputation is strength—he was right in believing that the deduction of three or four hundreds from the numerical strength of our Light Brigade could be no sufficing compensation to him for the moral disaster sustained by the main body of his powerful cavalry—the disaster of having been overthrown and put to flight by the desultory and uncombined onsets of scanty numbers of horsemen. Perceiving, as he

General Liprandi's questions respecting the exploit of the Light Brigade.

could not fail to do, the unspeakable rashness, or rather self-destructiveness, of the charge, he was disposed to attribute it to the maddening power of alcohol; and it would seem that he was rendered all the more indignant by imagining that the disgrace of his cavalry—his cavalry numbered by thousands—was the result of a drunken freak. He found himself obliged to abandon that somewhat easy mode of accounting for heroism when he had examined our prisoners. Upon his asking them whether they had not been made drunk before the charge, they were able to assure him with truth that the men of our Light Cavalry (as also, indeed, those of Scarlett's brigade who had defeated General Ryjoff in the morning) were not only guiltless of having touched any strong drink, but had been actually fasting all day.¹ For proof of this they appealed to the state of their haversacks when taken from them, which contained their untouched rations, including their untouched ration of rum.

Liprandi showed a strong wish to learn the name and rank of an English officer who had been seen retreating on a chestnut horse with white heels; and upon questioning the English prisoners on the subject, he was told by some of them that the officer so seen was Lord Cardigan. Upon receiving this answer General Liprandi remarked, that nothing but the advantage of having a good horse could have saved the rider from the Cossacks who pursued him.²

It has been computed that the onset, the combat, and the Duration of the retreat, which are popularly comprised under the combat called the 'Light Cavalry Charge,' lasted twenty minutes.³ What was suffered and done in that time I have sought to record. I will add the opinion re-

¹ It was just when they were about to be dismissed to their breakfasts that our cavalry were called upon to advance; and from that time until the Light Cavalry charge they were either kept moving or on the alert.

² Supposing that the prisoners were right in identifying the rider of the chestnut horse as Lord Cardigan, Liprandi's words add another corroboration (if any such were needed) to Lord Cardigan's account of the circumstances under which he began to retreat. There is only one witness—Thomas King—who connects the retreat of the rider of the chestnut horse with the time 'when the second line were going down.'

³ This was General Scarlett's computation, and it has been generally adopted as likely to be right. Lord Cardigan at first used to speak of twenty-five minutes as the probable period, but he afterward—and with great urgency—insisted that General Scarlett's computation was the right one.

Lord Raglan's privately expressed opinion of the charge. specting this singular passage of arms which was spontaneously and in private expressed by the English Commander. With but two small brigades of cavalry under his orders, Lord Raglan had cogent reason for thinking bitterly of an operation by which one of them had been shattered; and, when writing confidentially to the Secretary of State, he declared that the result of the Light Cavalry charge was a 'heavy misfortune'—a misfortune he felt 'most deeply.'¹ In conversation at Head-quarters he not unfrequently expressed his painful sense of the disaster; and foreseeing the enthusiastic admiration which the feat would excite in England, he used sometimes to lament the perverseness with which he believed that his fellow-countrymen would turn from the brilliant and successful achievement of Scarlett's brigade to dwell, and still dwell, upon the heroic, yet self-destructive exploit of Lord Cardigan's squadrons; but the truth is that, apart from thoughts military, there was a deep human interest attaching to the devotion of the man and the men who, for the sheer sake of duty, could go down that fatal North Valley as the English Light Cavalry did. This feeling on the part of others Lord Raglan might be willing to repress, but he could not help sharing it himself; and despite all his anger and grief, despite the kind of protestation he judged it wholesome to utter for the discouragement of rash actions on the part of his officers, I still find him writing in private of the Light Cavalry charge that it 'was perhaps the finest thing ever attempted.'²

The well-known criticism delivered by General Bosquet was sound and generous. He said of the charge, 'It is splendid; but it is not war.'³ He spoke with a most exact justice; but already the progress of time has been changing the relative significance of that glory and that fault which his terse comment threw into contrast. What were once the impassioned desires of the great nations of the West for the humbling of the Czar are now as cold as the ashes which remind men of flames extinguished; and our people can cease from deploring the errors which marred a battle, yet refuse to forget an achievement which those very errors provoked. Therefore the perversity which sent our squadrons to their doom is only, after all, the mortal part of the story. Half-forgotten already, the

¹ Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1854.

² Oct. 30, 1854.

³ 'C'est magnifique; mais ce n'est pas la guerre.' This was said by General Bosquet to Mr. Layard in the field, and at the time of the charge.

origin of the 'Light Cavalry Charge' is fading away out of sight. Its splendor remains. And splendor like this is something more than the mere outward adornment which graces the life of a nation. It is strength—strength other than that of mere riches, and other than that of gross numbers—strength carried by proud descent from one generation to another—strength awaiting the trials that are to come.

XI.

Divining apparently that the disaster incurred by our Light Cavalry would chill the ardor of the Allies, Liprandi not only determined to reverse that movement of retreat from the Causeway Heights which Lord Raglan had so swiftly detected, but even wished, it would seem, to make a show of seriously offering resistance to the Allies if assailed in that part of the field. He therefore countermarched the Odessa regiment to the ground near the Arabtabia Redoubt,¹ from which it had been withdrawn at the approach of our cavalry, and he moved such additional troops to the same ground as brought up his force on that part of the Causeway Heights to a strength of eight battalions, supported by artillery.

It is probable that Sir Colin Campbell detected this change of disposition on the part of the enemy; for he came to the Duke of Cambridge, and, with a good deal of earnestness, entreated his Royal Highness to dissuade Cathcart from attacking the redoubts. His Royal Highness declined to interfere; but it is probable that Sir Colin Campbell may have found some other channel by which to convey his advice. At all events, no attack took place. I do not imagine that Sir Colin meant to express any opinion against duly concerted measures for the recovery of the heights, but only to deprecate an isolated attack upon ground where the enemy had just concentrated a large part of his force.

However, General Canrobert and Lord Raglan had a force in the plain which, by this time, was so disposed that they might undertake the recapture of the heights, and they were called upon to determine whether or not it would be well for them to use their power. Lord Raglan, I believe, still desired to do so; but the loss of the Light Cavalry Brigade, though it did not impair the power of the Allies to recapture the heights, was a reason which made it more difficult than before to maintain an ex-

¹ The Number Three Redoubt.

tended dominion in front of Balaclava. Indeed it was evident that the dominion which had there been exercised could now be no longer maintained without either relaxing the siege, or else determining that a portion of the French covering army should come down to take charge in the plain; and it is evident that this was a condition of things which would fairly entitle General Canrobert to even more than his usual weight in the Anglo-French counsels.

Now, General Canrobert, as we know, had conceived from the first that the advance of the Russians into the plain of Balaclava was a mere snare by which they were trying to lure him down from the Chersonese; and it must be acknowledged that, if looked at in a too narrow spirit, the reasons which could be adduced against any attempt to recapture the forts had a great appearance of cogency. It was said that, with their limited strength, and the great business of the siege in hand, the Allies could not afford the troops needed for occupying ground so distant as that on which stood the redoubts; that if they were that moment in possession of the heights, policy would require that they should give them up the next day; and that, plainly, it must be unwise for belligerents, whose whole prospects depended upon the speedy capture of Sebastopol, to undertake a combat for the recovery of ground which they could not afford to occupy.

In its direct bearing upon what may be called the merely material view of the question, the argument was possibly sound; but it had the defect which the great Napoleon in the successful part of his career so well knew how to avoid—the defect of leaving out from the reckoning all allowance for those moral forces which govern the actions of men. The events of the day had been such, that if they should be followed by the extrusion of the enemy from the sites of the Turkish redoubts and the recapture of the English guns, the Russians, it was plain, would have to go out of action not only with the distinct consciousness of a defeat, but of a defeat rendered bitter and humiliating by the overthrow of their powerful cavalry; whereas, if Liprandi should be left in possession of the hillocks, and the small iron guns which he had been able to capture, he might plausibly claim a victory, and would have some real trophies to show in the Theatre Square at Sebastopol. It is true enough that no such nominal victory as this was calculated to give mighty confidence to Liprandi's own little army—the men who composed it knew the truth too well—but it was for the defenders of Sebastopol rather than for the field army that moral force

was vitally needed ; and in Sebastopol, as we now know, the 'victory of Balaclava,' and the guns which, though taken from the Turks, could still be truly called 'English,' were well fitted to be received as blessings of unspeakable value. They could not fail to give heart to the men—whether soldiers, or sailors, or people—who were engaged in defending the place ; and on the other hand it may be taken for granted that if the tidings of so slender a 'victory' as that of Balaclava could bring all this accession of moral strength to the beleaguered town, the opposite effect that must have been produced by Liprandi's defeat would have been fully proportionate.

It was determined that the Russians should be left in undisturbed possession of the ground which they held.

The determination of the Allies.

Sir George Cathcart, who had brought his division to the ground near the Redoubt 'Number Four,' now caused the work to be manned once more by the Turks ; and his riflemen took part in a fusilade which appeared to have the effect of silencing two Russian guns.

At about four o'clock the firing came to an end ; but all grave contention had ceased from the moment when the Allied Commanders determined to acquiesce in Liprandi's conquest. He held without farther challenge all three of the captured redoubts ; and retained to a point so far westward his dominion on the Causeway Heights as to be able to forbid free communication between Balaclava and the main Allied camps by the line of the Woronzoff road.

With the condition of things now shown, both the Allies and the Russians were so far content that they allowed the battle to end.

Close of the battle.

XII.

If the scope of this conflict were to be measured by numbering the forces engaged, and the men killed, wounded, or taken, a much slighter record than the one I have framed would be fully enough for the purpose ; but from its effect in cramping the English at Balaclava, and exalting the spirit of Sebastopol, this first effort of Prince Mentschikoff's resurgent field-army exerted much power over the subsequent course of events ; and, on the other hand, the battle comprised several fights which so happily elicited the quality of the soldier, whether English, French, Russian, or Turk, as to have a distinct present bearing on the warlike repute of each nation engaged,

The kind of importance which can be attached to the Battle of Balaclava.

and, therefore, of course, on its strength, and therefore, again, on its welfare. Under that kind of aspect, the glory of fights which sprang out of sheer chance or mistake may come to be of higher moment to England than the objects and the vicissitudes of a somewhat fanciful war long since at an end. What are now the 'four points of Vienna' when compared with the achievement of Scarlett's dragoons and Cardigan's Light Cavalry charge?

Told more shortly, the story is this: Marching by two un-
Summary of
the battle. connected routes in the early morning, a portion of Liprandi's forces established batteries with which they cannonaded the Turkish redoubt on Canrobert's Hill. Upon being apprised of this movement Lord Raglan at once sent down two divisions of foot; but time must necessarily elapse before the troops thus dispatched could come into action; and, in the meanwhile, there were no English forces with which to support the Turks in their defense except our division of cavalry and its attendant troop of horse-artillery.

The question was, Whether Lord Lucan, with the cavalry arm alone, could and would aid the Turks in warding off for a few hours the impending attack? With the approval of Sir Colin Campbell, he abstained from launching any of his squadrons in arrest of the enemy's progress; and our horse-men, though compelled to be spectators of what followed, were not suffered to interpose as assailants.

Being thus let alone by our cavalry, and but slightly molested, if molested at all, by its attendant troop of horse-artillery, the Russian infantry proceeded to storm the work on Canrobert's Hill, and by the strength of their overwhelming numbers they succeeded in carrying it, though not until the brave little Turkish garrison of not more than 500 or 600 men had lost, in killed only, as many as 170.

Upon seeing the fate of the redoubt on Canrobert's Hill, the Turks posted in the three next adjoining works abandoned them at once to the Russians. The enemy having speedily entered them, dismantled and afterward quitted the one called 'Number Four,' but kept the other three in his grasp, together with their seven English guns.

As the Russians advanced, our cavalry fell back; and Lord Lucan had just taken up a position in the South Valley, where his troops would cover Balaclava, when, by an order sent down from Head-quarters, all his squadrons were drawn in under the steep slopes of the Chersonese; but that last order again was presently followed by another, which directed that eight

squadrons of Heavy Dragoons should countermarch toward Kadiköi, and aid the defense of the gorge.

Notwithstanding the rapid and almost brilliant success which had hitherto rewarded his enterprise, Liprandi did not hold to the purpose, if ever he had it, of really attacking Balaclava. Yet by arraying his powerful cavalry, with its attendant batteries, across the North Valley, he not only showed a good front to the troops coming down from the Chersonese, but connected himself by his right with the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills; and as Jabrokritsky was there establishing himself, it might be said that the Russians at this time were an army taking up a position.

Their array was apparently meant to be the commencing stage of a deliberate, well-conducted retreat.

Since the Russians were attempting nothing against Balaclava, and the Allies had as yet no division of infantry far advanced on the plain, there resulted a pause in the battle.

The Russian cavalry, however, having before it a great tract of unoccupied ground, was—without any very large purpose—induced to advance up the valley; and (after detaching on its way the four squadrons which descended toward Sir Colin Campbell and quickly turned aside from his fire) this great body of horse continued to move forward till it came within range of the Chersonese batteries; when, after incurring two shots, it turned aside to its left and gained the top of the Causeway ridge.

Then ended that part of the battle which was governed by design, and Chance began to have sway.

It happened that whilst countermarching toward Kadiköi, in obedience to the order last mentioned, General Scarlett with six of his squadrons had reached that part of the South Valley which lay directly under the Russians now crowning the ridge.

That which followed was the great fight between the Russian cavalry and our Heavy Dragoons. The Russian cavalry, upon being overthrown, did not merely retreat to the ground whence it came, but it moved off far away to the rear with its attendant batteries, leaving the two protruding columns of Liprandi and Jabrokritsky in a state of severance the one from the other—two wings without a body—and each of them very open to attack.

Lord Raglan instantly saw his opportunity, and ordered—in writing—that the cavalry should advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. This direction not having been executed by the commander of our

cavalry, was followed, after an interval, by the yet more peremptory order which Nolan brought down from Lord Raglan.

Upon the delivery of this order there occurred the strange scene which ended in Lord Lucan's conceiving that, instead of attacking the heights, it was his duty to send Lord Cardigan and his Light Brigade down the fatal North Valley, and to follow himself in support with the Heavy Dragoons. The first moments of Lord Cardigan's forward movement proved the wisdom with which Lord Raglan had ordered an attack on the Causeway Heights; for when the Russians perceived the advance of the Light Brigade, without yet being able to foresee its actual destination, the Odessa battalions—those battalions which stood on the spot to which Lord Raglan had directed the attack—retreated at once from the forward position they had occupied on the Causeway Heights, and formed square a good way to the rear.

The Light Brigade continued to move forward; and, for a time, Lord Lucan was anxiously following its advance with a portion of his Heavy Dragoons; but afterward (though still holding his Heavy Dragoons in readiness to cover his Light Cavalry during a portion at least of its anticipated retreat) he judged that it was his duty to save the rest of his squadrons from the disasters which the Light Brigade was incurring, and determined that Lord Cardigan's attack must thenceforth remain unsupported.

Lord Cardigan persisted in his advance down the valley; and then followed the rest of the operations which constitute the 'Light Cavalry Charge.' It was in advancing down the length of the valley that our Light Cavalry incurred their main losses, and were reduced to a third of their strength; but the remnant of the brigade seized the battery at the foot of the valley, overthrew the main body of the Russian cavalry, and forced their way back through the rest of them, owing much of their immunity in retreat to the brilliant achievement of D'Allonville and his famous 'Fourth Chasseurs d'Afrique.'

Emboldened by the disaster which our Light Cavalry incurred, and possibly, also, by visible signs of hesitation in the counsels of the Allies, Liprandi began to reverse his movement of retreat. The Odessa battalions countermarched to the ground from which they had been withdrawn, and some additional troops were established on the line of the Causeway Heights.

For reasons based on the difficulty of holding a wide extent of ground in the plain of Balaclava, the Allies determined

to acquiesce in Liprandi's conquest of the redoubts; and with that decision—though vain shots were afterward fired—the battle came to an end.

XIII.

In ground, the Allies lost the outer line of defense which the English by the aid of the Turks had provided for Balacava; and with it, they so lost their freedom of action in the country they had made bold to invade, as to be thenceforth confined during several months within very narrow limits, and that, too, with great strictness. They remained, of course, in the occupation of the whole of the Chersonese; but there was a question, as we shall hereafter see, of actually abandoning Balacava; and although the proposal to that effect was ultimately discarded by the Allies, the scope of their dominion on the land side of the place became so contracted as only to include the marine heights on our right, and just so much ground in front of the place as was necessary for maintaining its communications with the Chersonese by the way of 'the Col.'

In submitting to be thus extruded from the Causeway Heights, the Allies gave up the control of the Woronzoff road, and the time was at hand when this loss would become a cause of cruel sufferings to the English army.

The Allies lost in killed and wounded about 600 officers and men, besides some fifteen unwounded English and a small number of Turks who were taken prisoners.¹ The Russians, it seems, lost in men killed and wounded about 627.²

The Russians took out of the redoubts captured from the Turks seven cast-iron English guns. Also, Liprandi was enabled to send to his chief the welcome trophy of a Turkish standard.

It may here be recorded, and recorded with gratitude, that the English prisoners, upon the whole, were treated with great kindness; and I will mention a touching example of good feeling displayed by the poor Muscovite soldiers. Simple, untutored men, they

The loss of ground sustained by the Allies.

The casualties resulting from the battle.

Trophies taken by the Russians.

Treatment of the prisoners taken by the enemy.

¹ I am not aware that any one unwounded Englishman having under him an unwounded horse was taken prisoner.

² This includes some who were only 'contusionnés,' and also fifteen missing. I include those last because I believe that all who were 'missing' had been either killed or wounded. The basis of the statement as to the Russian losses is the official return, to which (by adopting it) General de Todleben gives the weight of his authority.

yet had heard so much of the ways of other nations as to be aware that the Englishmen did not live on that strange waxy substance which goes by the name of 'black bread;' and their kindly natures were so moved by the thought of this that they generously subscribed out of their humble pittances to buy white loaves for the prisoners.¹

With the knowledge of the kindness thus extended to our own people, it is painful to have to add that the Turkish prisoners were ill treated.

With which of the two contending forces did the victory rest? If it be believed that—however irresolute—ly—the Russians entertained the design of trying to break into Balaclava, the failure of their attempt would be a circumstance strongly bearing upon the question; for when they ventured to descend into that South Valley by which Balaclava might be approached, they were instantly stopped at one point by the 93rd Highlanders, and superbly defeated at another by Scarlett's dragoons. If that were all, it might seem to follow that the palm was with those who repulsed the attacks; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that our Light Cavalry, after seizing the twelve-gun battery and routing the main body of the enemy's horse, was itself obliged to retreat, and that the Russians, though worsted in combat after combat, still were suffered to remain in possession of the ground, the redoubts, and the trophies which they had won in the first hour of the morning. Upon the whole, therefore, it will probably be thought that there was no such decisive inclination of the balance as to give to one side or the other the advantage which men call a 'victory.'

But, apart from the mere name of victory, one of the weightiest effects of a battle is the change which it commonly works in the self-confidence of the opposing forces; and under this aspect of its consequences the result of the day's fighting in the plain of Balaclava was somewhat anomalous; for the action consisted of five several combats not effectually brought into one by any pervading design; and, excepting only the first, there were none of these combats which ended without shedding glory on the Allies, and inflicting something like hu-

The effect of the battle upon the self-confidence of the Russians.

¹ General de Todleben communicated this to me, and I have great confidence in the accuracy of the statement. The statement must not be understood as applying specially to the prisoners taken at Balaclava.

miliation on the enemy. Therefore the effect of the day's conflict was such as to be disheartening—oppressively disheartening—to those of the Russians who actually fought in it; and it is probable that for a long time afterward it would have been impracticable to make the Russian cavalry act with any thing like confidence in the presence of a few English squadrons; but, on the other hand, the facts were such that, without any actual misstatement of them, they could be narrated in a way highly encouraging to all Russians who were not on the field, and especially encouraging to the soldiery, the seamen, and the people upon whose spirit the fate of Sebastopol was depending. Liprandi could dwell upon the brilliant assault and capture of the work on Canrobert's Hill, and upon the fall of the other redoubts; could pass lightly over the conflicts which his cavalry hazarded with the Highlanders and with Scarlett's dragoons; could speak frankly of the wondrous pertinacity evinced by our Light Cavalry in its road to destruction; could state that, in the teeth of all the forces brought down by the Allies, he had persisted in holding the line of the captured redoubts; could show that he was thus pressing close upon the English camp at Balaclava; and could end by producing the captured guns and the captured standard as fit tokens of what had been achieved. Dispatched from the camp of a relieving army to a beleaguered town, such a narrative as this, with the many and brilliant adornments which rumor would abundantly add, might well carry heart to the garrison; and we now know that the tidings and the trophies of the battle brought such joy and encouragement to the people defending Sebastopol as to aggravate, and aggravate heavily, the already hard task of the besiegers.

With each hour of the lapsing time from the night of the 20th of September, that store of moral power over the enemy which the Allies acquired by their victory had been almost ceaselessly dwindling; and although it be granted that, so far as concerned all those Russians who were assailed by our cavalry, or by D'Allonville's Chasseurs d'Afrique, the old spell was superbly renewed, it is yet, I think, true that with the rest of the enemy's forces, and especially in the lines of Sebastopol, our patience under the capture which deprived us of the Turkish redoubts and the English guns which had armed them did much to destroy what was left of the ascendant obtained on the Alma.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

LORD CARDIGAN.

IN general, there is but little disposition on the part of the world to analyze any great feat of arms with the notion of seeing exactly how much was done by the troops, and how much by their leader. Under the ordinary and popular aspect of warlike conflicts, the actions of the chief and his soldiery are blended into one glowing picture; and since it is easier, and even more interesting to contemplate the prowess of one man than the compound deserts of a thousand, the result most commonly is that, without truly learning what guidance was given by the commander, mankind are content to assign him an enormously large share of the glory which he and his people have earned. In the instance of the Light Cavalry charge, this was the more especially likely to be the case, because the General in immediate command of the assailing troops was their actual, bodily leader. I imagine that if Lord Cardigan had remained silent, no painful scrutiny would have been ever applied to the actions of the man who rode the foremost of all between two flanking fires into the front of the twelve-gun battery, and the glory allotted to the chief would have been nearly as free from question as the glory of his martyred brigade. But, as in the disposal of his daily life Lord Cardigan had separated himself from his troops by choosing to live in that home of comparative luxury which a well-supplied yacht could afford whilst not only his officers and men, but even his immediate commander, lay always camped out in the plain, so also in the graver business of upholding his fair fame as a soldier by argument, assertion, and proof, he acted in such manner as to sever himself from that very brigade with which his renown had been blended.

Under stress of ill health, he returned to England. There, as may well be supposed, he was greeted with the wildest enthusiasm; and then began the long process by which he mismanaged his military reputation. By consenting to be made the too conspicuous and too solitary hero of public ovations; by giving to the world his own version of the famous Light Cavalry charge; by showing—he showed this quite

truly—how well he had led the attack, but omitting—and there was the error of errors—to speak of that separation which I have called being ‘thrown out;’ by continuing in this course of action until he provoked hard attacks; by submitting to grave specified charges, or meeting them with mere personal abuse; by writing letters to newspapers; by sending complaints to the Horse Guards; by making himself the bitter antagonist of officers, nay, even of regiments, where claims for the least share of glory seemed clashing at all with his own; and finally by a process of tardy litigation exploding, after eight years of controversy, in one of the law courts at Westminster, he at length forced the world to distinguish between his brigade and himself. He forced men, if so one may speak, to decompose the whole story of the ‘Light Cavalry Charge;’ and one result is, that the narrator of that part of the combat which began when the chief went about, is driven against his will to an unaccustomed division of subjects, having first to go home with the leader, and then travel back to the fight. In such conditions, it is not possible to do real justice by merely saying what happened. It would be cruel, and wrong to speak dryly of Lord Cardigan’s retreat without giving his justification. Accordingly, at the very moment of narrating his retreat I began to show how he defended it; and I now think it right to impart the nature of his justification with more fullness than could well be allowed me whilst yet in the midst of the story.

So long as he moved down the valley under the guidance of what he understood to be an assigned duty, no danger seemed to appall him, and of a certainty none bent him aside from his course. That which afterward baffled him was something more perturbing than mere danger to one whose experience had been military without being warlike. What he encountered was an emergency. Acting apparently with the full persuasion that the leadership of his first line was the one task before him, he all at once found that of that first line he could see nothing, except some horsemen in retreat, and already a good way up the valley.¹ It did not, it seems, appear to him that by holding up his sword for a rally he

¹ That the theory was no mere afterthought, and that Lord Cardigan really considered the leadership of the first line as the one task before him is shown, I think, by the terms of the private memorandum which he imparted to Lord Raglan on the second day after the battle, and long before controversy began; for he there described himself as having been ordered to attack—not with the Light Brigade, but—with the 13th Light Dragoons, and the 17th Lancers, *i. e.*, with the regiments constituting his first line. See note, *ante*, p. 505.

could draw any stragglers to his side, and he had no aid-de-camp, no orderly with him. What was he to do?¹ Well indeed might it be said that the emergency was an unforeseen one, for what manual had ever explained how a cavalry leader should act if all the troops he could see were out of his reach, and he had no one at his side by whom he could send an order?

Even when in the midst of the narrative, I found time to speak—although shortly—of what Lord Cardigan believes to be the true rule of cavalry practice. His theory is, that a cavalry officer in command of two or more lines when about to undertake a charge should first give sufficient directions to the officers in command of his supports, and thenceforth address himself specially (in the absence of exceptional circumstances) to the leadership of the first line; the principle apparently being that, by reason of the impossibility of transmitting verbal orders to a distance in the midst of a cavalry charge, the movements of the first line are in the nature of signaled directions, which offer a continuous guidance to the squadrons advancing in their rear. The General does not of course cease to be in the actual and effective command of the whole force engaged in the charge, but he exerts his authority over the squadrons advancing in support first by giving them anticipatory directions, and afterward by showing them through the means of their eyesight and without any farther words the way in which he leads his first line.² If, in short, he gives proper instruction to his supports before the commencement of the charge, and then proceeding to lead his first line, takes care to lead it efficiently, he has done all that in ordinary circumstances could be required of him.

There is a defect in the argument by which Lord Cardigan applies this theory to his own case; for as soon as he had determined that (without first riding off a great way to the rear) there was nothing for him to do toward rallying or otherwise governing the fragments of his first line, the exigency under which a General may be forced to leave his

¹ As was said by the Lord Chief Justice, it would be well for men forming opinions upon Lord Cardigan's conduct 'to ask themselves how they would have acted in a similar state of things?'

² Supposing the application of the theory to be confined within proper bounds, it seems to be based upon the necessity of the case, and to be, for that reason, sound; but I observe that infantry officers are at first much startled when they hear it propounded as a justification for leaving the supports to themselves.

supports to take care of themselves would seem to have lost its force. After the conclusion he had come to in regard to the hopelessness of attempting to rally his first line, or taking any farther part in its combats, Lord Cardigan was so circumstanced that he had leisure to look after his supports; and, indeed, there was no other public duty of a momentous kind that he well could attempt to discharge.

Lord Cardigan, however, has reinforced this theory by an important assertion. He solemnly declares that when he retreated, he nowhere could see his supports; and after intimating a belief that he could not have reached them without pushing his search through bodies of Russian cavalry, he finally submits that any endeavor on his part to get to his supports under such circumstances would have been absolutely hopeless and therefore wrong.

In explanation of the course that he took in retiring, Lord Cardigan has made written statements, of which the following are a portion:—After stating that he ‘gradually retreated’ until he reached the battery into which he had led the first line, he goes on to say—‘On arriving there I found no part of the first line remaining there; those which survived the charge had passed off to the left short of the Russian limber-carriages or retreated up the hill. I can upon my most solemn oath swear that in that position, and looking round, I could see none of the first line or of the supports. The supports ought to have followed me in the attack, instead of which they diverged to the right and left. . . . My aids-de-camp were prevented by different causes from being with me. I was consequently nearly or quite alone. I have already positively stated that when I got back to the battery which we had attacked and silenced, I could see none of the first line, and no troops formed either on the right or the left. I therefore found myself alone; and I ask, was it not my duty to retreat gradually and slowly in rear of the broken parties of the first line up the hill, rather than turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of my supports, without knowing at the time which way they had gone, they not having followed the first line in the advance as they ought to have done? My humble opinion is, that it is quite sufficient for a General of Brigade to return with as well as lead the attack of the front line, unless he should by chance come in contact with his supports, in which case he would remain with them; but it may be observed that no general officer

Lord Cardigan's assertion to the effect that he did not see the supports.

His written explanations of the course he took in retiring.

‘could have rendered any service or assistance in an affair like that of Balaclava, in which all the loss of men and horses was sustained in twenty minutes, and there were no troops left with which to attack an overwhelming force like that of the Russians in position on that day.’ ‘What was the duty of the Brigadier under such circumstances? In such a desperate *mêlée* to remain to be taken prisoner, or was it his duty to retire?’²

When Lord Cardigan declares that at the time of his retiring he nowhere saw the supports, he places himself in antagonism to a great body of sworn testimony.³

The sworn testimony by which this assertion is encountered.

The definite question thus raised.

Is it, can it be true that Lord Cardigan in his retreat met a part of his supports then moving down toward the battery, and that in the face of their continued advance he pursued his way toward the rear, past the left of the 4th Light Dragoons?⁴

I acknowledge the apparent weight and the general consistency of the evidence which has been adduced in support of an affirmative answer to this question, and I believe in the good faith of the witnesses. I also acknowledge that, supposing the supports to have reached the guns before Lord Cardigan retreated, it is hard to understand how he could have ridden back through the battery without becoming cognizant of the obstinate and boisterous combat which was there maintained for some time by the 4th Light Dragoons. But, on the other hand, there stands the solemn assertion of Lord Cardigan; there is the mass of counter-evidence which he has adduced;⁵ there is a question of mistaken identity;⁶

¹ Paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan.

² Another paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan.

³ The affidavits here referred to in *Cardigan vs. Calthorpe* were not regarded as being strictly relevant to the exact question *then* at issue, and Lord Cardigan, I believe, had no opportunity of adducing evidence in contradiction of them. The effect of the litigation was to *raise* the question stated in the text, but not to *solve* it.

⁴ This was the main question raised by the testimony adduced on behalf of Colonel Calthorpe.

⁵ Not sworn and filed in a court of law, but verified by the witnesses as their solemn ‘declarations,’ and laid before me by Lord Cardigan.

⁶ Notwithstanding the great difference in the ages of the two men, an officer who was himself with the 4th Light Dragoons, and who could judge of the extent to which smoke and rapid movement might baffle the sight—I mean Captain E. W. Hunt—believed that Lieutenant Houghton of the 11th Hussars, who rode back mortally wounded, was mistaken for Lord Cardigan. From another source I have ascertained that Lieutenant Houghton (who wore the same conspicuous uniform as the leader of the brigade) rode a chestnut horse very like Lord Cardigan’s.

there is difficulty in seeing how Lord Cardigan, after his encounter with the Cossacks, could possibly have come back in time to be meeting the 4th Light Dragoons on the English side of the battery; and it will not be forgotten that the officer whose conduct at the time of his retreating has thus been brought into question, was the one who, a minute before, had been leading his brigade down the valley, and charging at its head through the guns with a firmness that was never surpassed.

The question is not ripe for conclusive decision.¹ Its issue is one of great moment to the military reputation of Lord Cardigan, but not, after all, essential to a due comprehension of the battle; because all agree that at the time of his retiring Lord Cardigan had become personally isolated, and was giving no orders. Still dwelling now upon the memory of the man who led the Light Cavalry charge—he has died since the last sentence was in type—I am unwilling to withhold all acknowledgment of what—as contradistinguished from a rigorously deduced conclusion—I will call the strong personal bias which my mind has received. I can not, I do not believe that Lord Cardigan, when he retreated, met and saw his supports advancing.²

Down to the time of his extricating himself from the Cossacks, Lord Cardigan's leadership of this extraordinary charge was so perfect as to be all but proof against even minute criticism. And to say this of his exploit is to say a great deal; for in the first place, his actions on the 25th of October have been subjected to a piercing scrutiny; and next, it is evident that his obedience had more the character of a soldier's martyrdom than of what men call 'desperate service.' Whilst he rode down the valley at the head of his splendid brigade with something like a foreknowledge of the fate to which he was leading it, he could not but feel

¹ Some of those who, as is supposed, might throw much light on the question, have hitherto maintained silence. The proceeding in Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe was not one well calculated to probe the truth, for besides that the question was narrowed by technical rules, and that the evidence was not given orally, the disputants were without the means of obliging any witnesses to testify.

² It is the opinion of an officer of great authority who was so placed in the field as to be highly capable of forming a correct judgment of the effect of the smoke and other baffling causes, that whilst the three supporting regiments were advancing, it would have been quite possible for Lord Cardigan to ride back between two of those regiments without seeing either of them.

that he was giving his chivalrous obedience to a wrongly-interpreted order; and there is nothing more trying to a soldier than the notion of being sacrificed by mistake.

The splendid machine which he had been trusted to wield was so perfectly constituted, and composed of men so resolute that although ever lessening and lessening in size as the squadrons advanced down the valley, they never broke up until they had entered the battery; and as long as it was possible for the attack to go on in that orderly, disciplined way, so long, notwithstanding all the havoc that round-shot, grape, and rifle-balls were making, and notwithstanding the slenderness of the thread on which his own life seemed each moment hanging, the leader performed what he believed to be his duty with an admirable exactness, and a courage so rigid, that almost one might call it metallic. I can not but think that by a feat of devotion so brave, so desperate, and yet, during some eight or ten deadly minutes, so deliberately pushed on to extremity, he entitled himself to a generous interpretation of what he next did when his peace-service lessons all failed him.¹

It has been said indeed that Lord Cardigan's attack was deprived of the heroic character which might otherwise have belonged to it by the fact of his having acted against his will, after actually remonstrating against the decision which consigned him and his brigade to the fatal valley, and that he had no choice but to charge like a hero or else become at his peril a willful disobeyer of orders which directed him at once to advance.

But I imagine that this view is erroneous. In the first place, it is not at all usual to strip a leader of the glory naturally attaching to his enterprise by saying that, though acting superbly, he only was brave under orders; but in point of fact no such dilemma as the one supposed was really constituted. We saw what Lord Lucan stated to have been the terms of his order, and whether his version of the words or that of Lord Cardigan be adopted, there was nothing in them which would have caused an irresolute man to think himself compelled to lead his brigade to destruction by taking it down the length of the valley to the mouths of the guns then distant a mile and a quarter. It was only under the chivalrous construction which Lord Cardigan chose to put on the

¹ This as I understand was the ground on which the Lord Chief Justice proceeded when he said that criticism of the man who led the Light Cavalry charge 'should be a generous and liberal criticism.'—*Judgment of the Lord Chief Justice.*

words that he could be compelled or even empowered to hazard the attack which he made.

Besides, if I am rightly informed, there was nothing more easy than for Lord Cardigan to let his advance down the valley come to an early end, not only without doing or omitting any act for which he could have been blamed, but even without being forced to confess to himself that he was so acting as to check the advance. The rapid advance of a body of Cavalry can not of course be perfectly governed by orders like the march of Foot soldiery, and the compactness of squadrons when once fairly launched against the enemy is so much dependent upon what may be called the 'opinion' of the force and so liable to be destroyed by the uncertainties, or the faltering, or the impatience of even a few men that, upon the whole, its principle of coherence is fragile and delicate in the extreme. What the troops of the first line have to do is to look carefully to the leader, and if his bearing is such as to convey different impressions to different men, a loosening of the ranks will begin. Therefore, on the part of the leader, slight gestures, slight movements in the saddle, slight changes of pace, slight license given to impatient horsemen are, in general, but too likely to be followed by the farther loosening of the ranks, the angry objurgations of the officers, and finally by that impotent fumbling after carbines or pistols which proves that the attempt at a charge has stopped short and will presently cease; but in Lord Cardigan, during those minutes when he silently rode down the valley, none could see that one small sign of faltering or of doubt which alone would have sufficed to arrest the attack. From the first moment of the onset to the one when the battery was entered the brigade felt the will of its leader.

* * * I take the liberty of saying that I shall continue to welcome any communications with which I may be honored respecting the Battle of Inkerman, and subsequent events in the Crimea down to the close of June, 1855.
—A. W. K., 28 Hyde Park Place, London.

APPENDIX.

I.

Extract from a Memorandum of a Conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons, which was made by Mr. George Lock, February 10, 1856, and approved as accurate on the same day by Sir Edmund.

‘SEBASTOPOL undoubtedly might have been taken within five days after we landed in the Crimea. He had earnestly pressed that an immediate attempt should be made on it; Lord Raglan had the same feeling. After the Battle of the Alma, the same day, he received a note from Lord Raglan requesting that he would call on him by eight o'clock the following morning. He prepared to go; but meanwhile he received a letter from Admiral Dundas, saying that information had been sent him by the Turkish Admiral, that seven Russian line-of-battle ships had left the harbor, making apparently for Odessa, and ordering him (Sir Edmund) to get ready to follow them with the steam squadron. Sir Edmund answered that he could not understand this; that he, Admiral Dundas, ought to have better information on the subject than the Turkish Admiral; that he, Admiral Dundas, was himself lying within twelve miles of the harbor; that doubtless he had been watching it narrowly by means of the numerous steamers at his command, and therefore that it was not likely that such a squadron could have put to sea without his knowledge; that even if they had, it was extremely unlikely they would go to Odessa, which was *a cul de sac*.’ (He found afterward that the Admiral had kept no watch whatever on the harbor.)

‘Before, however, this matter was cleared up, the time for going to Lord Raglan had passed, and it was between twelve and one before he got to Head-quarters. On going in, after explaining the cause of his being late, Lord Raglan showed him a memorandum made by Sir John Burgoyne, in which he suggested the movement round the head of the harbor to the Sebastopol side. He, Sir Edmund, at once urged strong reasons against this. He said that the character of the whole expedition was that of a surprise; that it was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the strength of the enemy, or their resources, and that in great measure they still remained ignorant on these points; that all they knew positively was that the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to them, and that the best chance of continued success was to follow it up rapidly, and to try and take the northern forts by a *coup de main*. Lord Raglan said that he concurred in these views; that he had already made representations to St. Arnaud on the subject; that he proposed to him at once to advance on the Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the forts, but that St. Arnaud had told him his troops were tired, and that it could not be done; that he, Lord Raglan, was disappointed by this answer, and could not understand it, for he knew the troops could not be tired, and that there must be some other reason.’ (The truth was, as afterward known, that St. Arnaud was here stricken down by his mortal malady).

'Sir Edmund again saw Lord Raglan the following day, and found him in low spirits. On asking him the cause he said he had been again urging on the French General to advance across the Belbec, but that he had replied that he had ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong earthworks on the banks of the river; and though he did not doubt that the Allies could force them as they had the works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss that would be entailed. On this, Sir Edmund went on board a small steamer, ran close in, reconnoitered the works, found them to be as represented, but that they were without guns. He reported this, but the French General replied that he had already given his officers orders to commence the march round the harbor, in order to reach the south side; that during this march, as is well known, they fell in with the rear-guard of Mentschikoff's army abandoning Sebastopol; and it is now known that the Russians had not left 2000 men in the place, believing it to be untenable.

'Immediately on their arrival at Balaclava, he, Sir Edmund, had urged again on Lord Raglan an immediate assault; but Sir John Burgoyne represented strongly against it, and urged that regular approaches be made. He said it would cost them a loss of 500 men (!!) There was then little appearance of defenses on the town side. It was stated that the Russian fleet would cause loss of the assaulting troops; on which he, Sir Edmund, pointed to the Malakoff Hill, then unoccupied, and advised the immediate construction of a battery there, which would make it necessary for the fleet to take care of themselves. That a day or two after this he again urged an assault on Lord Raglan. By this time the Russians were at work throwing up batteries, and consequently the loss to be caused by an assault would be greater than if done in the first instance. Lord Raglan was willing, and asked him how he would proceed. He, Sir Edmund, said, in answer, that it was now clear that the Russians saw they (the Allies) were about to lay regular siege to the place. Let them be encouraged in this belief; send lots of men to the front with pickaxes, or, if they have them not, with something to resemble pickaxes, and commence turning up the ground, and when they least expect it, rush in upon them. He urged that if this were not done the place would not be taken except after grievous loss; that the men who now composed the army would never live to do it. Lord Raglan frequently adverted to this afterward. He would have been very willing to do it by assault, but he was not supported in the proposal by the French General, nor by his own Engineers.

'Canrobert was a fine, honorable, chivalrous fellow, but a miserable commander-in-chief—brave as steel personally, but he dare not take responsibility. He had, on four separate occasions, made arrangements with Lord Raglan for assaulting the place, and each time made excuses when the moment arrived for getting off; he has been heard since to confess that he durst not have attempted it.

'Sir Edmund's opinion of Admiral Dundas as a commander-in-chief is not favorable. I mentioned that it was my impression, from reading the accounts that came home, that he (Sir Edmund) must have determined to take upon himself to act independently, and as circumstances might demand of him.

'He said it was quite true—that he was reduced to this necessity—that it was a great responsibility, but that there was no help for it; that indeed in this he acted by the advice of Lord Raglan, and at his request; that he (Lord Raglan) told him the expedition must be given up unless he consented to take active charge of it. While saying this, Lord Raglan alluded to the singular position in which he felt himself—viz., that having been edu-

'cated in the strictest school of discipline, he should yet be suggesting* to a 'second in command to set aside the authority of his Commander-in-Chief.'

HATCHFORD, February 11.

I last night showed this memorandum to Sir Edmund Lyons, saying that I had no business to make notes of what he had said without his knowledge. He returned it after reading it, confirming its correctness.

(Signed)

GEORGE LOCH.

(Private.)

CLUMBER, January 10, 1863.

MY DEAR MR. LOCH,—I am much obliged to you for allowing me to read your interesting memorandum of a conversation with Lyons.

I was so often on board his flag-ship off Sebastopol, that you will easily suppose that there is little in it which is new to me; indeed I can corroborate from other sources of information a great deal of it.

What is related in page 20 struck me with *personal* interest. It was done under secret instructions from me, sent (most irregularly, of course, but, as I thought, justifiably on account of the imminent danger) without the knowledge of my colleagues.

This must be known to Kinglake, as he no doubt has my letter.—I am, yours sincerely,

(Signed)

NEWCASTLE.

II.

Argument for avoiding the Attack of the North Side.†

'The north front was exceedingly strong by nature, and extended across a ridge of bold and rocky heights, intersected by steep ravines. A permanent fort, conspicuously situated in a commanding position, occupied its centre, and was supported on either side by earthen intrenchments and batteries. The entire front was exposed to enfilade from the right of the position, where heavy guns could readily and securely be placed; and all the approaches were commanded by the men-of-war and steamers in the harbor. This position was, moreover, defended by an army, which, although recently defeated, had retreated to its supports, and was still very powerful, as subsequent events clearly proved.

'To assail such a position by a *coup de main* with an army little superior to the defenders, with nothing but field-pieces at its command, and with its flanks and retreat quite insecure, would have been a most desperate undertaking, with every probability of a failure or repulse, the consequences of which would have been most disastrous.

'A regular siege, on the contrary, required heavy guns and stores of all kinds, and therefore a harbor. Now the only place to the north of Sebastopol where the disembarkation of stores could be effected was the narrow, shallow beach at the mouth of the Katcha, open to every gust of wind, difficult to defend, and which, from its distance in the rear, would have been

* Lord Raglan could not have used exactly the words 'should yet be suggesting.' See his reply to the Duke of Newcastle's letter, given in a note, *ante*, p. 236. What Lord Raglan probably spoke of as so strange was the circumstance of his having been asked to make the suggestion by the Secretary of State.

† It might be assumed that this argument (extracted from the Official Journal of our Siege Operations) is substantially Sir John Burgoyne's; but those who prefer looking to his publicly avowed words will find the same argument in p. 238 *et seq.* of his 'Military Opinions.'

‘much exposed, while its communications could have been intercepted at any moment by an enemy capable of such enterprises as he afterward attempted at Balaklava and Inkerman.’

III.

Statement (dated 24 Nov., 1867) by Sir Edward Wetherall respecting the Flank March.

I was directed to lead the Cavalry, who were at the head of the column of the army; I do not consider that Lord Lucan's command was a reconnoitering column in the ordinary acceptance of the term. My orders were positive to follow the main road which led down to and crossed the Causeway at the head of the harbor as far as I could, and then to take a direction S.S.E., I think (and not W., as the latter direction would have led toward Severnaya), and I was given the Light-house at the head of the Inkerman valley as a general direction. On arriving at the edge of the plateau where the road dipped, I perceived a road to my left, the existence of which I was unaware of. Harding (who was with me) and I galloped up the road some distance, but finding its direction was N.E., we agreed it was better to abandon that line and adhere to the direction given. The Horse-Artillery (Maude's troop), I believe, never left this road, for I recollect, after we had marched some distance on, hearing the sound of wagons to our left. I went, with Lord Lucan's permission, to see what they were, and found Maude's troop in the road with Lord Raglan, who asked me where the Cavalry were. I replied, About a quarter of a mile to the right. He then directed me to bring them up as quick as possible, as a Russian column had crossed our front.

On returning to the Cavalry, I found them forming up on the open ground near Mackenzie's Farm, and the Greys, who were at the head of the column, were advancing in pursuit of the enemy.

IV.

The Flank March. The Order given to Lord Lucan.

(Memorandum.)

The Cavalry Division supported by the second battalion Rifle Brigade will proceed on reconnaissance in a direction S.S.E., toward a spot marked on the map ‘Mackenzie's Farm,’ on the great road leading to Sebastopol. This road will be watched both ways, and reported on. The Cavalry will not descend into the road. There is a deep ravine or gully running about N.E., commencing at ruins of Inkerman, which it will be desirable to report upon as to practicability. An officer will be sent back as soon as possible with Earl Lucan's report.

(Signed)

RICHARD AIREY.
Quartermaster-General.

V.

Letter printed in 'L'Expedition de Crimée' of a French Divisional General whose name is not given by M. de Bazancourt.

Les bâtiments qui portaient le matériel de siège arrivaient en même temps à Balaclava ; mais on était si loin de s'attendre aux difficultés que l'on allait rencontrer, qu'il fut questions de ne pas débarquer ce matériel, et qu'on parut disposé à tenter une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol. C'est injustement, selon nous, que l'on a conclu du parti pris par les Généraux Alliés, qu'ils avaient manqué de résolution en cette circonstance. Si les Russes, réfugiés après la bataille de l'Alma sur les hauteurs d'Inkermann, y eussent attendu nos armées, un combat heureux eût peut-être ouvert les portes de Sébastopol aux Alliés. Mais l'armée ennemie, ayant par une marche semblable à celle que venait de faire l'armée Anglo-Française, conservé ses communications avec l'intérieur, et s'étant établie sur le flanc et les derrières des Alliés, une attaque de vive force contre Sébastopol, dans ces conditions, devenait une opération des plus hasardeuses, qui n'entraînait pas dans le caractère méthodique et peu entreprenant du général Anglais [! !— See *ante*, vol. i. chap. xlv. sec. 25], et que ne pouvait guère risquer le nouveau général, qui, investi depuis quelques jours seulement du commandement, voyait peser sur lui une immense responsabilité. Malakoff (car c'eût été alors, comme toujours, le point d'attaque) n'était pas fortifié comme il l'a été depuis ; mais la position en elle-même déjà très forte pouvait en vingt-quatre heures, et avec l'habileté des Russes à remuer la terre, se couvrir d'ouvrages de campagne, armés d'une puissante artillerie. L'armée Alliée, menacée sur ses derrières par l'armée de secours, ayant à combattre une garnison de 25 à 30,000 hommes, sous le feu de la flotte et des forts du nord, qui ont pris, ainsi qu'on l'a vu depuis, une si grande part à la défense de cette position, courait le danger, en cas d'un succès, d'être jetée à la mer. Le siège régulier fut donc résolu.

VI.

Extracts from Letters of Lord Raglan tending to show his opinion as to the policy of storming the place at first.

Although it is true that in his dispatches and private letters he omitted—nay, studiously omitted—to disclose his opinion, he nevertheless often wrote in language which could hardly have come from him unless he had been one of those few who perceived the peril of delay, and lamented the irresistible concurrence of opinion which was inducing the Allies to forego the prompt seizure of their prize. Thus on the first day after the completion of the flank march he showed how clearly he perceived the advantage which the Allies gained by surprising the enemy on the South Side, for he wrote : 'We have taken the enemy quite aback by a manœuvre for which they were 'not by any means prepared.* And five days later he showed himself keenly alive to the advantage which the enemy was gaining from delay, for he wrote : 'The garrison is actively and incessantly employed in adding to the 'defenses, and forming a continuous line of works along the South front 'which had previously, to all appearance, been much less protected, and they 'have likewise been busily occupied in bringing in large stores of supplies 'of different kinds† Again, five days later, he wrote : 'The enemy how—

* Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, Sept. 28, 1854.

† Dispatch addressed by Lord Raglan to the Secretary of War, Oct. 3, 1854.

'ever is in great force within the place, and have been busily engaged since they discovered the design of making the South Side the object of attack in strengthening the whole front, and arming the works which they have established with the heaviest artillery.* And yet again, on the same day: 'The enemy have taken advantage of the time that has elapsed since they discovered our intention of attacking the South Side of Sebastopol to strengthen the whole front;' and then, after describing the nature of the defenses which the enemy had thus been preparing under the eyes of their invaders, he goes on to say: 'These formidable preparations make the approach to the place extremely difficult, and without cover an advance upon it is next to impossible.† And in yet another letter on the same day, he spoke of the undertaking to subdue the enemy's fire as 'an almost hopeless task, considering the number, weight, and metal of the guns they have in position, and the cover they have been able to give them since they saw the necessity of strengthening the South Side of Sebastopol.‡

Now a mere disputer, no doubt, may well enough fence and say that these dispatches and letters yield no actual proof of the opinion Lord Raglan had formed upon the question of giving the enemy time instead of assaulting at once; but those who have an eye for the truth will incline, perhaps, to believe that he who could thus be insisting, and insisting again on the strength which the enemy had gained from the respite accorded him, must needs have been one who, having perceived the peril of delay whilst yet there was time to avoid it, had formed, from the first, an opinion that the place should be promptly assaulted. And this, as has been seen in the text, is the opinion ascribed to Lord Raglan by the two men who enjoyed his most intimate confidence—that is, by Sir Edmund Lyons and General Airey.

VII.

Extracts showing that in November, 1854, both the French and English Engineers came back, after all, to 'enterprise' as offering the best means of extrication.

In a memorandum before me in the handwriting of Sir John Burgoyne, he says: 'In the present state of affairs of the Allied armies before Sebastopol some decided measure of progress must be immediately adopted, either by a vigorous assault of the place, or an attack on the enemy's army in our rear as a preliminary to it, both of them arduous undertakings, and under arrangements that will require energy and audacity on the part of the forces fronting in every direction.' The memorandum is not dated, but it is marked by Lord Raglan in pencil with these words: 'This has no date, but it was previous to the battle of the 5th.' And in his memorandum of the 28th of November on General Bizot's project of attack Sir John Burgoyne writes: 'This, as seems to be confessed by General Bizot, would not be the most methodical and safe course to pursue under ordinary circumstances of adequate means and a favorable season of the year; but under the pressure of our present situation it would seem imperative to adopt a more short and enterprising process to accelerate our proceedings..... The circumstances under which the Allies are now placed before Sebastopol may in some degree be compared to those under which the Duke of Wellington considered it necessary at sieges in the Peninsula to

* The same to the same, Oct. 8, 1854.

† Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 8, 1854.

‡ The same to the same of the same date, but written later, and headed 'most confidential.'

'adopt irregular and somewhat hazardous modes of attack for want of 'means and time for the more systematic course.'

Is it possible to be reasoned into the belief that 'audacity' and an 'enterprising process' would have been more opportune in the closing days of November than in the first or second of the weeks after the Battle of the Alma?

VIII.

Extract of Return to the Admiralty showing the number of men and the quantity of material landed from the English fleet to aid the land forces in the siege of Sebastopol down to 28th of October.

Officers and seamen, 1786.

Officers and marines (besides 400 more landed at Eupatoria), 1530.

6 68-pounders, with 400 rounds for each gun.

50 32-pounders, with 150 rounds of shot and 30 of shell for each gun.

9 24-pound howitzers, } with 70 rounds of ammunition.

9 12-pound howitzers, }

1300 8-inch shells.

3000 8-inch cartridges.

630 24-pounder rockets.

770 8-inch cargasses.

Timbers and planks collected from different points for platforms.'

IX.

General de Todleben's Explanations of Prince Mentschikoff's Reasons for his Flank March.

Voyons par quelles raisons le Prince Menchikow avait été déterminé à entreprendre une marche de flanc sur Bakhtchisarai.

Après l'occupation du Belbeck par les Alliés et leur campement en vue des fortifications du côté Nord, la situation du Prince Menchikow était devenue fort critique. Les ouvrages du côté Nord se trouvaient—dans le cas d'une attaque dirigée contre eux par les Alliés—réduits à leurs propres forces, et ces forces, en comparaison de celles des Alliés, étaient parfaitement insignifiantes; l'armée Russe, séparée d'elles par une large baie, ne pouvait leur prêter aucun secours.

On devait, en outre, dans la supposition d'une attaque des fortifications du Nord, l'attendre à ce qu'une partie des troupes de l'assaillant s'étendirent vers la gauche et occuperait une forte position sur les rochers encarpés de la ferme Mackenzie et des hauteurs d'Inkermann.

La Tschernaïa est bordée de rochers sur presque toute la longueur de son cours, qui ne peuvent être franchis qu'en quatre endroits très rapprochés les uns des autres. Ces passages présentent tous les inconvénients des passages de montagne, et peuvent être, sans beaucoup d'efforts, rendus tout à fait inaccessibles au moyen d'un petit corps d'infanterie appuyé par quelques bouches à feu. Si les Alliés eussent occupé cette position, notre armée aurait été forcée de rester à Sébastopol et d'attendre l'ennemi sur le mont Sapounè qui, présentant une position assez forte, avait pourtant le désavantage d'une trop grande étendue—environ douze verstes. Par suite de la position prise par l'ennemi sur les hauteurs d'Inkermann, le Prince Menchikow aurait en ses communications coupées avec l'intérieur de la Russie, et alors la situation

de l'armée Russe, privée de ses approvisionnements et de l'espoir de recevoir des renforts, aurait été fort pénible.

Il est vrai que dans ce cas, la garnison de Sébastopol aurait pu être notablement renforcée par l'armée ; mais si l'on considère l'étendue en longueur du terrain qu'occupaient nos troupes, les forces supérieures de l'ennemi et l'issue de la bataille de l'Alma, on voit qui nous ne pouvions avoir la certitude de vaincre l'ennemi dans le cas où il aurait attaqué la ville. Tous les avantages étaient évidemment de son côté, et s'il eût obtenu un succès, non seulement nous perdions la ville et la flotte, mais notre armée elle-même était aussi perdue.

Ayant bien pesé toutes ces circonstances, le Prince Menchikow, convaincu que son armée n'était pas en état de sauver Sébastopol si l'ennemi dirigeait une attaque contre cette ville, jugea qu'il valait mieux prendre les mesures les plus efficaces et employer les efforts les plus énergiques pour la défense de la presqu'île de Crimée. Néanmoins, il gardait encore l'espoir que, si l'irrésolution des Alliés et le courage désespéré de nos marins permettaient de contenir pour quelque temps l'ennemi devant Sébastopol, l'armée pourrait, après avoir reçu des renforts, arrêter les succès ultérieurs des Alliés.

Guidé par ces puissantes considérations, le Prince Menchikow prit la résolution de quitter la ville et de se diriger vers Bakhtchisarai, afin de pouvoir renouer ses communications avec la Russie et menacer le flanc et les derrières de l'ennemi sans ses préoccuper de l'impression défavorable que son éloignement devait produire sur la garnison de Sébastopol.

X.

Protest of Vice-Admiral Korniloff against Prince Mentschikoff's plan of still keeping the army aloof from Sebastopol.

It appears that the importance of preventing the enemy from penetrating into Sebastopol, is beyond all discussion. This is evident from the very efforts of our enemies to get possession of the town, together with the mass of Government establishments and ships that are in it. The loss of either would be irretrievable for Russia ; even the subsequent destruction of the whole army of the enemy on the ruins of Sebastopol would not compensate the Emperor for the demolition of that important port, and for the loss of the whole Black Sea fleet, not only with its ships, but with all the officers and sailors who had been trained by such constant and unremitting exertions. To defend Sebastopol with the forces at our command is impossible. The line of defense extends over seven versts, intersected by deep ravines with many approaches, which can only be defended by our artillery and by the simple temporary earthworks. Three columns, each consisting of 15,000 men, might easily, by three different ways, descend the heights occupied by the enemy's camp, and, with no great sacrifice, crush their respective adversaries, however desperate their resistance might be ; the seamen and reserve soldiers now forming the garrison scarcely amount to 15,000. I therefore consider it indispensable for the security of the town to double this number of the garrison—i. e., to increase it by a division. Only then, when we shall have the seamen in reserve and be able to employ them for sapping works, and for keeping up the fortifications as well as strengthening the defenses, for which sailors are so eminently suited—then, and only then, can we hope to resist an assault and to save the town. The movement of the army, though useful in diverting the attention of the enemy, may meet with a reverse, and thus open a passage to the enemy for the object of all his efforts ; and be-

sides, considering the small number of our troops, this movement would be any thing but formidable. The enemy, having spies, will soon discover the weakness of the garrison, and of the army itself, and, benefiting by the opportune moment, will seize both town and fleet in the very teeth of our army. In conclusion, to secure the defense of Sebastopol, and to employ the remainder of our troop to watch the North Side, whither the reinforcements coming from Russia should be directed, is our only practical mode of defense, and I consider it not only possible, but even certain.

SEBASTOPOL, 19th September (1st October), 1854.

XI.

Grounds of Statement as to Strength of the Garrison.

It is right to say that General de Todleben (p. 277) cuts down this strength to the round numbers of 28,000; and therefore it may be well for me to give the authority on which I rely. I adopt the figures which are given in full official detail by Gendre, the author of '*Matériaux pour servir*;' and the following is the note by which he authenticates his statements: 'The number of the naval troops is taken from the following sources: List of the troops on the "Distance" of Vice-Admiral Novosilsky on the 16th (28th) September; report of Captain Sokovnin (who brought the recruit marching battalions) of the 23rd September (5th October), and lists of the troops under the command of Captains Bartenaff and Varnitzky on the 13th (25th) September. The number of infantry is taken from the muster-rolls of General Möller of the 23rd September (5th October), and of the Commander of the Boutir regiment of the 24th September (6th October).'

General Todleben speaks of the battalions as being only forty-two in number, whereas Gendre's list (and he describes by name each battalion) amounts to forty-five.

XII.

NOTE RESPECTING THE STRENGTH OF THE BESIEGERS AND THE GARRISON IN OCTOBER, 1854.

Strength of the French.

L'arrivée de ces renforts [the remainder of General Levaillant's division] porte l'armée Française en Crimée à 46,000 hommes, et 5500 chevaux.*

Strength of the English Infantry.

'I inclose.....and, 3rdly, a statement of the effectives of the infantry, by which you will see that the rank and file little exceed 16,000; and when these have furnished the guards and working-parties for the trenches, there remain in camp available for the support of those in advance in case of a sortie, and for the maintenance of our position, which is as sailable on our extreme right, and right rear, something under 8000 men.'†

* Niel, p. 65. The day with which he connects his statement is the 18th of October.

† Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, 23rd October, 1854.

Strength of the Turkish Troops.

Under the command of General Canrobert, 8 battalions, probably about 5000 men.

Under the command of Lord Raglan, about 4400 men.

Strength of the Garrison.

See chap. xvi., showing the strength on the 6th of October, and add to the figures there given 3112 infantry, being the strength of the 'Minsk' regiment, which was sent in as a reinforcement on the 9th.*

XIII.

The French Siege Batteries, 17th of October.

No.			
1.	(de la marine)	7 canons de 30, 2 obusiers de 22 ^c	Total, 9 pieces.
2.	"	8 " 4 "	" 12 "
3.	(de l'artillerie)	6 mortiers de 27 ^c , 2 mortiers de 22 ^c	" 8 "
4.	"	6 canons de 24, 2 mortiers de 22 ^c	" 8 "
5.	{	1 ^{re} face, 4 obusiers de 22 ^c	" 12 "
		2 ^e face, 4 canons de 24.....	
		3 ^e face, 2 canons de 24, 2 canons de 16.....	
6.	(de la marine)	4 obusiers de 22 ^c , seuls en état de faire feu de lendemain.....	" 4 "
			Total, 53 "

* Todleben, p. 285.

XIV.

The English Siege Batteries, 17th of October.

LEFT ATTACK.			RIGHT ATTACK.*		
No. of Battery.	No. of Gun.	Nature of Gun.	Object.	Name of Battery.	No. of Pieces.
1 {	1	Lancaster.	To batter the tower and the salient and right face of the Redan.	{ Right Lancaster or 5-gun Battery. Left Lancaster.	{ § 1 § 4 1
	2	8-in. 24-pdrs.			
	9	24-pdrs.			
2 {	2	Lancaster 10-in.	{ Enfilade left face of Redan, and batter its right face, and the Barrack Battery.	{	{ 3 10-in. mortars 4 24-pdrs.
	3	8-in. guns.			
	5	24-pdrs.			
3 {	2	8-in. guns.	{ Barrack Battery and principal buildings in the town.	{ Frenchman's Hill, or Gordon's Battery, commonly called the '21-gun.'	{ § 7
	6	24-pdrs.			
4 {	1	8-in. gun.	{ Enfilade and batter Flag-staff Batteries and adjacent buildings.	{	{ 5 8-in. guns. 1 8-in. Lancaster.
	5	24-pdrs.			
Green Hill, or Chap-maid's Batteries.	5	10-in. mortars.	{ On the Redan and ground in front of Flag-staff Batteries.	{	{ 2 8-in. guns. 2 24-pdrs. 2 10-in. mortars
Total, 41† pieces of ordnance.					32 pieces of ordnance.
					Grand total..... 73

* In this table (taken—with some corrections of the nomenclature—from the Official Journal of the Royal Engineers) the Lancaster Batteries are treated as forming part of the 'Right Attack,' but in the text they are rather treated as separate.

† 17 of these guns were manned and worked by the Royal Navy.

‡ Frequently called the Tower Battery.

|| The ground there called Frenchman's Hill is the Woronzoff Height.

¶ The Journal of the Royal Engineers speaks of the Man-of-war Harbor as the 'Dockyard Creek;' and, as there really existed an inlet which went by that name, the error might confuse. The real 'Dockyard Creek' was (as its name imported) the creek running up to the Docks.

XV.

Armament of those Russian Batteries which were opposed to the Batteries of the Besiegers on the 17th of October.

BUTS PRINCIPAUX.	Canons à bombe de 3 pouds.	Canons.				Canons Caron- ades.			Licornes.*		Mortiers.		Total.
		de 68.	de 36.	de 24.	de 12.	de 36.	de 24.	de 18.	de 1 poud.	de $\frac{1}{2}$ poud.	de 5 pouds.	de 2 pouds.	
Batteries Françaises sur la Chersonese	1	..	5	3	4	13
Batteries Françaises du Mont Rodolphe	5	..	13	6	6	..	10	..	7	..	1	3	51
Batteries Anglaises de la Montagne Verte	2	2	5	11	4	1	..	25
Batteries Anglaises du Mont Worontzow	2	4	13	5	24
Batteries Anglaises de Lancaster	2	3	5
Total	5	5	21	29	6	3	21	4	15	4	2	3	118

* The Licorne is a Russian variety of the Howitzer.

XVI.

Strength and Armament of the three Russian Sea-fort Batteries which were engaged by the Allied Fleets.

BATTERIES.	MEN.	Cannon.				Licornes.		Mortars of 5 pouds.	Total pieces of ordnance.	Total of pieces so placed as to be able to answer the fire from the ships.
		Shell guns of 3 pouds.	36-pounders.	24-pounders.	18-pounders.	Long, of 1 poud.	Long, of $\frac{1}{2}$ poud.			
Quarantine Sea-Fort	277	2	29	12	9	6	58	33
Fort Alexander	272	2	11	16	4	19	..	4	56	17
Fort Constantine	470	50	..	34	4	6	94	23
	1019									
		4	40	66	4	65	13	16	208	73

XVII.

Memorandum on the Climate of the Crimea by Mr. Cattley, which was sent by Lord Raglan to the Home Government on the 23rd of October, 1854.

The climate of the Crimea is subject to great changes from heat to cold; but the winter, during the winter, is generally and almost always cold. During a period of thirteen years (from 1841 to 1854) only one winter was without any frost, and one with very little; but the place of frost was supplied by rain, which fell in torrents at short intervals during the months of December, January, and February. The greatest degree of cold during this period was in the year 1846, when the thermometer marked at Kertch 22° frost Reaumur! and though the climate of Kertch may be somewhat colder than that of the south coast of the Crimea, or of the neighborhood of Sebastopol, still the degree of frost in these latter places was in that year from 18° to 19° Reaumur, and this accompanied by a severe N.E. wind, and very often by driving snow, lasting for days and even for weeks. In such weather no human creature can possibly resist the cold during the night unless in a good house properly warmed, and in the daytime unless warmly dressed. The poorer class of inhabitants of the country, Tartars as well as Russians, have sheep-skin coats and caps, and their feet protected by bandages of linen or woolen stockings under their long boots. The soldiers are always in barracks or in warm houses; and the sentinels on guard are furnished with a large fur pelisse and fur *galoches*, which they slip on over their boots while on duty, and they have warm mitts or gloves for their hands. Farther, the transitions from cold to heat, and *vice versa*, being often very sudden in this climate, are very trying to those unaccustomed to them. It often happens that in the morning there are 5° or 6° heat, and in the evening 10° or 12° frost. These changes are very dangerous to those who may happen to be exposed to wet—the extremities being apt to be frozen. The keen winds on the hills are often fatal to those who may not be properly clothed.

The climate being so variable, it is, of course, very difficult to offer any opinion as to what it may be during the ensuing season; but, in any case, cold weather must be looked for, and would be very difficult to guard against unless with the aid of warm houses and warm clothing.

Frost declares itself sometimes as early as the 5th or 6th of December, sometimes toward the end of the month. In 1853 there was incessant rain during the month of December and till the 15th January, when frost set in, and in twenty-four hours there were 15° frost, which continued with more or less intensity for seventeen days. In the year 1842 frost set in the 27th December, and lasted, with short intervals of thaw, till the 27th February, 1843. The winters of 1843-44, and 1844-45, were mild; 1845-6-7 were severe; from 1847 to 1853 there has always been more or less frost, and once during that period 17° Reaumur of frost. On an average, I should say, then, 10° or 12° frost may be looked for.

XVIII.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS LAID BEFORE MR. KINGLAKE BY LORD LUCAN.

The circumstances under which the forces advancing from the Baidar direction were suffered to occupy Kamara and establish batteries on the neighboring heights?

It was not possible for Sir Colin Campbell to prevent the enemy estab-

lishing themselves on the heights commanding Kamara. It was very far from his base, and would have required a strong force of infantry and artillery. We had been obliged to discontinue patrolling this pass a full week before the 25th October, and the enemy were occupying Tchorgoun village and heights between that village and Kamara.

The grounds on which it was judged right for our cavalry to avoid attacking the forces which assailed the Turkish Redoubts?

Lord Raglan not having acted on the communication sent to him the day previous by Sir Colin Campbell and myself informing him of the approach of a considerable Russian army, and leaving us altogether without support, we considered it our first duty to defend the approach to the town of Balaclava; and as this defense would depend chiefly upon the cavalry, it was necessary to reserve them for this purpose. I therefore confined myself to cannonading the enemy so long as my ammunition lasted, and to threatening demonstrations. We only left the neighborhood of the forts after they were already captured. My opinion was, that the advance upon Balaclava could only be assisted [qu. 'resisted'] by the cavalry on the plain, and I placed them in order of battle for that purpose until removed by Lord Raglan. The soundness of my opinion was established by the check and retreat of the enemy immediately on the repulse of their cavalry; and be it observed that their cavalry were attacked and repulsed on the very site I had prepared to meet them.

The circumstances under which it happened that the advance of the Russian Cavalry to the ground where it turned to engage our Heavy Dragoons was a surprise?

This advance of the Russian cavalry was *no* surprise, nor did I ever hear it so described. From the time that they descended into the valley they moved very slow, and should have been seen by General Scarlett when still one mile distant. I saw them before they crowned the heights, and found time to travel over double the extent of ground, and to halt, form, and dress the attacking line before it had traversed more than half the breadth of the valley.

The grounds on which it was thought necessary for the Heavy Brigade to desist from supporting the Light Brigade in its charge?

Be it remembered that I had carefully divided the Light Brigade into three lines, to expose as few men as possible in the first line, and that the first line should be efficiently supported. So soon as they had moved off, I instructed my aid-de-camp to have me followed by the Heavy Brigade formed in the same order of three lines. I then galloped on, and when very far up [qu. 'down'] the valley I observed that the Heavy Brigade in my rear were suffering severely from flanking batteries; and with the remark that they were already sufficiently close to protect the Light Cavalry should they be pursued by the enemy, and that I could not allow them to be sacrificed as had been the Light Brigade, I caused them to be halted. Had not the Chasseurs d'Afrique at this time silenced one of these batteries, it is my opinion that the Heavy Cavalry would have been destroyed.

When the Heavy Brigade was halted, no possible object existed for farther exposing them, they could only be useful in protecting the retreat of the Light Brigade; and I am confident that from their position they materially did so.

The purport of the Order given to Lord Cardigan after the receipt of the Order brought by Nolan.

With General Airey's order in my hand, I trotted up to Lord Cardigan, and gave him distinctly its contents so far as they concerned him. I would not on my oath say that I did not read the order to him. He at once objected, on the ground that he would be exposed to a flanking battery. When ordered to take up his then position, he had expressed, through his aid-de-camp, the same apprehensions. I told him that I was aware of it. 'I know it,' but that 'Lord Raglan would have it,' and that we had no choice but to obey. I then said that I wished him to advance very steadily and quietly, and that I would narrow his front by removing the 11th Hussars from the first to the second line. This he strenuously opposed; but I moved across his front and directed Colonel Douglas not to advance with the rest of the line, but to form a second line with the 4th Light Dragoons.

XIX.

STATEMENT LAID BEFORE MR. KINGLAKE BY LORD CARDIGAN.

The brigade was suddenly ordered to mount, upon which I sent one of my aids-de-camp to reconnoitre the ground.

Lord Lucan then came in front of my brigade and said, 'Lord Cardigan, you will attack the Russians in the valley.' I said, 'Certainly, my lord,' dropping my sword at the same time; 'but allow me to point out to you that there is a battery in front, a battery on each flank, and the ground is covered with Russian riflemen.'

Lord Lucan answered: 'I can not help that; it is Lord Raglan's positive order that the Light Brigade is to attack the enemy;' upon which he ordered the 11th Hussars back to support the 17th Lancers. After advancing about eighty yards, a shell fell within reach of my horse's feet, and Captain Nolan, who was riding across the front, retreated with his arm up through the intervals of the brigade. I led straight down to the battery without seeing any body else in front of me. I had to restrain some of the officers, who got very much excited within eighty yards of the battery by the heavy fire. I led into the battery, a shot being fired from one of the largest guns close by my right leg. I led into the battery and through the Russian gun limber-carriages and ammunition-wagons in the rear. I rode within twenty yards of the line of Russian cavalry. I was attacked by two Cossacks, slightly wounded by their lances, and with difficulty got away from them, they trying to surround me. On arriving at the battery through which I had led, I found no part of the brigade. I rode slowly up the hill, and met General Scarlett. I said to him, 'What do you think, General, of the aid-de-camp, after such an order being brought to us which has destroyed the Light Brigade, riding to the rear and screaming like a woman?' Sir J. Scarlett replied, 'Do not say any more, for I have ridden over his body.' Lord Lucan was present at this conversation. I then rode to the place from which we had moved off, and found all my brigade there; and, upon having them counted, there then were 195 mounted men out of 670. I immediately rode to Lord Raglan to make my report; who said, in a very angry way, 'What did you mean, Sir, by attacking a battery in front, contrary to all the usages of warfare and the custom of the service?' Upon which, 'I said: My lord, I hope you will not blame me, for I received the order to

'attack from my superior officer in front of the troops.' I then narrated what I had done as described above.

Lord Lucan put in an affidavit upon oath that when I retreated I passed eighty yards from him. He was close by when I spoke to General Scarlett. I came up to General Scarlett quite slowly. I afterward galloped to the remains of the brigade re-forming.

XX.

STATEMENT LAID BEFORE MR. KINGLAKE BY LORD CARDIGAN.

Having been kindly promised by Mr. Kinglake that he will make me acquainted with the nature of the observations he intends to make in the next volume of his history of the Crimean war, I am anxious to give him the fullest information with regard to all which occurred connected with the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade against the Russian battery at Balaclava.*

I commence by stating that the time occupied from the movement of the brigade to the attack to the time of re-forming on the same ground did not exceed twenty minutes—the distance passed over was one mile and a quarter, at the lowest calculation—and in that space of time 300 men who had gone into action were killed, wounded, or missing, and 396 horses were put *hors de combat*. Of the 670 men who had gone into action, only 195 were mounted when the brigade re-formed on the ground from which they had moved off, and during the engagement 24 officers were killed or wounded.

I presume that no one doubts that I led the first line of the brigade, consisting of the 13th Light Dragoons and 17th Lancers, through the Russian battery, and that, being the first man into the battery, that I pursued my course until I came up to the line of the Russian cavalry. That, being alone there, in consequence of the officers of my Staff being wounded or disabled, I was attacked by two Cossacks, slightly wounded, and nearly dismounted; that, on being nearly surrounded by Cossacks, I gradually retreated, until I reached the battery into which I had led the first line; that, on arriving there, I found no part of the first line remaining there. Those which survived the charge had passed off to the left, short of the Russian gun limber-carriages, or retreated up the hill.

* The promise above mentioned by Lord Cardigan was made under these circumstances: Several years ago—I believe in 1864 or 1865—I sought to allay in some measure Lord Cardigan's extreme anxiety by saying that, with respect to those points on which my opinion might be unfavorable to him I would call his attention to them before the publication should take place, so that he might have an opportunity of submitting to me any considerations tending to change my view, and I intimated that I would do this in the form of queries, asking whether he had any farther explanation to offer upon such or such a point. During the years which followed, Lord Cardigan (in his anxiety to do himself justice) honored me with visits so frequent and with a correspondence so ample (on his part) that I considered the subject as exhausted. Accordingly when he adverted to my promise, I submitted to him that, considering the great extent to which I had given up my time to him since the period when the promise was made, it would be well for him to release me from it. He showed an indisposition to do this; and the slight feeling of anger which his persistency gave me tended much to counteract the pain that I felt in fulfilling the promise. I said I would fulfill it at once. Accordingly, I wrote the promised queries in Lord Cardigan's presence, read them out to him and gave him a copy of them. This was on the 15th of February last. Lord Cardigan, under the pain which he thus brought upon himself, showed at the time a perfect command of temper; and though he afterward brought me a kind of written protest strongly questioning my impartiality, he offered to withdraw this before reading it, and after reading it expressed a wish that it should be considered as withdrawn. I said I wished that the paper should not be withdrawn, and upon Lord Cardigan's saying that he wished to take it away with him, I obtained from him a promise to let me have it afterward. This he did.

I can upon my most solemn oath swear that in that position, and looking round, I could see none of the first line or of the supports. The supports ought to have followed me in the attack, instead of which they diverged to the right and left.

I have already stated that the first line did not follow me after I passed through the battery in leading the charge; but whilst I was engaged with the Cossacks they passed off to the left, to avoid the Russian limber-carriages, or retreated up the hill.

My aids-de-camp were prevented by different causes from being with me; I was consequently nearly or quite alone.

I have already positively stated that when I got back to the battery which we had attacked and silenced, I could see none of the first line, except those returning up the hill, and no troops formed either on the right or the left.

I therefore found myself alone, and I ask, Was it not my duty to retreat gradually and slowly in rear of the broken parties of the first line up the hill, rather than turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of my supports, without knowing at the time which way they had gone, they not having followed the first line in the advance, as they ought to have done?

My humble opinion is that it is quite sufficient for a general of brigade to return with as well as lead the attack of the front line, unless he should by chance come in contact with his supports, in which case he would remain with them; but it may be observed that no general officer could have rendered any service or assistance in an affair like that of Balaclava, in which all the loss of men and horses was sustained in twenty minutes, and there were no troops left with which to attack an overwhelming force like that of the Russians in position on that day.

Twenty minutes being the time occupied in the affair, and the distance a mile and a quarter at the least, gives eight minutes for the advance, eight minutes for the retreat, and only four minutes for fighting or collision with the enemy.

Before concluding, I must revert to a subject already alluded to—viz., that the only point really to be considered is whether, after leading into the battery, and up to the Russian cavalry, and being wounded and nearly taken prisoner by the Cossacks, and having with difficulty got away from them—whether I was justified in returning slowly in rear of my own line, who were retreating up the hill, or whether it was my duty to turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of the supports, they not having led straight, but having separated in the advance, one to the right of the valley, and one to the left; whether I was bound to ride through the Russian cavalry in search of the supports, or to remain on the ground I have referred to, there being none of our troops formed there, or to be seen in any direction? As to my having retired, as it is asserted, under the Fedioukine Heights, the evidence of the non-commissioned officers in the printed pamphlet completely contradicts such an assertion. The question is, whether some officer of the 11th Hussars, wounded, was not seen by the men of the 4th Light Dragoons retiring in the rear of that regiment under the Fedioukine Heights?

References appended by Lord Cardigan to the above Statement, and by him headed 'Evidence in Proof.'

1. General Scarlett's evidence, from page 272 to 274 of printed appendix.

2. Lieutenant Johnston of 13th Light Dragoons, from page 267 to page 272.

3. Extract from Colonel Jenyn's evidence: 'I, with one or two others, tried to rally the few men whom I saw left mounted, but it was utterly impossible to do so, and we returned in broken detachments through the guns, which were then deserted.'

4. Extract from my own evidence: 'No general officer could have been of any use. The feeble remains of the lines of the brigade could have done nothing more under a general officer than they did under their own officers.'

5. Evidence of William Gray, trumpet-major of the 8th Hussars: 'The Earl of Cardigan led the charge against the Russian battery at the head of the first line of the brigade. The 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons formed the rear line of the brigade; but very early in the charge the 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons became gradually separated, the 8th Hussars bearing to the right, and the 4th Light Dragoons to the left; and as we advanced farther, the distance between the two regiments increased very materially.'

6. Extract of a letter written by Lord George Paget to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge in 1856, the following passage occurs: 'On the advance of the first line, I gave the word, "Second line will advance; 4th Light Dragoons direct." Soon, however, in the advance, I perceived that the 8th Hussars were bearing away to the right, and they kept gradually losing their intervals, and by the same process their alignment, till they finally became separated from us. There are plenty of witnesses who could prove that during the whole of this time I was doing my best, and using the utmost exertions of my voice to keep them in their proper place, and to close them to the 4th; and at last Lieutenant Martin, 4th Light Dragoons, galloped to Colonel Shewell to assist me in my efforts.'

7. General Scarlett states: 'At the instant when the first line of the Light Brigade charged into the battery, it was almost impossible, from the dense smoke and confusion, to discover what took place; but a few minutes afterward I observed the remnants of the Light Brigade, as well as the remains of the second line, retreating toward the ground which they had occupied immediately before the charge; whilst dismounted men, and horses without riders, were scattered over the space which the brigade had just traversed. I recollect on this occasion pointing out to Lord Cardigan the broken remnants of his line as they were retreating up the hill. I firmly believe, from the information I received both at the time of the engagement and afterward, that Lord Cardigan was the first to charge into the battery, and that he was amongst the last, if not the last, to return from behind the guns.'

8. Lieutenant George Johnston of the 13th Hussars says: 'As to the opinion that we ought to have re-formed, etc., why, Sir, there were none to form, had it been possible. Instance in my own regiment. We turned out 112 of all ranks, and lost 84 horses; in fact there were only 10 of us assembled on the spot from whence we charged. We had 26 men wounded, 13 taken prisoners, and 12 killed; consequently all the generals in the Crimea would have been puzzled how to re-form us.'

* General Scarlett afterward explained that he meant 'among the last of the first line' which he (Lord Cardigan) commanded in person.—*Letter to Colonel Calthorpe, 1st May, 1863.*

XXI.

RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICES OF GENERAL WILLIAM FERGUSSON BEATSON.

Entered the Bengal Army in 1820.

Being on furlough, he, with sanction of the British Government, served with the British Legion in Spain, in 1835-36, first as Major, afterward as Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding a regiment, at the head of which he was severely wounded.

For services in Spain received Cross of San Fernando from Queen of Spain; and Her Britannic Majesty's permission to wear it, September 12, 1837.

Returned to India in 1837, and received thanks of Government of India for capture of Jignee, in Bundelkund, in 1840; and of Chirgong in 1841.

In February, 1844, received thanks of Agent, Governor-General, Scindia's dominions, for recovering, for Gwalior Government, forts and strongholds in Kachwahagar.

In March, 1844, received thanks of Government for volunteering of Bundelkund Legion for Scinde; which volunteering, the Governor-General declared, placed the Government of India under great obligation.

In March, 1845, was mentioned in Sir Charles Napier's dispatch regarding campaign in Boogtee Hills; which service called forth approbation of Government.

In July, 1846, the conduct of Legion while in Scinde, of which he was Commandant, was praised in general orders by Governor-General Viscount Hardinge.

In July, 1848, received approbation of Government of India for taking Jagheer and fort of Rymow from Rohillas.

In November, 1850, recaptured Rymow from Arabs.

In February, 1851, took the fort of Dharoor, one of the strongest in the Deccan.

In March, 1851, the following General Order was issued by the Resident at Hyderabad:—

‘Brigadier Beatson having tendered his resignation of the command of ‘the Nizam’s Cavalry, from date of his embarkation for England, the Resident begs to express his entire approval of this officer’s conduct during the ‘time he has exercised the important command of the Cavalry Division.

‘Brigadier Beatson has not only maintained but improved the interior ‘economy and arrangement of the Cavalry Division; and the value of his ‘active military services in the field has been amply attested, and rendered ‘subject of record, in the several instances of Kamgoan, Rymow, Arnee, ‘and Dharoor.’

Memorandum dated Head-quarters, San Sebastian, March 4, 1837.

For his gallantry in the actions of the 28th of May and 6th of June, 1836, Lieutenant-Colonel Beatson received the decoration of the first class of the Royal and Military Order of San Fernando.

From S. Fraser, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General, August 13, 1839.

A loyal spirit, so creditable to Captain Beatson as their Commanding Officer, pervades the force under his command.

From Captain D. Ross, Agent at Jansi, March 18, 1840.

Commendation of Captain Beatson and the officers and men under his

command for their gallant conduct in overcoming the obstinate resistance at Jignee.

From the Officiating Secretary to Government N. W. P., March 21, 1840.

The thanks of the Government to Captain Beatson for the gallantry displayed in the attack upon Jignee.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, April 6, 1840.

The high satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council with the cool and gallant conduct of the officers and men of the Bundelkund Legion in the attack of the position at Jignee, which his Lordship in Council considers as reflecting the greatest credit on Captain Beatson and the officers who have acted under his authority, in bringing the Legion to its present state of discipline.

From the Secretary to Government N. W. P., May 1, 1841.

The Honorable the Lieutenant-Governor has received the highest gratification from the ability and gallantry displayed by Captain Beatson and the force under his command, in the reduction of that fortress.

From the Secretary to the Government of India, May 17, 1841.

I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council warmly concurs in this tribute of praise to the Commanding Officer and the officers and men of the detachment lately employed against Chirgong; and has been pleased to direct a copy of Captain Beatson's report of his operations to be published in the official Gazette, a copy of which is inclosed. The steady gallantry of the young sepoy of the Bundelkund Legion, emulating that of the older troops employed on the occasion, has been alike creditable to them and to their commandant and other European officers. His Honor is requested to cause these sentiments to be communicated, through the Agent in Bundelkund, to Captain Beatson, and to the other officers and troops engaged in the service.

Extract of Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Sleeman, February 9, 1844.

In conclusion, I beg to offer to you, and the officers and soldiers under your command, my best thanks for the services you have rendered in recovering possession of the forts and strongholds which had been taken by the insurgents from the Gwalior troops.

March 9, 1845.

Honorable mention in dispatch from Major-General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., to the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council.

From the Secretary to Government of India, July 22, 1848.

Approbation of the efficient manner in which Brigadier Beatson performed the duty intrusted to him—that of taking possession of the Jagheer and Fort of Rhymow; and ridding the district of the Rohilla after settling their claims.

Inscription on a Sword presented after the Bundelkund Legion was broken up.

TO MAJOR W. S. BEATSON, late Commander-in-Chief of the Bundelkund
Legion,

From his friends of the Legion, in token of their admiration of him
as a soldier, and their esteem for him
as an individual.--1850.

*From General Sir Charles Napier, G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief in India, Sep-
tember 26, 1850.*

Speaking of Beatson as 'one who did right good service when under
'my command, which I have neither forgotten, nor have I any disposition
'to forget.'

*Extract from General Order by the Resident, on the part of the Nizam's Gov-
ernment, March 10, 1851.*

The Resident begs to express his entire approval of this officer's conduct during the time he has exercised the important command of the Nizam's Cavalry Division.

Brigadier Beatson has not only maintained but improved the interior economy and arrangements of the Cavalry Division; and the value of his active military services in the field has been amply attested and rendered subject of record, in the several instances of Kaingaon, Arnee, Raemhow, and Dharoor.

*The following accompanied the presentation of a piece of Plate from the officers
of the Nizam's Cavalry, after Brigadier Beatson gave up command.*

'We have availed ourselves of this method of testifying our regard for
'you personally, and our admiration of your talents and abilities as a sol-
'dier, under whose command we have all served, and some of us have had
'opportunities of witnessing your gallant conduct in action with the enemy,
'and your sound judgment upon all occasions, when Brigadier in command
'of the Nizam's Cavalry, both in quarters and in the field.'

*Extract from Minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, Sep-
tember 1, 1851.*

I was induced to appoint Major Beatson to the Nizam's service in consequence of the very energetic and able manner in which he had commanded the Bundelkund Legion for two years in Scinde, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Extract of Letter from the Earl of Ellenborough, G. C. B., April 24, 1852.

I remain impressed as strongly now as I was then with a sense of the obligation under which you and your noble legion placed the Government when you volunteered for service in Scinde.

This was the officer who, notwithstanding his lengthened experience, his military rank, and the high commands he had held, was so animated by an

honorable desire to render war-service that he was content to take his part in the campaign with no higher position than that of being attached (with Lord Raglan's consent) to the Staff of General Scarlett. And this was one of the two officers named with high commendation in that report of General Scarlett's which Lord Lucan thought fit to suppress.

XXII.

GENERAL SCARLETT'S STAFF.

Report from General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, October 27, 1854.—(Extract.)

'My best thanks are due to Brigade-Major Conolly, and to my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Elliot, 5th Dragoon Guards, who afforded me every assistance, and to Colonel Beatson of the Honorable E.I.C. service, who, as a volunteer, is attached to my Staff.'

General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, December 17th, 1854.

Remonstrance against the omission of the names of Colonel Beatson and Lieutenant Elliot.

General Scarlett to the Military Secretary.—(Extract.)

'Lieutenant Elliot, till severely wounded in the head, was at my side in the charge, and previously displayed the greatest coolness and gallantry. Colonel Beatson also gave me all the assistance which his experience and well-known gallantry enabled him to do throughout the day.'

Lord Lucan to General Scarlett, December 18, 1854.—(Extract.)

'I did not consider it fitting specially to name him [Lieutenant Elliot] in my report.....I do not consider that it would have been justice toward regimental officers specially to name all Staff officers, and I think that the obvious consequences of such general and indiscriminate* recommendations would be that but little value would be attached to general officers' requests, and that the claims of all would suffer.'

General Scarlett recommended Elliot for the Victoria Cross, and the application was refused on the plea that to charge and fight hand to hand was nothing more than the duty of a cavalry officer.

* Certainly Lord Lucan discriminated, and discriminated, as I believe, without acting from 'favor and affection,' but still so infelicitously that he named and commended in his dispatch his own first aid-de-camp, who had not happened to be in any of the cavalry charges, and (suppressing Scarlett's report) steadfastly refused to allow the name of Elliot to appear, Elliot being a man who had charged at the side of Scarlett, and come out with some fourteen wounds!

XXIII.

The Strength of the body of Russian Cavalry under General Ryjoff which engaged General Scarlett's Brigade.

It is admitted by General de Todleben that the Russian cavalry included in Liprandi's and Jabrokritsky's detachment numbered 22 squadrons of regular cavalry, with a strength of 2200, and 12 'sotnias' of Cossacks, with a strength of 1200, making altogether 3400. Upon the question whether Colonel Jeropkine's six squadrons of 'combined Lancers' formed part of General Ryjoff's force, and also upon the question whether the squadron which advanced against the 93rd Highlanders rejoined the main body before Scarlett's charge, the wording of Liprandi's official dispatch is indecisive. On the other hand, General de Todleben's statement is explicit enough in giving a negative to both these questions; and the General even seeks to cut down the force which engaged Scarlett's dragoons to a strength of 1400: but, as he discloses the cause of the mistake which led him to that conclusion—namely, the mistake of overrating the number of squadrons opposed to Campbell—his error does not mislead. In support of the opinion that puts Ryjoff's force at about 3500, I may state that the body certainly included Lancers (other than Cossacks), and that is a fact which could be well accounted for if the six squadrons of Jeropkine's Lancers were present. As tending to show that the estimate of 3500 might not be excessive, I may mention that an accomplished artillery officer (Colonel Hamley), who would be necessarily well skilled in estimating distances and (by consequence) in inferring the numerical strength of a column, was of opinion that Ryjoff's force must have numbered no less than 6000. I consider that a computation of from about 2000 (or, speaking more exactly, 1900) to 3000 is the highest that could well be made by any one who does not altogether discard the official Russian accounts.

XXIV.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE RECALL OF LORD LUCAN.

BALACLAVA, Oct. 26, 1854.—

DEAR GENERAL AIREY,—I inclose a copy of the order handed me by Captain Nolan yesterday, as desired by Lord Raglan. When his lordship is enabled to give it his attention, I anxiously hope that he will not still think 'I lost the Light Brigade' in that unfortunate affair of yesterday.—Believe me, etc.

(Signed)

LUCAN, *Lieut.-Gen.*

The Quartermaster-General.

Lord Raglan to the Secretary of State, October 28, 1854.—(Extract.)

As the enemy withdrew from the ground which they had momentarily occupied, I directed the cavalry, supported by the Fourth Division under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, to move forward and take advantage of any opportunity to regain the heights; and not having been able to accomplish this immediately, and it appearing that an attempt was making to remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, follow the enemy in their retreat, and try to prevent them from effecting their objects.

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In the meanwhile, the Russians had time to re-form on their own ground, with artillery in front and upon their flanks.

From some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Major-General the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade.

This order was obeyed in the most spirited and gallant manner. Lord Cardigan charged with the utmost vigor, attacked a battery which was firing upon the advancing squadrons, and having passed beyond it engaged the Russian cavalry in the rear; but there, his troops were assailed by artillery and infantry as well as cavalry, and necessarily retired after having committed much havoc upon the enemy.

BALACLAVA, Nov. 30, 1854.

MY LORD,—In your lordship's report of the cavalry action of Balacava of the 25th ultimo, given in the papers which have just arrived from England, you observe that, from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Lord Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade. Surely, my lord, this is a grave charge and imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character.

I can not remain silent; it is, I feel, incumbent on me to state those facts which I can not doubt must clear me from what I respectfully submit is altogether unmerited.

The cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry, when Captain Nolan, the aid-de-camp of the Quartermaster-General, came up to me at speed, and placed in my hands this written instruction:—

Copy.

'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.'

(Signed)

'R. AIREY.'

After carefully reading this order I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it; the aid-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him where? and what to do? as neither enemy nor guns were within sight. He replied in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the farther end of the valley, 'There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns.'

So distinct in my opinion was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aid-de-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance; and to the objections he made, and in which I entirely agreed, I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided against my conviction to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines, and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots Greys and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the spot from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry, in the event of their being pursued by the enemy; and when, having already lost many officers and men by the fire from the batteries and forts, any farther advance would have exposed them to destruction.

My lord, I considered at the time—I am still of the same opinion—that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant-general, doubtless I

have discretionary power ; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my Commander-in-Chief within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position, commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I preferred my own opinion to that of my general, and in this instance must have exposed me and the cavalry to aspersions, against which it might have been difficult to have defended ourselves.

It should also be remembered that the aid-de-camp, well informed of the intentions of his general, and the objects he had in view, after first insisting on an immediate charge, then placed himself in front of one of the leading squadrons, where he fell the first victim.

I did not dare so to disobey your lordship ; and it is the opinion of every officer of rank in this army, to whom I have shown your instructions, that it was not possible for me to do so.

I hope, my lord, that I have stated the facts temperately, and in a becoming and respectful manner, as it has been my wish to do. I am confident that it will be your desire to do me justice. I will only ask that your lordship should kindly give the same publicity to this letter that has been given to your report, as I am sensitively anxious to satisfy my Sovereign, my military superiors, and the public, that I have not, on this unhappy occasion, shown myself undeserving of their confidence, or unfitting the command which I hold.—I have the honor, etc.

(Signed)

LUCAN, *Lieut-Gen.*
Commanding Cavalry Division.

His Excellency the Commander of the Forces.

Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.—(Rec. Jan. 8, 1855.)

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, Dec. 16, 1854.

MY LORD DUKE,—I regret to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Grace the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan.

When I received it, I placed it in the hands of Brigadier-General Airey, the Quartermaster-General, and requested him to suggest to his lordship to withdraw the communication, considering that it would not lead to his advantage in the slightest degree ; but Lord Lucan having declined to take the step recommended, I have but one course to pursue—that of laying the letter before your Grace, and submitting to you such observations upon it as I am bound, in justice to myself, to put you in possession of.

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan complains that, in my dispatch to your Grace of the 28th of October I stated that, ‘from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he ‘was bound to attack at all hazards.’ His lordship conceives this statement to be a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously on his professional character, and he deems it incumbent upon him to state those facts which he can not doubt must clear him from what he respectfully submits as altogether unmerited.

I have referred to my dispatch, and, far from being willing to recall one word of it, I am prepared to declare, that not only did the Lieutenant-General misconceive the written instruction that was sent him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called upon him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the Light Brigade, and unhappily, at the same time, occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it.

In his lordship's letter he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him. He merely says that the cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry.

This previous order was in the following words:—‘The cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry, which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.’

This order did not seem to me to have been attended to, and therefore it was that the instruction by Captain Nolan was forwarded to him. Lord Lucan must have read the first order with very little attention, for he now states that the cavalry was formed to support the infantry, whereas he was told by Brigadier-General Airey, ‘that the cavalry was to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights, and that they would be supported by infantry,’ not that they were to support the infantry; and so little had he sought to do as he had been directed, that he had no men in advance of his main body, made no attempt to regain the heights, and was so little informed of the position of the enemy that he asked Captain Nolan, ‘Where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight?’

This, your Grace will observe, is the Lieutenant-General's own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with, and a repetition of, the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word ‘attack,’ be it observed, was not made use of in General Airey's note) an unseen enemy, whose position, numbers, and composition, he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no steps whatever to watch.

I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack—there was nothing in the instruction to require it; and therefore I conceive I was fully justified in stating to your Grace what was the exact truth, that the charge arose from the misconception of an order for the advance, which Lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards.

I wish I could say with his lordship that, having decided against his conviction to make the movement, he did all he could to render it as little perilous as possible. This, indeed, is far from being the case, in my judgment.

He was told that the horse-artillery might accompany the cavalry. He did not bring it up. He was informed that the French cavalry was on his left. He did not invite their co-operation. He had the whole of the heavy cavalry at his disposal. He mentions having brought up only two regiments in support, and he omits all other precautions, either from want of due consideration, or from the supposition that the unseen enemy was not in such great force as he apprehended, notwithstanding that he was warned of it by Lord Cardigan, after the latter had received the order to attack.

I am much concerned, my Lord Duke, to have to submit these observations to your Grace. I entertain no wish to disparage the Earl of Lucan in your opinion, or to cast a slur upon his professional reputation; but having been accused by his lordship of having stated of him what was unmerited in my dispatch, I have felt obliged to enter into the subject, and trouble your Grace at more length than I could have wished, in vindication of a report to your Grace in which I had strictly confined myself to that which I knew to be true, and had indulged in no observations whatever, or in any expression which could be viewed either as harsh or in any way grating to the feelings of his lordship.—I have, etc.

(Signed)

RAGLAN.

(Copy.)

WAR DEPARTMENT, Jan. 27, 1855.

MY LORD,—I have to acknowledge your lordship's dispatch, dated the 16th December, inclosing the copy of a letter addressed to you by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, and submitting to me observations upon its contents.

Upon the receipt of that dispatch, I felt that the public service, and the general discipline of the army, must be greatly prejudiced by any misunderstanding between your lordship as the general commanding Her Majesty's forces in the field and the Lieutenant-General commanding the Division of Cavalry; but desiring to be fortified in all matters of this nature by the opinion of the General Commanding-in-Chief, I submitted, without delay, your lordship's dispatch, and the letter of the Earl of Lucan, for the consideration of General the Viscount Hardinge.

I have now the honor of inclosing, for your lordship's guidance, an extract from the reply which I have this day (26th January) received from Lord Hardinge, and which has been submitted to and approved by the Queen.

I have, therefore, to instruct your lordship to communicate this decision to the Earl of Lucan, and to inform his lordship that he should resign the command of the Cavalry Division, and return to England.

In performing this painful duty, I purposely abstain from any comments upon the correspondence submitted to me; but I must observe that, apart from any consideration of the merits of the question raised by Lord Lucan, the position in which he has now placed himself toward your lordship renders his withdrawal from the army under your command in all respects advisable.—I have, etc.

(Signed)

NEWCASTLE.

Field-Marshal the LORD RAGLAN,
G. C. B. etc., etc., etc.

(Extract.)

HORSE GUARDS, Jan. 26, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—Lord Lucan, in his letter of the 30th November, objects to the terms used by Lord Raglan in his public dispatch, that his orders for the Light Brigade to charge were given under a misconception of the written order, etc.

He declines to withdraw that letter, and adheres to the construction he has put upon the order, that it compelled him to direct a charge.

The papers having been referred by your Grace to me, I concur with Lord Raglan that the terms he used in his dispatch were appropriate: and as a good understanding between the Field-Marshal commanding the forces in the field and the Lieutenant-General commanding the Cavalry Division are conditions especially necessary for advantageously carrying on the public service, I recommend that Lieutenant-General Lord Lucan should be recalled; and if your Grace and Her Majesty's Government concur in this view, I will submit my recommendation to Her Majesty, and take Her Majesty's pleasure on the subject.—I have, etc.

(Signed)

HARDINGE.

His Grace the DUKE OF NEWCASTLE,
etc., etc., etc.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, February 13, 1855.

MY DEAR LORD LUCAN,—It is with much concern that I fulfill the painful duty of transmitting to you a dispatch which I received yesterday evening from the Duke of Newcastle.

I have anxiously considered how I could acquit myself of this task with most regard for your feelings; and I have arrived at the conclusion that

the best way is to put you in possession of the Minister for War's communication and orders, without reserve or comment.

If you should desire to see me, I shall be happy to receive you at any time that may be most convenient to you.—Believe me, very faithfully yours,
(Signed) RAGLAN.

Lieutenant-General the EARL OF LUCAN.

20 HANOVER SQUARE, LONDON, *March 2, 1855.*

SIR,—I have obeyed Her Majesty's commands to resign the command of the cavalry of the Army of the East, and to return to England; and have now the honor to report my arrival, for the information of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

I consider it due to my professional honor and character to seize the earliest moment of requesting that my conduct in ordering the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaclava, on the 25th October, and writing the letter addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, on the 30th November, may be submitted to, and investigated by, a Court-martial.

I make this appeal to General Lord Hardinge with the greatest confidence, believing it to be the undoubted privilege, if not the positive right, of any soldier to be allowed a military inquiry into his conduct, when, as in my case, he shall consider it to have been unjustly impugned.—I have the honor, etc.

(Signed)

LUCAN, *Lieut-Gen.*

The Adjutant-General.

HORSE GUARDS, *March 5, 1855.*

MY LORD,—I have had the honor to submit to the General Commanding-in-Chief your letter of the 2nd March instant, reporting your arrival in London from the Army in the East, and requesting that your conduct in ordering the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the action of Balaclava, on the 25th October last, and writing the letter you addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan on the 30th November, may be submitted to, and investigated by, a Court-martial.

I am directed by the General Commanding-in-Chief to state in reply that, after a careful review of the whole correspondence which has passed, he can not recommend to Her Majesty that your lordship's conduct in these transactions should be investigated by a Court-martial.—I have the honor to be, etc.

(Signed)

G. A. WETHERALL.

Major-General the EARL OF LUCAN.

HANOVER SQUARE, *March 5, 1855.*

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me that the Commander-in-Chief can not recommend that my conduct should be investigated by a Court-martial.

Until this day I have been kept uninformed of the letter from Lord Raglan, which appears to have been addressed by his lordship to the Minister of War, when forwarding mine of the 30th of November last.

This letter contains entirely new matter, and is replete with new charges, reflecting more seriously than before on my professional judgment and character. There is now imputed to me, and for the first time, inattention to, and neglect of, another order; and again, a total incapacity to carry out my instructions, and to avail myself of the means placed by his lordship at my disposal.

Charges so grave, and of a character so exclusively professional, can not, I submit, be properly disposed of without a military investigation. I find myself, therefore, compelled to express my anxious wish that the Command-

er-in-Chief will be induced kindly to reconsider his decision, and consent to my whole conduct on the day of the action of Balaclava (25th of October, 1854) being investigated by a Court-martial.—I have the honor, etc.

(Signed)

LUCAN, *Lieut-Gen.*

To the Adjutant-General.

March 12, 1855.

Letter from the Adjutant-General, stating that the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards can not recommend that your conduct on the 25th October should be investigated by a Court-martial.—I have the honor, etc.

(Signed)

G. A. WETHERALL, *A. G.*

Major-General LORD LUCAN, etc, etc.

XXV.

The Nature of the Litigation in the Suit of the Earl of Cardigan vs. Lieutenant-Colonel Calthorpe.

The tenor of the litigation in Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe was of this kind. In his 'Letters from Head-quarters'—a book of which the successive editions appeared in 1856, 1857, and 1858—Colonel Calthorpe had substantially maintained that Lord Cardigan, after leading the Light Cavalry, retreated prematurely, and he had also stated in the same book that Lord Cardigan so retreated without having entered the battery.

In 1863 Lord Cardigan applied in the Court of Queen's Bench for a criminal information against Colonel Calthorpe, and supported his complaint by affidavits which proved that he had not only entered the battery, but had passed on, some way, beyond it.

Colonel Calthorpe being satisfied with the proofs which his adversary had adduced upon this particular point, acknowledged his mistake so far as concerned the spot where Lord Cardigan's retrograde movement began, and declared himself 'satisfied that the Earl of Cardigan entered the Russian 'battery,' but he firmly persisted in maintaining that Lord Cardigan had retreated prematurely;* and in support of that contention, he adduced a mass of evidence which went to show that whilst the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars were in the act of advancing toward the battery, Lord Cardigan rode by, on his way to the rear. Moreover, to show at how early a moment Lord Cardigan had retired, he adduced an affidavit by no less a personage than the Commander of the whole English Cavalry in the Crimea—that is, by the Earl of Lucan.

It was considered that Colonel Calthorpe, having thus partly shifted his ground, could not be allowed, in that suit, to sustain the charge of premature retreat in a new form; and Lord Cardigan was not called upon to refute, if he could, the evidence which had been adduced against him.

So, the change wrought by the litigation was substantially this:† On the one hand it had become clear from the proofs, nay it was even unanimously acknowledged that Lord Cardigan rode into the battery; and the highly favorable comments of the Lord Chief Justice added largely to the advantage thus gained by the plaintiff; but, on the other hand, the substance of

* This he did by formally declaring in an affidavit his adherence to the following passage in his book: 'This was the moment when a general was most required, but unfortunately 'Lord Cardigan was not then present.'

† The actual decision was that the rule obtained by Lord Cardigan must be discharged; but not for reasons founded on any thing that occurred in the battle. The rule was discharged without costs.

the charge which had been brought against Lord Cardigan—the charge of having prematurely retreated—remained still upheld against him as a charge deliberately persisted in by his adversary, and one which now rested no longer upon the mere assertion of an author narrating what he had heard from others, but—upon the testimony of numbers of men who (having at the time of the battle held various ranks in the army from that of the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry down to the private soldier) declared upon oath that they had seen with their own eyes, and heard with their own ears, the things to which they bore witness.

Upon the whole, the upshot of the litigation was that, ostensibly, and so far as concerned the immediate impression of the public, Lord Cardigan was clearly the gainer; and yet by the very process which brought him this advantage he had provoked into existence a mass of sworn and written testimony which, though judged to be out of place in the particular suit of Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe, might nevertheless be used against him with formidable effect in any other contention.

When I had imparted to Lord Cardigan my idea of the state in which his military reputation was left by all this sworn testimony, he caused to be prepared some ‘statutory declarations’ by persons present in the combat, and laid these before me with great numbers of other documents. In fairness, these counter-declarations should be read as a sequel to the affidavits filed in Cardigan *vs.* Calthorpe.*

* Accordingly, if a report of the trial with copies of the affidavits be published, I should wish, in justice to the memory of Lord Cardigan, to have the declarations which were laid before me printed in the same volume.



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